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Abstract
This thesis examines the political responses of urban Tanzanians to the policies of 
economic liberalisation implemented since the late 1980s by the Government of 
Tanzania as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme sponsored by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It also examines their political 
responses to the issue of multiparty politics. The argument is that even though 
Structural Adjustment has been initiated in Tanzania, it crucially needs public 
support to engender the kind of government commitment and capability that is 
required to enable the government to implement it fully. It looks at three categories 
of respondents, those of the urban lower classes, those in the government and party 
bureaucracy and those in the educational and media sectors, who form part of the 
intelligentsia. The analysis is based on fieldwork carried out in the three major 
towns of Dar-es-Salaam, Arusha and Dodoma where open-ended interviews were 
conducted with more than 290 citizens. One wide-spread response to the economic 
hardship, since the early 1980s, has been to work in the informal sector, which 
along with the illegal underground economy, has been termed the Second Economy. 
The responses largely indicate a willingess to put up with the hardships imposed by 
the economic austerity of the liberalisation measures, over and above that caused by 
the economic crisis of the early and mid-1980s. But whether this public tolerance 
will continue in the absence of further short-term benefits is not clear. Also, 
regarding the moves towards political liberalisation and multiparty politics, these 
late-1980s developments are seen as improving governance, with a general feeling 
being that it has served to improve the functioning of the single-party. But clearly 
urban Tanzanians do not feel that more parties means greater democracy. However, 
the related phenomena of ‘disengagement’ from the state and the ‘informalisation’ 
of the economy, with their diversion of state resources including human capital away 
from the formal economy, do not augur well for the future success of structural 
adjustment. If, consequently, growth in the formal sector does not respond to 
structural adjustment as it is intended to, the political legitimacy of the leadership 
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Chapter 1
Introduction : State, Civil Society and Structural Adjustment in Africa
1.1. High to Low Politics : ‘Disengagement’ of Civil Society in Africa
The post-colonial state has been the focus of a considerable amount of 
political scholarship, especially in the 1960s, and for good reason: it remains the 
most prominent landmark on an institutional plane.1 The character of the post­
colonial state in Africa derives in large measure from the character of the colonial 
state - centralised, coercive and bureaucratic.2 As Bayart (1993) writes, the post­
colonial state in Africa was constructed on colonial foundations, as opposed to 
developing ‘organically’ "from the entrails of civil society" (p. 32).3 Thus, Nellis 
(1972) notes that the national elite that came into power in Africa "was thoroughly 
accustomed to legally strong, hierarchically organised and centralised and 
economically-intensive governing systems" (pp. 12-13). But in addition to all the 
formal attributes of the colonial state, the post-colonial state was no longer 
accountable to colonial powers, giving the impression of almost limitless power. But 
as Chabal (1992, pp. 79-80) notes, this power was largely illusory. For, while on
1 "States possessed governments, bureaucracies, armed forces, police; they ran schools, hospitals, 
dispensaries, postal services and airports; they controlled marketing boards and trade licences; they issued 
communiques and made political statements; they had representation on international bodies like the United 
Nations (UN) or the Organisation o f African Unity (OAU). In short, states were visible and 
understandable" (Chabal, 1992, p. 69).
2 See also Gann and Duignan (1967), Diamond (1988), Chazan (1988) and Chabal (1992). Diamond 
(1988), referring to the work o f Gann and Duignan (1967) writes that "the colonial legacy was not only 
authoritarian but also statist, going on to note that "the colonial powers imposed extensive state controls 
over internal and external trade in their African colonies, and in the later stages o f  colonisation, this 
intervention broadened and deepened" (p. 7). See also, Young, 1988.
For Bayart (1986), civil society in its classical sense does not generally exist in Africa since "deep 
cultural, religious, linguistic rifts preclude its formation" (pp. 118-120). Chabal (1992) observes like 
Bayart that "the state in Africa is an excrescence in that it did not as in Europe or Asia, grow organically 
from and against civil society" (p. 73).
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the one hand much was expected of the new states - thus creating enormous new 
commitments for the new leaders, on the other, it had access to much smaller state 
resources - given that many colonial sources of income had to be abolished in the 
wake of independence and given that the new state could not access the extra­
national resources that the colonial power could furnish to its colony.
In response to these new challenges, most new post-colonial states in Africa 
chose ‘statist’ modes of development - thus entrusting their bureaucracy with hugely 
expanded administrative tasks, centralised power further and increased the role of 
patronage.4 The state was also seen to be the locus of economic power and access 
to state resources was a prized accomplishment, whether through the bureaucracy 
or through political means, direct or indirect - i.e., through patron-client networks. 
As Diamond (1988) writes, "[bjoth for its resonance with socialist and 
developmentalist ideologies and for its obvious utility in consolidating power, and 
accumulating personal wealth, this legacy of statism was eagerly seized upon and 
rapidly enlarged by the African political class after independence". Caught between 
financial constraints and mushrooming demands on state resources, the state chose 
to spread itself thin by expanding and accommodating as many as possible. The 
state, in other words, was ‘overdeveloped’ (Alavi, 1971; Leys, 1976) and 
‘predatory’ (Lai, 1984; Bates, 1981).
But while ‘overdevelopment’ carries the connotation of state dominance, the 
power of the state was illusory to the extent that effective administration was 
severely hampered by dwindling finances - due to the demands of the patrimonial 
state - and the threats to its political legitimacy implicit in any attempt to cut or 
reduce these patron-client relations. The fear of political threats to its leadership and 
the inability to effectively govern have led to the portrayal of the post-colonial state 
in Africa variously, ‘weak’ (Folley and Rothchild, 1983; Migdal, 1988), ‘soft’ 
(Forrest, 1988; and Lai, 1987), a ‘lame Leviathan’ (Callaghy, 1987), ‘omnipresent
4 Chabal (1992) thus observes that patronage was "the most convenient and effective means o f  
government" (p. 177).
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1but hardly omnipotent’ (Chazan, 1988) and a ‘quasi-state’ (Jackson, 1990).5 Thus 
Diamond (1988) writes "[t]he typical African state may be described as ‘swollen’, 
in that it is at once both too large and too weak" (p. 20), A weak state, Foley and 
Rothchild (1983) point out is confronted simultaneously with a variety of severe 
problems including economic scarcity, a decaying economic and social structure, 
decline of regulated inter community relations, a deep cleavage between state and 
society, insufficient state legitimacy and inadequate state coercive power. Yet 
typically, the state has resorted increasingly to coercion and authoritarianism to 
protect itself. Thus Mazrui (1983) describes the state as "excessively authoritarian, 
to disguise the fact that it is inadequately authoritative" (p. 293). Bayart (1986) 
writes that the post-colonial African state expanded, "developing in and upon 
society, multiplying its specialist apparatuses, subjecting populations to its control, 
criss-crossing the territory it occupied and finally subjecting the activities of society 
to its control" (p. 112).
This description clearly militates against the centrality accorded to the state 
in the ‘modernisation’ theory that developed in the 1960s (and which still continues 
today) which take the state to be the central organ to maintain social harmony, 
political and economic well-being and to foster development and nation-building 
(Almond and Coleman, 1960; Apter, 1965). Even the radical notion of the state that 
followed implicitly endorses the centrality of the state (see, for instance, Alavi, 
1972; Ake, 1981; Skocpol, 1980).6
Political analyses since the mid-1970s interpreted political events in Africa 
focussing on the political institutions of the state. When society was brought into the
5 To Jackson and Rosberg (1982), the African state is merely a recognised territorial unit within 
the international community. They are in fact skeptical about the African state meeting an empirical 
definition o f  the state based on its ability to exercise control (enforce laws, policies and regulations) over 
the people in the territory under its jurisdiction. They also attribute its survival to its juridical identity in 
international law and willingness o f other states to recognise it and prop it up, rather than to its intrinsic 
political legitimacy. It is in this context that Jackson (1990) feels that the ex-colonial states in Africa are 
"still far from complete" (p. 2) in terms o f empirical statehood and he thus terms them ‘quasi-states’.
6 The international dependency can be seen as an outgrowth o f class structural analysis like Amin 
(1976), Ake (1981), Saul (1979), Sklar (1979), Shivji, Mamdani (1976) in that it (i) depends on Marxist 
class theory and (ii) it locates domestic power in the formal apparatus o f the state. Pluralists spoke o f  
various groups vying for control over state resources while Neo-Marxists saw the contending 
parties/groups in terms o f class differences and sought to show how the new state apparatus became a 
vehicle for new class formation.
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1analysis it was merely to explain why the state did not function properly. It is since 
the 1980s that works of political scientists like Hyden (1980), Klein (1980), Azarya 
and Chazan (1987), MacGaffey (1987) and Lemarchand (1988) has shifted the focus 
to civil society and the ways in which civil society has been coping with the state.7 
In a significant attempt to redefine politics, Leftwich (1983) observes that the state 
constitutes only one of the many possible foci of socio-economic and political 
exchange. In other words, as Bratton (1989) argues, politics, power and control are 
not necessarily coterminous with state or public domain and, as Chazan (1988) puts 
it, "power vectors and the search for empowerment take on different meanings in 
this context" (p. 123). Thus, Chabal (1992) notes: "As the interpretative capacity of 
state-centred conceptual frameworks has decreased over time, it has become quite 
evident that political scientists have been led astray by the mirage of high politics: 
constitutions, parties, governments, parliaments, ideology, etc." (p. 82).
From this perspective of ‘low politics’, Chabal (1992) argues that the chief 
characteristic of the African post-colonial state is its "drive for political and 
economic hegemony" (p. 81), and the extent to which it has been fulfilled has 
depended crucially on the politics of civil society. To Chabal thus, the nature of the 
African post-colonial state "derive[s] in large measure from the nature of civil 
society and its mode of coexistence with it" (p. 82). Such an approach has 
occasioned a plethora of society-based studies focused on survival strategies in the 
changing economic and political circumstances, like the informal economy, and on 
the "internal dynamics of socio-economic relations in small-group settings" (Chazan, 
1988, p. 122). Such society-centred approaches, "do not consider participation in the
n
Although originally civil society has been used as a "generic term for society and the state" now  
it is used to refer to "organisations and institutions in the contemporary social order which are separate 
from and find expression in their relationship to the state". Whereas the state is "identified with a legal 
and institutional apparatus ... civil society denotes patterns o f association (such as interest groups, 
professional bodies, membership organisations) which are customary and spontaneous and not necessarily 
dependent on the law" (Healey and Robinson, 1992, pp. 160-1).
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state as axiomatic or necessarily desirable" (id.).8
Indeed, a feature of civil society dynamics in contemporary Africa is its 
‘disengagement’ from the state, where ‘disengagement’ refers to "a tendency to 
withdraw from the state and to keep it at a distance from its channels as a hedge 
against its instability and dwindling resource base" (Azarya, 1988, p. 7). 
Disengagement is thus manifest as a skepticism concerning the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of state action and thus is popular evasion, a move away from the state- 
cash nexus to subsistence economy or to parallel or black market smuggling 
activities, etc.9 But a withdrawal from the state, or disengagement, need not be 
absolute, whereby state education and social services are still attractive. The 
assumption of disengagement is that the state is not always "the most desirable 
magnet" for social action and that it constitutes "one of the many poles for social 
and economic exchange" (Azarya, 1988, p. 18).10
Although thinking in terms of incorporation into or disengagement from the 
state focuses attention on various groups and sectors in civil society as they respond 
to what the state achieves or is unable to achieve, this focus must not detract from 
the obviously-overwhelming presence of the state in Africa. It is the repository of 
international aid and investments, of political, military and other such (diplomatic) 
support and internally, its extractive resource base and regulatory function is
Because o f the fear o f political authority citizens increasingly stop using what Hirschman (1970) 
calls their "voice option". To him "voice is nothing but a basic portion and function o f any political 
system, known sometimes also as ‘interest articulation’" (p. 30). Although Hirschman also uses the notion 
o f an "exit option", it is basically as an economic concept (i.e ., exit from market demand when prices 
rise). Hyden’s powerful thesis o f the ‘uncaptured peasantry’ introduced the explicitly political notion o f 
an ‘exit option’ o f  citizenry from the state arena. See also Bratton (1990).
9 See Azarya and Chazan (1988) for varied formes o f disengagement. But Azarya recognises that 
some forms o f disengagement like parallel markets have "some sort o f official collusion" (p. 8). For 
Azarya, secessionists activities, civil wars, regional separatism come within the ambit o f  disengagement 
though he does not see military coups, strikes, demonstrations and assassinations as part o f disengagement.
10 In contrast, Azarya (1988) defines ‘incorporation’ as "the process whereby large segments o f the 
population associate with the state and take part in its activities in order to share its resources" (p. 6). 
Incorporation may manifest itself in population migration from rural to urban areas and from remote 
regions to economic and communication centres. It may include greater receptivity to mass media and an 
influx o f  immigrants from neighbouring countries. More specifically economic manifestations are an 
increase in the production o f goods and services, a larger wage labour force, greater commercialisation 
o f agricultural products and the emergence o f new forms o f entrepreneurship, encouraged and subsidised 
by the state.
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significant. As Azarya (1988) puts it, what needs to be realised and not 
underestimated is that despite this Leviathan-like character of the state, "segments 
of society manage to maintain patterns of behaviour which are at variance with the 
state codes ... They hold on to their ways of life with greater tenacity or devise new 
forms in response to though not necessarily in accordance with state action ... [and] 
are quite successful in circumventing the greater power and determination of state 
leaders." (p. 18).11 The centrality of the state in political analysis thus is slowly 
being lost with doubts being cast on the state’s role in fulfilling economic and social 
aspirations. With the blossoming non-formal socio-economic and political activities - 
there is much movement between the official and the unofficial, public and private, 
rural and urban - resulting in a "precarious balance between state and society" 
(Chazan, 1988, p. xi) and this has ushered in a shift in the "centre of political 
gravity" (id.).
A concept that attempts to incorporate this perspective and balance the actors 
is that of governance (a concept that the Carter Center of the Emory University of 
Atlanta, and, more specifically, Richard Joseph, Michael Bratton and Goran Hyden, 
have sought to popularise among Africanists). The basic idea is that political power 
is vested outside the government as well, and, as a result, the government is forced 
to make concessions and bargains with different sections of society in order to 
maintain its political support base and legitimacy.12 Hyden (1989, 1992), thus, goes 
beyond the performance of governments to the social roots of authority, pointing out 
that governance is "characterised by reciprocal behaviour and legitimate relations of
11 In this context, Ndulu (1985) writes, "[although the bulk o f the population is politically 
immobilised, their power is implicitly acknowledged and the regimes cater clientelistically to some o f their 
demands (through amenity provision) while assuring that these pressures do not reach levels requiring 
severe structural reform" (quoted in Young, 1988, p. 59).
12 Hyden elevates ‘governance’ to an "umbrella concept" to define an "approach" to comparative 
politics, an approach that fills analytical gaps left by frameworks that have previously enjoyed prominence 
in the discipline (Hyden, 1989), defining it as "conscious management o f regime structures with a view  
to enhancing the legitimacy o f the public realm" (1992, p. 7). Public realm, to Hyden, encompasses both 
state and civil society. He emphasises that "the state is not the sole harbinger o f political power" (Hyden, 
1992, p. 6). Governance, to him, "does not imply as government does, that real political authority is 
vested somewhere within the formal legal institution o f the state. Nor does it imply, as the term leadership 
does, that political control necessarily rests with the Head o f State or official leadership elite" (id.).
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power between governors and governed".13
1.2. The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa
Although through the 1960s and 1970s the World Bank endorsed significant 
government intervention in the economy in order to foster development, it radically 
altered its views in the 1980s with the onset of economic crises in many African 
countries (e.g., World Bank, 1981). Its reaction to the increasing balance of 
payments and budgetary management difficulties arising from diminishing export 
earnings, increasing burdens of debt servicing and inappropriate domestic policies 
was the formulation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The underlying 
assumption in these programmes devised by the IMF and the World Bank was that 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa will only be resumed by a contraction of 
state activity and development of liberalised markets.14 Thus, the measures within 
the reform programmes include, producer price reform, reform of subsidies, 
liberalisation of internal and external trade, new foreign exchange systems (i.e., 
severe devaluation), introduction of cost-sharing for previous state services and the 
restructuring of government institutions.
The implementation of these largely technical economic prescriptions were 
the conditions on which financial assistance was to be advanced to African 
governments in the early 1980s. The IFIs however were consciously politically 
neutral playing a merely supervisory role in the reform process. But with the 
deepening economic crisis in Africa, the view of the IFIs became more 
interventionist, with attention shifting to legal and political reform in recipient 
countries in order to create a congenial environment for liberalised growth (Toye,
i a
Hyden (1989) notes that ‘governance’ differs from rule’ because rule does not presuppose 
legitimacy.
14 The IMF and the World Bank are together referred to as International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs).
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1992; Beckman, 1992; Jeffries, 1993).15
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, however, are not the 
only international bodies interested in guiding African development and neither is 
their approach to the development problem unique or original.16 In the specific 
context of the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Africa (e.g., UNECA, 
1989), which advocates a needs-oriented, self-reliant, participatory and (more 
recently) environmentally protective development strategy for Africa, Sandbrook 
(1993) notes that "[ajlthough the World Bank has borrowed some of the rhetoric of 
human-centred development since 1989, the ECA nonetheless advocates far more 
radical change than that envisaged by the international financial institutions" (p.
135). In the context of the ‘African alternative framework’ to orthodox SAP 
formulated by the UNECA in 1989, Sandbrook (1993) observes that, "whereas the 
World Bank advocates opening up the African economies to global market forces, 
the ECA contends that it is largely the external dependency of these mono-cultural 
economies that accounts for their lack of dynamism" (p. 136). Also, he notes that 
the Lagos Plan of Action (April, 1980) formulated by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, endorses ECA’s focus, 
namely that the continent should "replace its export-led development model with a 
more inward-looking self-reliant thrust ... although economies which continue to 
produce primary commodities for traditional export markets, would progressively 
achieve greater self-sufficiency in food and manufacturing production" (ibid., p.
136), By aiming for ‘collective reliance’, Africans would "break their excessive 
dependence on external markets, investment and technical expertise ... [and] 
producers would realise economies of scale in the expanded market" (id.). But
15 Jeffries (1993) writes that "[h]aving barely started to implement such reforms, however the 
[World] Bank was by 1989 beginning to shift its emphasis towards ‘governance’ in a much broader sense, 
calling for ‘political renewal’ including a ‘pluralistic institutional structure’, a free press and respect for 
human rights" and further, that "[subsequently, the Bank has o f  course joined bilateral donors in tacitly 
tying its assistance to evidence o f political liberalisation" (p. 26).
16 For alternatives to the World Bank/IMF view on development in sub-Saharan Africa, in 
particular, UNICEF’s Adjustment with a Human Face (1986-1987), the ‘Africa’s Priority Programme for 
Economic R ecovery, 1986-1989’ o f the OAU in 1985, the ‘UN Programme for Action for African 
Economic Recovery and Development’ o f 1986 and the ECA Report o f 1989, see Loxley and Seddon 
(1994), pp. 490-493.
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Sandbrook notes that, "unfortunately, however, African governments who endorsed 
the Lagos plan largely ignored their policy commitments in the 1980s" (id.). The 
structural adjustment programme of the international financial institutions, thus, 
remained the only viable practical alternative.
The move from conditional financial assistance to the formulation of the 
structural adjustment programmes followed the acceptance of Lipton’s (1977) thesis 
of ‘urban bias’ which held politically powerful urban coalitions responsible for 
diverting state resources hitherto to the detriment of the rural constituents. The 
assumption underlying the structural adjustment is that such reform would lead to 
a redistribution of income in favour of groups that have been discriminated against 
by the prior policies of these governments. Bates (1981) and Lofchie (1975) attempt 
to show how the distribution of power in post-colonial Africa affected agricultural 
growth and rural incomes, arguing that rural poverty is a product of discriminatory 
trade and pricing policies. To them, the urban political coalitions that shaped 
developmental policies in the 1960s and 1970s did not represent peasant interest and 
were also contradictory to those of industrialists, workers and political elites whose 
profit margins would fall if, for instance, farm prices were to be raised. The urban 
political coalition according to Pletcher (1986) was maintained through price 
controls, food subsidies, and state-run marketing boards. Hence, a conscious anti- 
urban bias was build into these structural adjustment programmes.
SAPs with their concomitant redistribution of income and fundamental 
changes in the way the state operates pose economic and political problems for the 
governments, as acknowledged by the World Bank, when it argues: "underlying the 
litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance. Because 
countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many countries have served 
their own interests without fear of being called into account. In self-defence, 
individuals have built up personal networks of influence rather than hold the all- 
powerful state accountable for its systematic failure ... The leadership assumes broad 
discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy. Information is controlled and 
voluntary associations are coopted or disbanded. This environment cannot... support 
a dynamic economy." (World Bank, 1989a, pp 60-61).
In essence, the IFIs considered the failure of public institutions is a "root
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cause" of Africa’s weak economic performance. The quality of government has 
deteriorated, it was argued, with "bureaucratic obstruction, pervasive rent-seeking, 
weak judicial system and arbitrary decision-making" (WB, 1989a, pp. 60-62) and 
"a deep political malaise stymies action in most countries" (p. 192). SAP thus cannot 
function without a well-functioning state and the retreat of this state is essential as 
a strategy for liberating civil society and "empowering the people" (WB, 1989a 
quoted in Beckman, 1992, p. 85). Political reform, to bring about democratic 
government, was necessary to provide an adequate enabling environment for 
structural adjustment.
But as Beirsteker (1990, p. 488) points out, the SAP’s emphasis on a 
diminished role of the state "has political implications both for domestic relations of 
production (between capital and labour as well as between foreign, local and state 
sectors) and ultimately for the position of countries in the international division of 
labour ... [and also has] significant long term implications for the choice of 
development strategy". SAPs, thus, involve a major re-alignment and, as Gulati 
(1990) points "the development coalition ... underpinning the existing edifice of 
policy will have to be altered" (p. 77). In fact, the programme means that the 
leaders relate to their constituents in "an entirely new way" (Herbst, 1990, p. 10). 
It involves major curtailments in the ability of the state and leaders to provide 
patronage.
Thus, the reason why the World Bank has felt obliged to enter into questions 
of political theory is because it has doubts about the capacity of the African state to 
"handle resistance" to SAP. Resistance to SAP, according to the Bank, emanated 
from narrow self-seeking elements, "the vested interests that profit from the present 
distorted incentives and controls" (WB, 1989a, p. 192),17
The implementation of structural adjustment programmes thus can be said to 
imply a ‘state-sponsored disengagement’ (Bratton, 1989) in the form of drastic
Nevertheless, Beckman (1992) feels that "the Bank seeks to boost this capacity (to "handle 
resistance") not by addressing the objections o f the opposition but by seeking to undercut its political and 
ideological legitimacy" (p. 87). Further, Beckman feels that, contrary to the World Bank view , it is 
resistance to SAP and not SAP itself that breeds democracy. Thus he says that "SAP can be credited with 
having contributed to this development [rise of democratic forces], not because o f  its liberalism but 
because o f  its authoritarianism (Beckman, 1992).
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austerity measures to curb imports and to reduce government spending - which is in 
direct contrast to the first phase of African statehood, stretching from Independence 
to recently, which was the state-centric era of the ‘engagement paradigm’ when state 
consolidation was manifest in state-intervention in the economy, apparently to 
cement patron-client relationships, with "paradigmatic examples" being the 
blossoming state enterprise, agricultural price policy and import regimes (Herbst, 
1990, p. 950). And civil society reacts to such state policies in a myriad of ways 
which can ultimately threaten the political legitimacy of the ruling polity.
Driven by the declining real income, urban households (including 
professional classes) have sought multiple income-generating activities (Mustafa, 
1992). Some have functioned clandestinely to avoid heavy taxation or rigid price 
controls to meet consumer needs for goods and services that the state can no longer 
provide (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). The 1980s have thus been a period in 
which informal enterprises and informal organisations have sprung up all over Africa 
- the former to secure personal incomes and the latter to protect the welfare and 
interests of members as state-provided social services have deteriorated or collapsed. 
In the process of increasing levels of autonomous economic activity, the provision 
of services outside of the state and the evolution of new mechanisms for popular 
interactions with law-enforcement agencies, the bureaucracy and politicians, a 
weakening of the authority and influence of the African state has been inevitable.18 
It is in this context that Sandbrook (1986) asks "[w]hat will hold these societies 
together when the rulers have little in the way of patronage to distribute?" (p. 330).
Hyden (1992) lucidly captures the dynamics of state and civil society in the 
context of structural adjustment when he writes:
In return for political acclamation and quiescence, leaders promised 
to improve mass living standards. But state elites ultimately violated 
reciprocal norms by taking arbitrary decisions, by failing to deliver 
goods and services and by diverting public resources to private ends.
Also, the partial abdication of sovereign authority for policy-making
18 Informalisation poses a number o f problems for political systems that hitherto functioned on the 
assumption that the formal sector was not only a motor o f economic growth but an indicator and an 
regulator o f  economic performance, a means o f satisfying the political expectations o f  significant social 
groups and a means o f  ensuring that most social and political transactions could be centrally monitored 
or controlled.
21
to the World Bank and the IMF undercut rather than bolstered 
political legitimacy of incumbent state elites. In such a situation, the 
citizens have been emboldened to exercise their rights of non- 
compliance: at first they disengaged by retreating into informal 
activities, later they re-engaged in political dialogue with the state, for 
instance, through popular protests.
Whether or not it was international pressure or internal pressure that finally 
led African governments to accept Structural Adjustment is, however, a moot point. 
Contrary to the popular radical view, Bratton and van De Valle (1992) say that 
African governments introduced economic reforms primarily in response to 
indigenous demands. They agree with Loewenthal’s assessment in the context of 
Latin America and Southern Europe, namely, "although international factors may 
condition the course of [regime] transition, the major participants and dominant 
influences in every case have been national" (p. ix, 1986).19 If these domestic (or 
civil society) forces are indeed that powerful, then what implications do the 
dynamics of civil society have for the continuation of structural adjustment policies 
and for the nature of the state in contemporary Africa?
Concerning the impact of structural adjustment programmes on the political 
structure of the concerned country, there are those who perceive in the economic 
crisis and adjustment a means for strengthening civil society, and thus 
democratisation - the intermediary process being economic and political 
informalisation (Bratton 1989, 1990; Lemarchand, 1988; Azarya and Chazan, 1987; 
Rothschild and Chazan, 1988; Diamond, 1988). There is an optimism about 
"deepening democratic traditions ensconced in local political cultures" and the 
emergence of "alternative institutions and patterns of interaction, separate from those 
that have developed in the formal arena" (p. 130; Chazan, 1988).
This is a perspective shared by the World Bank, who see SAP as 
strengthening civil society against the corrupt and inefficient bureaucrats and 
politicians who formed part of the state that oppressed civil society. However, as 
Beckman (1992) notes it is not so much the policies of SAP as the reaction of civil
19 Others who have analysed pressures from within society include Chabal (1986), Diamond, Linz 
and Lipset (1988) and Fatton (1990).
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society to these policies that have promoted the search for indigenous methods of 
self-preservation and representation.
Nevertheless civil society appears to have become more active in its 
‘disengagement’ from the state. Although the demands of various groups within it 
have received a better hearing through the process of ‘informalisation’, it is not 
entirely correct to conclude that this has led to ‘democratisation’ or even that all its 
effects have been positive, for power relations and exploitation may be located 
within civil society as well.20 MacGaffey (1983) says that "the expansion of the 
second economy has provided a means for class formation outside the state since it 
offers opportunities for capital accumulation independent of the state". She goes on 
to note that "the various activities of the second economy has been one source of the 
opportunities for capital accumulation that has resulted in the emergence in recent 
years of a small commercial middle class of substantial business owners ... [who] 
have invested in productive as well as distributive enterprise and in real estate; ... 
enjoy a middle class lifestyle ... are giving their children a secondary and even a 
university education ... [and] are thus reproducing themselves as a class" (pp. 382-
3).
Coming to the question of changes in political systems as a result of 
Structural Adjustment, it is true that a multiparty system and elections cannot really 
be taken as a true indicator of democracy and does not guarantee either a well- 
functioning polity or economic progress. In fact these failed in the early 1960s 
(Ghana, Nigeria, etc.) in Africa and there is little a priori reason to believe that they 
will succeed in the 1990s if just their form is adopted.
In order to answer these questions, however, one needs to see the African 
economic and political reality in terms of a complex set of overlapping and 
underdetermined structures, forces, alliances, traditions and ideologies. It takes more 
than conventional theoretical assumptions to understand the way gains and losses are 
distributed among different social groups. This study attempts to evaluate the effects 
of structural adjustment policies on concrete social and political structures from this
90  »Thus, Lemarchand (1988) states that "class formation may also take place on a substantial scale 
outside the state, a point which emerges with reasonable clarity from the works o f  Reginald Green and 
Janet MacGaffey" (p. 165).
23
perspective in the specific context of Tanzania.
1.3. The Structure of the Analysis
The analysis begins, in Chapter 2, with details of the analytical framework 
used to view the information gathered on the political responses of particular sections 
of civil society in urban Tanzania and the methodology used to elicit the responses. 
It also briefly explains the concentration on urban Tanzania. This is followed by a 
detailed introduction in Chapters 3 and 4 to the economic and political background 
of structural adjustment in Tanzania. This, it is felt, is essential to the understanding 
of the context of the political responses discussed subsequently.
The three empirical chapters of the analysis deal with three major groups 
within the civil society of urban Tanzania, namely, the urban lower classes - both 
the lower levels of government and workers in the informal sector, the bureaucracy 
and the intelligentsia - consisting of University staff and students as well as 
mediapersons. Each of these chapters begins with a brief description of the section 
of civil society it evaluates and the relationship of the sample canvassed to the group 
which it is supposed to represent. This is followed by a discussion of the specific 
features of the Structural Adjustment Programme that affect that category of 
respondents and the measures they have taken either in response to the crisis or SAP 
itself in terms of secondary income-generating activities. The main focus, however, 
is the political responses of the respondents in that particular group of urban civil 
society.
A final concluding chapter draws these threads together and discusses the 
possible implications of these responses for the future of Structural Adjustment 
Policies in Tanzania and for the future of the Tanzanian state.
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Chapter 2
The Frame and Method of Analysis
2.1. Introduction
In order to evaluate the political response of urban Tanzanians to the impact 
of the government’s policies of structural adjustment, a framework and method of 
analysis are necessary. This chapter discusses these and also explains the urban focus 
of the thesis besides presenting the methods used in collecting the data on political 
responses and the order of the following chapters.
The implications of the political responses can be divided into two: the 
impact on the capability of the government to complete the structural adjustment of 
the Tanzanian economy and the implications for political reform, from single-party 
governance to effective multipartyism. But of course economic reform, political 
response and political reform are dynamically inter-related, all three being influenced 
by the economic crisis that pre-dates the attempts at reform.
The next section discusses the urban focus of the analysis, partly justified by 
the fact that the ‘urban bias’ thesis - introduced by Lipton (1977) and applied to the 
African context by World Bank (1981) and Bates (1981) - is an important guide to 
the (anti-urban interests) orientation of SAP, and partly because finances constrained 
a study of rural political response. The third section discusses the appropriate 
framework for the analysis of the dynamic relationship between economic reform, 
political response and political reform. The work of Nelson (1988) and of Mosley, 
Harrigan and Toye (1991), highlighting the factors necessary for politically effective 
and sustainable structural adjustment, is the main source of the frame of analysis. 
The fourth section presents the methodology used in the survey of urban political 
responses.
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2.2. The Political Significance of the Urban Sector
Michael Lipton’s (1977) powerful polemic against the ‘urban coalition’ 
undermining development and efforts to alleviate poverty, originally in the Asian 
context, has influenced thinking about structural adjustment in Sub Saharan Africa. 
Lipton argues that the main reason why urban interests appear to benefit significantly 
from the development process at the expense of rural areas is because of the bias of 
political and economic power towards urban as opposed to rural ‘class’ interests. 
This urban bias is manifest, according to Lipton, in the form of excessive 
industrialisation, distorting trade regimes, failure of redistributive tax strategies, 
neglect of agricultural investment and virtues of primary health care compared with 
modem curative medicine. In an oft-quoted passage, Lipton writes: "The most 
important class conflict in the poor countries of the world today is not between 
labour and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national interests. It is between 
rural classes and the urban classes" (p. 12) In a more-compressed summary article 
in 1982, Lipton presents a most forceful case for the urban-bias thesis thus:
"In essence, the urban bias hypothesis is that the main reason why 
poor people stay poor in developing countries is as follows:
Small, interlocking urban elite - trade union leaders and a supporting 
staff of professionals, academics and intellectuals - can in a modem 
state substantially control the distribution of resources. In the great 
majority of developing countries, such urban elite spearheaded the 
fight against the colonising power. Partly for this reason, urban elites 
formed and have, since independence, dominated the institutions of 
independence - government, political parties, civil service, trade 
unions, education, business organisations and many more. But the 
power of the urban elite, in a modem state, is determined not by its 
economic role alone but by its capacity for organisation and control.
Hence urban power in developing country by comparison with early 
modem development in England in 1740 to 1820 or somewhat later 
in continental Europe - has been out of all proportion to the urban 
share in either population or production. Rural people, while much 
more numerous than urban people, are also much more dispersed, 
poor, inarticulate and unorganised. That does not make them 
quiescent, but it does diffuse their conflicts. On the whole rural 
groups fight locally. Nationally they seek to join or to use urban 
power and income, not to seize that power and income for the rural 
sector." (p. 66)
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Although Lipton acknowledges the heterogeneity within the two main
concepts of his thesis, rural and urban classes - with classes in each sector treated
as broad block interests - he attributes even this intra-class differentiation to the
urban bias. He thus writes:
"Inequalities within rural areas also owe much to the urban-biased 
nature of development policies. The cities want to receive preferably 
food, surpluses of savings over rural investment; foreign exchange for 
industrial development, surplus of ‘human capital’ in the shape of 
rural bom doctors, teachers, engineers and administrators, as children 
brought up largely at rural expense but who as adults serve largely 
urban needs; who, in the rural areas, can provide such surpluses? 
Provide a small farmer, meeting ... half his family food needs, with 
the extra irrigation, or improved health, or the educated knowledge, 
to grow more food, and his family will consume the grains. Provide 
similar inputs to a large farmer and the resulting output will be sold - 
and the receipts very probably served for re-investment in urban 
activities. This, too is inefficient (as well as inequitable), because it 
is a small farmer who saturates each acre, each kilogram of fertiliser, 
with more effort and thus grows more output per acre-year than the 
large farmer. But it is the large farmer who gets all the goodies. That 
is the ‘urban alliance’. The towns get their cheap surpluses, food, 
exportables, etc., even if not made very efficiently and equitably" 
(Lipton, 1982, p. 68).
In essence, articulate and literate urban classes exert powerful influence to 
induce underdevelopment through price twists, the allocation of subsidies, credit, 
investment opportunities, health and education facilities.
"Resource allocations within the city and the village as well as 
between them reflect urban priorities rather than equity and 
efficiency. The damage has been increased by misguided ideological 
imports, liberal and Marxian, and by town’s success in buying off 
part of the rural elite and thus fragmenting most of the cost of the 
process to the urban poor" (Lipton, 1976, p. 13).
Such an urban bias results in the concentration of education resources, 
fertiliser, health services and other farm inputs in urban areas with rural people with 
strong urban links also benefiting, albeit, at the expense of the urban and rural poor. 
It is this systematic positive bias towards the urban people that Lipton sees as the
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main factor that keeps poor people poor.21
Bates (1981) further advances the work of Lipton by extending it into Africa 
and ‘deepening’ it by "concentrating more fully on the political process behind the 
formation of agricultural policies"22 Although Bates (1981) explicitly acknowledges 
the influence of the external environment, he argues that the urban bias is 
" [significant in determining the] pattern of development in the developing countries 
as well as significant in shaping the impact of external environment on the structure 
of the local societies" (p. 8).
For Bates (1981), thus, the foremost social objective of governments in 
developing countries is to shift the basis of their economies away from agricultural 
commodities and towards the production of manufactured goods and it is this 
objective that strongly influences their choice of agricultural policies. Agricultural 
price policies and rural taxation are designed to capture resources from rural 
agriculture and move it into urban industry and services. This was manifest in the 
dirigistic state apparatus, trade and exchange control, state owned banks and 
industries, trading corporations with monopolies of agricultural export crops and 
food procurement agencies. Bates stresses the personal motive behind animate 
political choices. Governments, to stay in power, appease powerful urban interests - 
new industrialists and manufacturers and the bureaucracies that administer the 
market - and discriminate against rural interests via price- and income-based 
policies.
9 1 Lipton’s thesis has been challenged on empirical, conceptual and theoretical grounds. Political 
theorists like Corbridge (1982) find the concept o f urban and rural ‘classes’, defined on the basis o f a 
common ‘class’ interest, unconvincing - since some social groups (e .g ., the rural elite) could be assigned 
to either group in terms o f  ‘class interest’. Dependency theorists like Wallerstein, quoted in Shaw and 
Grive (1977), find the lack o f theoretical emphasis on external forces in the allocation o f  domestic 
resources equally unconvincing. For Griffin (1977), it is a "bizarre situation in which the people who 
control over half o f the land in rural areas counted as beneficiaries o f urban bias, whilst the people who 
accounted for over half o f  the labour force in urban areas are assigned to rural classes and suffer from 
urban bias" (p. 109) while, empirically, Sen (1977), Das Gupta (1977) Williams (1981) and Toye (1992) 
report that there are, in fact, no unified ‘class’ interests in the developing countries that they study. 
Indeed, Mitra (1977) finds evidence for a ‘rural bias’ in the 1960s experience o f  Indian development. 
Lipton’s (1989) response, however, is that while the urban-bias hypothesis may not explain the persistence 
of all Third World poverty, instances where it does not are generally exceptions to the rule.
22 For Bates agricultural policy consists o f "governmental actions that affect the incomes o f rural 
producers by influencing the prices these producers confront in the major markets which determine their 
incomes" (1981, p. 3).
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Like Lipton, Bates argues that the power of the urban interests to organise 
and to articulate their demands works as a direct pressure on the government policy, 
since the high political costs of urban food price inflation forces the government to 
‘buy’ social peace through policies to lower urban food prices. But, at the same 
time, returning some of the earnings from taxing agriculture to a select few in the 
form of farm input subsidies imposes collective deprivation while conferring 
selective benefits which, Bates notes like Lipton, enables the government to divide 
and rule the rural sector effectively.
This line of argument is also perceptible in the 1981 World Bank study 
entitled Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1981) which 
identifies persistent anti-agricultural bias as the ‘chief policy error’ of African 
governments and which forms the conceptual basis for the anti-urban bias evident 
in the design of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Structural adjustment, thus, is apparently aimed at reducing rents accruing 
to urban interest groups and benefiting rural interest groups, wherever possible.
A focus on urban political response, thus, is perhaps more appropriate than 
a purely rural focus - although the best option obviously is an analysis of the 
responses of both rural and urban interest groups. This last, however, is outside the 
scope of the present study and hence the focus is on urban interest groups and their 
political responses.
2.3. Framework of analysis
The fundamental questions of this thesis, i.e., what political responses have 
government policies of structural adjustment evoked in urban Tanzania and what 
implications do these have for further economic and political reform in the country, 
requires a framework or structure within which to examine the relevant factors. And 
it is useful in this context to look at some of the literature on this issue. Of the 
studies of the factors influencing the politically effective and sustained 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), Nelson (1988) and
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Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1991) (hereafter MHT) are of direct interest.23 These 
are examined in greater detail below.
Nelson (1988), sees the political sustainability of SAPs as the dynamic 
outcome of three related factors:
(a) the strength of the political leaders’ commitment to the programme;
(b) the capability of political leaders to implement reforms; and
(c) the nature of the political response that the programme evokes from 
politically influential groups.
To her, these interact dynamically to influence the political consequences of 
the programme. Given the present emphasis on implementation, the focus will be on 
the first two while the extent to which the third affects the rest will be played down, 
for the moment. Political responses will be looked at in greater detail in a later sub­
section.24
It is useful to distinguish between initial and continuing commitment, the 
former referring to the pre-implementation period and the latter to the post­
implementation period of economic reform. Initial commitment to certain or all 
policies of a structural adjustment programme, Nelson points out, can come from 
two different sorts of sources. It can be bom of duress, from the desperation of a 
rapidly-worsening economic crisis. But such commitment will fade if any aspect of 
the situation becomes less desperate (such as, for example, a rise in price for a 
major export commodity). On the other hand, commitment can come from a positive 
preference by political leaders for economic reform, either because it is consistent 
with the leaders’ own goals or ideological leanings or because they perceive that the 
possibility of personal or political advantage outweighs the risks of failure. Nelson 
thus feels that "the strength of leaders commitment is determined by the perceived 
margin o f advantage, that is, the degree to which the expected results of stabilization
23 For an elaboration o f the view taken by Nelson (1988), see the three volumes o f  a collaborative 
research project on the politics o f adjustment published as Nelson (1989), Nelson (1990) and Haggard and 
Kaufman (1992). For a critical view o f their analytical framework, see Jenkins (1995). These are 
discussed further in the concluding chapter.
24 It is nonetheless true that some initial assessment o f potential political response would have been 
made by political leaders who may have gone in for reform. The responses mentioned in (c) are therefore 
interim responses to the programme, before it is fully implemented, which would affect the pattern of 
future implementation through their impact on factors (a) and (b).
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are preferred to available alternatives" (1988, p. 88, emphasis in the original).
This reasoning implies that doubts about the economic benefits of SAP 
measures seem to play a major role in the delay in adoption or the vacillating or half 
hearted implementation of measures. Scepticism on the part of political leaders - 
either stemming from limited understanding of the economic logic of reform 
measures or deep-rooted statist, anti-market biases casting doubt on the ability of the 
profit motive to be socially constructive, at least in the particular institutional setting 
- is a deterrent to strong commitment. But initial commitment alone is no guarantee 
of continuing commitment or of effective implementation. Both depend on the 
dynamic interplay of the capability of the government to implement its policies 
effectively and the effects that these policies have on its support base, via the 
political response of the public through the various interest groups and opposition 
parties that operate in a polity.
Given commitment, the capability of the leaders to implement reform is 
significantly influenced by the scope and nature of their political support base. The 
concept of support base is not identical with popularity, Nelson points out, since 
popularity fluctuates and can rise or fall whether or not SAP was pursued. For 
Nelson, the term refers instead to groups bound to the regime by more durable ties 
of ethnic identity, ideological compatibility, ingrained party loyalties and\or patron- 
client networks (to name the major kinds of links). Thus, while the popularity of any 
government broadly depends on its ability to maintain conditions under which most 
of the population can prosper, patron-client parties rely much more explicitly and 
directly on a continuing stream of favours and benefits flowing directly from the 
patron to his designated client, rather than reaching (all) parts of the population as 
a result of the impersonal operation of institutions and policies.
Every political system, including those in Africa, has its patron-client 
networks, although the degree of dependence varies; in some cases, it may only be 
a minor element while in others it may be central to the political existence of the 
governing elites {inter alia Chabal, 1992; Bayart, 1993). In countries in which the 
government relies heavily on patron-client ties, therefore, structural adjustment 
policies (particularly stringent budget discipline) that move away from direct controls 
and towards greater reliance on market mechanism, including more realistic pricing
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among the public and parastatal sectors, therefore can adversely affect not only the 
general popularity of a government but at the resources needed to maintain its 
political support base.25
Bates (1981) lends support to this general theme by pointing out that if a 
politician’s main means of building and maintaining support is the direction of jobs, 
contracts, licences, foreign exchange, subsidised goods and services and other 
benefits to his (or her) political friends and away from political enemies, he cannot 
lightly relinquish such control to price mechanisms that can not distinguish supporter 
from opponent. Thus, not only vested economic interests and ideological leanings 
but also the very structure of political support mechanism become obstacles to 
economic reform involving decontrol.
MHT evaluate the factors affecting the implementation of SAPs in three 
African countries, Kenya, Ghana and Malawi, as part of a nine-nation study from 
different parts of the world. From this study, they derive four distinct (but not 
mutually exclusive) hypotheses or factors affecting the successful implementation of 
SAP.
1. Authoritarian Government: Authoritarian governments (characterised by the lack 
of regular elections for representative assembly and Head of State and the non­
existence of the freedoms of press and personal expression) are more likely to be 
strongly committed to adjustment and capable of being better performers than 
democratic ones.
2. Newness o f the Government : Newly-formed governments (that is, change of 
political leadership before the adoption of SAP) are likely to be better adjusters than 
governments of long standing, reflecting the adage that ‘the new broom sweeps 
cleanest’.
3. Intensity o f Prior Crisis : A greater intensity of the economic crisis predating SAP 
(i.e., the extent of worsening of economic conditions) directly affects the adoption 
and implementation of reform policies, the latter being characterised by an ethos of
Patronage, as Chabal (1992) points out in the case o f the post-colonial African state, furnished 
the most convenient and effective means o f government but with its increased institutionalisation, it greatly 
reduced the scope for effective administration.
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a conscious understanding of adjustment policy instead of an apathetic acceptance 
of government policy.
4. The Dominance o f the Pro-Reform Group : The commitment to reform results 
from a struggle between pro- and anti-reform interest groups in the country, with the 
pro-reform (with the help of external elements like the IMF and the World Bank) 
becoming politically dominant.
A further factor they consider important is the competence of the bureaucracy 
of the government implementing reforms.
However, not all of them are unequivocally verified empirically. In the 
context of the study of three sub-Saharan African countries, Kenya, Malawi and 
Ghana, MHT find that all three are more authoritarian than democratic; all three are 
instances of widely ranging "newness"; and the country with the deepest economic 
crisis, Ghana, recorded the most success in implementing SAP. But, as the authors 
themselves admit, only the second appears to be true in all cases. New regimes often 
count on a brief "honeymoon" during which much of the public is willing to suspend 
adverse verdict and adopt a ‘wait and see’ stance towards policy changes. A broad 
consensus that fundamental changes are needed increases receptivity to the 
government technique of persuasion. Public faith in the honesty and efficiency of the 
government plays a major role here.
While the direct relationship between the intensity of the preceding economic 
crisis and the implementation of reform is reversed in the other (non-SSA) countries 
that MHT examine, the other two hypotheses cannot be proved or disproved even 
in the context of the three SSA countries that MHT examine.
For one, while Ghana does seem a strong supporting example for the link 
between crisis and commitment at first, even in the non-African countries that MHT 
discuss, the success rate was greater in countries which did not have an especially 
severe shock to living standards at the start of the 1980s.
Secondly, all three countries have differing degrees of authoritarianism and 
dictatorship, and hence the hypothesis cannot be disproved and hence tested. Thus, 
the view of one World Bank writer that "a courageous, ruthless and perhaps 
undemocratic government is required to ride roughshod over these newly created
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special interest groups" (Lai, 1983, p. 33) is not empirically validated at least in the 
case of the three SSA countries that MHT examine.26
And lastly, while it is a tautology that commitment is bom out of a political 
dominance by pro-reform groups within the country, the composition of the anti­
reform group was surprising. MHT found that most recalcitrant vested interests in 
the path of economic liberalisation, which have the power to frustrate certain kinds 
of economic reform (e.g., maize marketing in Kenya, parastatals and large holding 
companies in Malawi personally owned by former President Banda), were in 
agriculture rather than in the industrial structure, despite the policy reform being 
ostensibly aimed at removing the urban biases which disadvantaged rural producers.
But an important additional factor considered by Toye (1992), is the quality 
of the administrative services available to the implementing government. In his 
general overview of structural adjustment, a visible factor determining the 
differences in the implementation record of governments committed to SAP was the 
administrative skills of the bureaucracy.
Synthesising these arguments suggests that the factors influencing the actual 
implementation of economic reform can be grouped into two broad categories:
(i) factors affecting a government’s initial and continuing commitment to reform 
- including (a) the anticipated and actual effects of reform on the political 
support base, more specifically, on the composition of the pro- and anti­
reform interest groups within society; (b) the degree of external support, both 
political and financial, that the government could count on, before and during 
reforms; and (c) the ‘newness’ of the political regime; and
(ii) factors affecting government capability - including the feedback effects on the 
government’s support base of the implementation of the policies, the external 
support base, the skills and efficiency of the bureaucracy, and/or an 
authoritarian regime.
The overlap of certain factors into both categories is because these factors
26 Diamond 1988, p .25 points our that "authoritarian regimes have been no more (often less) 
effective than democratic ones" and goes on to say that authoritarianism has been "repeatedly rejected" 
as a "premise o f  government" (p. 26).
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affect both government commitment and government capability. Without domestic 
political support for continuing reforms, for instance, a government may not be able 
to either commit itself to reform or carry out such reforms effectively. Whether or 
not these are necessary or sufficient factors (conditions) for commitment or 
capability, however, is entirely dependent on the contemporary political context.
There thus appear to be five basic elements of a (dynamic) framework for the 
present analysis:
1. the factors determining the implementation of the various government 
policies of structural adjustment, which, in turn, determines the actual impact 
of such policies on the public at large;
2. the factors determining the perceived impact of SAP measures, including 
actual impact and the subjective evaluation of impacts on other groups;
3. the varying capacity to translate such perceptions into political action - which 
ultimately determines political response;
4. the likely outcomes of the feedback impact of the political response of the 
public on the implementation of future policies of structural adjustment
5. the implications of these political responses for the nature of the political 
process itself.
In the present context only the last four facets are of direct importance, since the 
implementation of policy itself is taken as the starting point for the field survey. The 
question of urban political responses and their possible implications for SAP and for 
the nature of state-society relations is dealt with in greater detail below.
2.3.1. Determinants of Political Response
While the actual policies implemented may be evaluated in terms of their 
relation to targets or the problems they were designed to overcome, evaluating the 
political response of the public to these policies is a much more complex task. There 
are two essential complications. First, the implications of actually implemented and 
potential policies of structural adjustment vary across individual and social groups, 
not only in actual fact but also in terms of perceptions. Such perceptions are
35
subjective, being influenced by a variety of factors, which make evaluations of the 
impact of the policies of structural adjustment extremely difficult. Second, even if 
the perceived impacts were uniform across a set of individuals or groups of 
individuals, the actual political response that results may vary widely, due to 
differences in potential for political expression. Together, they make causal 
connections between impact and response extremely difficult.
But some analysis of possible political response is necessary. And it is true 
that the basic measure is the extent to which social groups gain or lose, or at least 
stand to gain or lose. Prediction on the basis of available information, at least within 
broad limits, is necessary and possible. Only, the margin of error must not be 
understated. The analyses of this thesis are based on this understanding and the rest 
of this sub-section is devoted to detailing the problems that can beset such an 
analysis and the manner in which they have been dealt with.
Differential Impact and its Perception : While structural adjustment programmes are 
specified on the basis of individual policies, the impacts of these are extremely 
difficult to determine for a particular individual or social group, for several reasons. 
First, different aspects of the package can bear differentiy on the same group. Also, 
effects may cumulate for some groups, for example, civil servants may face 
simultaneously increased prices for imported consumer goods due to devaluation, 
declining real wages due to wage freezes, cuts in prerequisites due to budget 
reductions, and frustrating shortages of funds and inputs for the particular SAP 
measures for which they are responsible. Third, the impacts of SAPs on other 
groups may partly offset one another. For instance the producers of export crops 
may gain from an increased external demand for their products but may also have 
to pay more for imported fertilizers and pesticides - both effects resulting from 
devaluation.
Fourthly, the time frame of impact is important. There are measures that 
particularly hit some groups of people in a prompt and a manifest way while 
benefiting others in an indirect and diffuse sort of way. For instance reduced 
protection against imports may put high-cost indigenous producers out of business. 
On the other hand direct gains to consumers and to firms that need the products as
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inputs to their production (hence to workers in such firms and to purchasers of their 
products) are much more dispersed, partly incidental and partly delayed.
But there is no reason why gains or losses need only be monetary. For some 
groups, gains and/or losses may not be primarily material but may involve power 
and authority, security, autonomy, or relative status. Next, the perception and 
interpretation of the individuals also shape their reactions. Nelson (1988) discusses 
four factors that influence the subjective assessment of the impact of structural 
adjustment policies:
1) the attribution for responsibility for losses (or gains) to such forces as
government, foreign creditor, or fate (which can include phenomena such as, 
droughts, floods and other natural calamities);
2) the expected duration of losses, whether short-, medium-, or long-term;
3) the degree of confidence that policies will help to solve economic problems;
and
4) the perceived equity of impact among classes and, in many countries, among
ethnic groups and/or region.
A sustained sacrifice from the public at large and a positive response from 
the private sector entrepreneurs depend on the perception that the program is 
working. Ministry of Finance and Central Bank officials focus on cuts in public 
sector and trade deficits, reduced arrears in payments on foreign obligations, and/or 
increased international reserves. Large and medium sized businesses and the private 
financial community look at the same indicators. Small firms are more likely to 
direct their attention to more immediate tangible concerns, like availability of credit 
and foreign exchange for imported inputs. Workers and consumers’ criterion is the 
improvements affecting their daily lives, for example, availability of staples (maize), 
soaps, textiles, simple medicines, more earning opportunity in the informal sector, 
and regular transport service (buses).
Finally, since governments almost invariably pursue the various elements of 
the SAP policy packages unevenly, gauging implementation raises tricky issues of 
weighting.
But the basic point is that there is no clear one-to-one correspondence
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between the effects of actual policies and perceived impact, as there is not between 
perceived impact and political response.27 Yet an essential starting point to 
comprehend political reactions to SAPs is a rough assessment of gaining and losing 
groups.
Political Responses to Policy Reform : The main interest of the present analysis is 
how urban Tanzanians feel about SAP and what they do about it. Just as what they 
feel about SAP can be influenced by a variety of factors, what they do about how 
they feel depends on another range of factors, an important consideration being their 
differing capabilities for effective political action. For, even individuals and groups 
conscious of their shared interest and to some degree organised may lack adequate 
political resources - including information and contacts, control over economic and 
other assets, numbers, discipline as well as sympathy and support from a wider 
public - to register a politically significant influence.
But an important consideration before discussing the factors influencing 
political response to government policies of structural adjustment is the notion of 
‘group’ interests. As seen earlier, Lipton’s use of the term ‘class’ in outlining his 
concept of urban bias and his sharp critique of the ‘urban coalition’ has itself been 
widely criticised in the literature. The criticism has been directed not only towards 
the formation and existence of such an urban coalition manipulating an urban bias
27 Further, iu terms o f gainers and losers, a case in point is the equity-based argument made in 
favour o f Structural Adjustment, i .e ., its claim to improve income distribution, more to strengthen the case 
than to clinch it. Apart from the fact that factors like interdependence o f formal and parallel markets make 
it hard to quantify the distributional effects, MHT find in their nine-nation study that, in qualitative terms, 
it is unconvincing. They point to rural groups who do not stand to gain, like small crop farmers and 
female agricultural labour who work for wages, as well as urban groups which stand to lose - affected 
by government lay-offs and rising consumer goods prices - including the urban poor (who often move 
back silently to join  the rural poor rather than benefit from the few public works projects laid on to soften 
the blow o f adjustment). Commenting upon the Ghana living standards survey (in 1987) - where not only 
over 80% o f the lowest quantile o f income earners were found to live in rural areas, but so also were 40% 
o f the highest quantile - Loxley (1991) remarks that "when combined with other information from this 
survey, these data caution one against generalising simplistically [ex ante] about urban/rural distributional 
impacts o f adjustment programmes". But these calculations o f political gains and losses were not made 
by the governments themselves but by the promoting agencies. Toye (1992) writes that "explicit political 
calculation seems to be largely absent from the [IMF’s] programmes". Thus, while SAPs were not 
designed to compensate those who were losers in the policy changes, such compensation had to be 
politically engineered by the implementing governments to ensure the acceptability o f the package by the 
various interest groups that operated and who were sometimes crucial to the government’s own political 
support base.
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but also towards the direction of such a bias (see footnote 1).
In their more recent study of structurally adjusting developing countries, 
MHT find no rural or urban interests operating through homogeneous well- 
functioning interest groups.28 For them, large farmers in rural areas can and do 
organise but only to help themselves rather than small family farms, or the landless 
wage workers constituting the poor or the very poor. MHT point out that sometimes 
the large farmers (as in Malawi) help themselves at the expense of the poor 
smallholders. Thus, they conclude that, generally, gainers are organised to support 
reform, but typically farmers as a whole in developing countries do not constitute 
an organised or powerful (vested) interest group.
And in urban areas, MHT conclude that industrialists also do not constitute 
a united interest group (e.g., in matters of trade policy), for, supporters of industry 
are too divided to agree on how and where to create rents and have united mainly 
to support import liberalisation. Toye (1992) also finds the absence of clear evidence 
of the ways in which urban people operate politically as an interest group.
MHT suggest that, instead of looking for ‘urban coalitions’ and interest 
groups to hang the development of dirigisme, it is more plausible to view this as the 
product of centrally-directed patronage politics. ‘Dirigisme’, to them, results from 
an active search by government leaders for support - which may build up either in 
the urban or in the rural sector.29 Such patron-client networks are the focus of the 
study of ‘governance’, which is dealt with in greater detail in the following sub­
section.
But the point here is simply that interest groups may be too rigid a term to 
use for the actual phenomenon of individuals gathering under a banner of common 
interest vis-a-vis another group of individuals or the government. Rather, it may be 
more appropriate to view these as flexible social amalgams, which form and re-form 
as the lines of conflicting interests are re-drawn. The term ‘interest group’ is 
henceforth used in this context-based sense.
0Q
Loxley (1991, p. 41) also feels that the rural sector is highly heterogeneous in its economic and 
social set up and casts serious doubt on the notion o f the rural sector as a unified interest group.
29 See Sandbrook (1986), for the idea that such development is a "top-down" rather than "bottom-up" 
phenomenon.
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In the case of structural adjustment, the backdrop of economic crisis and the 
new austerity measures combine to distribute economic hardship and political 
discontent across society. A broad swathe of the "popular sectors," including 
industrial and informal sector workers, small merchants, and the large and growing 
body of poorly- paid public and private sector service and white collar workers share 
many interests. Moreover many households include formal and informal sector 
workers, further intermingling their concerns. In such circumstances, large-scale 
protests could break out with the original supporting groups being joined en route 
by individuals from a broad spectrum of urban and rural occupational and economic 
strata. Food riots caused by major cuts in food subsidies - as witnessed in Cairo in 
1979, and Tunisia, Morocco, and Dominican Republic in 1984 as also in Chile and 
Zambia in 1986 (where the December 1986 maize price dots were spearheaded by 
mine workers but joined by many from other social classes in the cities) - are a case 
in point.
Thus, even if well-defined coalitions of interest groups are hard to find, it is 
nonetheless true that individuals can unite to express collective political responses 
to the adverse impacts of a policy or a set of policies. And this seems to be the sort 
of response that structural adjustment policies seem to have thrown up so far. But 
then there are several factors that mitigate or enhance such political expression.
At least three factors affect the actual political response of the public even 
after they form an interest group. The first is access to political resources (which 
was mentioned earlier). The second is a more elusive, but perhaps more important, 
factor highlighted by Nelson (1988) - the public mood with respect to economic 
policies. A public mood prepared for economic reform improves the prospects for 
temporary toleration of austerity, a grace period during which the government has 
a provisional grant of confidence. Such a mood is also likely to constrain protest by 
specific groups that might otherwise create serious problems.
The third is the availability of political space. MHT point out that the degree 
to which groups can mobilise themselves is only part of the explanation of the 
effectiveness of an interest group in influencing SAP. This is because a country 
without a free legislature, free press and normal liberal civil rights is much less open 
to interest group influence than one with ‘thicker’ or ‘denser’ institutions in society.
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For example, in Ghana there has been a decline in the avenues for interest groups’ 
sphere of action but this does not mean that authoritarian regimes are more effective 
as economic reformers. It just implies that the power to subvert economic reforms 
is concentrated at the highest levels of the state.
Once the actual political response is determined, the next step is to analyse 
the possible consequences for further economic and political reform of such political 
responses to the government policies of structural adjustment implemented so far.
2.3.3. Feedback Impacts of Political Responses on Reform
There are perhaps two aspects to the political responses of citizens to the 
policies of reform implemented by the government. First, the anticipated political 
response, evaluated even before the policy is implemented; and second, the actual 
political response that results from those policies.
In the case of Structural Adjustment, it is clear that a government will 
commit itself to reform only if it is either forced to - recognising painfully that the 
economic and political costs of failure to act are probably greater than the cost of 
action - or if it perceives a ‘margin of advantage’ (Nelson, 1988). The political cost 
of such action is usually that the public is likely to attribute to the government the 
responsibility for economic hardships that would have occurred (perhaps even more 
acutely) in the absence of these policies. For this reason, politicians are likely to 
view adoption of SAP measures as accelerating or accentuating public reaction to 
economic hardship and focusing those reactions on the government itself instead of 
on exogenous forces such as ‘insatiable’ foreign creditors.
Even if it decides that the political benefits are worth the costs, and opts for 
reform, the actual political response could be substantially greater than those 
anticipated. Such an outcome could have serious consequences for the political 
legitimacy of the government possibly leading even to a fall from power. The crucial 
factor here is the actual political response that the implemented reforms elicit from 
politically formidable groups - such as civil servants, military officials, organised
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labour, teachers, professionals and university students.30
The core political problem with a Structural Adjustment Programme that must 
be sustained over several years is usually that these groups are precisely those that 
must bear substantial losses. These are the groups whose living standards have 
moved out of line, most seriously, with what the country can afford. A great deal 
of burden is put on bureaucratic capabilities to plan and implement reforms, even 
when some of these reforms are intended to reduce government intervention in the 
economy. Both the public and private sector are insufficiently trained or experienced 
as entrepreneurs to take charge of the transformation into a market-based economy. 
SAP thus generates an atmosphere straining the very limits of managerial capacity. 
Adopting SAP could, therefore, intensify the political risks inherent in an already 
tight economic situation. This adverse political response could ignite political 
opposition not only on grounds of increasing economic hardship, but also on 
ideological grounds related to ‘external manipulation’ and ‘government capitulation’.
This could be one explanation for the activities of a government that decides 
to opt for SAP and then target politically powerful categories of people, both within 
and outside the state sectors, for the most vigourous explanation and nationalistic 
(patriotic) appeals. For if actual exceeds anticipated political response to the extent 
that it undermines the government’s political support base, it could well lose power 
due to its adoption of the economically rigorous SAP.
This is all the more reason to view political responses within the context of 
‘governance’, i.e., the dynamic relationship between rulers and ruled (Hyden; see 
Chapter 1, section 1.1).
To summarise, the analytical framework to be used in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis is as follows. The factors determining the implementation of 
reforms, i.e., those determining government commitment and capability, are only 
discussed briefly in Chapters 3 and 4, with attention being focused on the political 
responses of different groups in society to the policies already implemented. On the
TO The term interest groups often connotes private sector groups. In less developed countries, these 
may not be organised or influential enough to exert much pressure. However, civil servants and officials 
o f public corporations - including the military - constitute potentially crucial interest groups, not only 
because o f their organizational awareness and control over important assets but also because o f the absence 
o f powerful private interest groups.
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basis of these, the possible implications for future economic and political reform are 
discussed, keeping in mind the fact that the government and the various interest 
groups in society are engaged in a dynamic political dialogue.
The next section details the methodology used in collecting data on urban 
political responses in Tanzania.
2.4. Methodology
Three aspects of the methods used to collect the data are discussed in the 
following sub-sections: Firstly the characteristics of the sample vis-a-vis the 
population of respondents and in relation to the purposes of the present study; 
secondly the format used in data collection; and finally the biases inherent in the 
sample.
2.4.1. The Sample of Respondents
The present analysis examines urban political response in three of the largest 
urban centres of Tanzania - Dar-es-Salaam, Dodoma and Arusha - and was carried 
out between March and August 1992. These three urban centres are in coastal, 
central and northern Tanzania, respectively, and are important for several different 
reasons. Dar-es-Salaam is the present capital and the main centre of coastal entrepot 
trade. Dodoma, set in the arid central zone of the country, is the future capital of 
the country and already houses many of the important government offices (such as 
the Prime Minister’s Secretariat). And Arusha on the north-eastern border with 
Kenya is the major tourist town of the country, the starting point of safaris into the 
important national parks, including Serengeti (the world’s largest safari park) and 
Ngorongoro (the world’s largest intact volcanic crater).
The sample of urban political respondents are broadly divided into three: (1) 
the urban informal sector, including petty shopkeepers, street vendors and transport 
operators), lower sections of administration (secretaries and other clerical staff); (2) 
political and party functionaries (i.e., from the CCM), trade unionists and 
bureaucrats - civil servants and other officials in government offices, banks and
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parastatal organisations at the national and regional levels; and (3) the intelligentsia, 
in the form of staff and students (drawn largely from the University of Dar-es- 
Salaam) and the media. The following Table give a category-wise breakdown of the 
sample.





D odom a Arusha Total
Urban Lower 
Classes
Informal self-employed 40 20 26 86
Lower Echelons of 
Administration
21 12 14 47
Intelligentsia
University Students 40 7 10 57
University Teaching Staff 12 - - 12
Mediapersons 5 - - 5
Bureaucracy Regional and Central 
Government Officials
12 8 8 28
Political & Party 
Functionaries
Party Leadership 21 10 8 39
Trade Unions 8 6 6 20
TOTALS 159 63 72 294
The sample could, in theory, be further delineated in terms of criteria like 
sex, age, social status and income groups, but some criteria do not seem to be strong 
delineators in the case of our sample.
Of the total of 294 respondents, about 37% of the respondents are women, 
72% of whom are from the informal services sector (mainly market women, hair- 
braiders, bar-keepers, etc.), the rest being from party cells, lower echelons of 
administration (e.g., secretaries, personal assistants) and from the intelligentsia. 
Interestingly, women were conspicuous by their absence in the bureaucracy.
Age-wise, there is a considerable difference in the sample respondents 
although within specific categories, the age-differential varied. While the bureaucrats 
were largely between 40 and 55, political leaders were between 30 and 50. The 
teaching community was generally younger, from about 35 to 45 with the students 
of course being younger (although they appeared older than the average in most
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western Universities). The lower echelons of administration were between 25 and 
35, although the informal sector workers ranged widely from 15 up to around 50. 
The effect of these age differentials on the responses could not, however, be 
explicitly accounted for.
No distinction is made on the basis of ethnic origin because family, village, 
church and national identities have served to make Tanzania an ethnically 
homogeneous nation.31 Although there are more than 120 different ethnic groups 
and cultures, ties of language, political ideology and now familyhood (with a high 
rate of ethnic inter-marriage) have dissolved the ethnic boundaries between tribes 
and cultures and it is relatively well-known now there are hardly any regional 
concentrations of ethnic groups (see, for example, Hyden, 1968).
Income differentials and social stratification also did not appear to be 
substantial, but there would appear to be a demarcation between the intelligentsia 
and the political & party functionaries on the one hand and the lower administrative 
classes and (purely) informal sector workers on the other.32 While the opportunities 
of academic privileges like subsidised housing and foreign travel would be the 
obvious source for the improvements in lifestyle for the intelligentsia, it must be 
stressed that a more important factor than mere formal income earnings is the 
increased opportunities for informal activities and the differential access to such 
opportunities (i.e., those with more initial resources could embark on more paying 
side-line activities) that have arisen with the rise of the informal economy (as 
described in the previous chapter).
3 1 Hyden’s description o f the design o f questions for his survey between 1964 and 1965 is especially 
illuminating considering the period: "When structuring these questions, however, w e only used those 
alternatives, which had been offered to us in the course o f  the pre-testing, in order to avoid the creation 
o f alternatives, which did not exist in the minds o f the interviewees. We wanted, for instance, to know  
which institutions in society that the adults considered most important for which they wanted to teach their 
children to work. The answers which came out in the course o f the pre-testing indicated "the nation", "the 
family", "the village" and "the church". No mentioning was made o f  "the tribe" or the "chiefdom" (1968,
p. 261).
32 This seems to accord with findings concerning income differentials in the country as a whole. 
The ratio o f  income disparities having reduced from 27 : 1 to 9 : 1 in the mid 1980s - in contrast to 
neighbouring Kenya where it stood at 40 : 1 at the end o f the same period (Cheru, 1989, p. 46).
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2.4.2. Data Collection Methods
In gathering information on political response, three methods were used. 
First, informal open-ended personal interviews and conversations with various 
strata/categories of urban dwellers structured around a set of questions (a complete 
questionnaire-based approach would have necessitated further complications 
regarding government research clearance). Second, Presidential Commission 
Reports, other government reports and pamphlets, and research publications by the 
Economic Research Bureau (ERB), Planning Commission and the University of Dar- 
es-Salaam - such as the Tanzania Economic Trends (hereafter TET), Uchumi (in 
Kiswahili), UDASA Newsletters, Tamuli etc. And third, national and local daily 
newspapers, the Daily News, Business Times and Family Mirror, from January 1990 
to August 1992.
Survey interviews in the University of Dar-es-Salaam served as a pilot study. 
On an average, due to proximity, all in the campus, about 4-5 interviews could be 
conducted in a day, each lasting between 20-25 minutes for the younger respondents 
and over 45 minutes for older respondents (who hedged and clarified their stance 
time and again before answering the question in full). But stress was laid on the fact 
that the first meaningful reaction would be recorded and not changes in the original 
answer, unless they had not comprehended the question itself the first time around.
Many informal conversations with staff at the Eastern and Southern African 
Universities Research Programme (ESAURP) and those from the University of Dar- 
es-Salaam added information and insights prior to the actual interviews. Professor 
Maliyamkono at ESAURP provided the initial link and also acted as mediator in the 
process of gaining a formal research clearance. Interacting with many of the 
ESAURP researchers informally was quite fruitful and being affiliated to Professor 
Mohammed Halfani at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of 
Dar-es-Salaam, facilitated contact with other University departments like Political 
Science and Economics.
Thereafter, interviews were conducted in the three towns of Dar-es-Salaam, 
Arusha and Dodoma. Nearly all interviews of bureaucrats were conducted in fairly 
open-ended and informal though confidential manner since the interviewees preferred
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to remain anonymous. Although this procedure does not appear to be common in 
political science, in comparison to cultural anthropology - where it is accepted 
practice, it was done because the nature of the issues being discussed warranted 
some protection of respondents’ identity.
The questions spanned three sets of issues: the changes in the household 
economic situation of this group in the period post-SAP (i.e., post 1986); the 
measures undertaken as part of the recent liberalisation ; and attitudes towards the 
CCM and towards the idea of a change in the political system. The responses to 
these questions (and related extended questions) and personal observations have been 
coupled with relevant literature on similar trends observed in urban Tanzania to 
present an overview of the activities and political response of this category.
The distinction between direct and indirect impacts, although understandable 
in abstract theoretical terms is somewhat more difficult to maintain in actual 
interviews. Responses to specific SAP measures are conditioned as much as by the 
direct impact, i.e., the impact on personal economic situations, as by a more 
removed third-party view of the SAP measure, i.e., the impact on the welfare of 
other members of society - including, the point of view of others within the same 
peer group, of people in other sectors of the economy, or even that of the 
government and the nation as a whole. Consequently, no rigid distinction is made 
between responses to direct impacts and those to the wider and more indirect impacts 
of the various SAP measures discussed.
Eight measures of SAP are discussed: (1) the increase in the price of essential 
commodities; (2) and (3) the increased and easy availability of foreign commodities; 
(4) the easy availability of second-hand clothing; (5) the imposition of user fees for 
education; (6) government control of salaries; (7) the creation of private property 
rights in land; and (8) the formation of new cooperative societies.
Official timings dictated the scheduling of most interviews. Government 
officials could be contacted only during the official working hours - from 7.00 a.m 
to 2.00 p.m. - party and trade union personnel, shopkeepers and other employees 
could be found almost all day and till late in the evening. One consequence of this 
varied accessibility is that the number of respondents in each category is not the
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same.
But whereas the routine in the University was more flexible in general 
because of the proximity of research subjects and the informality of the interviews, 
the interview schedules in the case of the other categories of respondents was often 
forced into flexibility because of the rather cavalier attitude to appointment times that 
characterised government offices in urban Tanzania (although it might be fair to say 
that this is common to most government offices). Despite prior appointments, 
therefore, contingency schedules had to be drawn up almost always and frequently 
an interview was possible only after 2 or 3 appointments had been made (and 
cancelled). In general, interviews lasted from between 30 minutes to an hour.
A general difficulty was that despite being hospitable and willing to spend 
time, many of the respondents were unwilling to discuss political issues and 
especially to commit themselves on any of these. In the case of many respondents 
in the informal sector as well as the lower echelons of the administration, a local 
CCM ‘ten-cell’ leader had to be found to set up the interview with the members of 
the cell so as to enhance and facilitate the credibility of the investigation following 
initial experiences without such a leader and consequent problems.
The second source of data, government reports and other publications of 
research and University bodies, are available in full only from either the source of 
publication or certain research institutions in Tanzania, such as ESAURP and IDS.
Newspapers and government reports were also difficult to procure both in 
Tanzania and thereafter in London. In Tanzania, the only sources of back issues of 
newspapers were the archives of the newspapers themselves and although access was 
possible (though difficult), no photocopying facilities were available. Strangely 
enough, the Kenyan national daily newspaper The Daily Nation was more accessible 
in Arusha than the local Tanzanian papers. Back in London, the only source of these 
newspapers appears to be the Tanzanian High Commission where some limited 
issues are available (albeit not on loan) and, again, no photocopying was permitted.
2.4.3. Biases Implicit in the Analysis
A lack of experience of field work in Africa as well as time and financial
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constraints prevented any more scientific selection of respondents. The sample, 
therefore, is not unbiased but perhaps this is not so unusual. All that can really be 
said in its defence is that the effort of getting rid of these biases was considerably 
more than what the available resources of time, effort and finances would permit. 
Yet, in order to place this data on urban political responses in perspective, the 
sources of bias must be clearly stated.
First, despite the theoretical justifications for concentrating on urban Tanzania 
rather than on rural Tanzania, it is true that only about 20% of the population lives 
in urban areas (Tanzania, 1988). But, outside the party network, the nucleus of 
almost all (other) political activity is in urban areas - including the headquarters of 
the largest rural citizen’s organisation, the Tanganyikan Farmers’ Association (in 
Arusha). Trade union activity, universities and government offices are all 
concentrated in the three towns of Dar-es-Salaam, Arusha and Dodoma. In terms of 
size, however, Dar-es-Salaam is by far the largest, with an estimated population of 
1 million in 1985 (Buren, 1993). Although there are townships larger in size than 
both Arusha and Dodoma, these two are distinguished by the concentration of 
government offices, national and local organisations and/or business interests.
Second, even the reasonably large sample of 294 urban respondents is not 
statistically random, in the pure sense of the concept, but is probably as random as 
is possible in such interview-based data gathering, given the constraints that were 
present.33 Although the sample represents most of the major political interest 
groups in urban Tanzania, the civil service, the bureaucracy, public sector officials, 
professionals, University teachers and students - in itself a fairly broad cross-section 
of the urban population - it is by no means a complete survey of even the total 
number of urban groups that actually exist. The most important omission is of 
course the military.
o*a h t
A statistically random sample refers to a sample selected from a population using a procedure or 
criterion that ensures that every individual in the population has an equal chance o f  being selected. This 
ensures a fair and unbiased representation o f all groups within the population. W hile with secondary data, 
based on exhaustive coverage o f the population (like the Census) a random sample can be picked using 
either a computer programme or a random number table, this is not possible when selecting a sample from 
primary data. At best the researcher can hope to eliminate obvious biases and aim for as representative 
a cross-section o f  the population as possible.
Thirdly, within these categories, the selection of respondents was constrained 
by the availability, willingness to respond and the ability to communicate in English. 
But given the impressive record in mass education (see section 6.2 below), and the 
fact that English is the second language (after kiswahili) in most schools (if not the 
medium of instruction) the use of English in conducting interviews may not be as 
large a source of bias as in other contexts.
The availability of respondents and their willingness to respond, however, are 
perhaps universal features of interview-based data collection and there is little that 
can be done to remedy the bias that it naturally carries.
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Chapter 3
The Political and Economic Context of Liberalisation in Tanzania
3.1. Introduction
The political and economic background to the major changes in the 
development strategy of Tanzania,34 such as the liberalisation measures of the IMF- 
sponsored economic reform being implemented since 1986, is crucial to any 
evaluation of public and governmental responses to such measures. This chapter 
briefly goes over the main political and economic factors that affected Tanzanian 
post-colonial development until the early 1980s, in particular, the deliberate attempt 
to extend the control of the state over the economy and civil society since 1967 and 
the various internal and external factors that led to the economic crisis beginning 
in the late 1970s.
Tanzania was the second poorest nation in the world at the time of political 
independence and had an extensive bureaucratic structure in keeping with its colonial 
pattern of development. The political and economic structures that the newly- 
independent nation inherited from its colonial past, and the main features of its early 
years of development, are briefly described in the following section (section 3.2). 
The impact on the economy and the polity of the formal adoption in 1967 of the 
ideology of ujamaa by the single-party state under President and Party Chairman 
Julius Nyerere is briefly discussed in section 3.3. In particular, this section points 
out the strong nexus between party and state that developed, almost as a consequence 
of the single-party state, and traces the subsequent extension of state control over 
various economic, political and social institutions of the country until the attempts 
in the early 1980s to reduce the state’s role in public decision-making.
34 The country became independent Tanganyika in 1961 and after it merged with Zanzibar in 1964 
it came to be known as the United Republic o f Tanzania. All references to ‘Tanzania’ in the text, 
however, pertain to the mainland, unless otherwise mentioned.
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The performance of the development strategies adopted by the single-party 
state is mixed, with a positive above-average performance in the years until 1977 
and a sharp deterioration thereafter. The causes for this decline have been 
extensively debated and analysts have placed differing emphasis on the internal and 
external factors that are understood to have contributed to this crisis. The economic 
decline and its causes are discussed briefly in the fourth section (section 3.4). The 
final section outlines an important consequence of the economic crisis, the enormous 
growth of informal sector activity, of the parallel or second economy. A concluding 
section ends the chapter.
3.2. From Independence to Arusha (1961 to 1967)
At Independence, Tanzania inherited a large bureaucracy and a legacy of 
extensive state intervention in domestic market activity. This was based on the view 
that the government had to provide social and economic infrastructural facilities, and 
an atmosphere conducive to private investment in agriculture and industry. But 
industries were poorly developed at Independence and what existed either processed 
agricultural commodities for export or produced simple consumer goods for the 
economy (Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986)35This was not only because Tanzania 
lacked an indigenous capitalist class to engage in such industrial development, but 
also because most industrial investment was attracted to the ‘neighbouring periphery- 
centre’ Kenya (Rweyemamu, 1973; Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986).
Agricultural development in the late colonial period had been organised 
according to two parallel approaches, the ‘progressive farmer’ approach, and the 
‘transformation’ approach. The former was commissioned by a visiting World Bank 
Mission on the eve of Independence, and gave priority to the allocation of resources
35 Skarstein and Wangwe (1986, p. 2), note that there were only 20 establishments employing 10 
persons or more and owning fixed assets worth Tsh 20,000 or more. And further, that these, employing 
a total o f  20 ,000 persons, could cater for the livelihood o f only about 1 % o f  the population in 1962 while 
contributing only about 4 percent o f  GDP.
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to those areas, crops and people that promised greatest return.36 The 
"transformation” approach on the other hand sought to promote the introduction of 
new techniques by moving people into empty but fertile land, on the assumption that 
they would be prone to change when finding themselves in new surroundings. As a 
result, these new settlements absorbed substantial capital and manpower resources 
without yielding the expected returns, and without settlers developing a perspective 
of these schemes as their own (Hedlund and Lundahl, 1989).
The government at Independence adopted a strategy of import-substituting 
industrialization, but only to produce simple consumer goods indigenously, on the 
advice of the World Bank (1961) and an expert economic assessment.37 From 1961 
to 1967, through the Three Year Plan (1961 to 1964) and the First Five Year Plan 
(to run from 1964 to 1969, but aborted in 1967), the economy continued along 
colonial lines with little change. The first five year plan, which was supposed to 
cover the period from 1964 to 1969, resembled that of neighbouring Kenya (Hedlund 
and Lundahl, 1989). It was the work of a small group of expatriate (French) 
planners and many failures had resulted from an absence of strong political structure 
in which the planning process could be embedded (Bienen, 1967 and Leys, 1969). 
It lacked political direction, was rushed into existence, and had to be substantially 
revised (Hyden, 1979).
The colonial pattern of agricultural policy continued till 1967, when the first 
five-year plan adopted the World Bank’s "transformation approach" as a strategy of 
agricultural development (World Bank 1961). However, the objective of setting up 
modem African farms in newly-opened settlements proved to be an expensive failure 
and was publicly abandoned in 1966 (Duignan and Jackson, 1986, p. 211). There 
was little significant technological transformation, and the agricultural performance 
recorded was mainly the result of an increase in the acreage of export crops by 
small-holder farmers (Coulson, 1982). The early path, thus, had been "a classic case 
of neoclassical export-oriented ‘dual economy’" (Temu, 1979, p. 200).
36 Temu (1979, p. 199) notes that the Mission (see World Bank, 1961) blamed the deficient 
extension services and extreme conservatism of the peasants for the agricultural stagnation. Cliffe (1971), 
to the contrary, refers to this conservatism as "healthy scepticism" on the part o f the peasants.
37 This was by Arthur D . Little in 1961. See Skarstein and Wangwe (1986).
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During this period, however, the economy grew at an average rate of over 
6 percent per year (Hodd, 1986, Table 1, p. 12) with per capita output increasing 
by about 5 percent per annum. While the agricultural production was generally 
favourable, it was the performance of the industrial sector that was most impressive. 
Value added in manufacturing increased by over 200 percent (Skarstein, 1986, 
Table 1.2, p. 10) while the share of manufacturing in GDP nearly doubled from 4 
to 7.5 percent (Leys, 1973). This phenomenal growth has been attributed to a 
variety of factors including, tax incentives, guaranteeing against nationalisation, 
establishing industrial estates and the publicity given to investment opportunities 
(iinter alia, Skarstein, and Wangwe, 1986; Hedlund and Lundahl, 1989). Further, 
the impressive agricultural and industrial output in the first five years was attained 
without inflation or balance of payments disequilibrium (Lipumba, 1989).
This development path, however, ran counter to Nyerere’s notion of ujamaa 
socialism (Nyerere, 1962; discussed in greater detail in the next section).38 Nyerere 
was not concerned so much about the amount of output generated as much as the 
extent to which such production depended on the external economy and the manner 
in which it was produced and distributed.
Politically, Tanzania was a one-party state, under the control of the party 
under which Tanganyika had gained independence and of which Nyerere was 
Chairman, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). The de facto 
monopoly of TANU over political space in the new state had been ratified early, 
with Nyerere’s call in 1962 for the adoption of a one-party state to foster unity and 
development within the country. This led to a Presidential Commission for a one- 
party political system in January 1963 "to give statutory recognition to the one-party 
system of government in Tanganyika" ,39 Nyerere considered a single-party political 
system the best means to achieve ujamaa socialism, although the procedure adopted
38 Although the idea o f ujamaa had ushered in as early as in 1962, there followed a separation of 
de facto  ideology from practical policy since the implementation o f Nyerere’s programme meant a 
complete reversal o f existing trends.
39 The meeting o f  the National Executive Committee o f  TANU (10th-14th January 1963) authorised 
the President to set up a commission for a one-party which the Annual Conference o f TANU endorsed 
on the 16th o f  January 1963 (Msekwa, 1975, pp. 35-47).
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to legitimise such a system has been criticised.40 As a result, in the Interim 
Constitution of 1965, Tanzania - after the merger between the Union of Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar - became a one-party state.
3.3. Ujamaa and Statism
In practice, ujamaa socialism in Tanzania meant extensive state involvement 
in both economy and society. These have had various effects, including economic 
inefficiency and a high degree of import-dependence which, among others, have 
been held up as causes for the economic crisis that set in during the late 1970s. The 
first sub-section outlines the concept of ujamaa socialism and its reliance on strong 
party and state control. The second and third discuss the major institutional changes 
caused in civil society and the economy, respectively, by efforts to achieve the goals 
of adoption of ujamaa socialism.
3.3.1. Uiamaa and the Arusha Declaration
Inspired by the presumed egalitarian character of the traditional African 
peasant community, Nyerere sought to develop post-colonial Tanzania along the lines 
of ujamaa socialism. The concept of ujamaa (which means ‘familyhood’ in 
kiswahili) was thus based on the central principles of shared work and capital and 
egalitarian distribution, or, in more socialist terms, ‘mass participation’, ‘commonly 
owned means of production’ and ‘equality in distribution’ (Nyerere, 1962).41 The 
interpretation of socialism was particular to Nyerere, however, who considered it 
native to Africa and, in contrast to the traditional Marxist emphasis on the formal
M sekwa (1975) notes that "the discussion leading to the decision to establish a one-party 
democracy in Tanzania was completely internalised within the party and there do not appear to have been 
any extra-party forces o f  influence involved" and also, "a general public discussion invited by the 
Presidential Commission came only after the Party had made the decision...".
41 For a variety o f  interpretations o f ujamaa socialism, see Saul (1972), Parker (1972), Hill (1975), 
Shivji (1976), Mueller (1980), Babu (1981), Cliffe and Mohiddin (1981) and Young (1982).
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means of production, focused on the inherent qualities of the individual.42 Ujamaa 
socialism, thus, emphasised the absence of class divisions, the sharing of work, land 
and assets on a basis of equality and need, underlined the respect for others, the 
importance of common property and the common obligation to work. The goal of 
socio-economic development in Tanzania, to Nyerere, was to restore in modern form 
the traditional African society - or ‘modernisation by traditionalisation’ (Mushi, 
1971). Self-reliance was a conscious choice in the light of the international context 
of post-colonial development. The new Tanzanian nation, thus, could become, with 
suitable plans and policies, the traditional African family and community writ large - 
the ujamaa.
To Nyerere, the (single-party) state guided by the ideology of ujamaa 
socialism was the natural vehicle for this transformation. Such use of an inherited 
capitalist state structure to effect a socialist transformation, it has been argued, 
indicates that Nyerere had "failed to address himself to the question of the state" 
(Othman, 1988, p. 163).43 Political unity was crucial to Nyerere who saw African 
and Tanzanian colonialism as a result of the fatal weakness of a lack of unity. His 
attempt to weave together ujamaa socialism, political structures and economy to 
create a strong state with a unified political culture found political expression 
through the Arusha Declaration of 1967.44
42 The opening line o f the TANU pamphlet in 1962 (written by Nyerere) reads, "Socialism - like 
democracy - is an attitude o f mind ... in the individual, as in the society" (Hedlund and Lundahl, 1989, 
p. 21). They also point out that the "highly individualistic approach to socialism and the way in which 
society should be organised, follows the strong identification with ‘African’ socialism which implies ‘equal 
and natural’ obligations on part o f society and the individual". While this conceptualisation o f  socialism  
has been criticised by extreme left-wing analysts, for example, Nabudere (1977), Tandon (1978) and 
Mukandala (1979), analysts like Boesen (1977), Cliffe (1975) and Shivji (1976) give Ujamaa qualified 
support, placing more faith in the figure o f Nyerere and his ideological commitment than in the theoretical 
foundations o f  his model o f socialism. However, Saul (1972), Szentes (1973), M ushi (1971) and (1981) 
and Pratt and Mwansasu (1978) are more sympathetic to the concept and its relevance.
43 Mawhood (1983, pp. 75 and 105) perceives a continuity in the structure o f  government and 
administration (including the legal system) since colonial times and writes: "Nyerere’s sympathy with 
communal values o f village harmonised rather than contrasted with the British Administration’s own 
preferences. Certainly there was a transformation at the time o f national independence, in the arrival of  
the socialist party to dominate the structure o f government, but structures themselves were modified in 
an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary way and important parts o f them persisted".
44 The major objectives outlined in the Arusha Declaration are to be found in Nyerere (1968a).
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The Arusha Declaration, an ideological statement by the TANU government 
in 1967 and an important milestone in the political development of the Tanzanian 
state, clarified the ideological position of the party and emphasised unity of purpose. 
Three major ways in which the Arusha Declaration sought to promote unity were by 
ratifying kiswahili as the national language, ujamaa as the common ideology, and 
TANU as the single party. Thus, the Arusha Declaration is articulated from the 
point of view of a single party-state - for example: "TANU is involved in a war
against poverty  we have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited
a great deal, and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has 
led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. We now intend to bring about
a revolution " (TANU, 1967). The Declaration thus specified the political, social
and economic goals of ujamaa as well as the nature of the institutional changes 
required to achieve the objectives of ujamaa - collective ownership and control of 
the means of production, mass participation in the work effort and the egalitarian 
distribution of income. Although it talked of the state and the party almost 
interchangeably, it was clear that it was the TANU government that was to 
transform Tanzania from a capitalist dependency into a self-reliant and socialist 
nation. Thus, through all this change the party was to ensure the political legitimacy 
of the state.
Tanzania appears to fit Nettl’s (1968) argument, in the general context of 
Africa, that a low degree, or absence, of ‘state-ness’ - associated with a lower 
capacity of the state to implement developmental policies - causes a single party-state 
to assume a particularly functional role, to become an "engine of authority 
legitimation".45 But in order to do this, the party-state usually had to assume more 
powers for itself and become more ‘statist’. In the present case, this was facilitated 
by the nature of the post-colonial state apparatus and institutions and the legacy of 
extensive state intervention in the economy.46 But given that the state was to be
45 See Nettl (1968), Apter (1965), Myrdal (1970) and Cranenburgh (1990), for discussions o f the 
phenomenon o f  ‘stateness’ in the specific Tanzanian context as well as the more general African and Asian 
contexts.
46 The post-colonial Tanzanian state could be said to be ‘over-developed’, in the tradition o f  Alavi 
(1971).
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guided by the party according to the ideology of ujamaa, the burden of development, 
in the final analysis, was left to TANU.
3.3.2, The Development of the One-Partv State
Nyerere gave two reasons for a single-party political system (Othman (1988), 
p. 160). Firstly, he felt that a multi-party system in a young country could result in 
political differences which might be exploited by external powers intent on 
destabilising the country. A single-party system would help to eliminate the 
substantial ethnic and tribal conflicts as well as religious and class differences that 
existed in the country at Independence.47 Secondly, he felt that a multiparty system 
was a luxury that the new state could not afford, especially given that there were no 
internal economic groups with divergent political programmes to offer or support. 
At that time, such argument was easily acceptable since the number of political 
organisations that had existed previously had performed badly at the elections 
immediately after political independence. The dominance of TANU at Independence 
was, thus, clearly demonstrated and unquestionable (id.).48
The main feature of the development of the TANU party after Arusha is the 
enhancement of its status within civil society, through specific legislation and
47 In 1961 Nyerere abolished chieftaincy and tribal associations with apparently no protest from 
the rest o f  society. However, Nyerere may have used the power and authority vested in him by parliament 
to push for unity o f this kind, Hartmann (1991) notes that Nyerere publicly rebuked Chief Fundikira in 
Parliament in 1963 for requesting special consideration to Muslims. But in hindsight it is clear that from 
a fragmented and disparate collection o f tribes and peoples at Independence (there are over 120 ethnic 
groups) Tanzania has achieved by 1988, "real national integration" with Tanzanians identifying with each 
other "not because o f common ethnic backgrounds or common religious beliefs, but because they share 
economic or political interests" (Othman, 1988, p. 160).
48 The TANU party had been in existence even before independence and had acquired an detailed 
hierarchical structure. Ten house cells were the basic units o f TANU for rural areas, with 50 member 
cells for places o f  work, each with an elected leader who represents the cell at a higher organisational 
level, such as the monthly Branch general meetings, representative annual conferences and executive 
committees. District and regional units with chairman and secretaries met at conferences (held at 30 month 
intervals) and had executive and working committees. At the apex was the National Conference (NC), the 
Party’s highest decision-making authority, electing the Chairman and Vice-Chairman o f the Party and, in 
the election year, nominating a candidate for the Presidency o f Tanzania. Policies were made by the 
National Executive Committee (NEC) and implemented through the NC and smaller central committees. 
A Chief Executive Secretary assisted by two deputies supervised routine party organisation. For details, 
see TAN U  (1971) and Bienen (1967).
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through the Constitution. Following Arusha, the Parliament (including the President) 
was to be a party committee and to function as the executive arm of the party. 
Virtually all office-bearers, political as well as state (including the President, the 
Vice Presidents, Commanders and officers of the Armed Forces, bureaucrats, and 
managers of parastatal organisation) had to be appointed or approved by the party. 
Also, the national executive of the party and the government leadership were to be 
linked in a hierarchical organ down to the lowest level of the ten-cell house system. 
But although the institution of the one-party state was to be central to the politics of 
mobilisation (and demobilisation) in Tanzania, it was to be accountable through the 
hierarchical structure of democratic decision-making of the party.49 In its pursuit 
of unity and mass representation, the party has an ‘Elders’ section and five ‘mass 
organisations’ representing youth, women, parents, national trade unions and 
cooperative movements, incorporated into the party through various Acts of 
Parliament during the early 1960s.50 Such a single-minded pursuit of unity, 
however, has meant that potential discontent and dissent are subordinated to the 
unifying dictates of the party. In particular, the inclusion of almost all mass 
organisations in civil society - including potential pressure groups like women, 
youth, students, workers and organisations - has virtually ensured the cooption of 
domestic dissent and the neutralisation of organised lobbying. Kiondo (1992) refers 
to this process as the ‘statisation’ of civil society.
While this extension of party control over civil society, especially as outlined 
in the Arusha Declaration, might be seen as a strengthening of political power in 
hands of the elite, the Mwongozo or Party Guidelines published by the TANU in 
1971 (TANU, 1971) seem almost anomalous (e.g., Shivji, 1976). This important 
party directive aimed to (i) increase the say of peasants and workers in determining 
their own affairs; (ii) build equality among the people, i.e., resolving the power and 
status differential between the leaders and the led and (iii) eliminate the attitude of
49 From a pluralist perspective, Dahl (1973), Foltz (1973) and Sartori (1976) have argued that a 
one-party democracy is a contradiction in terms. But see the discussion on the electoral regime o f the 
Tanzanian state below.
50 These include the Trade Union Ordinance (Amendment) Act, the Trade Disputes Settlement Act 
and the Civil Service Machinery Bill in 1962, and in 1964, the National Union o f  Tanganyikan Workers 
Establishment Act and the Security o f Employment Act. For a detailed analysis see Mihyo (1974).
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bossism, commandism and false consciousness and instill a sense of security and 
responsibility among both the leaders and the workers (cited in Makusi, 1983, p. 
33). Although it reflected "a more ‘vanguard’ notion about the role of the party" 
(Cranenburgh, 1990, p. 103) than there was in the Arusha Declaration - emphasising 
the quality of the party’s supervisory role through directing the conduct of leaders 
in implementing party policies - it appeared to assert the party’s anti-elitist position 
as an instrument of the people (more specifically, workers and peasants) and to try 
and bridge the gaps between the government, workers and management.51 Thus, 
Shivji (1976), Hedlund and Lundahl (1989) and Cranenburgh (1990), among others, 
find the Mwongozo conceptually more radical than the Arusha Declaration.52
The political dominance of the one-party system continued with the 1972 
decentralisation of power which made the party the de facto instrument of local 
government.53 In 1974, Nyerere (Daily News, 23 February, 1974, cited in Miti, 
1979, p 194) publicly raised the issue of TANU’s role in relation to the government 
and stated "under our One Party Constitution, TANU is supreme... .it has the power 
to give specific instructions about priorities of action in any aspect of our national 
life.. can call the cabinet, any minister, or any government official to account for 
their activities...it is their [the TANU Committee’s] task to guide and supervise the 
activities of all government ...".
In an amendment to the Union Constitution in 1975, the government formally 
introduced party supremacy over all organs of the state and also increased the 
indirectly elected or appointed members in the National Assembly (URT, 1975). In 
1977, TANU merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM) which continued from where TANU had left off. The ideology-based 
guidelines for party organisation and operation initiated by the Arusha Declaration,
51 The M wongozo states: "Any action that gives them (the people) more control o f  their own 
affairs is an action for development even if  it does not offer them better health or more bread" (reprinted 
in the Afiican Review, 1 (4), April 1972, p. 6; cited in Barkan (1979a), pp. 28-29.
52 Hedlund and Lundahl (1989, p. 29), in fact, point out that there were evident similarities, at 
least on paper, between the Mwongozo and M ao’s revolutionary writing.
rq t
For administrative purposes, Tanzania is divided into 25 regions, 20 on the mainland, and 5 in 
Zanzibar. For an analysis o f the decentralisation policies, see Ryewemamu, 1973.
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thus, continued to direct party formation and reformation through the 1970s and 
1980s. Cranenburgh (1990, p. 79) notes that with the formation of the CCM in 
1977, this ‘party of revolution’ asserted party supremacy more vociferously. By 
1977, the URT Constitution stated: "All political activity,...All business of the 
organs of the state...shall be carried out under the guidance and supervision of the 
party" (cited in Cranenburgh, 1990, p. 82). Thus, after 1977, all members of the 
government were required by the Constitution to be party members.
Although apparently monolithic, the single-party political system was flexible, 
being structured to have periodic accountability through the electoral system. 
Candidates have to be elected to Parliamentary and Party posts54 although such 
elections are largely focused on local issues (enhancing the idea of locality delegate 
or representative and servicing the local community). Also, election behaviour is 
governed by party guidelines, with curbs ranging from limitations on campaign 
expenditure to prohibitions on appeals to race, ethnic relations or religion in 
campaigns. While the provision of an ‘electoral regime’ (Bienen, 1974; Samoff, 
1987)55 operationalised the democratic ideals of ujamaa, the intensive political 
mobilisation and campaigns that it implied (with an extensive use of kiswahili) 
served to promote cultural homogeneity among an ethnically and linguistically 
diverse population.56
In 1981, the CCM undertook major revisions of its internal structure to 
increase operational efficiency and to eliminate the corruption that had been noticed
54 After 1985, this has included the post of the President o f the country.
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Sam off (1987) notes that "elections have both contributed to and, perhaps more often, formally 
registered power shifts among political alliances in Tanzania, both national and local. They have 
established a right o f  participation for politically disadvantaged groups" (p. 180). He goes on to say: 
"[w]ithin Tanzania, the institutionalisation o f elections has slowed the consolidation o f power o f a 
bureaucratic governing class and o f an aspiring bourgeoisie. Elections, by their adherence to at least some 
liberal democratic forms, have both impeded that consolidation and at the same time helped to legitimise 
it. Elections have supported the initiatives emanating from Nyerere and his allies at the centre to constrain 
elite formation ... elections remain a contested and vital terrain for political action" (p. 181).
56 This ‘semi competitive’ nature o f  the party (and the state) is adjudged to be one reason why the 
post-colonial one-party system in Tanzania has been remarkably resilient in that ethnic or tribal loyalties 
are minimal and that conflicts are predominantly on issues o f government performance and personalities 
(Samoff, 1987). It is nonetheless true that while the very act o f voting may be an affirmation o f  faith in 
the system, though not necessarily an indication o f support for specific policies, low voter turnouts in this 
single-party semi-competitive system could reflect alienation and frustration.
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in the party through the 1970s and especially during the economic crisis of the late 
1970s. Throughout the 1980s the CCM continued to undertake internal reform 
culminating in the Zanzibar Declaration of 1991. Although the official position is 
that it is an extension of the ideals of ujamaa and congruent with the Arusha 
Declaration, there appears to be a distinct shift in political ideology.57 Through the 
1970s and 1980s, however, the Tanzanian state was explicitly statist in its pursuit 
of the societal goals of ujamaa socialism, or, as Kiondo (1990) puts it, there was a 
‘statisation’ of both civil society and the economy.
3.3.3. The State and Economic Development
In accordance with the Arusha Declaration, the single-party exercised 
substantial authority on policy-making, government appointments and on the running 
of parastatal and other organisations in the public sector (which, in turn, was to 
control the development path of the economy). The state, under the guidance of the 
party, was to re-organise its institutional structure according to the basic principles 
of ujamaa socialism and pursue the goal of self-reliant economic development.58
In addition to these institutional changes, the state also had to formulate 
specific economic and social strategies to realise these goals. Thus, the state in the 
post-Arusha period formally adopted the strategy of ‘redistribution with growth’ 
(RWG) with a prominent bias towards agricultural production vis-a-vis 
industrialisation. These are examined in greater detail below.
Institutional Changes : Following the Arusha Declaration, the institutional reform 
that was highlighted was the capture of the "commanding heights" of the economy
57 This is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
58 Okumu (1979) comparing East African political systems by the mid 1970’s observes, "that in 
terms o f their respective capacity to make public policy, and ensure effective implementation o f those 
policies, TANU has developed a capability that is unique in the African experience" (p. 61).
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by nationalisation59 and the creation of over 400 parastatals to control the 
production and distribution of various industries. Local and foreign capital was also 
nationalised and former owners were paid full compensation (Hedlund and Lundahl, 
1989).60 The private sector was allowed to co-exist with the state sector, but was 
largely confined to agriculture, retail trade and construction.
Collective ownership and effort in the agricultural sector was translated into 
(i) the nationalisation of land, forests and other natural resources - with every citizen 
having the right of use but not ownership, (ii) the control of agricultural market 
activity through parastatal organisations and (iii) the (voluntary) re-organisation of 
agrarian production into ujamaa villages (ujamaa vijijini) - where, with the provision 
of various social services by the government and with collective work (‘kila litu 
afanya kazi’) using simple tools (rather than expensive imported machinery), rural 
development would be fostered and the disparity between urban and rural sectors 
diminished.61 Thus, agricultural and rural development were on communal and 
cooperative lines in accordance with the ideology of ujamaa and this received 
surprising support, at least in the early years, from the international community,
59 These included major industries and plantations, banking and insurance, imports and exports, 
land, forests, minerals, water, oil, electricity, news media and communications. See Skarstein and 
Wangwe, 1986, p. 6.
60 This proved a popular move with the majority o f Tanzanians because the property being 
expropriated was owned by Asian commercial capitalists and/or foreign interests (Kiondo, 1992, p. 22). 
Kiondo (1992), however, argues that the degree o f  actual control achieved over these resources was not 
significant since "nationalisations meant that the state simply went into partnership with international 
capital because the former owners not only retained shares in some cases but also provided managerial 
services through management contracts (p. 22). However, with the formulation o f  the M wongozo, the 
attitude towards domestic capitalists hardened and Hedlund and Lundahl (1989), citing Hyden (1972), 
point out that, "all private houses valued at above Tsh 100,000 were expropriated and as a result it is 
estimated that around one-fifth o f the country’s Asian population left in 1971 alone" and further, that 
"Tanzania suffered a major brain drain as a result o f this socialist offensive" (p. 28).
61 To arrest the growth o f  rural capitalism, Nyerere called for the establishment o f  Ujamaa villages 
- "economic and social communities where people [would] live together and work together for the good 
o f all" (e .g ., Nyerere, 1968b) - into which the government could bring education, health and social 
services as the first step o f a three-step strategy culminating in the transformation o f  the village into a 
multi purpose Cooperative society (with adequate security to attract commercial credit). See, for instance, 
Ellman (1975), p. 325.
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including the World Bank.62 But the voluntary drive to ujamaa villages - as indeed 
Nyerere had wanted (see, for instance, Nyerere, 1966, 1968) - turned into a forced 
march.
Villagisation was not an initial success with implementation being slow. 
Realising this, the TANU government launched a national campaign of ‘persuasion’ 
in 1970, under the personal supervision of the President,63 followed by a number 
of similar operations or campaigns that resulted in a doubling of the number of 
ujamaa villages between mid-1970 and 1973.64 There is substantial documented 
evidence however, that government officials forced peasants to form villages and, 
once in villages, to undertake collective economic activities just to qualify as ujamaa 
villages (see, inter alia, Coulson, 1979, Von Freyhold, 1979 and Hedlund and 
Lundahl, 1989).65
Overall, thus, the implementation of the objectives of ujamaa socialism 
increased the need for centralised decision-making in; (i) the allocation of resources 
such as foreign exchange, credit and to a lesser extent consumer goods and food; (ii) 
the determination and control of prices (including the exchange rate) and (iii) the 
regulation of trade in many goods (by state agencies). Public sector activity had to 
be expanded, not only because the nationalisation of assets and the centralisation of 
decision-making extended the scope of the public sector, but also, because of the 
leading role that public sector investment now had to play in the economic
62 Miti (1979) points out (p. 40) that the World Bank which, in 1961 had recommended a capitalist 
approach to rural development, had "undergone complete metamorphosis and was championing Tanzania's 
new rural development policy as a model o f development in the Third World".
63 This campaign was started in Dodoma and thus came to be known as ‘Operation Dodoma’.
64 URT (1971) points out that by 1971, only about 6 % o f the population lived in ujamaa villages 
and out o f 2 ,668  such villages then in existence, 2410 had not yet passed beyond the first stage, that is 
they featured no communal production (p. 55). Yet, Hyden (1980, p. 103) points out that in 1973, the 
number reached 5631 with a total membership exceeding 2 million people.
63 Nyerere also maintained that the main responsibility for mobilising the rural population to join  
ujamaa villages lay with TANU - i.e ., no voluntariness outside the scope o f strict party control seemed 
to be allowed. In a perverse case, the Ruvuma Development Association, started as early as in 1963 and 
working according to the principles sketched by Nyerere (i.e ., where voluntariness and material incentive 
worked), was closed down by Presidential decree and all assets confiscated in 1969 - since it did not come 
under the aegis o f  the party (inter a lia , Hedlund and Lundahl, 1989). This seems to have ended attempts 
to achieve ujamaa ‘from below ’.
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development of the country.
Strategies fo r  Development : As far as development strategies are concerned, the 
early choice of redistribution with growth (RWG) was fortunate since it was then in 
vogue in the development circles and "found a particularly ready echo in the World 
Bank which at that time [McNamara period] had a liberal phase [in the Keynesian/ 
progressive sense]" (Singer, 1989, p. 17). Along with the infatuation with 
Tanzania’s ujamaa policies in scholarly and progressive circles called ‘Tanzaphilia’ 
(Mazrui, 1969), the Tanzanian effort was internationally encouraged, at least till the 
1970s, and had the important effect of insulating the state from political policy input 
and critique from the donor community. Consequently, Tanzania’s policy-making 
was allowed to be determined indigenously and foreign involvement in Tanzania 
avoided domestic political issues and concentrated on technical and sectoral areas. 
But this degree of self-reliance, though important, was superficial.
The apparent emphasis on agricultural development during the 1960s and 
1970s reflected a firm stand against over-reliance on the policies of industrialization 
which, it was felt, would naturally create a dependence on the industrialised world 
(which would militate against the goal of self-reliance) and would also create an 
urban bias. Thus, Nyerere (1968b) writes, "If we are not careful we might get to the 
position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dweller exploiting 
the peasant". Yet, industrial development was not to be neglected.
Economic self-reliance was sought basically through import-substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) with domestic demand being met by domestic resources. 
Although the country had already been following a policy of ISI since Independence 
(see section 3,2), the post-Arusha phase expanded this effort from simple consumer 
goods to intermediate and basic industrial goods.66 This, however, was done in two 
stages. The Second Five-Year Plan (1969 to 1974) continued the earlier trend of 
simple consumer goods production although the institutional structure was shifted 
sharply to a more centralised mode through nationalisations and the imposition of 
administered prices and controlled distribution of commodities, including consumer
66 See section 3 .2 . and Skarstein and Wangwe (1986), pp. 4-8.
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goods and food (Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986, pp. 6-9). Small scale industries were 
also promoted (ibid., p. 7).
Although most of the institutional changes were implemented over the Second 
Five Year period from 1969 to 1974, the more detailed and long-term industrial and 
economic strategy (with a time horizon of until 1995) to achieve multiple long-term 
economic and social objectives had to wait till 1975, the planned start of the Third 
Five Year Plan.67 For this, a Basic Industry Strategy was chosen which focused on 
consumer goods and certain ‘core’ industries.68 Even though the Strategy itself was 
not implemented during the 1970s, several ‘basic industries’ had been set up by the 
mid 1970s, (Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986, especially, pp. 6-9, 28-52, 215) and the 
economy had developed heavily import-dependent industrial and infrastructural 
sectors.69
Finance for these imports came from two sources, foreign assistance and 
traditional agricultural export earnings.70 Foreign assistance, which had increased 
post-1967 despite the nationalisations,71 went towards the development effort rather 
than to conspicuous consumption and with such an emphasis on basic needs and self 
reliance, Tanzania was termed "an exciting example of a country setting the pace in 
that direction" (Mushi, 1979, p. 39). But since foreign assistance, at least until the 
1970s, was mainly of a ‘developmental’ nature to finance educational, industrial and 
rural development projects, it was not available ‘freely’ for domestic imports.
67 Although scheduled to start from 1975, the Third Five Year Plan was postponed due to the 
1973-74 crisis triggered o ff by the oil price hike and droughts and thus ran from 1976 to 1981.
68 See Skarstein and Wangwe (1986), pp. 28-52 for a description o f this strategy chosen from five 
alternatives,
69 See Kim (1976), p. 19 and Skarstein and Wangwe (1986), p. 190.
70  *Manufactured exports were only 20 percent o f total export value m 1980 and clearly, export
crops will contribute the major share o f Tanzania’s export earnings for a long time to come" (Skarstein 
and Wangwe, 1986, p. 246, quoting a World Bank study in 1981).
71 Clark (1978) notes that: "The Arusha Declaration and subsequent nationalisations did not slow  
the inflow o f foreign capital. In fact, if  anything else, they increased i t ... the doctrine o f  self-reliance and 
rural socialism was very attractive to many donors ... the socialist overtones far from repelling Western 
donors attracted them. Tanzanian socialism was not so strong (at least at this stage) that it challenged the 
interests o f Western capitalism" (p. 82). Full compensation payments to the owners o f  the firms being 
nationalised also helped to restore the confidence o f Western investors and financiers.
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External capital for most domestic development, consequently, had to come mainly 
from export revenues throughout the 1960s and 1970s.72
Economic Impacts o f the Development Strategies : These various developments had 
two major consequences for economic development through the 1970s: first, as 
remarked earlier, they increased the vulnerability of the economy to the vagaries of 
the international market through its increasing import-dependence; secondly, they 
fostered inefficiency within the government administration, parastatal organisations 
and collectively-operated farms and factories.
Regarding the latter, in agriculture, agricultural production dropped during 
the period of the villagisation programme (Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986, pp. 229- 
232).73 Further, the share of communal production in total agricultural output 
probably never went beyond one or two percent and where it existed, the impact on 
agricultural output was also not very encouraging (ibid., chapter 7). The productivity 
on communal farms, it is argued, was in fact lower than on private farms (see, inter 
alia, Hyden 1980, Lofchie, 1978, Ergas, 1980 and Coulson, 1982). Further, it is 
argued that communal production could not be claimed to be a success even from 
the point of view of distributive justice. McHenry (1979) notes: "In all cases, a 
proportion of the product, if there was any, went to finance village activities. In 
effect, participants in communal production were being taxed to pay for village 
needs. And the more one participated, the more he contributed to the welfare of 
others. Such behaviour was in accord with ujamaa ideals ... villages were taxed for 
doing what was wanted of them, i.e ., work on the communal farm, but not taxed for 
doing what was not wanted of them, i.e., work on private farms. The incentive 
effect of this system of distribution was therefore, counter-productive" (p. 168).
Till the mid-1970s both domestic and export production suffered disincentives 
with producers facing decreasing real prices for their output. Although this situation
72
Some industrial projects were, in fact, ‘tied’ to specific sources and types o f  external assistance. 
See Skarstein and Wangwe (1986).
73 Hyden (1980) and Legum (1988), however, maintain that the decline was only temporary, if  at 
all, but a detailed analysis o f the evidence shows a definite decline. Further declines were due, at least 
in part, to adverse weather conditions during the 1970s.
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was remedied in the case of domestic food production by increased output prices, 
production for export continued to face declining production incentives not only on 
account of inefficiencies within the parastatal marketing organisations but also 
because of an over-valued exchange rate (e.g., Skarstein and Wangwe (1986), 
especially chapter 7, and Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990), pp. 9 and 11). This 
naturally affected export production and export earnings which, in turn, affected 
capacity creation in the industrial sector.
The expansion of the public sector after the nationalisations created, firstly, 
an increase in the numbers of a bureaucracy widely accepted to be inadequate and 
ill-equipped, and, secondly, a decline in competitive efficiency in the economy 
(Bates, 1981). The argument is that the post-colonial bureaucracy was ill-equipped 
to develop the nation’s economy since it lacked adequate knowledge, skill and risk- 
taking ability, and actually inhibited growth by consuming too much of the state’s 
revenue (thus limiting funds for development) and by impeding the growth of private 
sector’s growth through owning too much and by over-regulating the economy 
(Cliffe, 1967; Bienen, 1967; Tordoff, 1967; Kjekshus, 1974; Mwansasu and Pratt, 
1979).
After the nationalisations, the lack of adequate numbers of experienced 
managers to run these parastatals meant that most of them came under the control 
of General Managers "who were bureaucrats more than businessmen and 
consequently ran their domains like civil service bureaucracies" (Duignan and 
Jackson, 1986. p. 213). It led to the development of ‘crony capitalism’ - a term used 
in the general context of Africa to describe the situation wherein the ruling elite 
appropriate legitimate control over massive resources through mechanisms such as 
marketing boards and the state’s retention of residual rights over minerals etc and 
used it as a basis for hegemony over the rest of society - with a strong element of 
personalism and patronage entered into many organisations and what had been a 
private economy of small firms managed by their owners eventually became an 
"inflated empire" controlled by state officials.
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Production in parastatal organisations was economically inefficient.74 In an 
early assessment of parastatal activity in Tanzania, Cadribo (1975) notes that the 
control of parastatals over production is inadequate to the point of being non-existent 
with (i) a lack of clear definition of objectives, (ii) proliferation of control organs 
and their rather ambiguous orders, (iii) limited scope of worker-participation as a 
means of control and (iv) the absence of commitment to Tanzanian socialist 
objectives among the managerial elite. Workers and their bureaucratic managers 
were complacent in the knowledge that their jobs were virtually guaranteed by the 
socialist state.75 Parastatals, especially, seemed to be politically privileged territory 
protected by the official ideology of the state. Political exhortation to economise and 
to try harder, which was Nyerere’s response to the problem of laxity and 
inefficiency (e.g., Nyerere, 1977), was not realised. More investment seemed to be 
going into meeting the political requirements of full employment and worker’s 
welfare than into increasing industrial productivity.
Further, such state monopolies severely restricted the degree of competition 
in the economy and this decreased productivity further. With a decline in 
productivity, buyers’ markets became sellers’ markets with excess demand for 
several consumer goods, inputs and intermediate goods. This inefficiency was, 
however, compounded by further inefficiency in aid-financed ventures where cost- 
consciousness tended to be lower than for even domestic projects for a number of 
reasons (see, for instance, de Vylder 1988, Eriksson, 1991).
Yet there is some approval for the performance, at least in relative terms. 
Green (quoted in Coulson, 1982) claims that despite the opportunist nature of elites 
in Africa, for some unexplained reason this has not happened in Tanzania where the 
"public sector has accepted material rewards substantially lower than those in
74 Nyerere (1977) observes that from 1967 to 1974, industrial output per worker, as measured in 
current prices, declined by 14 percent, with an even greater decline in real terms. Barkan (1979), fh. 30, 
p. 38.
75 Hyden (1980), in fact, points out that the Mwongozo was misinterpreted by workers as a 
directive against exploitation by management. In the wake o f the Mwongozo, Barkan (1979) observes out 
that in 1973-74 there were a series o f "work stoppages and lockouts o f plant managers that, in turn, led 
to relatively loose supervision by managers who feared further confrontation with their s ta ff  (p. 18). In 
practical terms, the argument has been that it thus contributed to indiscipline and slackness in parastatal 
organisations and bureaucracy.
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neighbouring states with no evident loss of morale and loyalty". Pratt (1976), writing 
about the ‘benign elite’ in Tanzania, gives high marks to the bureaucrats and 
politicians in Tanzania as developers despite what he calls "occasional dangers of a 
doctrinaire determination of politics".
But a part of the blame for economic inefficiency has to be laid on the fact 
that the state was required to be ‘paternalistic’, formulating policies and organising 
industry with workers participation and equality of income distribution as the 
yardstick. The allocation of national resources was to be determined on the basis of 
need rather than expected profit (Nyerere, 1968) and this criterion was to determine 
the structure of production in the economy. In practice, thus, the state was ‘soft’, 
supporting chronic loss making firms and parastatal organisations.76
But while ‘soft’ on the one hand, the state could, on the other, impose a 
certain degree of hardship, in pursuit of ujamaa, through egalitarian measures such 
as income re-distribution like low wages and salaries, nationalisation and policies of 
villagisation. In such cases, however, the ideology itself provided the required 
political legitimation. Thus, extensive use was also made of non-material collective 
incentives such as moral appeal and even coercion to undertake potentially 
‘unpalatable’ measures that were deemed necessary for the realisation of ideological 
aims (Hedlund and Lundahl, 1989, especially pp. 41- 42).
Yet, it is undoubtedly true that Tanzania witnessed strong returns to its large 
investments in social services. Education improved substantially and the country with 
less than 10 percent adult literacy at the time of Independence had the most literate 
population in black Africa by 1975 (Morrison et al., (1989). Medical facilities 
improved from severely low levels and infant mortality dropped and life expectancy 
rose from 34 in 1962 to 47 by 1975 (World Bank, 1989; Legum, 1988).
This political, social and economic performance forms the backdrop to the 
economic crisis that began in the late 1970s and resulted in a need for foreign 
exchange. This led to negotiations with the IMF and the structural adjustments to the
76 Chronic loss-making firms whose output is deemed essential by the state and are therefore 
supported financially by the state are said to be facing a "soft budget constraint". This could work through 
various ways, including tax exemptions or subsidies from the government budget and cheap credit from 
centralised bank system. But a ‘soft’ state could go beyond merely supporting loss-making firms and could 
extend to subsidising consumers and agricultural producers (see, for instance, Eriksson, 1991, pp. 26-32).
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economy that aimed to dismantle many of the institutional features described in this 
section. The economic crisis is described in detail in the next section, while the 
negotiations are discussed in the following chapter.
3.4. The Economic Crisis and the Second Economy
The oil price shock of 1973 combined with a drought in Tanzania to initiate 
a period of poor agricultural performance which affected the industrial performance, 
the balance of payments and economic growth, culminating in a severe economic 
crisis from the late 1970s onward. The details of this economic crisis are examined 
in the sub-section 3.5.1, while 3.5.2 presents the various factors held responsible for 
the crisis and the last sub-section (3.5.3.) discusses the rise of the parallel economy 
as a consequence of the economic crisis,77
3.4.1. The Manifestations of Economic Crisis
Despite the triple effects of the oil price hike, drought and food shortages 
during the years from 1973 to 1976, by 1977 the Tanzanian economy had "a trend 
growth [of GNP] of over 5 per cent ... external reserves... equal to five months of 
imports... an overall food surplus and a record Recurrent Budget" (Legum, 1988, 
p. 5).78 Taking the whole period from 1970 to 1979, Hodd (1986) finds that 
"Tanzania experienced growth of GDP which averaged 5 per cent per year, which 
allowed an increase of GDP per head at 1.8 percent" (p. 2). By 1976, Industrial 
growth, impressive in the period from Independence to 1972, had recovered from 
its post-1973 slump to exceed the overall economic growth rate in 1976 (Skarstein 
and Wangwe, 1986, p. 11). The coffee boom in 1977 "facilitated a relatively
77 The next section details the liberalisation measures introduced in an attempt to deal with the 
crisis.
78 For the period from 1961 to 1969, Hodd (1986) quotes World Bank documents to say that in 
terms o f  the main economic indicators - overall economic growth, inflation, the proportion o f GDP 
devoted to investment and the balance o f payments - Tanzania performed "better than average for the 
whole o f Sub-Saharan Africa and even better when compared with the Low-income group o f African 
countries" (p. 2).
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adequate allocation of foreign exchange to industries following the improvement in 
the balance of payment position" (ibid.).
But from 1978 onwards, however, almost all economic indicators have 
registered declining performances of crisis proportions.79 Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa (1990) note that real GDP declined from "an average of 5.1 per cent per 
annum in 1970-76 to less than 2 per cent between 1976 and 1986 when population 
growth was 3.2 per cent per annum" (p. 1). This translated to a decline in real 
income per capita of more than 15 per cent from 1976 to 1986 (id.). Inflation soared 
from "less than 5 per cent in the 1966-70 period through 11 per cent in the 1970-76 
period, to 30 per cent after 1979" (ibid, pp. 1-2) while "the balance on current 
account deteriorated abruptly from a deficit of $US 49 million in 1977 to a deficit 
of $US 539 million in 1982, hitting an all time low of $US 565 million in 1980" and 
the deficit in public finance "rose by more than 6.5 times between 1978-9 and 1984- 
5, reaching an unprecedented 20 per cent of GDP in 1980" (ibid, p. 2).
The deterioration in the balance of payments situation from 1978 onwards 
caused negative industrial growth from 1979, and, by 1983, "manufacturing value 
added had declined back to the levels of 1967/68" (Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986, 
p. 11 and also Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, pp. 5-6). Agricultural production, 
which had been declining from 1973, caused the volume of agricultural exports to 
decline "dramatically" by 36.5 percent from 1973 to 1980 (Skarstein and Wangwe, 
1986, pp. 227 and 246 and also Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, pp. 5-6 ). 
Worse, in 1981-82, the net imports of food (staple grain) were almost three times 
higher than officially marketed domestic output and comprised about 9 percent of 
the total imports of the country. From 1980 to 1988, Hodd (1988) concludes, 
Tanzania’s economic performance has been "inferior to the average for African low- 
income countries" p. 1).
The effects of this declining performance are manifold. Over the period 1980 
to 1988, Hodd (1988) writes: "The currency has become seriously over-valued, with 
the black market valuing the Shilling at half to a third of the official rate ... 
Minimum wage legislation [has been] widely flouted ... consumer prices for up to
79 Some analysts prefer to date the origins o f the crisis to 1974 "when Tanzania faced her major 
first balance o f  payments deficit". See for instance, Bierman and Campbell 1989, p. 70.
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3,000 itemised consumer goods [resulting] in food subsidies to urban consumers and 
the periodic unavailability of such modest requirements as sugar, soap, salt, batteries 
and light bulbs except on the black market ... shortages of fuel, spares and raw 
materials resulting from languishing export revenues ,.. [and] a crippling shortage 
of foreign exchange" (p. 1).
Yet, as Legum (1988) himself points out, a "people-centred rather than 
finance-centred view provides a completely different view of the actual progress and 
retrogression in Tanzania since its independence", noting (i) that infant mortality had 
decreased from 225 per 1,000 live births in 1962 to 137 in 1984; (ii) the crude death 
rate had dropped from 22 per 1,000 in 1967 to 13 in 1982; (iii) life expectancy had 
increased from 35 in 1962 to 51 in 1984; and (iv) from a situation at Independence 
where "only handful of children went to school at all and adult literacy had only just 
begun", the national literacy rate was 85 per cent (pp. 3-4).80 In this context, 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) observe that a group of writers have focused on 
"Tanzania’s political stability over two decades and democratic practices; its 
contribution to the liberation struggle in South Africa; its adherence to a position of 
non-alignment in international politics, and its success in promoting literacy, 
preserving its ecology, and providing homes for the homeless" and that fact that 
"Tanzania has been singled out for praise of its extremely workable programme for 
dealing with refugees" (p. 2).
It is undeniable, nonetheless, that the economic crisis had caused much 
hardship to the people of Tanzania. Thus, Young (1983) writes in 1983:
The outward signs of economic deterioration seem everywhere 
evident ... Long lines form early each morning in Dar es Salaam 
outside a medium-sized bakery for white bread. There is a shortage 
of almost all consumer staples: flour, cooking oil, sugar, kerosene, 
charcoal and clothing. For the first time some residents speak 
privately of the possibility of urban violence. The Government’s 
policies do not seem to be able to secure a minimum level of food for 
the majority of the urban population. As for the rural population, 
there is virtually nothing to buy" (p. 22, quoted in Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa, 1990, pp. ix-x).
RO , »Legum (1988, pp. 4-5) provides other statistical details in support o f  his interpretative view.
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3.4.2, Explanations for the Crisis
Although there are those who seek to lay the blame for Tanzania’s economic 
crisis on the extent of state intervention post-1967,81 a variety of factors including 
incorrect government policies and external factors beyond the control of the state 
have contributed to the crisis. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990), thus note that 
although Tanzania’s economic problems have been blamed on its socialist policies, 
Western assistance has also played a major role in creating problems over which 
Tanzania had little control ("by investing too heavily in the building of capacity - 
capacity that the country does not have the foreign exchange to keep supplied with 
inputs"; p. 2).82
Among the external factors, Maliyamkono and Bagachwa note that high 
import prices for petroleum products and low export earnings from basically 
agricultural exports caused a drastic deterioration of Tanzania’s terms of trade as a 
"relatively unindustrialized country competing in the international markets" (ibid., 
p. 3). They note the badly-timed expansion of aid-financed industrial capacity in 
Tanzania, the break up of the East African Community in 1977, the war with Idi 
Amin in 1978, the oil price hike in 1979 as well as the spate of natural calamities 
that struck the subsistence farming and export farming sectors, including severe 
droughts in 1973-4, 1981-2 and 1983-4.83
The resultant shortage in foreign exchange led to a drastic cut in imports of 
fuel which "cut heavily into Tanzania’s infant industrial and distribution systems and 
adversely affected agricultural production" (id.). As the economy contracted and had 
to pay higher prices for industrial inputs, the country was plunged into trade deficits 
which, despite the substantial amounts of short- and long-term loans and grants,
81 Legum (1988) notes that both ‘too much socialism* and ‘too little socialism ’ have been used as 
critical explanations for the economic crisis. For views blaming internal economic policies within a 
centralised state for the crisis, see Lofchie (1978), World Bank (1981) and (1983b).
o - i
For a critical view o f the external influences on Tanzania’s crisis, see, inter alia , Green et al.
(1980).
83 The last factor is estimated to have cost approximately $US 1.5 billion (Green, (1985) or 
roughly three years o f  its export earnings (Singh, 1986a).
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caused foreign debt to steadily increase from just under 20 percent of GNP in 1970 
to 27.6 percent in 1980 (ibid.).
To Skarstein and Wangwe (1986), however, the decline in agricultural 
production, especially for export, is the "single most important factor bringing about 
the grave stagnation of the industrial sector since the mid-1970s" (p. 271) although 
they do not wish to present a monocausal explanation. They thus cite other ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ factors, including "planning failures, technology problems, 
management problems, deteriorating terms of trade, soaring oil prices, etc." (ibid.). 
Their summary analysis of the crisis is as follows:
"In the 1970s, industrial investment - largely financed by foreign aid - 
went on at a very high pace, especially towards the end of the 
decade. The additional capacities resulting from these investments 
required increased imports of raw materials, spare parts, etc. 
However, ... Tanzania’s export sector at the same time deteriorated 
and export earnings stagnated. As a result, the economy became 
increasingly less able to cover the foreign exchange costs of operating 
its acquired industrial capacities, and a grave underutilization of 
capacities developed. The production shortfalls combined with 
increasing employment nourished inflation and contributed to a 
further depression of the export sector. In brief, the Tanzanian 
economy became increasingly unable to sustain the new industrial 
capacities it had acquired through foreign aid combined with high 
domestic costs. In this way, foreign aid became an integral element 
in the downward spiral of the Tanzanian economy after 1976/77." (p.
270).84
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) count among the internal factors 
contributing to the decline three macro-economic decisions made by the government 
during the 1970s which, in their words, "seem, in retrospect, to have had a 
deleterious effect on the country’s economic performance" (p. 5). First, like 
Skarstein and Wangwe, they note the implicit discrimination against agriculture, 
which has included "low prices for agricultural products relative to industrial
84 Somewhat graphically, Frankel points to the role o f Western aid for development schemes in 
Tanzania’s crisis when he says "The schemes have littered Tanzania’s rural landscape with remains o f  
factories, farm machinery, roadways and water pumping systems that the country lacks the money, spare 
parts and expertise to operate and maintain" (quoted in Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, p. 8).
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products, lack of access to public socio-economic services, inadequate and irregular 
supply of agricultural inputs, poor extension service, poor marketing facilities, and 
scarcity of basic consumer goods" and conclude that the agricultural sector has been 
"starved of adequate incentives, financial, technical and managerial resources". This 
withdrawal of support cut into the export earnings necessary to support an industrial 
sector heavily dependent on foreign imports.
Second, economic mismanagement and inefficiencies caused by the 
proliferation of an increasingly inefficient central bureaucracy to organise and 
regulate production in the economy. They note that "the public sector in Tanzania 
has expanded beyond its technical and managerial capacities and has invariably been 
associated with proliferation of unproductive bureaucracies and financial losses" (p. 
7). They also note that the intensity of the economic crisis has been worsened by the 
misappropriation of resources through all sorts of malpractices including "illegal 
transfers of resources (for example, fraud, kickbacks on contract, smuggling of 
goods, etc.) which "tend to stifle work effort by imposing an unnecessary burden on 
the productive members of the official economy, and may therefore adversely affect 
savings and investment" (p. 7).
Third, overambitious and unrealistic target setting in the provision of basic 
needs to a growing population which, "though desirable equity-wise", has been yet 
another drain on national resources, exacerbated by social welfare spending during 
periods of drought (p. 6).
Interestingly, Nyerere himself acknowledges almost all of these factors 
(Legum, 1988, pp. 6-8)85 noting, in addition, that the loss of oil imports hit 
transport especially in the more remote rural areas and that the break up of the East 
African Community in 1977 meant that the country lost repair workshops for 
locomotives and had to build an entire new structure of civil aviation and central 
post and telegraph services. He also acknowledges that mistakes were made in policy 
formulation and implementation - including, over-ambitious and unrealistic target 
setting which resulted in "distortions and expensively wrong decisions" (ibid, p. 7) 
and a lack of efficiency and effective coordination among a number of the 400
oc
Legum, unfortunately, does not provide references to the exact publication from which he has 
paraphrased N yerere’s views.
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parastatal organisations, an increase in the numbers employed by the government 
(with the civil service increasing by 55 percent despite a 10 percent cut in 1976 and 
with the number of employees in government departments going up by 35 percent).
But where Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) find that desirable expansion 
in basic needs is merely "yet another drain on resources" (p. 6), Nyerere finds 
‘problems of success’, noting that there had been "a remarkable rise in living 
standards in the fifteen years after independence - with a population that had begun 
to dress better and with children acquiring the habit of wearing shoes; with improved 
eating standards and higher consumer spending; with better public transport, 
universal primary education, improved supplies of fresh water etc.", which had 
"created new expectations and demands for greater state expenditure to satisfy the 
new appetite for better clothes, education, medical and other services" (Legum, 
1988, p. 7). As Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) rightly observe, however, 
different views on the crisis "differ not so much in fact, but rather in emphasis and 
choice of values" (p. 2).
3.4.3. The Rise of the Parallel Economy
One phenomenon that the crisis helped to foster, according to Maliyamkono 
and Bagachwa (1990), is the second economy.86 They argue that along with "the 
regulation of the economy mainly through excessive centralised economic decisions, 
quantitative restrictions, licensing and price-and interest-rate fixing by governmental 
agencies during a prolonged period of shortages", the economic crisis had "fuelled 
the growth of parallel markets - the second economy" (pp. 7-8 and 37). It was not 
that the informal sector had never existed in Tanzania but the fact that activities 
which, like those of the informal sector, were outside the official reach of 
government regulation and monitoring had been given such an impetus by a 
combination of events since the economic crisis in the late 1970s that a larger
86 The development o f ‘indigenous non-state associations’ (e .g ., Kiondo, 1990) to provide people 
with alternative organisational structures, is another consequence o f the economic crisis. This is analyzed 
in greater detail in chapters 4 and 5.
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concept, the second economy, developed by the 1980s,87 Today the importance of 
the second economy in Tanzania cannot be overemphasised, with estimates showing 
that it has grown from a negligible 2.8 percent of the official GDP in 1976 to over 
30 percent of the same in 1986 (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990).
They go on to distinguish two broad categories within the "vast and varied 
set of activities" (p. 27) that comprise the second economy: the legal and the illegal, 
the last being further divided into two types. The first includes "worthwhile 
productive activities initiated with honest (legal) objectives" as a source of additional 
revenue to satisfy subsistence consumption requirements ranging from small-scale 
operations such as part-time urban farming and housewives selling mandazis (buns) 
on streets part-time to medium-scale activities, such as operating "small-scale 
bakeries, custom milling units and small garage[s]" (p. 135). The second category 
of second economy activity comprises illegal operators who "are in business 
primarily to reap rents - for example commodity racketeering, speculation in foreign 
exchange and over-invoicing" and, therefore, clearly have illegal objectives and deny 
Government its legitimate revenue (id.). Here, there are illegitimate activities which 
take place in the "genuinely parallel circuit outside the official system" as distinct 
from those which originate in the official system (p. 48).
Although the first category is relatively more ‘visible’, it is the second 
category which attracted more public and media attention in the early 1980s with the 
government branding such operators "economic saboteurs" and carrying out a 
massive ‘crackdown’ on such activities in March 1983.88 The then Prime Minister
87 Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) point out that "the complex phenomenon referred to here 
as the second economy has meant different things to different observers" and attribute the lack o f any 
general theory to explain such economic and social behaviour to the "definitional and conceptual 
variations" that exist. They, however, endorse Tanzi’s (1982) definition o f the second economy when they 
write that it "engross[es] all production and exchange activities which, given current conventions [and 
various other domestic reasons], are not measured by national accounts statistics" (p. 27),
88 The government launched the 1983 crackdown on the 23rd o f  March and several people were 
held and property confiscated by the National Anti Economic Sabotage Tribunal under the Anti Economic 
Sabotage (Special Provision) Act. The detainees were subject to the same treatment as those detained 
under the Preventive Detention Act o f  1962. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) write: "The actions taken 
during the crackdown beginning on 23 March 1983 were codified retrospectively by the Economic and 
Organised Crime Control Act 1984 No. 13 (Principal Legislation) which listed and defined these economic 
offences in the schedule: exchange control offences; bribery and corruption; bribery o f  participants in 
sports events; hoarding commodities; leading organized crime; hoarding o f money; fraudulent schemes, 
games, and artifices, theft o f public property, etc; persons conveying or having possession o f goods
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Edward Sokoine outlined their activities:
"in border regions, he said, they smuggled out goods which they then 
sold, and bought goods to smuggle back and sell at high prices; 
people registering as tour operators engaged in foreign exchange 
fraud; people with import permits over-invoiced them and retained the 
difference; some people in Government and parastatals paid in foreign 
currency were paid in local currency and credited with the difference; 
some telephone subscribers did not pay their bills because they knew 
the staff; some diplomatic personnel abused the personal imports 
regulations; bogus contractors hoarded building materials in order to 
inflate costs later" (quoted in Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, p. 
xiii).
Later, Prime Minister Sokoine identified four major groups that dominated 
racketeering as (i) "dealers who smuggled out foreign currency, especially via 
tourists"; (ii) "those who smuggled out of the country property and goods like cattle, 
gold, ploughs, medicines, radio sets and batteries"; (iii) "hoarders, profiteers and 
speculators who exercised some sort of monopoly buying large quantities of goods, 
storing them, and so exacerbating the scarcity of essential goods"; and (iv) "a group 
of Government and parastatal leaders who either directly or indirectly collaborated 
with these economic saboteurs" (quoted in Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, p. 
xiv).89
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) differentiate between two approaches to 
the second economy: the conventional dysfunctional approach - which sees such 
activities as mere passing phenomena "reflecting moral decay or the disintegration 
of standards of proper behaviour ... [or] departures from established economic and 
social norms of equilibrium" which are "necessarily antipathetic to the healthy 
development of modem economic and social service structures" (p. 30); and an
suspected o f  having been stolen or unlawfully acquired; unlawful sale o f designated authority goods; 
authorization o f unlawful supply o f  designated authority goods; occasioning loss to specified authority; 
cattle theft; stock theft; interfering with a necessary services (National Security Act, 1970); using firearms, 
etc; offences against conservation o f wildlife; offences in relation to the Gemstone Industry (Development 
and Protection) Act 1970); unlawful prospecting, etc.; offences in relation to the Diamond Industry 
Protection Ordinance, and theft o f mail matter" (p. xv).
89 Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) present a detailed analysis o f the manner in which these 
activities are carried out, the size o f such activities and their sectoral distribution. See, for instance, 
chapters 2-4.
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alternative view - which sees second economy activities not as a passing 
phenomenon but as a "vibrant and steadily rising economic sector", fulfilling, at 
least in part, "positive functions which are not adequately fulfilled by existing social 
economic structures" or as "adaptations to social or market forces working towards 
societal harmony or equilibrium", "a healthy reaction to the pathology of the state" 
(pp. 32-33).
Next, they discuss the growth of the informal sector90 and see the second 
economy as the "broadening and intensification of informal sector activities in almost 
every aspect of economic life" and, unlike the usual characterisations of the informal 
sector, not confined to urban areas alone (pp. 34-35). This enables them to include 
"not just the usual informal self-help activities often initiated with honest (legal) 
objectives in the face of bureaucratic indifference or outright hostility” but also 
"activities with illegal objectives such as drug trafficking, smuggling and poaching" 
in their understanding of the second economy.91 But they further divide this latter 
class of (illegal) informal sector activities into those originating from within the 
government sector (i.e., those involving misuse of government machinery and 
privileges) and those originating outside the government sector (including smuggling, 
drug-trafficking, black-marketeering, etc.).
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa discuss six factors that contributed significantly 
to the "expansion of the informal sector and hence the growth of the second 
economy": (i) rural-urban migration in search for jobs; (ii) declining employment 
opportunities in the formal sector; (iii) declining food availability; (iv) disincentives 
for the expansion in the formal sector, including excessive and inefficient 
government regulations; (v) inadequate legal and institutional control mechanisms 
to back up and supervise the government’s interventionist programmes; and (vi) the 
economic crisis (pp. 37-40).
90 Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) define the informal sector as "groups o f  semi-organized and 
unregulated activities ... largely undertaken by self-employed persons" - which the earlier dual economy 
model was incapable o f  dealing with; see p. 34)
91 Such a definition would also bring within the scope o f  the second econom y, the much smaller- 
scale o f activities are represented by the matapeli or the conmen who also seek to defraud, on a much 
smaller scale than those mentioned earlier, but with higher visibility.
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But equally, it does appear that this is an excessive number of factors and 
perhaps the main ones are just two: (i) the failure of the state-controlled planned 
economy to provide adequate economic growth, employment and social services 
(including food and basic commodities); and (ii) the series of international events in 
the 1970s which affected the growth prospects of a vulnerable developing economy.
A possible response to the counter-factual question of whether or not the 
second economy would have grown in the same proportion in the absence of the 
external shocks is to say that the 1 silent dissatisfaction and the withdrawal from the 
official market to black market" (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, p. xi) were 
inevitable consequences of the structural features of the statisation of economy and 
civil society and to argue that the external shocks leading to the economic crisis had 
only pushed forward the growth of the second economy by a few years. In other 
words, the second economy has an internal dynamic of its own.
It is clear that the state was central to the operations of the second economy, 
since, as Maliyamkono and Bagachwa point out, it was the state which defined what 
was legal and illegal as also what was public and what was private (p. 48). Since the 
state regulates economic activity through policy directives and administrative 
machinery, they point out that "the very authority, legitimacy and credibility of the 
state depends on its success in regulating and enforcing its policy directives" (id.). 
If the emergence of the second economy is placed against this background, it can be 
clearly seen "as a reflection of the weakening of state control, and [of] not only the 
inability of the state to provide the basic needs of the masses but also its 
ineffectiveness in controlling and co-ordinating its excessive interventionist 
programmes" (ibid., p. 49).92
92 In this context, it is significant to note that following the intensification o f  the crisis and the 
significant cuts in public expenditure on social services in the mid- and late-1980s, various non­
governmental organisations have come up, including those providing the population with alternative means 
to satisfy various basic needs (like security and medical facilities), professional organisations to protect 
various group interests, and organisations to safeguard the environment, w om en’s interests and those o f  
youth. But these being more a phenomenon o f the latter part o f the 1980s when the liberalisation attempts 
were in place, are dealt with in the next chapter. See, especially, section 4 .4 .5 .
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3.6. Conclusions
The Tanzanian state which, under Nyerere, adopted the goal of ujamaa 
socialism through the Arusha Declaration of 1967 set in motion far-reaching changes 
in the economic and political structure of the country. These included the 
nationalisation of all assets (including capital, land and all natural resources), the 
formation of an elaborate system of state-control over production and exchange 
(including ujamaa villages, parastatal organisations and price and exchange rate 
controls), the enforcement of egalitarian systems of income distribution (including 
curbs on salaries and wage earnings), and the incorporation of all social groups 
within the ambit of the party (including organisations of potential dissent such as 
youth, women and workers).
In the late 1970s, the economy faced a crisis of unprecedented proportions 
brought on partly by the structural features of the economy and the deteriorating 
performance of the agricultural sector, and partly by the external shocks to the 
economy, such as a worsening international terms of trade, droughts and floods, the 
break up of the East African Community and the war with Idi Amin’s Uganda. The 
main impacts were a set back in industrial and economic growth and severe 
economic hardship for the people. It was partly in response to this worsening 
economic situation and partly in response to the administrative inefficiency of the 
state that the period from the late 1970s onward saw the enormous growth of the 
informal sector and the parallel or second economy. More than the economic crisis, 
however, it is the development of the second economy that is an important indicator 
of the failure of statism in Tanzania.
The next chapter discusses the various measures adopted by the government 
of Tanzania to tackle the continuing economic crisis and the proliferation of the 
second economy. An important feature of the period after 1982, however, is the shift 
in the state’s approach towards the second economy as part of a larger effort at 
economic and political liberalisation.
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Chapter 4
Indigenous and Sponsored Liberalisation in Tanzania
4.1. Introduction
Though it is convenient to date Tanzania’s commitment to policy reform from 
1986, when Tanzania agreed to the conditionalities that the IMF placed on financial 
assistance, and to see this being facilitated by the election of President Mwinyi in 
the fall of 1985, there are strong indications of change in the economic mood at least 
three years before the Presidential succession. The year 1984, in particular, stands 
as a milestone with the 1984-5 budget introducing partial trade liberalisation, 
removing (certain) subsidies, increasing agricultural producer prices and introducing 
user fees in selected social services. The Tanzanian shilling was then devalued 
substantially and the private sector was consciously encouraged and promoted 
through institutional reforms relaxing government controls over the economy. The 
next section traces the negotiations with the IMF, since they began in 1979, and 
argues that in fact all the indigenous liberalisation attempts were based on the 
original proposal of structural adjustment given by the IMF in 1981, and that these 
differed from the post-1986 reforms only in terms of degree.
The impact of the reforms on the social and economic structure of the 
economy was substantial, with widespread agreement about increasing hardship felt 
by both the urban and rural populations following the abolition of subsidies and the 
inflation following the devaluations. This trend has intensified after 1986 with 
substantial cuts in public expenditure on social services which exacerbated the 
precarious economic situation created by the massive devaluation and price 
decontrol. The third section outlines these effects, dividing them into direct and 
indirect effects, including among the latter the substantial growth of the second 
economy.
The initial response of the government, both to the rise of the second
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economy and the continuing economic crisis, was to tighten its own internal 
structure and operational efficiency. This was mainly done through a stronger 
rhetorical commitment to the ideals of ujamaa. But with corruption and patronage 
worsening as the crisis and the economic hardship intensified, measures like the 
crackdown on ‘economic saboteurs’ had to be repealed in the twin interest of 
utilising the foreign exchange circulating in the second economy as well as of 
appearing more liberal to the international donor community. This uneasy 
coexistence of ujamaa socialism and liberalisation trends has caused an ‘ethical 
duality’, as the fourth section details. This section also discusses two major 
consequences of this ethical duality: firstly, a need for secrecy regarding the exact 
details of the reform; and secondly, a dissatisfaction with the ideals of ujamaa 
socialism. The latter was manifest in two distinct ways, the growing pressure for 
economic reform from within the government apparatus itself and a growing demand 
for a multiparty system. This last resulted in the Zanzibar Declaration of 1991, 
which overturned many of the precepts of the Arusha Declaration. It also succeeded, 
in 1992, in forcing the government to allow the formation of other political parties.
4.2. Structural Adjustment and the IMF
A major factor in the deepening economic crisis in Tanzania which started 
in the late 1970s was the shortage of foreign exchange. As discussed earlier (section 
3.4.2), this was caused by two basic factors. Firstly, there were several unexpected 
demands on national foreign exchange stocks, including, the oil price hikes which 
increased the prices of many essential import required by the manufacturing industry 
and the transport sector (such as machinery, petroleum and petroleum products, 
vehicles and industrial raw materials), an unwanted war with Uganda,93 and food 
imports for famine and flood relief. Secondly, by the late 1970s the country’s export 
revenue was low and falling, because of a fall in producer incentives in the country’s 
main exports, agricultural export crops. These effects were exacerbated by the 
inefficiency and corruption within the parastatal organisations and the government
Biermann and Campbell (1989) quote Avirgan and Honey (1982) to state that Tanzania responded 
"rather hesitantly" to the Ugandan war.
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bureaucracy (e.g., Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, chapter 3, especially, pp. 68- 
71, 86-94).
Since the country had not of course become economically self-reliant, its 
industrial production, agricultural production and infrastructural services were all 
adversely affected by the shortage of foreign exchange. The country therefore 
desperately needed foreign assistance, not only to finance its industrialisation and 
modernisation effort but also to provide the machines, vehicles, raw materials and 
fuel to run its economy and emerge from its economic crisis. It was in this context 
of crisis management, with “less than one week’s worth of foreign exchange needed 
to cover the average import bill", that the government approached the IMF for 
financial assistance in early 1979.94 This section seeks to show that the 
liberalisation measures adopted by the government over the period 1982 to 1986 
were heavily influenced by the 1981 IMF proposals for reform, which the 
government had initially rejected on the basis of the anticipated adverse social 
effects. After briefly outlining the process of negotiation until the signing of the 
agreement with the IMF in 1986, complete with conditionalities, and after sketching 
the various indigenous programmes of economic liberalisation, the section points out 
the similarities between the IMF-sponsored reform and the indigenous reform as well 
as between both these and the memorandum submitted by the IMF to the Tanzanian 
government in 1981.
4.2.1. IMF and Crisis Management : The Initial Years
The initial negotiations with the IMF in 1979 were partly successful but as 
Stein (1990) writes, "[ajttempts to formulate a major program led to a breakdown 
in negotiations by the Fall of 1979, after the government rejected a stringent but
94 This was not the first time that Tanzania had approached the IMF for financial assistance. In 1974, 
the country had drawn on its non-conditional gold tranche and had been granted the low-conditional first 
credit tranche and the first oil facility. But following a further deterioration, its request for a second credit 
tranche (for "an extraordinary credit allowing for financing basic industrial imports" (Biermann and 
Wagao, 1986, p. 142) was made conditional on "domestic credit use by the public sector" (Biermann and 
Wagao, 1987, quoted in Stein, 1990, p. 4). Stein (1990) writes that "at a period when the state was 
interested in expanding its domain and influence, any constraint on the financial instruments to accomplish 
this was unacceptable" and negotiations continued through 1975 and 1976 "with the government drawing 
on the low conditional facility, and the compensatory financing facility” ( p. 4).
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typical set of IMF conditions... [including] significant devaluation, a wage freeze, 
abolition of price controls, higher interest rates, a relaxation of import controls, and 
a reduction in real government spending” (p. 5).95 There seem to be two accounts 
as to what happened next. Stein (1990) maintains that "with the continuing 
deterioration, by 1980 Tanzania returned to the bargaining table" (p. 5). But Kiondo 
(1990) writes that after Tanzania rejected the IMF conditionalities of 1979 - "as a 
matter of principle : that it was totally unacceptable for the IMF to meddle with its 
economic policies" (p. 28) - Nyerere first "castigated the IMF for taking advantage 
of Tanzania’s economic crisis in order to replace its ujamaa policies with capitalist 
oriented ones" in his New Year address to the Reception of the Diplomatic Corps 
in Tanzania in 1980, and then organised an international conference called the 
Arusha Initiative along with Jamaica "where the IMF was criticised for similar 
interventions in Manley’s Jamaica" (p. 28)96.
A three-year standby financial agreement was concluded in September 1980, 
which, importantly, did not include the condition of devaluation - the major 
objection that Nyerere had raised earlier (Stein, 1990, p. 6; Biermann, 1988, p. 176; 
and Biermann and Campbell, 1989, p. 73). Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990, p. 
12) point out that Nyerere’s government was not opposed to the principle of 
devaluation (indeed, Biermann and Campbell (1990, p. 78, note that it had been used 
several times as a policy instrument in 1979) but to the magnitude and timing that 
were being proposed. Nyerere’s main fear was urban violence consequent upon the 
removal of food subsidies and the rise in the cost of living - through the inflationary 
effects of the devaluation - given that there already was considerable hardship due 
to the economic crisis. The timing was also important, for, as Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa, (1990) write, "if it were to take place [in rural areas] after the harvest 
had been sold, low-income peasants with insufficient cash reserves and [who] had 
no access to credit would be worse off because they could not afford the increased
95 Stein (1990) writes, quoting Green (1983, p. 357) that "[i]n early 1979, an interim program was 
constituted providing the country with a compensatory fund facility, and access to the first credit tranche. 
Tanzania was forced to devalue by an eighth to over eight shillings per dollar, but had trouble meeting 
other targets" (p. 5).
96 Kiondo refers this account to Development Dialogue, number 2, 1980.
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prices of food and agricultural inputs immediately following devaluation" (p. 12).
Nevertheless by November 1980 the government could not reach the targets 
set by the agreement of September 1980, partly because of high public sector 
expenditures, and the IMF credit was consequently frozen (Biermann, 1988, p. 176). 
Thus the crisis continued through 1981, as did the negotiations, "despite Nyerere’s 
critique" (Biermann and Campbell, 1989, p. 74). Although discussions in March and 
July 1981 ended in discord, the IMF presented the government with a memorandum 
in September 1981 with a possible programme. According to Stein (1990; p. 7), this 
proposal included:
(a) a devaluation of between 50 and 60 percent followed by monthly
adjustments;
(b) targets for reductions in the budgetary deficit and bank financing;
(c) a wage freeze for the first year;
(d) "commercially sound" parastatal policies, eliminating several subsidies;
(e) raising interest rates and eliminating subsidies on lending rates;
(f) increased producer incentives to farmers;
(g) removal of input import controls leading to price liberalisation; and
(h) the adoption of a single licensing system.
There is some more discrepancy in accounts at this point. Biermann and
Campbell (1989) hypothesise (given the strict silence by the Tanzanian media) that 
an agreement must have been concluded, but nothing came of it because the IMF 
cancelled loan agreements to some 15 countries, including Tanzania, in April 1982. 
Stein (1990), however, states that the government rejected this programme and 
negotiations lapsed for seven months (Stein, 1990, p. 7). As Stein (1990) explains, 
"[a]t this juncture ... the IMF policies were ideologically unacceptable and difficult 
to implement given the problems with the marketing boards" (p. 7). Whatever the 
truth, the point remains that the government was once more bereft of financial 
assistance from the IMF and the crisis continued to worsen, with droughts in 1981- 
82 further affecting exports and also creating a need to import food (Maliyamkono 
and Bagachwa, 1990, pp. 4-5).
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Yet Stein (1990) points out that it was this proposal that was "largely 
implemented between 1982 and 1986 [in the guise of the various indigenous attempts 
at reforming the economy] and also through the 1986 agreement [with the IMF on 
structural adjustment]" (p. 7). With a worsening crisis, Tanzania was forced back 
to negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank in August 1982. But, with the 
growth of nationalist sentiment as well as the hard-line posturing of the international 
financial core, these were abandoned in a mood of hostility. Biermann and Campbell 
(1990) note, on the one hand, that "on-going IMF negotiations were ... interpreted 
from a nationalist perspective so that apprehensions about an impending loss of 
political autonomy remained a valid argument in a society whose socialist model had 
been generally appreciated". On the other, they note that "[w]hereas in 1980 the 
IMF had been obliged to improve its reputation among African debtor states, the 
deepening global depression made conciliation unnecessary ... [and] further, crisis 
management among the core capitalist countries had significantly tilted politics into 
a hard-line posture against the Third World." This "moulded bilateral negotiations 
between the Fund and Tanzania with IMF conditionality leaving no room for 
manoeuvre or compromise" (pp. 77-78).
In addition, by the early 1980s, other foreign donors were alarmed by the 
rapid deterioration in Tanzania’s balance of payments and the mounting debt 
repayment. Some bilateral donors, including Britain, Germany and the United States 
"who, up to 1982, had been sympathetic to Tanzania’s economic policies", began 
to side with the IMF and the World Bank and "tied their assistance to Tanzania on 
condition that an agreement with the IMF is reached" (Kiondo, 1990, p. 29; 
Biermann and Campbell, 1990, p. 77). Kiondo quotes Osborne’s (1988) account of 
the British position, which apparently was the voice of the rest of the donor 
community (except the Scandinavian countries): "British aid policy is to support 
economic reform. Because it was thought that aid to Tanzania in recent years might 
not be used to maximum effect, no new capital aid projects have been started except 
activities such as road maintenance to protect earlier investments. Other donors have 
adopted somewhat similar policies... Britain has promised substantial support to help 
implement an economic reform programme in Tanzania if one is agreed with the 
International Monetary Fund" (p. 29). Kiondo (1992, Table 2.1., p. 25) illustrates
the decline in net disbursement of overseas development assistance to Tanzania from 
a peak of 702.7 million US dollars in 1981 to a low of 486.9 million in 1985, a 
decline of more than 30 percent in a period of 5 years.
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, (1990), however, argue that Tanzania’s 
traditional donors did not "give up on her, despite the IMF argument that lending 
should depend on prior agreement", but that this period coincided with conservative 
market-favouring governments in these donor countries (p. 114).97 and this meant 
that "the IMF was able to pressurise Tanzania with more intensity" (p. 115). They 
quote the former British Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe to say: "only by 
agreeing terms with the ‘international financial institutions’ would African countries 
find willing donors in Europe and the US. ‘There is ever wider recognition that 
peace and reconciliation, political stability and the discipline of economic liberalism 
are the key to national recovery’" (id.). Further, fearing pending insolvency, many 
private banks "drastically reduced their credit lines and finally cancelled them in 
1984" (Biermann and Campbell, 1989, p. 74). Later, according to Campbell (1990), 
"representatives of the Fund lobbied the Nordic States - the biggest donors to 
Tanzania - saying that their aid needed to be monitored more responsibly" and 
subsequently, "the long-standing western "donor" agencies of the Nordic States 
joined in the call for an agreement with the IMF in what was described as the need 
for discipline in the Tanzanian bureaucracy" (p. 59).
This is the background to the Tanzanian government's attempts to reach a 
compromise with the IMF which took the form of attempts at indigenous 
liberalisation over the period 1982 - 1986 and which, according to one analyst, was 
basically the memorandum for action proposed by the IMF in 1981 (Stein, 1990).
4.2.2. Conditionalities and Indigenous Liberalisation (1982 - 1986>
Alongside the negotiations with the IMF, the government introduced an 
emergency strategy for dealing with the crisis called the National Economic Survival 
Programme (NESP). Announced in May 1981, the NESP was however not a
97 The reference obviously is to Reagan in the United States, Thatcher in Great Britain and Kohl in 
West Germany.
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success. It has been described as a "hasty, ill-conceived, and ineffective program" 
(Stein, 1990, p. 8) and as "a set of incoherent targets" (Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa, 1990, fn 18, p. 182), with its principal weakness being unrealistic targets 
and a reliance on state directives for economic action. Thus, Loxley (undated 
mimeo; quoted in Kiondo, 1990, p. 28) writes: "It relied principally upon directives 
to state entities and moral exhortation to peasants and workers. But directives per 
se were of little value in a situation of acute goods shortages and the mobilisation 
of workers and peasants on a purely political basis was, by 1981, almost futile in 
Tanzania". The evidence demonstrates that the plan was not based on a realistic view 
of the economic capacity of the society. Stein (1990) shows that targets were 
ridiculously optimistic and running as high as 16 times the level of production in 
previous years. With such unrealistic targets, based in part on a lack of an 
understanding of the technical limits of ‘hoe agriculture’, the party and government 
called on the peasants to double production. The rural population could hardly make 
sense of the exhortation of NESP to produce more when the bureaucrats and 
managers were openly flouting the egalitarian ideals of ujamaa. With its design 
inadequate to mobilise people and resources, the NESP performed badly and most 
variables (exports, industrial output, etc.) moved in a direction opposite to the one 
projected.
By 1981, the government had abandoned the NESP and had embarked on 
another reform programme, this time with the help of the Tanzania Advisory Group, 
"an external Independent Advisory Group of sympathetic academics" (Stein, 1990, 
p. 9).98 Termed the government’s "first major attempt to redress the deteriorating 
economy" (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, p. 8), the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) covered a three-year period from 1982 to 1985 and aimed to 
"restore public sector finances, reduce inflation, and to improve both external and 
internal balances". It also aimed at "restructuring the economic activity through a 
system of incentives to producers, rationalising Government spending, introducing
98 According to Kiondo (1990, fn. 5 , p. 43): "The Tanzania Advisory Group (TAG) was established 
in late 1981 on the basis o f  an agreement between former President Nyerere and the former World Bank 
President McNamara. It was financed by an IDA Technical Assistance Credit. The members agreed upon 
by both Tanzania and the World Bank were Messrs. Michanek (Head), C. Pratt and C. K. Helleiner. 
Professors B. Van Arkadie and J. Loxley served in the group’s Secretariat".
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measures to improve capacity utilization and labour productivity, and strengthening 
the planning system by instituting more effective budgeting, monitoring and 
enforcement of priorities" (ibid., pp. 8-9).
In concrete terms, the government increased the level of incentives to 
agricultural producers as well as investment in agriculture, devalued the currency, 
sought to rationalise the marketing and distribution systems through various 
measures, including the abolition of restrictions on inter-regional trade, the system 
of pan-territorial pricing for agricultural commodities and the crop export taxes and 
the reduction of the list of items with price controls (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 
1990, p. 9; Eriksson, 1991). But although these measures succeeded to some extent 
in "reducing costs and increasing the efficiency of Government operations", the 
success of SAP depended crucially on anticipated foreign capital inflow which did 
not materialise (id.). Thus, the SAP measures did not halt the declining growth in 
the productive sectors of industry and agriculture and inflation continued to rise at 
30 percent per annum and shortages of food and consumer goods were continued.
The SAP, however, is an important attempt at reform since it contained 
elements of the proposal outlined in the previous section and signalled "a significant 
departure from the previous dominant mode of thinking within the state" (Stein, 
1990, p. 9). Yet at that time the Minister of Planning felt that the SAP "would 
enable Tanzania to revive the economy without prejudicing government policy on 
socialism and self reliance" (Biermann and Campbell, 1989, p. 76, emphasis added). 
This combination of liberalisation and ujamaa ideology within the SAP is perhaps 
explained by the twin imperatives of indicating to the international community that 
it was prepared to go along with the IMF while keeping in line with the official 
party ideology. Thus, Stein (1990) notes that "like the IMF, SAP recognised the 
need for control of the overall financial aggregates [but] only at a more moderate 
rate of truncation" (p. 9). He then notes that there were, however, several areas of 
discord still and these were the areas that appeared to preserve the elements of the 
socialist model that had been operating. Thus, Stein (1990) writes, "while proposing 
liberal elements, the SAP still contained a series of directive policies, particularly 
with respect to controlling parastatals" and quotes from the SAP document a "threat 
of "appropriate action" against those responsible for "flagrant departures from
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budgets" (p. 10).
Further, the government took the attitude that visible signs of economic crisis 
like shortages of food and essential commodities were because of the operation of 
‘economic saboteurs’ (see section 3.5.3 in the previous chapter) and concentrated 
efforts on clamping down on activities such as hoarding and black-marketeering 
(Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, especially the Prelude). This diverted attention 
from what are, arguably, the real causes of the crisis and which liberalisation 
measures even in the SAP were attempting to address. Thus, it seemed that the crisis 
was being ‘attacked’ by the government separately from its plans for re-starting 
economic growth. Thus, Stein (1990) writes that "increasing centralization and 
control through directive measures continued beyond the introduction of SAP" and 
that the Anti-Sabotage Act of 1983 was "clearly the most overt attempt by the state 
to extend its punitive arm in support of central control of the economy" (p. 10).
By 1984, however, the pressure by donor countries was beginning to push 
Tanzania in the desired direction and the June 1984 budget announced significant 
liberalisation measures including abolition of subsidies in various economic sectors 
(notably maize flour and fertilizers), reduction of a number of commodities from the 
price-control list and the devaluation of the Tshilling (Biermann, and Wagao, 1986, 
p. 146; Malima, 1986, p. 134 and Kiondo, 1992, p. 25).
But perhaps the most radical aspect of the budget of 1984 was the fact that, 
for the first time, the government took the line that the crisis was not the result of 
economic sabotage, and instead that such activity was to be condoned in the interests 
of the country. This ‘absolution of the saboteurs’ took the form of partial trade 
liberalisation measures whereby people with their own foreign currency were 
allowed to import commodities and sell them at market-determined prices (Ndulu, 
1984; Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990; Kiondo, 1990). The government, 
following the lead of the then premier Edward Sokoine first allowed residents to 
import commercial vehicles (particularly pick-ups) "whenever they could secure 
foreign exchange outside the official allocation system" (Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa, 1990, pp. 14 and 115) and then extended this provision "to cover the 
importation of a specified range of consumer, intermediate and capital goods by 
introducing the own-funded import scheme" (p. 14). In addition, an ‘export-to-
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import’ scheme was introduced whereby exporters were allowed to retain 10 per cent 
of their export revenue. In fact, Biermann and Wagao (1986) write, "the government 
offered absolution to the racketeers who hoarded the foreign currency" and virtually 
invited them to "invest their money-capital and to import duty-free, those 
commodities that were not locally available" (p. 146). Despite its ideological 
implications, such partial trade liberalisation significantly improved the foreign 
exchange situation with the provision of a "second window" value for the shilling, 
while retaining the official value" (Kiondo, 1990, p. 30) permitting illegal foreign 
exchange to be used for the country’s economic development."
Kiondo (1990, p. 26) feels that this particular reform was politically 
significant for two reasons. In the first instance it offered another, significant, 
indication to the IMF and to the donor community that the government was ready 
to cooperate, since the devaluation issue had been almost the only point of 
disagreement between the government and the IMF. Thus, according to Kiondo 
(1990), partial trade liberalisation became "the central dynamic force behind the 
current liberalisation movement but it also provided a compromise between the 
government and the IMF on the long-debated issue of currency devaluation" (pp. 25- 
26).100
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this legitimisation of the activities 
of the domestic second economy not only spurred its growth but also won for its 
operators, "supporters in the Party and government" under the banner of 
liberalisation (Kiondo, 1990, p. 30). In fact, as Malima (1986 : cited in Kiondo, 
1992, pp. 26-27) observes, attempts to control the prices of imported goods (after 
1984) were resisted not only by the business interests but also "by their spokesman 
in the party and government". The partial liberalisation of trade was novel and 
unprecedented and follows a shift in the government’s perspective on the second
"  Campbell (1986), thus writes, "[i]n reality, the liberalisation o f trade was a surreptitious route by 
which the state could institute a dual exchange rate" (p. 21; quoted in Kiondo, 1990, p. 30). Kiondo 
(1990) notes that the price o f commodities in the shops were at the prices set by the importers with their 
own exchange - even when the street price o f dollar was TSh 150 when the official rate was only Tsh 17.
1 DO The IMF had demanded massive devaluation as one o f  the key pre-conditions for an agreement 
while the government had conceded only a modest exchange rate adjustment (e .g ., Kiondo, 1992, Malima, 
1986).
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economy, as Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, (1990) point out, from an undesirable 
passing phenomenon to a vibrant and steadily rising economic sector fulfilling some 
positive functions not adequately fulfilled by existing state structures (pp. 32-33). 
Thus, the 1984 budget was not, as Stein (1990) asserts, "simply a continuation of 
a trend" in all respects and in particular, it is not entirely true that "there [is] ... no 
new socio-economic approach as such" (p. 11). With both external and now internal 
pressures, the government had virtually irreversibly committed itself to reform by 
1984.101
But as a precondition to an agreement with the IMF, the government had to 
produce a three-year programme which "defined the nature and scope of reforms that 
Tanzania was going to undertake" (Kiondo, 1990, p. 31). This was the Economic 
Recovery Programme, adopted in July 1986, and constituting an organic extension 
of the Structural Adjustment Programme of 1982-85. It aimed at the gradual 
attainment of a sustained growth in real income and output, correction of external 
imbalances, reduction of the internal deficit and inflation and incentives for all types 
of producers (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, p. 10). In August 1986, Tanzania 
submitted a "Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies" to the IMF 
"indicating the adjustments it would undertake over an 18 month period" and on 
August 28th 1986, the IMF agreed to a standby arrangement subject to the 
government’s performance on criteria it had submitted (Stein, 1990, p. 12).
Political leaders continued to emphasise that liberalisation in Tanzania was 
not just an event initiated by the 1986 signing of the IMF accord, but a social 
process with "transformatory ramifications linked to a continuum predating the 
accord" (Campbell and Stein, 1990, p. 6).
4.2.3. IMF and Structural Adjustment (1986 - 19911
The IMF’s structural adjustment programme in Tanzania is embodied in the 
ERP and its successor programmes, the Economic and Recovery Programme 2 (ERP
101 As a continuation o f the theme o f external trade liberalisation, an Open General Licence (OGL) 
scheme was introduced in 1988 to extend the range o f goods which could be freely imported (Eriksson 
and Lundahl, 1989, pp. 26-27).
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2) implemented between 1989 and 1992 (also called the Economic and Social Action 
Programme (ESAP)) and the recently mooted Priority Social Action Programme 
(PSAP). The close similarity in the objectives and reform measures of these 
programmes and those of their predecessor programmes has led Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa (1990, p. 18) to consider the former to be an organic extension of the 
latter. They write: 'Tndeed much of what was incorporated in the agreement with 
the IMF had been enacted previously. Slight differences between the SAP and ERP 
reforms relate to the speed and intensity of adjustment and the extent to which 
various policy instruments were relied upon to influence economic activity" (p. 18). 
The details of this 1986 agreement include the following initial targets:102
1. an initial exchange rate adjustment followed by regular monthly adjustments;
2. ceilings on domestic credit of the banking system to the government;
3. limits on domestic assets of the banking system;
4. limits on total bank credit to certain major parastatals
5. cumulative reduction in external payments arrears through cash and limits on 
the accumulation on new debt;
6. limits on new external borrowing contracted or guaranteed by the government 
for 1986-87, a 1-15 year maturity range, and none permitted by the 
government or public sector guaranteed by the government; and
7. limits on the budget deficit.
Most of these were specified for each quarter over the period 1986-87 with 
reviews at the beginning and end of 1987, to decide targets for the rest of 1987 and 
1987-1988 respectively. Other targets, such as for increasing real interest rates, 
producer prices, taxes on petroleum products and for reducing income tax rates, the 
number of controlled prices and salary increases, were similar to those contained in 
the ERP in terms of magnitude and pace. (Stein, 1990, p. 14). Tanzania was also 
prohibited from:
1. imposing or intensifying restrictions on payments and transfers of
international transactions;
102 These are from Stein (1990, pp. 12-14) where full details are available, A summary o f  ERP 
measures is available in Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990), p. 10.
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2. introducing multiple currency practices;
3. concluding bilateral payments on certain types of agreements; and
4. imposing or intensifying import restrictions for balance of payment reasons.
As Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) summarise it: “Policy actions undertaken by 
the Government in pursuit of the ERP reform have included regular monthly 
adjustment in the exchange rate and introduction of a crawling peg; consolidation of 
the partial import liberalisation measures; measures to improve agricultural 
marketing structures, further relaxation of controls, and a more active role of 
increased producer incentives to stimulate agricultural output. These measures were 
to be accompanied by reforms in the fiscal, monetary and interest rate structures in 
order to cut down inflation, and to instil discipline and improve efficiency in the 
allocation of domestic resources'* (p. 10).
In comparison with the Structural Adjustment Programme (1982 - 1985), 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) write that the Economic Recovery Programme 
(1986 - 1989) has witnessed "deeper and more far-reaching institutional reforms, 
especially in the reorganisation of crop marketing institutions, the increasing role of 
the private sector in the various sectors of the economy and the scaling down of the 
quantity of public sector services" (p. 19).
In addition to the similarity of the 1986 reform package with its predecessor 
programmes, Stein (1990) points out that there are a number of similarities between 
this and the original 1981 IMF proposal that Tanzania had rejected. The extent of 
devaluation and the targets for bank financing and interest rates were roughly the 
same while other similar proposals included "liberalising price controls, reducing 
parastatal budget support, and removing subsidies from petroleum products" (pp. 14- 
15). There were some differences in degree, for instance, "producer prices were set 
in a more rigid range than in the 1981 memo". Although some conditions from the 
1981 proposal had been dropped, including "reducing the subsidy on sembe [maize] 
and reducing import controls on essential inputs", these had already been undertaken 
in the indigenous liberalisation programmes of the previous years (through, for 
instance, foreign exchange owner/earner schemes). He thus concludes that "by 1986, 
Tanzania had largely accepted the package it had so vehemently rejected five years
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back" (p. 15).
The 1986 standby agreement between Tanzania and the IMF was followed 
in October of the next year by a three-year Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) 
with the third year "left open pending negotiations over an Extended Structural 
Adjustment Facility [SAF]" (Stein, 1990, p. 14). There was some delay in 
implementing the SAF in both 1987 and 1988 because of disagreements over the rate 
of devaluation, but the government finally agreed to speed it up. Although Tanzania 
passed all the IMF reviews until January 1988, it failed the last one, reportedly due 
to an excessive growth of money supply, and this made it ineligible for the final 
tranche (id.). In 1988, the World Bank gave a loan from its International 
Development Agency’s "special program to assist low-income countries in Africa" 
which is reported to be "primarily for restructuring industry and for trade 
adjustments" (id.).
4.3. The Impact of Liberalisation
From the preceding sections it must be clear that liberalisation in Tanzania 
dates from 1982, when the government attempted to reform the economic system on 
its own, and not just from 1986, when the need to arrive at an agreement with the 
IMF forced Tanzania to accept the conditionalities of structural adjustment. But it 
is equally clear that the post-1986 liberalisation was qualitatively different from that 
in the preceding period in terms of both intensity of reform and speed of 
implementation. The final impact on the economic, social and political structures, 
thus, reflects a combination of these different attempts to liberalise the economy.
The reforms have had a generally favourable economic impact at the macro­
level, especially after 1986. But, in addition to this direct impact on the variables 
it was supposed to affect, there have been three major indirect effects of the reforms 
since 1986: (i) greater availability of foreign exchange; (ii) greater growth of the 
second economy; and (iii) a drastic reduction in social service expenditure and, 
hence, in the provision of basic needs. But first the direct effects are discussed in 
greater detail.
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4.3.1. Implementation of reforms : Direct effects
In his speech to the National Assembly on the 16th of June 1988, the 
Minister of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning summarised the achievements 
of the ERP (1986 - 1989) before presenting the Annual Development Plan and 
Revenue and Expenditures Estimates for 1988-89. This summary stated that the 
programme was "generally on track" with GDP having exceeded the population 
growth rate during in the two years after 1985 but not having reached the annual 
growth rate target yet. Government borrowing from the banking system had declined 
although the budget continued to depend heavily on foreign resources - "indicating 
the distance from a self-sustaining economy" (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, 
p. 20). Inflation had fallen in 1986 and 1987 but was still well over the ERP target. 
And "foreign exchange continues as the major constraint although the declining trend 
in export earnings which persisted until 1985-6 has been halted and reversed" (id.).
In general terms, therefore, there were positive signs of economic revival 
with export crop production recovering significantly after having declined on a trend 
for more than a decade. As the quarterly review of the economy, Tanzania 
Economic Trends notes: "While ERP targets for imports have not been quite 
achieved, the very considerable build-up of imports has been sufficient to ease the 
veritable ‘goods famine’ of the early 1980s and to provide the incentive goods and 
inputs for the revival of agricultural production" (quoted in Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa, 1990, p. 23). Food crop production and trade had also improved.
But this improved performance may not have been solely due to the producer 
incentives. As Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, (1990) point out, good weather in most 
parts of the country for the period 1985-88 may have been a significant factor in a 
country where "smallholder farmers who account for about 90 per cent of 
marketable agricultural output depend mainly on rainfed agriculture" (p. 22). They 
also point out that the increased export production has not led to increases in the 
dollar value of exports, partly because of the slump in world commodity prices in 
the early 1980s, and partly because of "ginning problems for cotton, processing 
difficulties for tobacco, cashew nut diseases and the general poor state of marketing 
and transportation of crops" (id.).
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But after a decade or so of liberalisation efforts, there had been some 
‘dramatic effects’ on the Tanzanian economy.103 The number of goods with 
controlled prices had dropped from 400 in 1986 to 10 in 1990. The ratio of public 
to private investment had declined from 122 percent in 1981 to 38 percent in 1989. 
The Tanzanian shilling had been devalued from 17 to the US dollar in 1986 to 230 
to the dollar in 1991. Real wages of government workers in 1991 were only 14 
percent of what they were a decade ago. The total foreign debt has grown nearly by 
nearly half 3.5 billion US dollars in 1986 to 5.1 billion US dollars in 1989 (ibid.).
But there had been a failure to reduce the level of the overall budget deficit 
which "partly reflects the slow growth in public revenue which is a result of a 
combination of a low tax base, inefficiency in tax collection, growing incidence of 
tax evasion and the general low level of economic activity during the recession 
period" and partly "stems from government’s reluctance to reduce recurrent spending 
which consists largely of wages and salaries of public workers whose incomes have 
already been severely eroded to bare minimums by the adverse economic situation" 
(id.). As seen earlier (see section 4.3) this led to the cancellation of the third tranche 
by the IMF in 1988.
More qualitatively, the new economic environment of increased competition 
has meant a greater availability of substitutes, in both the consumer and producer 
market, and with the increase in consumer options even parastatals have to compete 
for their customers. They have begun to advertise their goods and services and both 
private and parastatal firms have had to improve the quality of goods and cost 
efficiency (Eriksson, 1991).
Trade liberalisation and price decontrol have caused a decentralization of 
decision making, with a concomitant decrease in state intervention. But it has been 
suggested that these may be more apparent than real (Eriksson, 1991). While many 
state enterprises are now formally free to set their own prices, in reality the 
government still interferes in price setting. The pricing of goods and services 
perceived to be important, such as fares of air flights and rail journeys cannot be set 
without approval from the government although these services are not formally price
103 Africa R ecovery, July-Sept. 1990, p. 14.
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controlled. Entrepreneurial decisions remain centralised and operational decisions 
such as price and wage setting, decisions on employment, inputs and output are still 
highly (though not entirely) influenced by the bureaucracy. This implies that 
parastatal managers have little flexibility in cutting costs "by closing uneconomic 
lines, laying off staff, changing suppliers, and cutting down the various services they 
provide to staff" (World Bank, 1988b, p. 27). But, it appears that more competent 
managers are now being appointed (Eriksson, 1991).
The reform of parastatal organisations has only been superficially 
successful.104 Although a number of parastatals have been sold to private operators 
or liquidated, many have only been transferred to other government institutions.105 
This process of parastatal reform is incomplete and, despite repeated commitments 
have been made to the reduction of public sector and the closure of loss-making 
parastatals, changes have been on a case-by-case basis and a comprehensive 
restructuring programme has been delayed (Moshi, 1990, pp. 3, 22, 31).106
Despite rhetoric since the mid 1980s, and particularly since the ERP of 1986, 
stressing the financial accountability of commercial parastatals, and pronouncements 
that loss making parastatals ought not to be ‘bailed out’, Moshi (1990) points out 
that the government itself has tried to ‘bail out’ inefficient parastatals (such as the 
National Milling Corporation). It has also converted bank loans unserviced by 
parastatals into equity. But the government is not alone in maintaining economic 
inefficiency. Pointing out that practically all parastatals receive donor support in one 
form or another, Eriksson (1991) notes that "since the heavy devaluations began in 
1986, donors have become very active in attempting to bail out the recipients of 
their aid from the cash cover requirements", and further that "cost consciousness
104 For a listing o f  the more than 200 public enterprises still in operation, see IMF, 1991, pp. 732-
733.
105 Ngowi (1990) notes that only some twenty parastatals have been shut down and their assets either 
sold to private owners or handed over to other state institutions (p. 46). In agriculture, the activities earlier 
performed by Crop Authorities have been replaced by cooperative Boards (e .g ., for coffee, cotton, 
tobacco and cashew). For further details, see Kiondo, 1992, pp. 32-33.
10fi A notable failure, is the inefficient and expensive national milling corporation (NM C), whose role 
and functions have been redefined many times but in practice has continued to perform and function in 
the same manner as before. Its institutional body has remained intact and in fact the NMC has recently 
expanded its activities into selling sugar in mobile retail outlets.
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tends to be lower in aid financed projects" than in domestic projects.
With ERP 2, parastatals have been subordinated to a complex structure of 
supervisory and control agencies, with each parastatal being affiliated with a 
Ministry as well as, frequently, a holding company, particularly within trade and 
industry.107 It remains to be seen whether or not this successfully instils economic 
discipline.
A significant change in the rural areas has been the informal transformation 
of land from public to private property through the introduction of long-term leasing 
of land in 1983. Large farms are now permitted to lease land from the state for 33 
years and individuals for 99 years. Although, being the formal owner, only the State 
is able to own, lease and receive rent from land, once the land has been developed 
and cultivated, whatever is on the land may be leased by the user. While this has 
provided greater incentives to invest in agriculture, the practice does not seem to 
have become widespread.108
Areas within the infrastructural network still requiring reform are 
agricultural marketing and financial structure. The former has been on the agenda 
for quite some time but it still appears to be a politically sensitive issue.109 But 
agricultural cooperatives, not formally state owned but resembling state 
organisations, have been re-introduced in 1984.110 Subordinated to the party, they 
are financially dependent on the government like parastatals. In the banking sector,
107 The government is now, for instance, scrutinising the role o f  the holding companies and is 
considering merging and/or dismantling them. It is also setting up a new organisation to centralise the 
control o f parastatals into one single body. For further details, see URT (1990), World Bank, (1988), pp 
8-9; and N gowi (1990).
108 Land rights differ to a certain degree between crops and areas. In coffee-growing areas, or where 
cash crops are intensively grown, land rights are more developed and formal restrictions on user and 
property rights have not been enforced to the same extent as in other areas. A system o f customary land 
tenure has developed which implies that land can be inherited and that clan land is legal.
109 However, there are indications that more substantial changes might be forthcoming. The party 
has decided to let the cooperatives become independent organisations (Daily News, 17th July, 1990) after 
pressure for change from the donor community, for example. Nevertheless it remains to be seen whether 
the expectations regarding the dismantling o f the NMC will be realised.
110 Although originally a part o f the rural production and marketing network, cooperatives were 
abolished in 1973 following political fears regarding their growing power and influence. See, for instance, 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, (1990), pp. 64-71.
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despite wide-spread consensus about the need for reform, no institutional change has 
taken place although there have been several proposals.111
The government’s attempts to reduce its own size have, however, had mixed 
success. Although ministries were pruned from 40 to 30 in 1985, they were back to 
38 a few years later. Further, such reductions are largely superficial, having been 
through merging ministries or by re-designating state ministers (who had lost cabinet 
status but retained ministerial privileges).112 Thus President Mwinyi (1987 cited 
in Kiondo, 1992, pp. 32-33) pointed out that although the government planned to lay 
off 12,000 of its workers, it succeeded in doing away with only 4,865. 
Retrenchment of workers was also affected in the parastatals and only about 22,500 
had been laid off by June 1987, By and large, therefore, the state sector in Tanzania 
has remained intact during the implementation of economic programmes in the 
1980s.
But the combination of the several ‘austerity’ measures introduced, such as 
the freezing of wages, the removal of subsidies for many basic commodities and the 
introduction of ‘user’ fees for social services that were previously free, have resulted 
in escalating prices. Thus, between 1979 and 1984, prices rose on average by more 
than 50 percent; rents increased by 85 per cent, fuel, light and water by nearly 60 
percent, and personal care and health care by 50 percent. For urban dwellers, 
average retail prices of goods and services consumed increased by 100 percent 
between 1979 and 1987 with inflation averaging around 30 percent per annum from 
1980 to 1988 (Cheru, 1989; Moma, 1990; Stein, 1990).
4.3.2. Implementation of reforms: indirect effects
But perhaps the indirect impacts of these reforms are more important. Firstly
111 The Banking Commission has just submitted its report and recommendations. Introducing
competition into the banking sector is considered important, and all banks should be free to provide all
sorts o f banking services. The National Bank o f  Commerce should be divided into three banks which
compete on the same markets. It is also proposed that shares should be sold to private including foreign
investors. The report has been well-received by the President who has promised to implement the
recommendations speedily (Daily News, July 20th, 1990).
117 These meant that the entire staff o f merged Ministries has been retained and in essence, escalated 
expenditures since ministerial functions are sometimes replicated.
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and obviously, international financial assistance to Tanzania increased significantly 
after it signed the agreement with the IMF. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) 
write that "ERP reforms have been essential in triggering off donor funding for 
imports, which as a percentage of GDP rose from its low point of 13 percent in 
1983 to 38 percent in 1987" (p. 23).113
Secondly there is concern that the restrictions on public expenditure are "not 
directed at unproductive sectors such as military spending and administration, but 
are taken from expenditure on education and health" (ibid., p. 24). Military 
spending, for instance, had increased in the mid-1980s, when Tanzania increased 
solidarity military assistance to Mozambique and Green (cited in Legum, 1989) 
estimates that by 1987-88 this cost between US$ 125 and 150 million. Side by side, 
the central government shifted the financing of primary education to local 
governments. This, according to Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990), has led to a 
"dramatic decline in the quality and quantity of education because local governments 
have failed to raise sufficient revenues to finance primary education" (p. 24), As a 
result, enrolment in primary schools had dropped by 16 percent from 99.7 per cent 
in 1983 to 83.5 percent in 1985 (ILO, 1988). According to UNICEF figures, real 
per capita expenditure on education was cut nearly by half from 30 TShillings per 
head in 1980-81 to 16 in 1989 (Moma, 1990). This has resulted in a shortage of 
desks, chairs, books, writing materials and a decline in the maintenance of school 
buildings (Roy-Campbell, 1992). The medical budget, similarly, reduced from about 
7 percent of the total government budget in 1977-78 to 5.4 percent in 1982-83 to just 
over 2 percent in 1986-87 (Kiondo, 1990, p. 40). In real terms the expenditure on 
health declined by about 25 percent from 1978 to 1987 (Tungaraza, 1990). This has 
resulted in a shortage of medicines, beds and other medical supplies (Moma, 1990). 
President Mwinyi himself admitted in 1989 that "we had to put a great deal of 
emphasis on increasing production. It was not possible at the same time to put equal 
emphasis on the rehabilitation of the social services. The result is that these essential 
services have sharply deteriorated" (quoted in Moma, 1990, p. 13).
Thirdly there has been a rapid expansion of the second economy, in direct
113 They however go on to point out that a larger and growing proportion o f  this increase is on 
account o f imports under the ‘own funded’ scheme (p. 23). This is discussed below.
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contrast to the government’s initial expectations while introducing the various partial 
import liberalisation measures. This has been traced both to an underestimation of 
the size of the second economy and also to its growth following the liberalisation 
measures (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990).114 After the budget of 1984, 
Malima (1986 : cited in Kiondo, 1992, pp. 26-27) observed, "there is also some 
indication that liberalisation has led to an increase in the smuggling of our 
commodities outside our country ... as the scramble for dollars to import 
commodities which no one can afford mounts".
Contrary to the government’s original expectation, that the own-funded 
scheme would not last very long "because residents would soon exhaust their foreign 
exchange holdings" (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990) observe that this was "an 
underestimation of the potential of the unofficial economy as a source of foreign 
exchange" and, in fact, own-funded imports are "increasingly becoming more 
important than those secured under the import support scheme from donors" (p. 14). 
Both this and the ‘export-to-import’ scheme have resulted in significant increases in 
the share of imports, rising from less than 5 percent of total imports in 1984 to 22 
and 27 percent in 1985 and 1986 respectively (ibid., p. 111). Although the full 
impact of these schemes has yet to be established, they note that "in terms of 
government revenue generation, the effect has been positively spectacular. Customs 
duties and sales taxes levied on own-funded imports rose fourteen times from 77.4 
million Tshillings in 1984 to 1,078.2 million in 1986 (ibid, pp. 111-112).
114 Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) estimate that the size o f  the second economy, on a 
conservative estimate, was about 30 percent o f total economic activity in the country, around 39 billion 
Tshillings worth in 1986 (p. 61).
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4,4, Ethical Duality and Political Re-assessment
4.4.1. Ethical Duality
The party through this entire period and until 1990 was explicitly following 
and working under the ideals of ujamaa socialism, although it underwent a detailed 
and important self-examination. In 1981 it was acknowledged that the economic 
problems then gripping the country were partially a result of "our failure to lead the 
citizens", that "public resources were being destroyed or misused and there was an 
increasing tendency of misappropriation or embezzlement of public property" (CCM, 
1981, pp. 22-80). In other words, the CCM openly acknowledged the fact of the 
crisis and also related it to its "inability to match its action with its own words". 
Addressing the issue of economic crisis, emergence of class contradictions and other 
current problems, the Mwongozo (Guidelines) emphasised the need to bridge the gap 
between ujamaa theory with practice.
Consequently, CCM (1981) emphasised its commitment to socialist 
objectives, and resolved to strengthen the ideological mobilisation of party members 
and non-members. The ideological commitment of the leadership was to enable 
effective supervision of the bureaucracy and to devise an effective system of training 
to perfect its internal organisation. In its 1982 meeting the party re-organised its 
structure, expanding and consolidating its secretariat with central committee 
members being chosen to head various departments of the secretariat.115 These 
changes had significant effects in expanding the party administrative organisation 
with obvious attempts to assemble a bureaucracy that could work alongside the civil 
service and monitor it as well. In essence, these moves seemed to be directed 
towards enhancing the party’s ability to control the state as well as the civil society - 
a means to "kushika hatamu" (hold the reins of power). Mukandala feels that this 
created a certain degree of elitism - "there are now ordinary members, cadres and
115 An overall secretary to the NEC (National Executive Committee), also to be the Chief o f this 
Service o f the party, was appointed. Regional commissioner and Regional secretary positions were split 
up. A party regional secretary was freed from government work and all regional secretaries were made 
members o f  the NEC. The size o f  the central committee was reduced from 40 members to 18 to make it 
an effective decision-making organ (Mukandala, 1990).
105
those who were waken ketwa (impassioned)1' and the central committee, had begun 
to function "in a politburo fashion",116
This trend continued through the 1980s. Even as late as 1987 the Head of the 
Ideological Section of the CCM presented the 15 year party programme arguing 
emphatically for a need to enhance the productive forces in various sectors of the 
economy (Hartmann, 1991, p, 15). The document saw the role of the private 
sector/capital in ERP as "a temporary measure" thus indicating that the party had 
not changed its perspectives regarding private capital and had not formulated a new 
perspective which could conceptualise the changes that were taking place in the 
country.117 Hartmann (1991) feels that the document failed to relate the attainment 
of "[party] objectives to the material and social capacity existing in the country" (p. 
15). The ujamaa ideology seems to have become distant from the actual conditions 
prevailing in Tanzania as well as from the reforms taking place.
But it was clear to the rank and file that several sections of Tanzanian society 
were violating the norms of ujamaa socialism (section 4.2). Further, with the 
worsening economic crisis - centering on the shortage of foreign exchange, the 
government was forced to make structural adjustments of its own, not only to try 
and solve the crisis but also to try and appease its international creditors. This trend 
grew stronger especially after the budget of 1984. It is the inherent contradiction 
between private accumulation and its open encouragement by explicit government 
policies, on the one hand, and the party’s rhetorical reaffirmation of ujamaa and its 
goals of egalitarianism, self-reliance and African socialism, on the other, that 
Kangero (1989) has called the phenomenon of ‘ethical duality’ in Tanzania. In 
particular, the leadership appeared hypocritical in its condoning of internal excesses,
116 "State power and political institutions in Tanzania in the eighties", unpublished and undated 
paper, but probably 1991 (since it was made available by the author in 1991).
117 The CCM established a seven member committee (of outsiders) to inquire into the party’s affairs, 
and some o f  its recommendations have already been implemented. These include cost-cutting measures 
like closing down the party mini-headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam and firing, retiring, or returning to 
government some o f its employees. CCM has also been making efforts to cleanse itself and reduce 
duplication & overlap between itself and the government; instituting measures to attain financial self- 
reliance etc. Hartmann (1991), however, feels that "many o f the ideas, concept and programmes o f the 
party are a replay o f the 1970s and early 1980s so that one has a sense o f deja vu o f being caught up in 
a sort o f  time warp" (p. 15).
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both within the party and private accumulation within the economy when the rest of 
the economy was facing increasing economic hardship.
These contradictory trends drew strength from three further events. First was 
Nyerere’s stepping down as the President of the Union Republic of Tanzania and the 
election of a known advocate of liberalisation, Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985.118 
Nyerere however stayed on as Party Chairperson. Thus Kangero feels that this 
duality became explicit in political terms with the election of a President with some 
political support for liberalisation and a Party Chairperson who opposed 
liberalisation.
Second, the increasing cuts in public expenditure on social services, following 
the 1986 agreement with the IMF, led to a deterioration in services such as 
education, sanitation and the decreased delivery of health care and those material 
goods on which the hegemony of ujamaa rested (section 4.3.2). This not only 
increased the hardship of both the rural and the urban population but appeared to 
openly flout stated aims of ujamaa such as universal primary education, health care 
and protection of the poor.
The third event, which further strengthened the trend started by the first 
event, was the 1987 Party Annual Meeting where, contrary to expectations, Nyerere 
did not step down as Party Chairperson and was re-elected for a further term. Thus 
the separation of powers in 1985, intended to be a temporary measure until 1987, 
continued. Nyerere’s speeches at this Annual Conference reiterated the message of 
the 1967 Arusha Declaration and warned that the country’s achievements of peace 
and unity would be endangered if injustice and inequalities were allowed to prosper 
because social differentiation would begin "to divide us into classes". He claimed 
that although flexibility in implementation of socialist policies was essential, 
specially in times of economic difficulty, this should not lead to doing away with 
ujamaa goals (Hartmann, 1991, p. 15).
118 Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) note that as President o f  Zanzibar, M winyi "was quoted as 
hailing economic improvements for Zanzibar following the country’s import liberalisation". They go on 
to observe that the two other presidential candidates at the time, former Premier Edward Sokoine and 
former Cabinet Minister Salim Ahmed Salim "saw liberalisation as the immediate option". While Sokoine 
took the first step in the partial trade liberalisation when he permitted the importation o f  pick up trucks, 
even before 1984, Salim liberalised the importation o f nntumba, second-hand clothing at a public rally in 
the south o f Tanzania (ibid., p. 115).
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Throughout the 1980s, therefore, party supremacy continued to legitimise 
interference by party officials in decision-making at all levels of economic activity. 
Nonetheless it is true that under increased pressure from competition and reduced 
subsidies more ready approval was being granted from above for liberalisation 
measures (World Bank, 1988b, p. 34). But it is also undoubtedly true that the 
rhetoric of socialism along with legislation like the leadership code hampered the 
organisation of the legal instruments of the state for individual accumulation.
Three related consequences of the ethical duality are important. Firstly, the 
secrecy under which the reforms were made, including the signing of the agreement 
with the IMF, which contrast sharply with the media attention on the government’s 
opposition to the IMF’s conditionalities. The second and third, namely the growing 
support for economic liberalisation from within the government machinery itself and 
the growing support for a multiparty political system, are related, stemming from 
the undermining of the authority and capability of the single-party state from within 
itself, with the growing disenchantment of the wider population with the party and 
its ideology of ujamaa. These are discussed in the same order but in more detail in 
the three following subsections.
4.4.2. Decision-making for Economic Reform
While the negotiations have been widely-discussed, the actual documents and 
policy measures are virtually inaccessible to the general public. All the discussions 
on the terms of the IMF agreement were held in secret to the point that even the 
members of the cabinet and the national executive of the CCM were apparently 
unaware of the specific conditions until much later. While the Prime Minister and 
the President continued to call for the accord without public discussion, the 
Chairperson of the Party publicly expressed his opposition to an agreement.
It was only at a special conference of the National Executive Committee 
(NEC) of the CCM, in April 1986, that the party gave its consent to the Minister 
of Finance to come to an agreement with the IMF. The Minister of Finance 
presented the argument for an accord in terms of the need for foreign exchange. The
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party secretariat, responsible for economic affairs and planing, did not provide a 
counter and approved the signing without any further consultations - an explicit 
instance of absence of democracy within the party.
It has thus been pointed out by some critics that there was subterfuge in the 
approach taken by the Tanzanian government in signing the SAP document as well 
as in the implementation of reforms. Indeed, Kiondo (1992, p. 35) says "Tanzania’s 
reforms are implemented in secretive, unplanned and undemocratic ways" and 
further goes on to give the instance of a Conference held by the managers of some 
parastatal organisations wherein, in a resolution, the managers publicly complained 
that the government kept them in the dark on the details of the Economic Recovery 
Programme. He also points out that the agreement itself is still a mystery to most 
Tanzanians.119 Campbell and Stein (1992) state that "the Tanzanian population was 
never officially informed of the decision to come to an agreement" (p. 15).120 
Apparently, the Prime Minister once refused to discuss the Tanzanian government- 
IMF negotiations in Parliament by declaring that whether or not Tanzania reached 
an agreement was the prerogative of the government (Campbell, 1986, p. 16). From 
this, Kiondo concludes, that the nature of the state was changing with the changes 
in the politically dominant economic actors.
This approach of the Tanzanian government is inconsistent with its populist 
style and, especially, the guidelines of the party under the ideology of ujamaa. 
Consultations and public debates were denied even through the party structures. 
There could be two possible reasons for this: either, as Nyerere stressed, a fear that 
the IMF conditionalities could have volatile political consequences, capable of 
sparking off civil protests and disorder - and hence, the argument that the less the 
people know the better; or, the embarrassment of having to publicly embrace what 
the government has been known to have opposed fiercely and openly hitherto.
119 Kiondo (1992) asks, "When was it signed? What does it contain? Could Tanzanians have stopped 
it if  they thought it was not in their interest?" (p. 35). He claims that the contents o f  the document were 
hinted at different points in time and the only reporting was on what had been done rather than consulting 
on what was to be done.
190 The first public statement by the Head o f the State that there was an accord came as an item in 
the government-owned D aily News in October 1986 when, in a meeting with a Minister with Scandinavia, 
President M winyi called for international support for the Economic Recovery Programme.
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4.4.3. Pressure from Within : The Quest for Economic Reform
Another consequence of the ethical duality was the growing support for 
economic liberalisation from the ‘commanding heights’ of the government. 
Following the initial rejection of IMF conditionalities and the deepening economic 
crisis, the movement for reform consolidated itself internally, with the IMF finding 
domestic allies who, in turn, found political supporters within the state. Thus, in 
answer to the question of why Tanzania went in for structural adjustment at the time 
it did, Biermann (1988) and Kiondo (1990) point to the growing political power of 
the pro-liberalisation technocrats and to the growth of ‘domestic allies of 
liberalisation’ within the government, respectively. This argument, however, is made 
in greater detail by Hodd (1986, 1987) but in the more general context of African 
countries.
Hodd (1987) overturns Bates’s (1981) argument - that the ruling elites were 
against liberalisation because of the limited possibilities of private accumulation - by 
pointing out that the fact that several African countries did, in fact, go in for 
structural adjustment must indicate that these elites (after two decades of 
accumulation) might have now felt that either that they would stand to gain by the 
move or that it was time to "improve the circumstances of the larger community" 
(p. 342).121 To him, thus, three factors influenced the timing of structural 
adjustment. Firstly, the realisation by the ruling elites that liberalisation could signal 
new opportunities to accumulate. Secondly, the growing ability of the World Bank 
and the IMF to persuade potential aid donors and commercial lenders that market- 
oriented reforms are essential. Thirdly, the rise to influential positions within 
African governments and bureaucracies of those trained in the same market 
philosophy that the World Bank and the IMF practised - through the extensive 
educational and training links built between Africa and the West, especially by 
institutions like the World Bank.
Biermann’s (1988) analysis in the context of Tanzania is very similar. He
121 In support for this move towards sharing in the spoils, Hodd quotes the example o f the "captains 
o f industry in the 19th century in Europe and North America who turned to increasing philanthropy in 
the latter parts o f  their lives" (id.).
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pictures the technocratic elite - those within the government "nominated according 
to professional qualification and entrusted with the management of the economy" 
who have now matured as a "separate entity within a politicised state apparatus" - 
as confronting the political leadership over the issue of reform and manipulating the 
latter into a position of compliance (p. 177). He goes on to interpret the period from 
the start of the negotiations with the IMF in 1979 to the actual signing of the 
agreement in 1986 as a case of this group of advisors and technocrats manoeuvring 
the government from within the ‘commanding heights’ of the state structure.
Kiondo (1990) adopts a intermediate position, agreeing with the Biermann- 
Hodd type of hypothesis, that the state acceded to liberalisation, "worn down by the 
pressures of international donors and heavily penetrated by the domestic allies of the 
donors", and also with the Bates type of hypothesis that liberalisation was resisted 
because it was antithetical to the interests of the ruling elites - "since these reforms 
amount to a reduction of the state bourgeoisie’ ability to appropriate state resources 
for its own ends, and hence deprive it of its social base of reproduction" (p. 41).
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990), however, prefer the simpler argument 
that the point from which Tanzania began to liberalise was tied in with the departure 
of Nyerere ("just two years before the impending retirement") and that given the 
"conclusive evidence that all three presidential candidates saw liberalisation as the 
immediate option", it is "only sensible to argue that Nyerere preferred a smooth 
transfer of power while bankruptcy was staved off" (p. 115).
4.4.4. Demands for Multipartvism : The Quest for Political Reform
Perhaps the most important consequence of the perceived ‘ethical duality’ and 
the deteriorating economic and social situation (interpreted as a failure of the 
government’s development strategies), is increasing disenchantment with the party 
and its ideology of ujamaa. Such disenchantment can decrease the capability of the 
state to continue to direct the implementation of reform. One measure of this 
disenchantment is the growing demand for political reform, for a multiparty political 
system (among other things). This growing pressure, boosted by the dramatic 
changes of Eastern Europe towards the end of 1989, forced the government to bring
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the issue into the open.
Unofficially, however, the debate about competitive politics has been raging 
for some time now, and the issues being raised have in fact been traced to the 
Constitutional debate in 1983 (Kiondo, 1990). The debate, however, has been 
amorphous, unstructured, and disorganised and has also remained the preserve of the 
urban petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the media.122 In particular, two 
issues appear to be confused: one, whether or not the single party political system 
ought to be replaced by the multiparty system and two, whether or not the CCM 
should continue as the (single) party in charge of the country. At issue here is the 
critical question of whether or not the single party system is democratic, guarantees 
and provides the population with adequate avenues for political expression and 
participation in the political process at all levels. But (as will be elaborated in the 
subsequent chapters on political responses), it would seem that the burning issue is 
democracy rather than single party versus multi party systems. The debate has, 
however, touched on several other issues, such as the analysis of the shortcomings 
and weaknesses of CCM, and whether or not it could correct, cleanse and 
restructure itself to eliminate weaknesses bom of its unchallengeable monopoly of 
power.
The early government attitude to the emergence of such ‘parallel politics’ did 
not, however, create a conducive atmosphere for a well structured debate. When the 
pressure began in 1985, the government reacted in the mainland by arresting and 
detaining those who openly advocated multi-partyism, calling them Wokorofi 
Wachache or ‘a few disgruntled individuals’ (Mukandala, 1984).123 There has, 
nonetheless, been a loosening up of restrictions on political discussions in the 
country thereafter.
An independent survey of political attitudes (Othman, Bavu and Okema,
199 *The latter are basically nascent independent publications like Family M in o r, Business Times, 
M oto, Radi, Mambosasa, Mizani, Sani, and Fahari.
19S ,In Zanzibar, criticism against the Union political and economic structures was termed a 
"pollution" o f  the political atmosphere and forced the ‘resignation’ o f  the then V ice President o f the 
Union, Aboud Jumbe. It was to appease the political pressure for reform, that his successor Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi instituted some liberalisation measures to calm down the people’s pressure. The Union 
government was also forced to institute some political reforms such as a promise to allow people to vote 
for the people’s representatives and for the Zanzibar President.
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1988) just before the 1990 Presidential election showed that over 69 percent of the 
sample surveyed still cherished the single party system while 17 percent wanted 
multi-partyism. Of the latter, 44 percent wanted a multi-party system because it 
implied greater democracy. Of those who preferred one party systems, 89 percent 
did so because of the peace and tranquillity it had brought and would bring. Further, 
96 percent of those sampled thought that CCM should continue while slightly over 
half of the population in the sample would prefer a referendum on the debate 
(Othman, Bavu, and Okema, 1990).
Nyerere himself provided some encouragement to the debate when, in his 
valediction address in June 1990, he stated that "having one party is not God’s will" 
and urged his countrymen to hold a national debate in the best Tanzanian tradition 
on the merits of multipartyism.124 This gave the debate much needed legitimacy.
In January 1991 a Presidential Commission was announced to collect views 
of the people on the future of the country’s political system to be headed by Chief 
Justice Nyalali (and hence known subsequently as the Nyalali Commission). But 
although it was to comprise some twenty people, half of them from Zanzibar, and 
the other half from the mainland, their names were not announced. Almost 
immediately, an independent ‘Steering Committee’ for the change to multi-partyism 
was announced, chaired by Chief A. S. Fundikira, a former Minister of Justice.125 
With the announcement of this Steering Committee, the government immediately 
gave a list of names of its own Presidential Commission, a list which included an 
independent lawyer who had already been named as the Secretary of the Steering 
Committee.126 The government sought ways to legally curtail the activities of the
124 Sunday News, Tanzania, 3 June 1990. Salim Salim, the long time protege o f Nyerere and the 
Tanzanian Secretary General o f the OAU, urged African countries to heed the example o f Eastern Europe 
by combining economic with political pluralism and in its July 1990 summit, the organization pledged to 
democratize further our society and consolidate democratic institutions in our countries".
125 The members included Kasanga Tumbo, a former trade unionist and founder o f an opposition 
party in the early 1960s; Kasela Bantu, a former Member o f Parliament who was expelled from the 
Parliament in late 1960s; James Mapalala, a former trade unionist and an established human rights fighter 
who had been detained several times in the 1980s; Dr. Tenga, a Professor o f Law and a member o f the 
University o f Dar-es-Salaam legal aid association; and Rev. Mtikila, a controversial priest o f  a breakaway 
church.
126 The lawyer, however, declined the Presidential offer because among others he preferred to 
remain with the Parallel Committee.
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parallel committee,127 in 1992, but it officially announced the introduction of 
multipartyism, permitting the formation of political parties provided they satisfied 
certain criteria.128
4.4.5. Political Reform and the Zanzibar Declaration of 1991
The 1991 Zanzibar Declaration by the CCM’s National Executive Committee 
(NEC), officially described as a strengthening of the socialist ideals of the Arusha 
Declaration, is clearly a product of the political flux created by the demands for 
political reform and, in fact, appears to have overturned several essential parts of 
the Arusha Declaration. For instance, the 1967 Leadership Code contained in the 
Arusha Declaration which was intended to control the behaviour of leaders, stated 
the following (TANU 1967, pp. 19-20):
1. Every TANU and government leader must be either a peasant or a worker 
and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism;
2. No TANU or government leader should hold shares in any company;
3. No TANU or government leader should hold Directorships in any privately
owned enterprises;
4. No TANU or government leader should receive two or more salaries; and
5. No TANU or government leader should own houses for renting to others.
According to the Zanzibar Declaration however all members of CCM regardless of
127 For instance, when the Steering Committee had announced a public workshop for 10th and 11th 
o f April, 1991 to deliberate on the best way o f introducing multi party system in the country, the President 
reacted by banning all political activity related to the multi party issue and by announcing that his 
Commission was (the only one) legally entrusted with handling the issue. When the Secretary o f the 
Parallel Committee responded by explaining that the workshop was sponsored by TANLET (Tanzania Law 
and Educational Trust), a legally registered association, the Registrar General o f Societies served 
TANLET with a 7 days’ notice o f revocation o f its registration a few days later. TANLET’s application 
for a court injunction was granted on a promise that the trust would not engage in any activities until its 
fate was decided in court. Meanwhile, an attempt by the DARUSO (University student body) to have the 
members o f the coordinating committee give a public talk at the university was stopped, supposedly by 
an order o f the state house.
128 D aily N ews, 21st May 1992; Sunday News, 31st May 1992; Family M irror, first issue, June 
1992.
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leadership status have, with effect from February 1991, the right to:129
a. acquire shares in private companies;
b. own and rent houses;
c. draw more than one salary, and to
d. become a Director of a privately owned company
The content of the Zanzibar Declaration seems to be a reflection of the socio­
economic realities of the 1980s, while the timing appears to be a product of the 
political ferment of this period.
Regarding the content, the measures announced in 1991 merely formalised 
what had been going on behind the scenes for quite some time, as even Nyerere 
admitted (e.g., Legurn, 1988). By having extra sources of income through legal as 
well as illegal means, CCM leaders were breaching the norms and values of the 
earlier Leadership Code. All that the ZD appears to have done is to clear an open 
and legal way of accumulation, not just for the CCM leaders but for all its party 
members. It is unlikely that the decision will have something positive to offer to the 
majority of poor citizens. After all, not all CCM members are likely to become 
directors in privately owned companies or to enter into joint ventures with foreign 
capitalists. Neither can every one afford to build houses to rent or to buy shares in 
a private company when a majority of Tanzanians, even in government service, are 
barely able to make ends meet.130 The Arusha Declaration, in direct contrast, gave 
no room (at least on paper) for CCM leaders to involve themselves in the process 
of primitive accumulation.
Regarding the timing, it is important to note that economic liberalisation 
through the 1980s and a relaxation of the earlier government monopoly over even
129 D aily News, 15th February, 1991.
130 Eriksson (1991) observes that "given the low levels o f remuneration in the public sector, 
employees have been forced to divert their time and effort to other income-generating activities; this need 
for survival has not only contributed to inefficiency and low productivity within the sector but has also 
led to abuse and theft o f  public property, fraud and corruption" (p. 24). Although this issue is dealt with 
in greater detail in the next three chapters, for a general view, see Cheru (1989), Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa (1990) and Stein (1990),
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organisational space has led to the formation of several new organisations.
There are, however, three distinct types of new organisational moves. For 
one, there are organisations created to articulate, promote and defend the interests 
of various groups in society which were previously unorganised. For instance, the 
business community has organised itself into a Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture 
and Industry while various professions have formed their own associations, including 
businesswomen and traditional healers (Tripp, 1992). The Medical Association of 
Tanzania recently won rights for government physicians to legally treat private 
patients (ibid.).
The second type comprises mass organisations previously affiliated to the 
party - such as the workers’ organisation JUWATA, the women’s organisation 
UWT, the youth organisation VTJANA, the parents association WAZAZI and the 
organisation of cooperative unions, WASHIRIKA - which, in the 1990s, have begun 
to re-examine the relationship with the ruling one party.131 In an election survey, 
published in March 1990, over 80 percent of the population in the sample preferred 
autonomous and independent mass organisations. Currently, a process of 
reassessment of relationships in the workplace is going on, with workers 
organisations attempting to redefine their relationship with the party and women’s 
organisation resolved to align with a political party that champions their interests. 
It has also been reported that a new policy on cooperative societies is in the offing 
with voluntary association and democratic control among the guiding principles.132
The third type consists of self-help and development organisations which, 
although declared unnecessary at Independence, have re-emerged in the eighties to 
provide social services supplementing or substituting for state services. Indigenous 
and foreign non-state associations have increasingly provided alternatives to the 
state’s limited resources, especially with Tanzania plunging deeper into economic
J O I
As seen earlier in Chapter 3, the CCM monopoly o f politics in Tanzania has partly been effected 
through the domination o f these important groups in society (forced or otherwise) and o f their 
organizations. A notable instance is the requirement o f CCM membership for membership in these 
organisations.
132 Family M irror, March 1991, first issue.
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crisis in the 1980s (Kiondo, 1990).133 The number of such non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) has grown phenomenally in the late 1980s, with only 21.5 
percent of the 163 NGOs operating in the 1980s were there in the 1970s.134 But 
it is possible that many more than those officially registered actually operate. A 
notable case in the midst of the environmental organisations and those looking into 
women’s issues is that of traditional security networks like the sungu sungu which 
have re-emerged because the deteriorating law and order situation has caused petty 
thefts, pickpocketing (in dala dalas and elsewhere) and house-breaking to increase 
(Abrahams, 1989; Campbell, 1990; Tripp, 1992).135
Although the state tried initially to suppress the growth of such activity, by 
1990 the sungu sungu had been recognised as a formal and legal security 
apparatus.136 The government appears to have realised that such organisations may 
have helped avert an even more serious legitimacy crisis than the country’s leaders 
already faced and has not attempted to hinder the development of other self-help 
organisations. Further, it has tried to bring some of its own policies in line with 
societal imperatives and to open up new political space. This appears to be the 
guiding force behind the recent creation of a new ministry to deal with women’s, 
youth and environmental issues after the general elections of 1990 and the 
announcement of a new policy on cooperative societies emphasising voluntary 
association activity and democratic control.
The pressure for all these moves towards reform in the political space in 
Tanzania have dovetailed well with pressures for human rights. Various local
133 Hundreds o f  foreign NGOs are now involved in a multitude o f  activities ranging from small scale 
industrialisation to tree planting, digging o f  water wells, construction o f roads, provision o f health care 
and counselling, to mention a few.
134 The Tanzania Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO) Directory (1990).
Tripp (1992, p. 236) points out that although this is a modern phenomenon, sungu sungu have 
roots in traditional dance societies, hunting groups, cultivating teams and spirit exorcism associations.
136 The Hom e Minister Mrema has, in fact, recently applauded them, stating publicly that "people 
know the members o f  the police are too few for the big task" (Daily News, 22 November 1990, cited in 
Tripp, 1992, p. 237). Tripp (1992) also cites the D aily News as saying that "within two months o f  
organising the patrols, the number o f murders in the city [of Dar-es-Salaam] dropped dramatically from 
71 to 5 and armed robbery cases dropped from 48 to 6" (p. 237).
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organisations have sprung up including independent newspapers and international 
organisations, especially Amnesty International.137
The CCM leadership perhaps realises that changes are necessary within the 
party if CCM is to survive and retain a good number of party members. In order to 
achieve this CCM is trying to become liberal especially given the uncertainty of the 
outcome of the ongoing debate on multi-partyism. The CCM seems to be 
acknowledging the fact that the social and economic hardships have brought the 
majority of people to a point where they want a more liberal and more democratic 
approach to politics and real participation. The Zanzibar Declaration, thus, is clearly 
a concession to such a trend.
Ujamaa, with its hegemonic conception of goals and strategies, is no more 
the "powerful ideological complex" it used to be (Leys, 1990). Its conception of 
political goals and strategies as well as the CCM’s sole right to rule have been 
seriously challenged in the 1990s. The homogeneity and consensus that characterised 
Nyerere’s Tanzania are rapidly being replaced by political factionalism, competing 
ideologies of development and the emergence of social differentiation, class 
awareness, ethnic consciousness and religious identities. The current decade is likely 
to witness systemic change as a culmination of policy changes that began in the 
1980s. The crucial variable in the balance is of course the political legitimacy of the 
CCM-state and this will depend on the ability of the government to engineer 
economic recovery, the willingness of the donor community to assist it through this 
difficult period and the political response of the people who have to live through it 
all.
4.6. Conclusions
There has been considerable economic and political liberalisation in Tanzania 
over the entire decade of the 1980s, which has continued in the 1990s. Although
137 This has been more so in Zanzibar where, since 1985, struggles over state power have created 
a non-Union nationalism to which the state has responded with strong arm tactics, including detention 
without trial. These practices have now received worldwide condemnation. See, for instance, the Report 
o f the Amnesty International, 1990.
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most of the economic measures predated the formal 1986 accord with the IMF, 
reflecting the 1981 IMF proposals for structural adjustment, the degree of reform 
has substantially increased after 1986. With the substantial social and economic 
effects that have followed in its wake, it is arguable that the Tanzanian leadership 
has taken a shrewd political line in this matter vis-a-viz its public image (Stein, 
1990). If the economy continues in its downward trend the leadership can blame the 
IMF and even attempt to re-impose the directive option (which would reassure 
certain sections of the population), and, on the other hand, if it works, the 
government can argue that it was part of a wise voluntary shift by the leadership. 
In both cases, it is argued, the position of the state is likely to be strengthened, since 
it would get the credit and not the blame (ibid.).
Thus, although intellectual circles have criticised the Mwinyi government for 
not having come up with a policy to deal with the sociological problems of change 
and for not having projected a dynamic image of the government, it certainly goes 
to his credit that he has avoided potentially conflictual situations and has created a 
positive environment for economic reform. Though good as a short term government 
strategy, this seems to have allowed contradictory approaches to development to co­
exist within the state apparatus, weakening the government dynamic as well as 
perhaps the CCM support base.
Perhaps the greatest threat to the political legitimacy of the CCM-state is 
from the perceived ethical duality of the simultaneous official pursuit of both ujamaa 
socialism and economic liberalisation. This has led to a demand for political reform, 
both from within and outside the single-party structure, which is forcing the state to 
democratise and liberalise political institutions and to try and "capture" and coopt 
emerging new social forces within the state/party. But it is as yet unclear whether 
or not this will ensure the continuity of the current political order. For as Chabal 
(1986) notes, "states have not operated in a vacuum, it is ultimately their action in 
relation to the civil society which determines their complexion and fate of their 
policies" (p. 15).
With the prospect of multipartyism much closer at hand, the political 
reactions of the population are going to be an important consideration in whether or 
not the state is able to implement the economic reforms in full.
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Chapter 5
The Urban Lower Classes
5.1. Introduction
This loosely-defined category basically excludes the elite and professional 
classes and the large business classes and includes, instead, the informal sector - 
consisting of workers, skilled and unskilled, ranging from the casually employed, 
shop assistants, small restaurant workers, bus drivers, conductors and assistants to 
domestic help and also the class of the (small-scale) self-employed, such as stall 
owners and market women - and the lower echelons of the administration, including 
secretaries, clerks and other assistants. The economic fortunes of these groups have 
been affected both by the crisis and by the subsequent policy reforms, although not 
all groups have lost out. Some, indeed, have thrived.
But a critical factor in their performance in the years after Structural 
Adjustment was adopted was their condition around 1986, which was shaped by the 
economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the attempts at indigenous 
liberalisation by the Tanzanian government. This, therefore, is the starting point of 
this chapter and is the subject of the next section.
The third section discusses the sample of respondents actually surveyed and 
the method of interviewing. It also discusses the biases that could possibly affect 
conclusions regarding actual and future political responses.
The fourth section looks at the impact on this category of urban dwellers of 
the government’s economic policies, both in terms of what the government had 
actually implemented by the time of the survey (March - August 1991) and also in 
terms of the perceptions of those directly affected. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, subjective perceptions are affected by a variety of factors, including who 
is held responsible, the expected duration of the impact (gain or loss) and the degree 
of confidence in the effectiveness of the reform. These help to form the public
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‘mood’ which then influences the actual political response of these urban citizens.
The fifth section looks at the responses towards the performance of the 
government in implementing the reforms of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
and also assess the attitude towards a multiparty political system vis-a-vis a single­
party political system. A concluding section presents the major findings of the 
chapter.
5.2. Crisis, Adjustment and Survival: A Brief Account
5.2.1. Economic Hardship in the Earlv Eighties
The major impact of the Tanzanian economic crisis and the subsequent 
attempts at policy reforms over the period 1977 to 1986 on ordinary Tanzanians is 
the shrinking of their purchasing power and hence of their standard of living. Prices 
have risen nearly four-fold over this period and the incomes of even those in formal 
employment have not kept up. In addition to this direct effect on the welfare of 
Tanzanian citizens, the reduction in social service expenditure and formal sector 
employment in the wake of the economic crisis that began in the late 1970s and the 
subsequent attempts at economic reform have lowered the standard of living for the 
poorer sections of Tanzanian society even further.
The general price level increased nearly 24 terms in real times (2383%) and 
food prices increased nearly 15 times (1401 %) from 1977 to 1986, in nominal terms, 
according to the Retail Price Index for Urban Wage-earners shown in Table 5.2.1 
below.
121
Table 5.2.1 : Cost of Living (Retail Price) Index 1977-1986 (1970 = 100)
Year Retail Price Index for Wage Earners in Dar-es-Salaam
General % Change Food % Change
1970 100 - 100 -
1971 103 3 104 4
1972 114 11 115 11
1973 124 9 122 6
1974 163 31 166 36
1975 243 49 229 38
1976 294 21 305 33
1977 345 17 361 18
1978 403 17 432 20
1979 426 6 448 4
1980 503 18 537 20
1981 647 28 675 26
1982 797 23 848 26
1983 983 23 1009 19
1984 1155 17 1104 9
1985 1693 47 1610 46
1986 2383 41 2406 49
Source : Bank o f Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report, 1975 and 1984;
Ministry o f  Finance and Economic Planning, Mali ya  Uchumi Ya 
Taifa Katika Mwaka, Government Printers, Dar es Salaam, 1987, 
cited in Bryceson (1993), Table II.8, p. 226.
The ensuing annual nominal inflation rate of between 30% to 40% over this 
period, however, is only a fraction of the real inflation rate during this period owing 
to the fact that the Tanzanian shilling (Tshilling or Tsh) was devalued several times 
over the same period.1 Apart from the series of devaluations of the Tshilling, 
another major contributor to this phenomenal rise in the price level was the removal
1 These devaluations are mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4. The major source o f information on the 
devaluation exercises o f the Tanzanian government in the 1980s, however, are the Annual Reports o f the 
Bank o f Tanzania.
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of price subsidies by the government as part of the initial moves to decontrol 
administered prices within the economy (i.e., the NESP and the ERP of the 
Tanzanian government in the early 1980s).2
For Tanzanians in general and the lower income classes in Tanzanian society 
in particular, therefore, the real wage had started to fall even by the late 1970s. An 
estimate by the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1982) revealed that the real 
wage in 1980 was lower than that seventeen years before, in 1963. The government 
tried to combat this rise in the cost of living by progressively increasing the 
minimum wage in urban areas, from Tsh. 600 in 1981 to Tsh. 3,500 in 1991 (an 
increase of 48.3 percent per annum). But the increases have not matched the 
escalating cost of living and consequently poorer urban Tanzanians, earning close 
to the minimum wage, have seen their purchasing power squeezed between 
stagnating real wages and galloping inflation through the first half of the 1980s, as 
Table 5.2.2 shows.3
2 The peaks in the trend o f nominal prices around the mid 1970s are due to the oil price shock o f  
the early 1970s, die bad harvest years and the 1977 war with Uganda, which thus constitute the other 
external factors that led up to die economic crisis in die late 1970s. See Chapter 3 for further details o f  
this period.
3 All figures, unless mentioned otherwise, have been calculated from various editions o f the Tanzania 
Economic Trends, published by the Economic Research Bureau of the University o f  Dar-es-Salaam in 
collaboration widi die Planning Commission o f Tanzania.
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Table 5.2.2 : Minimum Wage Levels, Nominal and Real (1966-1986)
(1970 =  100)








1970 170 100 100
1971 170 100 96
1972 240 141 125
1973 240 141 113
1974 340 200 135
1975 380 224 119
1976 380 224 112
1977 380 224 100
1978 380 224 90
1979 380 224 79
1980 480 282 76
1981 480 282 61
1982 600 353 59
1983 600 353 46
1984 810 476 46
1985 810 476 35
1986 810 476 26
Source: Bryceson (1993), Table II.7, p. 225, calculated from Jackson, D ., "The disappearance o f strikes 
in Tanzania : incomes policy and industrial democracy", Journal o f  M odem  African Studies, 17 
(2), 1979, p. 248; Jamal, V , "The political economy of devaluation in Tanzania", ILO, Addis 
Abbaba, 1984, p. 32; D aily News June 15, 1984; and Tanzania Economic Trends, 1 (1), 1988.
But it is fairly clear from the Table that the changes in the real minimum 
wage pre-1977 are qualitatively different from those that followed. After rising to 
a peak of about 35% above the value for 1970 in the period before 1977, and 
equalling the 1970 value in 1977, the real value of minimum wages steadily dropped 
by nearly 75% from 1977 to 1986. The impact of this phenomenal fall in the 
purchasing power, however, has not been evenly spread across the cross-section of 
workers as Table 5.2.3. shows.
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Table 5.2.3 : Index of Real Wages by Salary Level (1965-1985)
(1969 =  100)
Year Sectors Minimum Wage Average Wage Middle Salary Top Salary
1968
All sectors
90 97 95 102
1969 100 100 100 100
1970 96 103 103 93
1971 93 103 105 88
1972 119 99 106 75
1973 109 102 96 67
1974 135 133 91 56
1975 103 108 68 44
1976 83 104 64 39
1977 71 98 58 33
1978 61 86 51 30
1979 58 77 45 26
1980 63 65 37 21




49 47 24 14
1983 40 39 17 12
1984 46 31 16 11
1985 31 NA NA 9
Source: World Bank, 1988b, p. 15.
The Table shows that, interestingly enough, the group that has seen the 
greatest fall in its real wage is the group of top salaried workers.4 The real value 
of the earnings of this group fell by 66% from 1970 to 1977 and by the same margin 
from 1977 to 1985, ending with a real wage worth only 9% that of 1970. This is 
followed by the average income earners, whose purchasing power fell by nearly two- 
thirds from 1977 to 1986 but whose earnings were almost the same in real terms in 
1977 as in 1970. The middle income group saw a slightly faster fall in the 
purchasing power of their earnings after 1977, the fall from 1970 to 1977 being 
nearly 42% and that after, around 58%. Thus, the real incomes of those earning 
minimum wages appear to have been least hit by the rising inflation although, like 
all the other groups, the fall in purchasing power after 1977 has been greater (56%) 
than the fall before (29%).
But this need not necessarily mean that those earning minimum wages were 
better off than those in higher income groups. For one, the changes in real 
purchasing power reflect the composition of the price index used to deflate the
4 This is an observation that Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) make as well.
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nominal wage and further, relative changes in purchasing power say nothing of the 
changes in absolute purchasing power, which depend on the extent of initial 
purchasing power. At least for the second reason, the effects on the inflation could 
have been worse for the lower income groups in urban Tanzania whose earnings 
were not substantial to begin with.
A further reason to suspect that the impact on the standard of living has been 
worse for lower income groups in urban Tanzania is the fact that the government 
expenditure on social services has been reduced significantly since the late 1970s, 
first as a result of the economic crisis and thereafter as part of the indigenous and 
IMF-sponsored programmes of economic rationalisation. Bryceson (1993, p. 10) 
points out that development expenditure declined almost by half, from 40% to 
roughly 20% of total government expenditure from 1976-77 to 1987-88 (p. 10). 
With inflation, real cut-backs in recurrent expenditure were apparent in all sectors 
of the economy, especially the social and the productive services, which were nearly 
halved.
Table 5.2.4 : Distribution of Government Expenditure by Sector (1977-1986)
Year












1977-78 15.0 14.3 7.3 3.2 4.9 22.3
1978-79 14.4 11.6 5.4 2.8 4.3 20.8
1979-80 17.1 13.0 5.7 3.8 5.2 26.1
1980-81 18.6 12.1 5.5 2.8 4.1 23.1
1981-82 16.6 12.8 5.2 3.0 5.4 19.3
1982-83 16.9 13.3 5.4 3.3 4.6 15.8
1983-84 22.0 11.7 5.5 3.3 3.3 15.2
1984-85 29 .2 6.5 4.8 3.5 2.5 15.1
1985-86 37.0 5.8 6.2 3.1 2.2 10.1
Source: Bryceson, 1993, Table II.5, p. 224, calculated from various issues o f the Economic Survey 
published by the Ministry o f Planning and Economic Affairs, Dar-es-Salaam.
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This fall in development expenditure, especially in essential services like 
water supply, health and education, hit the urban lower classes hard. Coupled with 
increasing taxation which, though progressive on paper, was regressive in actual fact 
(Bukuku, 1993) , the lower and middle-income groups in urban Tanzania were 
experiencing a serious decline in its standard of living by the mid 1980s, with a 
widening gap between earnings and the cost of living.
5.2.2. Structural Adjustment and the Urban Lower Classes
The period after 1986 saw an intensification of the trends identified earlier, 
namely, further falls in the urban real wage across income groups and further cuts 
in government expenditure on social services which meant, in turn, that there was 
a further fall in the standard of living of the less privileged groups in urban 
Tanzania.
Prices continued to rise in the latter half of the 1980s with further devaluation 
and further decontrol. Indeed these were part of the package of liberalisation 
measures that the IMF required in exchange for the financial assistance that Tanzania 
was so much in need of.5 According to the World Bank’s own ex ante estimates, 
the proposed 20% devaluation would have induced a 6% fall in real wages. Given 
that minimum wages did not rise further and that, instead, along with a 
unprecedented cuts in development expenditure in essential services there were a 
variety of user fees introduced for these services, the welfare of the urban lower and 
middle income groups in Tanzania seems to have suffered. These latter 
developments require some further examination.
The indirect effects on the standard of living due to deterioration in both the 
quality and quantity of public goods provided by the state include forced reductions 
of the already poor medical facilities in public hospitals due to cuts in medical 
budgets, declines in the proportion of social policy expenditure in a Gross Domestic 
Product exacerbated by the increasing inflation and drastic declines in budgetary 
allocations to the education sector (see Table 5.2.5 below).
5 For details on the package o f liberalisation measures, see Chapter 4.
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Table 5.2.5 : The Structure of Social Policy Expenditures
(in million TShs a t 1976 prices)
1985 1986 1987 1988
GDP 24278 25008 25972 27039
Total 960 1059 1129 1219
Spending
(4.0) (4.2) (4.4) (4.5)
517 567 585 602
Education
(2.1) (2.3) (2.3) (2.2)
335 401 441 521
Health
(1.4) (1.6) (1.7) (1.9)
8 7 7 9
Housing
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Social 24 45 57 51
Welfare
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Social 76 40 40 35
Services
(0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Note : The figures in brackets are percentages to GDP.
Source: F. S. K. Tungaraza (1990), " The IMF/World Bank sponsored programmes in
Tanzania", Unpublished paper presented at an International Conference in Addis 
Ababa, and documented in the Institute o f Development Studies, University o f Dar-es- 
Salaam.
The further reduction of allocation for Health (detailed in Table 5.2.6 below) 
has meant that public hospitals have been forced to cut down the already poor 
medical facilities, subjecting the generally under-privileged sections of society, and 
notably women and children, to poorer health facilities.6
6 Already maternal deaths are rampant at the National Hospital, Muhimbili, and while official 
explanations identify anaemia and the lack o f sufficient facilities (and district Hospitals), a more direct link 
appears to be the poor nutrition value o f meals related to the diminishing standards o f living o f the 
majority o f people (personal communication, Grace Tembo, staff nurse, Mwhimbili Hospital, June 1991).
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Table S .2 .6  : Amount o f M oney allocated for the M inistry of Health
(in million TShs)
1977-78 1982-83 1985-86 1986-87
Total government budget 9438.6 18965.0 30458.0 55594.0
Ministry o f  health budget 669.2 1019.8 1273.0 1693.0
Percentage 7.1 5.4 4.2 3.0
Source: Ministry o f  Health, "Utekelezaji wa Azimio la Arusha Kuhusu Siasa ya Ujamaa na Kujitegemea 
Katika Sekta ya Afya". Paper presented at the conference on 20 years o f the Arusha Declaration, 
Kivukoni College Dar es Salaam 1987, p .8.
But in addition to the increase in prices and the slash in the public services 
provided, the economic reform of Structural Adjustment has also meant the 
introduction of a variety of user fees. From the beginning of 1987, parents have 
been required to pay fees for their childrens’ secondary school education alongside 
a Development Levy imposed on all individuals over 18 (see Table 5.2.7 below).7
Table 5 .2 .7  : The Structure o f Annual School Fees Introduced in 1987
Type o f Educational Institution Value o f  New Fees (Tsh)
Day secondary schools without meals 350
Secondary schools with meals 700
Boarding secondary schools 2000
Technical Colleges 2500
Other schools except University 1500
Source: Annual Budget 1987, Government o f Tanzania, p. 18.
But the introduction of user fees in the school system comes on top of cuts 
in the budget allocated by the government to the education sector. Coupled together 
these mean that, unlike in the decades of the 1960s and the 1970s when primary 
education was freely available, the educational prospects for the children of the poor 
have diminished rapidly. The Tanzanian government itself acknowledged that in the
n
The Development Levy was intended to provide financial support for the recently-introduced local 
government councils.
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years following the cuts in the education budget the number of school dropouts has 
increased.8 With the latest round of cuts in budgetary allocation and the introduction 
of user fees, this trend seems set to grow stronger.
In this context, a study of 200 urban Tanzanians done in 1988 (when the 
minimum urban wage was Tsh 1260) on the minimum monthly basic necessary 
income (BNI) necessary for a wage-earner to support a family of five in Dar-es- 
Salaam found that two-thirds said that they required between 6 to 8 times the 
minimum wage (i.e. 7000 to 9000 Tsh) while nearly a third said they required from 
3 to 6 times that amount (5000 to 7000 Tsh) (Lugalla (1990). The order of 
magnitude of these figures suggests that there was indeed a wide gap between 
official income and the basic income necessary for urban survival.
These cuts in total spending have also meant public sector retrenchment 
(albeit with compensation) policies and a freeze in employment within the lower 
ranks of the public sector. The numbers of those made redundant could have been 
much higher but for the fact that the government’s intention to carry out large scale 
retrenchment was not implemented in full for want of a clear policy on redundancies 
(Bryceson, 1993). She also points out that "what retrenchment was done was 
sometimes contested by the workers through the permanent labour tribunals and 
often the workers were re-instated" (p. 23).
Like the pre-1986 crisis period, it is true that the rising cost of living, the 
cutbacks on public expenditures and the introduction of user fees after 1986 have 
affected urban Tanzanians in the lower and middle income classes more than the 
upper classes, at least in urban areas. Firstly, the latter can afford private 
alternatives to public services whose quality has diminished over time or which have 
been withdrawn. And secondly, since standard of living of these upper income 
groups was higher to start with, even the large percentage declines in real earnings 
that occurred may still have left them better of than say, those in the middle or 
lower classes. Thus, it would appear that the adverse impacts of the economic 
reforms seem to be shouldered by those least capable of bearing the burden.
Yet, it is surprising that the measures of economic reform enacted by the
8 The D aily News reported on the 1st o f January 1989 that the Ministry o f Education had admitted 
that Primary School enrolment had dropped.
130
Tanzanian government as part of the conditionality for financial assistance from the 
IMF proceeded without any significant public outcry. Several urban (and rural) 
interests were adversely affected with certain reforms, especially the removal of the 
sembe9 subsidy risked undermining people’s support for the government and also 
the CCM’s credibility as a mass-based political party. This is a significant absence 
given that the scale of the adverse impacts (which started in the late 1970s but 
intensified after 1986) is one for which the ILO finds "few international parallels". 
In the words of the same ILO Report, "declines of a much smaller magnitude have 
sometimes been associated with much social unrest" (p. 34).
A part of the reason why these hard-hit urban lower classes - specific targets 
of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programme from an urban-bias perspective - 
have not expressed the expected discontent despite the growing economic hardship 
might be that these do not constitute the politically powerful urban interests that 
Lipton and Bates seem to refer to. A part of the reason may also be the nature of 
the political culture that the single-party model of Ujamaa socialism has engendered. 
But undoubtedly a more important reason for this silence is the rise of the informal 
sector in urban Tanzania, which has grown from a set of survival mechanisms in 
times of hardship to a "truly dominant sub-mode of production" which some have 
called the Second Economy.10
5.2.3. Survival Strategies to Second Economy: The Rise of the Informal Sector
By the 1980s, sideline activities to supplement incomes in Tanzania were 
observed to have grown from unorganised activities carried out by desperate 
individuals to an economy distinct from the official one. Although by its very name 
the informal sector typically refers to small-scale activities which have eluded
9 Sembe is maize meal, the main staple diet in Tanzania.
10 See Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, Chapter 2, for a detailed discussion o f terms and the 
origins o f  the phenomenon. The quote is attributed to Green by Kunz (1991).
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official measurement,11 there is a larger set of activities that constitute the Second 
Economy. In addition to this largely-legal informal sector - which includes shoe 
shine boys, street vendors, market women, currency-exchange agents, owners of 
"one door" bars and restaurants, road side mechanics, and bicycle repairers (which 
provides food, drink, clothing and a wide range of goods and services to a cross 
section of the population especially the poor) - the Second Economy extends to 
small-scale and larger-scale activities which are outside the law.
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) distinguish between two sorts of illegal 
activities, those originating within the government and those originating outside. The 
former basically refers to government corruption, which includes the misuse and 
abuse of official positions and official resources for private gain. Besides corruption 
and nepotism, which are now widespread in law-enforcing institutions, theft by 
public servants has increased tremendously during the 1980s and cases of Custom 
and Sales Tax officers colluding with importers and other businessmen to evade 
taxes are rampant.12 With bribery and corruption reaching unprecedented levels, 
Tanzania appears to have reached a stage where in order to be successful in business 
one is almost obliged to be corrupt. The second set of illegal Second Economy 
activities that Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) distinguish are those originating 
outside the government sector. These include Ulanguzi (black marketeering), the big 
businesses of smuggling gold, diamonds, Tanzanites and other minerals, trophies, 
cash crops, medicine, illegal transactions of foreign currency and the operation of 
home-based private banks (see Maliyamkono, 1985 for details).
In addition to these large-scale illegal activities of the Second Economy there 
is another sort of illegal informal sector activity that goes on which is perhaps best 
characterised by the local term, matapeli, or small-time conmen activity (especially
11 The ILO’s Report attempts to define the informal sector as the obverse o f a formal sector that it 
defined. Thus, by inversion, the characteristics o f the informal sector are ease o f entry, reliance on 
indigenous resources, family ownership, o f enterprise, small scale o f operation, labour intensive and 
adaptive technology, skills acquired out o f the formal school system and unregulated and competitive 
markets (ILO, Employment, Income and Equity, cited by C. G. Johnson in Africa Development, XVII, 
No 1, 1992, pp. 67-68). The various definitions advanced in the literature are critically evaluated in 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990), chapter 2.
12 From various articles and publications in the two major daily newspapers, the pro-government 
D aily News as well as the more independent Family M irror and Business Weekly.
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in urban areas). The matapeli spans a wide range of tactics, including confidence 
tricks, petty deception (such as passing dud cheques) and small-scale commission- 
seeking intermediary activity in illegal transactions, an interesting variant being the 
vibaka or wapiga debe, who are usually young boys aged between 15 and 20 and 
assist bus owners in gathering passengers, especially in the dalla dalla buses,13 and 
re-sell bus or railway tickets bought in bulk in the official market at black market 
prices when they have been officially sold out.14
There also seems to be a retail-wholesale type of relationship between the 
smaller-scale matapeli and the larger-scale government corruption networks and the 
hoarding and illegal trading networks. With the decade-long scarcity of items like 
sugar, building materials and simple commodities like beer, all the actors in the 
illegal traders network both within and outside the government as well as the 
matapeli have flourished. With their largely illegal networks, it has always been 
easier for them to acquire and retail such scarce commodities, previously siphoned 
off official networks, and hoarded to create an artificial demand.15
But on the legal side, there are several side-line ‘informal sector’ activities 
that have come up, small in scale, largely urban and usually as a supplement to a 
regular form of employment. As the table below indicates, these units have increased 
phenomenally during the 1980s.
13 The now-common term ‘dalla dalla ’ for the pick-ups which are a popular form o f privatised public 
transport in urban and rural areas comes from the time when the flat rate for each passenger was a dollar’s 
equivalent to the Tshilling.
14 These vibakas are highly organized, have contacts and influence with ticket sellers, bus owners 
and law-enforcing officials, operate intelligently. For instance, black-market tickets have been known to 
be sold even to members o f the police force and to politicians. On a more whimsical note, some o f these 
vibakas have formed groups called Tide Wapi. meaning "where we get our daily bread" or "how we 
survive".
15 The entire phenomenon is now so widespread that terms such as Warushaji, Wahongaji or 
Walanguzi - i .e ., market-racketeers and Bei za Kurusha, Kuhonga, or Kulangua - referring to their hiked 
black market prices, are commonly known even to young children and have o f late secured a page in the 
new Swahili-English dictionary.
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Table 5.2.8 : Informal sector units by year of establishment
Year Number o f  units in 
Arusha
Number o f units in Dar- 
es-Salaam
1950-59 2 (2.1%) 0
1960-69 3 (3.1) 1 (0.7%)
1970-79 18 (18.5%) 26 (18.2%)
1980-87 74 (76.3%) 116 (81.1%)
Total 97 (100.00) 143 (100.00)
Source: Bagachwa and Ndulu, "The urban informal sector in Tanzania", University o f Dar-es-
Salaam, mimeo, quoted in Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, The Second Economy in
Tanzania, 1990, James Curry and Heinemann, Table 2.1 , page 143.
The pattern of the increase in the number of these units in both urban areas 
is interesting as it appears to link the growth of the informal sector directly with the 
period of economic hardship. In her study of Dar-es-Salaam in 1987-88, Tripp 
(1988b) found that 64% of the self-employed people began their enterprises within 
the previous five years. Her study also reveals the increasing role of women in self- 
employment, with 66% of urban women interviewed being employed and most of 
them (78%) with side-line activities which had started post-1983. Similarly, 
Bagachwa and Ndulu (1988) also found that about 75% of the informal sector 
enterprises in Arusha Municipality and four-fifths of those surveyed in Dar-es- 
Salaam had been established during the period between 1980 and 1987. In the most 
recent survey of informal sector activity, Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, (1990) also 
conclude that there are strong reasons to believe that the economic hardship of the 
period since the late 1970s has been the major factor behind the phenomenal growth 
of the informal sector in Tanzania. But their concerns are larger and they point out 
that not only the largely-legal activities of the informal sector but the larger large- 
scale illegal activities that comprise the Second Economy have also seen a 
phenomenal growth during this period. They estimate that the Second Economy in 
Tanzania has grown from a negligible 2.8% of the official GDP in 1976 to over 
30% of the same ten years later (see Table 5.2.9 below).
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Table 5.2.9 : Estimated size of the Second Economy in Tanzania (1978-86)
Year Official GDP at Factor Cost 
(TShs. million)
Second Economy GDP 
(TShs. million)
Second Economy GDP as 
% o f official GDP
1978 28430 2779.9 9.8
1979 32452 6842.0 21.1
1980 38667 9262.3 24.2
1981 45193 12308.3 27.2
1982 54845 15483.5 28.2
1983 60702 13354.4 22.0
1984 74608 18989.0 25.4
1985 97767 28211.6 28.8
1986 131346 41187.2 31.4
Source : Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, (1990).
As the Table demonstrates, the largest increase in the growth of the sector 
has been in the 1980s, and indeed this is what led Maliyamkono and Bagachwa to 
conclude that the informal sector had indeed grown from a collection of minor 
individual activities to a fully-fledged ‘second’ economy.
But the substantive question that has been the focus of much attention in 
government and international circles in the Tanzanian, African and even the general 
developing country contexts, has been whether or not the rise of the informal sector 
and the Second Economy has contributed or detracted from social welfare. Although 
the initial reaction to the illegal side of the Second Economy has perhaps justifiably 
been negative, subsequent focus on the legal side of the Second Economy has 
revealed several positive characteristics.
The informal sector, it has been discovered, allowed millions of African 
Urbanites to cope with deprivation and marginalization and to subsist from day to 
day. One World Bank document describes the informal sector as the "most 
influential and competitive part of African economies" (World Bank, 1989a, p. 135). 
Thus, the informal Sector was recognised by the Tanzanian government for what it 
could contribute towards easing unemployment in Tanzania’s towns and cities, 
towards income generation and the production of goods and services, towards
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entrepreneurial training and the development of skills, and also towards rehabilitating 
out-of-school youth.
But, herein is a curious contradiction. The illegal side to the informal sector 
is heavily sustained in reality by the very networks of ‘patronage and personal 
clientage9 that Structural Adjustment means to undo. An extreme caricaturist view 
of this situation would be that ‘the salaries of civil servants support the unemployed, 
the infirm, and the indigent’ and that ‘the cities support the countryside.’16
Then again, the activities of the Second Economy have been interpreted as 
an expression of resistance to the ineffective state intervention and also as a response 
to the failure of the official economy to deliver the goods - hence, a response to the 
crisis of statism in Tanzania (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). One clear area 
is the security of urban Tanzanian citizens. Going by the newspaper reports, with 
the intensification of the crisis there has also been an increase in petty thefts, pick 
pocketing in buses and elsewhere, armed robbery, house-breaking and banditry 
(e.g., upcountry buses being way-laid). While all this is by no means an abnormal 
urban phenomenon in many African, Asian and even Western countries, it is 
comparatively new in Tanzania. Consequently, this has brought the issue of societal 
security to the fore in urban Tanzania and social groups have begun to form local 
vigilante groups called sungu-sungu. Also, architectural designs of residential 
buildings have begun to change with most new houses now being fenced with thick 
concrete walls lined on top with pieces of broken glasses, doors and windows being 
reinforced with iron grills and some houses belonging to affluent social groups being 
electrified and equipped with security alarms. In response to this social need, private 
enterprise has resulted in two security companies (the Group Four and the Ultimate 
Security Unit) having found a market for their services in Tanzania. This reflects the 
failure of government instruments to provide such services and the rise of private 
enterprise, formal or informal, to fill the gap. The rise of the informal sector, hence, 
can be seen to have contributed to the creation of a genuine indigenous 
entrepreneurial class in contrast to the parasitic state aristocracy, which does not
16 That rural relatives depend on Public sector remittances from the city is a well-known phenomenon 
in developing countries and die Tanzanian case has been documented in Sklar and Whitaker (1991).
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contribute to national product while eating into state resources.17
Many contemporary commentators also saw Second Economy activities as 
having a positive influence on welfare and argue that the bulk of the informal sector 
activity in Tanzania represents truly innovative and self-reliant schemes, striving to 
meet the basic needs of daily life (Bagachwa, 1982, Ndulu, 1986, Tripp, 1988b, 
etc.). In addition, that these also possess the dynamism of up-grading artisanal skills, 
mobilising the otherwise domestic resources (specially through the provision of 
additional employment) and utilizing economic resources productively. If promoted, 
these could become a significant factor in the development of Tanzania, which is 
indeed striving towards a self-reliant economy. Further Tripp (1988b) observes that 
the rapid growth of the informal sector during the early 1980s has not been due to 
the government’s promotional efforts. It in fact reflects independence survival efforts 
by informal entrepreneurs to sustain livelihoods following the failure by the official 
economy to provide sufficient supplies of commodities. To Del Boca and Forte 
(1982, p. 182), thus, the Second Economy is a kind of ‘healthy’ reaction to the 
pathology of the state (cited in Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, p. 33).
Thus the informal sector can be seen as a catalyst for political and economic 
change since the persistent challenges of the informal sector to the state have led to 
liberalising, privatising government reactions resulting in a shrinking the state 
frontiers - thus inadvertently contributing to the reforms already taking place in 
Tanzania. From a slightly over-charitable position, even the illegal activities - the 
corruption that the IMF so deplores - fit the description of the private enterprise 
culture that it is attempting to encourage and is also a means by which the reach and 
influence of the over-statist single-party state is effectively reduced (Lemarchand, 
1988). This will be perhaps clearer after the response of the government to the rise 
of the informal sector and the Second Economy are examined in somewhat greater 
detail.
17 As Bayart (1993) and Chabal (1992) observe, the informal sector in many cases operates in 
collusion with the state sector. The point being made here, however, is that only the former is ‘productive’ 
in the narrow economic sense o f the term.
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5.2.4. Government Responses to the Second Economy
The government response to these developments has been contradictory. Until 
the mid-1980s the Tanzanian government held the view that the Second Economy 
was essentially dysfunctional in nature. Then in 1984 the government did a volte- 
face declaring that the underground Second Economy constituted a potential asset to 
the development of the nation.
When informal sector activities first rose to prominence in the early 1980s, 
the government’s position was clear-cut. The party leadership code of 1967 (the 
Mwongozo) prohibited party leaders (and their spouses) from having extra sources 
of income other than those earned from their official regular jobs and from hiring 
employees of any sort. There had been official efforts in the 1970s to check the 
advance of what the Tanzanian government labelled ‘clandestine employment’ and 
‘unfair competition’ to more established formal trading concerns. In 1973, the 
government had abolished the issue of urban trading licences to the self-employed 
urban traders. This was followed in 1976 by an attempt to forcibly resettle self- 
employed and unemployed residents of Dar-es-Salaam into neighbouring farming 
villages (which nevertheless failed because most of those moved into villages shortly 
returned to the city).
The initial government response to the rise of the informal sector in the late 
1970s and early 1980s thus was a crackdown on what it called economic saboteurs. 
This was in keeping with the contemporaneous government view that the Second 
Economy was dysfunctional, for at least three reasons. Firstly, it was not held to add 
directly to productivity. Secondly, it was said to be exploitative because it added a 
surcharge to goods and services produced by the official economy (even if they may 
have been in short supply). Thirdly, it also distorted Tanzania’s stated societal 
objectives of reducing income disparities and of producing a classless society. Such 
activity, the government felt, was creating a ‘comprador class’ of the walanguzi or 
marketeers who owed no allegiance to the goals of society. The final objection of 
the government seemed to be that it interfered with the country’s legal system by 
encouraging tax evasions.
The government crackdown on economic saboteurs took the form of a Penal
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Code Amendment in 1983, which made for the Human Resource Deployment Act 
of 1984 (known as Nguvi Kazi), and the Economic Sabotage and Organized Crime 
Act of 1984. The former Act categorised all self-employed and unemployed who 
could not produce officially recognisable identification cards as "unproductive and 
idle disorderly persons" and stated that they were to be rounded up and resettled into 
the countryside. But as Tripp (1988b) points out, this campaign was not a success 
as no sooner were truckloads of people dropped off into rural areas that the same 
people returned to the city to resume their small scale enterprises (p. 90). The latter 
Act also met with limited success and the government also began to realise that 
despite detaining and trying these parallel market traders, there was no improvement 
in the availability of essential goods and services.
The timing of the anti-economic sabotage trials, which were yielding little 
fruit, was important because it was at this time that the bureaucrats in the Ministry 
of Planning and Economic Affairs were preparing a policy on private sector 
investment intended to pave the way towards a financial agreement with the IMF. 
Consequently, the June 1984 Budget included a 26% devaluation, the removal of the 
sembe subsidy and the introduction of ‘own fund’ accounts to allow Tanzanian 
residents with foreign exchange to import goods without questions asked about the 
source of foreign exchange.18 These two government actions thus sought to pull the 
economy in two contradictory directions.
In the light of these contemporaneous developments, it is clear that the 
subsequent government turn-around on the question of the Second Economy 
constitutes either a unification of government policy efforts or a realisation by the 
government that the Second Economy might constitute a potential asset to the 
development of the nation by fulfilling positive functions which were not being 
adequately fulfilled by existing political and economic structures.
Officially, thus, Second Economy activities came to be seen as adaptations 
to social or market forces working towards societal harmony. By 1986, the 
walanguzi were declared to be performing a useful function in that there brought
18 Nyerere constantly maintained that these measures would have been taken irrespective o f  IMF 
pressure stressing that "the major difference between Tanzania and the IMF was not the demands 
advanced ... but the extent to which those demands should be stretched" (Daily News, 7th May 1985).
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food to the urban areas and to any other areas where there were food deficits 
(Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). Many activities of the informal sector were 
legalised and the government offered incentives and allowances for entrepreneurial 
activity, ranging from cheaper credit to changes in the timings of the official 
working day to enable side-line activity by even public sector employees in regular 
employment.19 In the same vein, the 1985-86 of the government Budget introduced 
cheap (below market rate) car loans to entitled and eligible officers in government 
and parastatal organisations.
But these liberalising measures could well have been misused. Bukuku (1993) 
points out that the post-1984 period has been used by top-salary earners/bureaucracy 
in public offices to regain some of the lost glory of the immediate-post-Independence 
years, when there were also cheap loans for housing, cars and domestic appliances 
(p. 86). But now there was a uniform excuse to cover even excesses: it was sound 
economic policy associated with economic reform. But at least to the operators of 
the Second Economy, small and large, the change of direction of government policy 
is very welcome for it has enabled them to openly pursue and extend activities that 
they need for economic survival and prosperity in times when the official economy 
cannot afford them the opportunities or security of an acceptable standard of living.
On balance, the government’s turn-around seems fortunate in that it has 
harnessed powerful economic forces which could help the economy in its quest for 
economic and thence political stability. However, this liberal government attitude has 
served to shrink the frontiers of the state itself. But whether or not the present 
sample felt the same way is a matter of further investigation.
19 Tripp (1988a, p. 14) notes that in Dar-es-Salaam the persistence o f  both transport problems and 
the undeterred operation o f  private mini buses (dala dalas) have led to the legalisations o f the private 
transport industry (causing a rapid expansion in their numbers to nearly twice the number o f official public 
buses). Apart from the move to legalise several hitherto illegal secondary activities, the government has 
also sanctioned that the lower echelons of the civil service are to get an additional 30% o f their gross 
salaries as transport allowance in addition to a five-day working week, office timings that end at 2 pm to 
facilitate entrepreneurial activity and loan packages for first-time entrepreneurs (Report o f the Bank o f  
Tanzania, 1986, pp. 19-20).
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5.3. Sample Description
Of the entire sample interviewed in the three urban localities of Tanzania, 
Arusha, Dodoma and Dar-es-Salaam, in the period between March and August 1991, 
a total of 143 adult (i.e., over the age of 18) permanent residents come under the 
general category of the urban lower classes. They include clerks, secretaries, 
security personnel, shop assistants and office assistants - i.e., the lower echelons of 
government administration and the private sector - and the self-employed who 
operate in the informal sector - hawkers, vendors, market boys and market women. 
Within these sub sample of 143, nearly two-thirds (96) are from the lower echelons 
of the urban formal sector while the remaining third (47) are from the urban 
informal sector. The geographical division of these respondents is shown in Table
5.3.1 below.
Table 5.3.1 : Distribution of the 143 Respondents of the Urban Lower Classes
Urban Lower Dar-es-Salaam Dodoma Arusha
Classes
Number % o f 
Total I
Number % of 
Total I







































The largest number of respondents (71) are from Dar-es-Salaam with Arusha 
having more (40) than Dodoma (32). In all three cities, the proportion of informal 
sector respondents is greater than the respondents from the lower echelons of the 
formal sector, in a ratio of two-thirds to one-thirds. And, once again, about half the 
respondents in each category are from Dar-es-Salaam with the number from Arusha 
being greater than those from Dodoma.
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Nearly 40% of the respondents in the entire sample of urban lower classes 
were women. But the proportion of women interviewed in the informal sector as a 
whole is more than double those interviewed in the formal sector. In the informal 
sector the women were basically managing either Mama Nitilie shanty hotels (selling 
peanuts, drinks, mandazis, chapati, and other local bites), market stalls (mostly 
selling vegetables) or hair braiding ‘saloons’. The respondents from the formal 
sector are secretaries, clerks, shop assistants and office assistants from the 
University of Dar-es-Salaam and from government offices.
The proportion of women respondents also varied across towns. In Dar-es- 
Salaam, for instance, the number of women interviewed is larger than in either 
Dodoma or Arusha in both sectors, although in terms of percentage of women 
respondents there were fewer women interviewed in Dar-es-Salaam than in Arusha 
but more than in Dodoma.
Apart from women, and those described in the first section, the category of 
lower classes also included the (small-scale) self-employed - shoe shine boys, street
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vendors, newspaper agents (who doubled as illegal currency exchange agents), "one 
door" bar and restaurant owners, carpenters, road side mechanics, and bicycle 
repairers. The breakdown of the sample according to occupational structure is shown 
in Table 5.3.3. But the categories require some explanation.
Shoe-shining is distinct from shoe-repairing since the latter refers to the semi­
skilled activity of cobblers while the former is usually done by small boys without 
much prior training, capital or indeed any permanent or semi-permanent vending 
space. Roadside repairing refers to the repair of vehicles ranging from bicycles to 
motorcycles and cars although the main activity seemed to be fixing punctures in 
tyres - since this requires comparatively less capital investment. Roadside snack bars 
refer to small establishments which sell home-made food and a variety of small 
snacks as well as beverages. Some of these were also small bars which sold beer. 
Newspaper vending also spilled over on many occasions into matapeli economy 
activity such as buying and selling with foreign currency. The retailing of bus tickets 
also refers to matapeli activity of boys who sell bus tickets on the black market after 
buying them in bulk to artificially cause a shortage. But clearly they are not 
operating on their own but are only ‘fronting’ for other, perhaps older, operators. 
Hawking refers to vendors who move around selling consumer wares while kiosk 
vending refers to those who vend from semi-permanent or permanent fixtures, such 
as a market stall or a rented shop front. Tailoring and hair-braiding are self- 
explanatory, except in this case they were not professional but operated out of 
houses. The respondents are further divided according to sex.
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Male Female Male Female Male Female
Shoe-shining 2 - 1 - 1 - 4
Shoe-repairing 2 - 2 - 2 - 6
Roadside repairing 3 - - - 1 - 4
Newspaper vending 2 - 1 - 2 - 5
Bus ticket retailing 4 - 1 - 3 - 8
Hawking 4 - 1 - 1 - 6
Kiosk vending 5 4 5 1 1 1 17
Roadside snack 
bars
8 6 2 3 1 4 24
Tailoring 1 5 - 1 - 5 12
Hair-braiding - 4 - 2 - 4 10
Total 31 19 13 7 12 14 96
Apart from an elaboration of the previously-stated fact that the majority of 
the respondents came from Dar-es-Salaam, this table reflects a sexual division of 
labour: women do not participate in certain informal sector activities - such as shoe- 
shining, shoe-repairing, newspaper vending and roadside motor repairing - while 
men do not participate in hair-braiding. In the sample, kiosk vendors, roadside snack 
bar operators and tailors came from both sexes.
The formal sector respondents also came from a variety of occupational 
backgrounds as Table 5.3.4 shows. Again, the categories require some explanation. 
Clerical staff refers to typists, clerks, secretaries and office assistants in government 
offices. Parastatal workers include all those who work in parastatal organisations of 
the government, but not as clerical staff. Cleaners are the cleaning staff in 
government offices while security guards are the askaris who are stationed in and 
around government offices and buildings. The other category covered in the lower 
echelons of the formal sector is that of shop assistants and sales persons in private 
sector shops.
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Table 5.3.4 : Occupational Structure of the Formal Sector Respondents
Occupations Dar-es-Salaain Dodoma Arusha Total
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Clerical Staff 4 6 3 - 3 2 18
Parastatal workers 2 1 1 - 2 - 6
Shop Sales Assistants 3 2 2 2 3 2 14
Cleaners 1 - 2 - 1 - 4
Security Guards 2 - 2 - 1 - 5
Total 12 9 10 2 10 4 47
Again, the respondents from Dar-es-Salaam have a numerical advantage and 
there is some evidence of a sexual division of labour. Cleaners and security guards 
are male while all other categories are represented by both sexes.
5.4. Assessing Sample Responses to Structural Adjustment
5.4.1. Perceptions of the Direct and Indirect Impacts of SAP
The responses to the eight SAP measures are presented in Table 5.4.1 below 
and discussed in more detail below.
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FS IS FS IS FS IS FS IS FS IS
Price
decontrol o f
5 - 7 1 5 11 30 78 - -
essential
commodities
10.63 14.89 7.29 10.63 11.45 63.82 81.25 - -
Availability o f  
imported
26 48 11 23 2 8 1 11 7 6
essential
commodities
55.32 50.00 23.40 23.95 4.25 8.33 2.13 11.45 14.89 6.25
Availability o f  
imported
31 23 6 28 2 18 1 9 1 18
luxuries 65.95 23.96 12.76 26.16 4.25 18.75 2.13 9 .3 7 14.89 18.75
Availability o f  
second-hand
36 81 6 8 2 7 3 - - -
clothes 76.60 84.36 12.76 8.33 4.25 7.29 6.38 - - -
Private
property rights
31 27 5 11 9 38 2 12 - 8
65.95 28.12 10.64 11.45 19.15 39.58 4.25 12.50 - 8.33
User fees for 
education
21 6 18 16 2 13 6 55 - 6
44.68 6.25 38.30 16.66 4.25 13.54 12.76 57.29 - 6.25
Formation of 
new
6 28 10 20 5 16 17 10 9 22
cooperative
societies
12 .76 29.16 21 .27 20.80 10.63 16 .67 3 6 .1 7 10.41 19.14 22.90
Government 
control of
17 - 26 - 2 - 2 - - -
salaries 36 .17 - 55.31 - 4.25 - 4.25 - - -
N otes : 1. Figures in italics are percentages to sector totals: 96 respondents in the informal sector
and 47 in the formal sector.
2 . FS refers to the respondents from die lower echelons o f  the Formal Sector and IS refers
to those from the Informal Sector.
Increase in the prices o f essential commodities : During the period of our study 
between March and August 1992 the minimum urban wage including allowances was 
TShs 3,500 per month, or TShs 117 per day. An indication of what this meant for 
a low-paid urban dweller’s living standard is apparent by the fact that this daily
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wage would have bought around IVi kilograms of maize flour (the staple) or a 
kilogram of bread or a loaf of bread with a few extra slices. A chicken would have 
required a saving of nearly three days wages, while a fish, nearly a week. And if 
he preferred to drink it away, he could have bought only two beers a day. Table
5.4.2 provides a sample of the prevailing prices.
Table 5 .4 .2  : Relative prices for items of mass consum ption
Item  o f M ass Consumption Prices
(TShs)
1 kilogram of maize meal 80
I loaf o f bread 100
1 kilogram of rice 110
1 chicken 300
1 fish 600
1 can o f beer 60
It would seem therefore, that such a wage could scarcely support one 
person’s food requirements, let alone the food of the rest of the family and 
additional necessary expenditure on housing clothing, health and other costs. As 
Lugalla (1990) finds in his 1988 study of urban living standards, urban Tanzanians 
require from 3 to 8 times the minimum urban wage to support a family of five in 
Dar-es-Salaam.
A similar response was forthcoming from the 96 respondents from the lower 
informal classes when asked to approximate the minimum monthly income they 
required in order to meet basic requirements of food, shelter, clothing and transport. 
As Table 5.4.3 below shows, a third required from 7,000 to 9,000 Tsh - i.e., from 
2 to 2 V2 times the urban minimum wage - while two-thirds required from 9,000 to 
11,000, i.e., from 2Vi to 3 times the minimum wage. A small minority required 
from between 3 to 4 times the urban minimum wage.
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Table 5.4.3 : Monthly Basic Necessary Income (BNI)
Basic Necessary Income Class 
(Tsh)
Percentage o f  
Respondents
7000 - 9,000 28
9,001 - 11,000 66
11,001 - 14,000 6
In this connection it is important to note that since most wage-earners in the 
category canvassed are poor and tend to reside in the outskirts of the city centre 
where rents are relatively low. As a result, they have to use public transport in order 
to get to their workplace which requires a lot of money since a single journey costs 
Tsh 30, around a quarter of the daily minimum wage - or half the daily wage for a 
days travel to and from work.20
Also, it is interesting to note that although the magnitude of the estimates are 
higher in our sample, the proportions of respondents quoting higher basic necessary 
income is quite similar to those in Lugalla’s 1988 study. But a major response to the 
rising cost of living is the proliferation of informal sector activity within the 
economy and especially in the urban areas. This, however, is discussed separately 
in the following sub-section.
The easy availability o f consumer goods : As a result of prohibitions, the 
cumbersome licensing procedures and the difficulty of acquiring official foreign 
exchange, consumers who wished to purchase imported commodities prior to the 
liberalisation in 1986 had to rely on illegal traders who smuggled these commodities 
across the country’s borders. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, (1990) point out that 
illegal transborder trade had been rampant across Tanzania’s borders and that there 
were three basic types of commodities involved in such trade. The first category 
includes consumer goods in short domestic supply like cooking oil, sugar, salt, toilet 
and laundry soap, toothpaste, matches, shoes, ready-made clothes, vehicle spare
20 And the estimate varies; Kiponda, a minimum wage earner who works in Dar-es-Salaam spends 
75% o f his salary on public transport to and from his workplace.
148
parts, beer, whisky and cigarettes. The second category of goods smuggled includes 
goods officially classified as restricted and which involve substantial capital outlay, 
such as cardamom, coffee, cotton, cattle, gold, hides and skins, ivory and precious 
stones. The third category includes luxury goods like whisky, vehicle spare parts, 
electronic equipment, television sets, radios and video cassette recorders 
(Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990, p. 102).
Following the partial import liberalisation of 1984, the number of items 
imported under the ‘own funds’ scheme has increased substantially and currently 
includes consumer goods, building materials, transport equipment, electrical goods 
and basic inputs for manufacturing. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, (1990) note that 
"[cjasual observation would also tend to indicate that the programme has resulted in 
import availability of essential consumer goods in most shops particularly in urban 
areas" (p. 112). They further observe that while the prices charged for these 
commodities still ranged from "4 to 7 times their import prices valued at the official 
exchange rates", consumers were not surprised by these high prices "since they used 
to pay probably just the same high prices to obtain similar goods in the Second 
Economy market before liberalisation" (id.). But they also argue that the increased 
supply through official channels has probably reduced the relative price of these 
commodities. In addition to the relative fall in prices, they argue that the relative 
advantage of liberalisation is "the high probability of being able to obtain goods in 
the desired quantities" (id.). This account corresponds well with the observations 
from the respondents in the sample.
Following these ‘liberalisation’ measures, there was also an increased and 
easy availability of second-hand clothing (mitumbua). While some of these were 
domestically supplied - now that there was a price to be had for such commodities - 
the bulk of these were from across the border, the likely sources being free clothing 
supplied as part of international aid to countries suffering from droughts and other 
natural calamities.
Those who benefited from this increased availability of consumer goods were 
rather naturally enthusiastic in their support of the government’s liberalisation 
measure, with the degree of appreciation being directly related to the extent of 
benefit. At the other end, there were some especially in the informal sector who
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perceived a loss in revenue due to the fall in the price of the imported commodities, 
as a direct consequence of the increased supply brought on by liberalisation.
Government austerity measures : user fees and government control o f salaries : In 
addition to the fall in purchasing power that the urban lower classes experienced in 
the early and mid 1980s, there was also the question of the deteriorating standard 
of living (detailed in the second section), exemplified by the reduced access to social 
services following the reduction in the government budgetary allocation to these 
services and the introduction of user fees as part of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme of 1986.
There is a striking disparity between the strengths of approval or disapproval 
between the respondents from the formal sector and those from the informal sector 
on the question of the imposition of user fees in higher education. Informal sector 
respondents expressed strong disapproval and felt that higher education was no 
longer worth the price. This feeling was reinforced by the fact that a large number 
of them were involved in informal sector activities which required little by way of 
extensive formal training. The feeling was that they would rather induct their 
children early on into the trade instead of continuing to send them to secondary 
school for a (hitherto) free education - let alone paying to send them to secondary 
schools. Using the argument that what was good for them (and their children) now 
was good enough for the future as well, they saw no major role for higher than 
primary education in their economic situation.
On the other hand, the lower echelons of the formal sector were not 
negatively disposed towards the introduction of user fees as they perceived that it 
could mean better facilities (or for that matter, any facilities at all) in health, 
housing, social welfare and, especially, education. For this last category, the 
education of their children was of great concern, as they felt that higher education 
was the modus operandi of upward mobility in the Tanzania of the future. They 
seemed concerned also that their children should have a better education than they 
themselves had had and could, thus, do better in life. A concern frequently 
expressed was that their children should not be stuck in the lower echelons of the 
formal sector.
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It is in this long-term perspective that the majority of the formal sector also 
felt that government control of salaries were beneficial to the nation as a whole. 
They were, in other words, prepared to make the short-term sacrifice in order to 
permit better opportunities in the future to arise. But it could also be that given the 
existing situation wherein government salaries were a smaller proportion of 
household income than the earnings from informal sector activities, it was seen to 
be almost futile to expect large increases in their official salaries anyway.
Creation of private property rights in land : In contrast to the earlier TANU 
guidelines and government policy which prohibited private ownership following the 
massive nationalization of the 1960s (detailed in chapter 3), the post-1986 
liberalisation included the important concession of private property rights. This 
clearly militates against the egalitarian objectives of the earlier doctrine of preventing 
the accumulation of assets in the hands of the wealthy and the perpetuation of 
affluence through the further use of these assets for private accumulation. But it is 
in line with the more liberal attitude towards market-based incentives for private 
enterprise, which is the underlying premise of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes.
The sample responses seem to express the contrasting ideological perspectives 
behind these two policy options. Nearly 75 percent of the formal sector respondents 
and 40 percent of the informal sector felt that private property rights were essential 
to tap the entrepreneurial potential of the nation - essential to the economic recovery 
and prosperity that the country desperately needed. On the other hand, more than 
50 percent of the informal sector respondents and just under 25 percent of 
respondents from the formal sector expressed their disapproval at this government 
measure. While the disapproval of the formal sector is perhaps more understandable, 
being the ideological disapproval of private ownership of the means of production, 
the disapproval of respondents from the informal sector is a little more subtle. To 
them, this represented a withdrawal of rights of access and use to hitherto common 
property resources, either as grazing land or as pathways or as public access land 
in general.
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Formation o f cooperative societies : The Co-operative Societies Act of 1991 
overturned the 1982 Co-operative Act and finally abolished the rather draconian 
measures of compulsory membership and hierarchical party control which were 
introduced in the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 and only mildly diluted 
in the 1982 version. The 1991 Act thus returned the "time-honoured Cooperative 
Principle of voluntary membership" (Yeo, 1992, p. 4) and disassociated the co­
operative societies from the three-tier federal structure with an Apex body that had 
existed since 1975.
This Act had already been discussed and passed by the time of the field 
survey but had not yet been implemented fully. Nonetheless, because it had been 
discussed in the party meetings and in the local media, the respondents were 
conversant with at least these two main features. Its timing, however, caused a 
natural association with the demand for multi-party politics.
As the Table indicates, the respondents from the formal and informal sectors 
were divided in terms of their approval or disapproval, with around a fifth of the 
respondents in both sectors being indifferent to the issue. Nearly 50 percent of the 
respondents in the formal sector and 27 percent of those from the informal sector 
disapproved of the measure. This was rooted in the fact that co-operatives would no 
longer be under party control and could thus be subject to private manipulation 
without check from higher authorities. As Yeo (1992) puts it, there is the fear that 
the new Act represents a "jump backwards from Socialistic modes of Co-operation 
which did not help the poorest, to older styles which did not help them either" (p. 
5).
But nearly half the respondents from the informal sector and a third of the 
respondents from the formal sector approved of the measure. The reasoning given 
for this preference was that this ‘experiment’ with villagisation had failed to help the 
people and it ought to be left to the voluntary enterprise of private individuals to 
make the best of a bad situation, a position that is ideologically close to the 
philosophy of self-help that underlies informal sector activities. Thus, in the rather 
sweeping terms of Yeo (1992), the Act was seen as "a commitment to trust the 
people to choose their own modes of Co-operation, anywhere on the spectrum 
between Marx and Adam Smith" (p. 5). Yet all this was without the benefit of actual
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current experience with co-operatives based on private enterprise and largely based 
on the dismal performance of the party-controlled villagisation experiment. The 
lessons of history, in this case the pre-1968 cooperative movement, are perhaps too 
old to be of much direct use.
An Overview of the Responses : Overall, while there seems to be some feeling that 
the Structural Adjustment Programme has been at the expense of the social services 
sector and hence, as being against the people at large. Interestingly enough, these 
feelings of antipathy were largely overshadowed by the understanding that this was 
the only option in front of the CCM government. But it is important to note that 
although not wholly supportive, a large majority of the sample in the urban lower 
classes were not averse to specific SAP measures.
There seemed to be a high degree of awareness tinged with nationalist 
fervour and the general response was conditioned by a realisation of macro-economic 
improvements in Tanzania compared to the extreme scarcity of the early 1980s. 
Parastatal and cooperative workers felt that their situation would not be bettered 
unless and until there was an improvement in productivity and their cooperation was 
profitable given that they could not reasonably expect wage increases over and above 
the rate of inflation.
There also seems to be optimism about the future, despite the current declines 
in real income, which appears to have bred a certain degree of patient acceptance 
of what they see as temporary setbacks in their personal economic situation. Thus, 
despite the hardships that the Structural Adjustment Programme entails, it seems to 
be preferred to the earlier situation.
But in contrast to the reaction to the negative aspects of SAP, on the positive 
side, there seemed to be a widespread approval that merit and hard work would be 
rewarded in the new policy environment. Private sector employees and those self 
employed frequently enthused about the increased incentives for hard work offered 
by expanding opportunities. This principle of prosperity through hard work also 
influenced the view that the potential deterioration in socio-economic inequality (i.e., 
from an income disparity ratio of merely 6:1 in 1970’s - a positive manifestation of 
the egalitarian setup in Tanzania) was acceptable because this was a matter of private
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business prospering due to application, innovation and own effort.
The IMF’s perspective on what needs to be done to improve the economic 
performance of Tanzania, therefore, seems by and large to find a responsive chord 
in the popular urban attitudes. The Kcizi (or work) ethic, the much popularised facet 
of Ujamaa is heard time and again and party cadres among the lower classes 
reaffirmed the need to strive towards bringing it into effect. Significantly, so is the 
Umoja (or unity) attitude of (especially) the lower income groups. The informal 
sector workers (especially matapeli) displayed considerable zeal about working hard 
- more so now that there were incentives, opportunities and government support. 
There seems to be a realisation that though they have a marathon task (kcizi kubwa 
or ‘big job’) before them, they would overcome it by hard work - captured in the 
oft-repeated phrase kujatahidi kufanya kazi kwa bidii. The predominant response of 
the respondents towards the Structural Adjustment Programme thus appears to be 
positive despite the fact that their personal economic situation had, as they saw it, 
stagnated or even deteriorated in the recent years. The feeling was that the situation 
would have been even worse in the absence of SAP, i.e., SAP was the lesser of two 
evils. On the positive side, there seems to have been a fillip to private enterprise and 
the real fear of the people appeared to be that, in the words of a regional planning 
officer of Arusha, "my ‘weakness’ will prevent me from developing now".
It is this spirit, in conjunction with the fact that SAP has severely affected 
real incomes (by removing subsidies on prices and by imposing user fees for social 
services), that has spurred the rapid development of the informal sector. As 
discussed previously, it is almost entirely in response to this trend in their standard 
of living that the majority of the urban lower classes, have had to pursue informal 
mradi (side-line) trading activities to support even basic minimum needs. These are 
examined in greater detail below.
5.4.2 Responses to the Austerity Measures of SAP
Just as the crisis has not meant the same thing to everybody, individual 
activities in response to the crisis vary, both across rural and urban areas and across 
income classes and occupational structures. Nevertheless, there appears to be a
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strong dialectical relationship between class position and survival strategy that is 
adopted in Tanzania. Sideline activities which demand relatively high initial capital 
investment like poultry farming, dairying, operating (pirate) taxies {taxi babu) and 
dalla-dallas (mini-buses), the letting of expensive houses to foreigners (with rents 
payable in foreign currency) remain the domain of middle and high income 
classes.21
Several ‘survival mechanisms’ have been adopted by individuals sampled in 
this category to supplement their regular or official source of income. But these 
informal sector activities are also pursued in the absence of a formal sector job, i.e ., 
as a primary occupation for informal sector respondents. Table 5.4.4 below details 
the various sources of income for the 96 respondents from the informal sector from 
one or more informal sector activities.
Table 5.4.4 : Informal-Sector Activity by Respondents in the Sample
Income generating activity Percentage o f Respondents 
in the Informal Sector
Percentage o f Respondents 
in the Formal Sector
(total =  96) (total =  47)
Small-scale trading activity 87 71




Note: Respondents listed more than one source o f extra income.
From the table, informal trading activities and small-scale urban farming 
activities account for the largest proportions of secondary activities in the sample.
2.1 A particularly urban phenomenon is the proliferation o f commercialised sex. Not only is 
prostitution becoming highly sophisticated and organized in terms o f its mode o f  operation and the kind 
o f institutions created to safeguard the interests including zones and markets o f prostitutes, but there is 
a rising number o f ‘non-professional’ prostitutes, who are what the local people term "after office hours" 
prostitutes - women who are employed in the formal sector and resort to prostitution as a sideline activity 
after office hours.
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The former include the occupations mentioned in the previous section - selling 
prepared food items to shanty-eating places (Magenges), tailoring, shoe-shining, 
shoe-repairing, hair-braiding and curling, motor repairing and maintenance services 
and beer-brewing. Urban farming activities (largely a phenomenon of the 1980s) are 
usually undertaken by those who remain at home and usually involve growing 
vegetables in their back gardens or in empty plots of land to substitute for marketed 
produce and also to sell to others in the locality. Small gardens outside residential 
houses, full tilled with mchicha (spinach), are thus a common sight in Dar-es- 
Salaarn.
But perhaps the more important feature that the Table highlights is the fact 
that nearly all respondents, even in a relatively small sample, appear to be taking up 
informal sector activities that form part of the Second Economy discussed earlier. 
At least every productive member of the household was involved, in one way or 
another, in a sideline project (Mradi). Even those in the administration and 
dependant on the state for social service and security had to resort to secondary 
activities. These percentages reveal the extent to which the informal sector provides 
a means of sustaining and supplementing incomes from formal sector jobs. They also 
indicate the extent of substitution of training and skill-formation in formal-sector 
activity which have proved inadequate to provide the necessary standard of living. 
This corroborates with direct observation and also substantiates the recently 
expressed view that ‘while in the 1960s there were no Tanzanian entrepreneurs, now 
there are no Tanzanians who are not entrepreneurs’ (The Guardian, 25th May 1990).
Nevertheless, some informal sector respondents also had more than one 
informal sector job and this feature is captured in Table 5.4.5 below, which lists 
secondary informal sector activities carried out in addition to their primary informal 
sector job.22
22  *The concept o f a secondary job for a respondent working in the informal sector is less intuitive
than it is for a formal sector employee. But all the former refers to is the fact that informal sector workers
may possess skills or training in another line o f activity entirely - even if they do not practise these within
the formal sector - or may have more than one job without prior enskilling or training. In cases where
there is little training in either job, then the earlier job is taken to be the primary occupation. Thus, the
secondary occupation may well turn out to be the more paying job. Examples o f secondary jobs would
be a carpenter without a regular job in the formal sector who sells newspapers in the bus-station or a
cycle-repairer on the road-side who may be a part-time askari or security guard on night-shift. In the latter
case, the later job would be die secondary occupation. It must also be noted in this context that Table
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Hair braiding (at home) 5 1 4
Tailoring (at home) 6 - 4
Small scale farming or assisting in farming 12 2 2
Supplying cooked food to snack bars 3 - 5
Domestic help/running errands 4 2 -
Dish-washing and cleaning in small/large 
restaurants
- 1 2
Securing clients for safari companies - - 4
Hawking 3 - 2
Kiosk vending 4 1 -
Security guards 7 - 1
Total 44 7 24
Note: Figures in brackets represent sample size o f informal sector respondents in each city.
A notable feature of this table is that the majority of the urban lower class 
respondents are resorting to legal informal sector activities although the matapeli 
economy is by no means unrepresented. Also, the sample does not cover those 
engaged in the large-scale illegal activities either concerning smuggling or 
government corruption.
But it is clear that while these may be the responses of the urban lower 
classes to changes in their personal economic situation, their perception of the wider 
or indirect effects of Structural Adjustment policies on other citizens, the 
government and the country as a whole also serve to condition their political 
responses to the Structural Adjustment Programme as a whole. These political 
responses are examined in greater detail in the following section.
5.3 .3  in the previous section gave the primary occupation for the respondents in the informal sector.
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5.5. Political Responses to Reform and their Implications
5.5.1. Views on Government Performance
Although the attitudes towards the government’s performance in 
implementing the Structural Adjustment Programme is closely linked conceptually 
to the attitude towards the party (i.e., in a one-party state), the latter is taken up in 
the next subsection. This section intends to evaluate the urban lower class’s 
perception of the government performance in implementing SAP and is thus 
connected to the previous section.
The government implementation of policies legalising the informal sector and 
increasing minimum wages (although not in real terms) along with offering 
incentives and allowances have been viewed with universal acclaim. Though there 
was a strong disapproval of the corruption and inefficiency of the leadership, the 
wananchi (the people) appreciated the anti-corruption purges initiated and sustained 
by certain sections of the government machinery, notably Nyerere, Sokoine, Mwinyi 
and now, the unconventional efforts of Augustine Mrema, the Minister for Home 
Affairs. Overall there was a general approving attitude towards the economic and 
administrative re-structuring along the lines of what they perceive as economic 
realism.
But at a more general level the Tanzanian attitude towards the CCM 
government, SAP and the question of political liberalisation is related not merely to 
the government performance, but also to how the urban lower classes comprehend 
the situation filtered as it may be by what they are exposed to through their 
leadership. Here there seems to be a lack of clarity within the urban lower classes 
about the ideological contents of Tanzania’s economic policies.23 The party thus 
seems to be quietly endorsing all the market-oriented capitalist legislation of the 
present government while senior party and government leaders (especially party
23 While the official policy o f the CCM (the 15-year programme launched in Dodoma in 1987) to 
guide the country into die next century is based on socialism and self-reliance, die premises o f die 
Structural Adjustment Programme and the Zanzibar Declaration in 1991 obviously contravene it. For 
details o f die Zanzibar Declaration, see Chapter 4, section 4 .4 .5 .
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deputy chairman Rashidi Kawawa and Prime Minister John Malecela) continue to 
defend socialism in public.
The patriotic notion of the CCM as a movement for independence against the 
colonial authority as well as the CCM’s egalitarian premises make the urban lower 
classes quite appreciative of the system despite little illusions about the corruption 
and nepotism among the leadership. Ujamaa, umoja (unity), ahum (freedom) and 
maendeleo (development) along with self reliance - the brave political slogans of the 
CCM government - are viewed as having created a Tanzanian culture that the 
Tanzanians are particularly proud of. The wananchi however are not interested in 
siasa za mdomoni (political rhetoric) but want a conducive political environment 
facilitating national and individual development efforts. This is a political culture 
which, with its high level of political education and with its ‘semi-competitive’ 
nature (with many instance of voters expressing explicit opposition and discontent), 
cannot be taken lightly. There is no denying that the urban lower classes have been 
questioning the maendeleo part of it - oft-repeated as wapi maendeleo (or where is 
development)? It is in this role that at least some of them perceive the Structural 
Adjustment Programme.
While the IMF’s SAP may be enshrined in Tanzanian law, the bulk of it has 
yet to be implemented - or set aside as the case may well be. Hence it would indeed 
be presumptuous to assume either that the generalisations about the urban lower 
class’s responses are to Structural Adjustment policies only or that they are definitive 
of the political responses to come.
5.5.2. Views on Multipartvism
Surprisingly, there was little association between membership and views on 
the viability of a multi-party political system. Just over half (56.6%) the respondents 
from the informal sector and the lower administrative class were members of the 
CCM party, as Table 5.5.1. below shows. Nearly all (93.6%) the respondents from 
the lower administrative class sampled were CCM members while less than 40% of 
the informal sector respondents belonged to the party, although the 81 party 
members are divided fairly evenly across the formal and informal sector samples.
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Table 5.5.1 : Party membership within the Sample
Urban Lower Class Sampled Total Number 
o f Respondents
Number o f  CCM 
members
Informal Sector 96 37 (38.5% )
Lower Echelons o f the Formal Sector 47 44 (93.6%)
Totals 143 81 (56.6%)
The high proportion of party members within the formal sector could well 
be because it is almost mandatory for government employees to not only be CCM 
members and to have been through ideological training (at the Kivokoni Ideological 
Training Institute at Dar-es-Salaam). When asked, however, there appeared to be an 
element of choice in the decision to join the party. Of the 44 CCM members from 
the lower administrative class, nearly all said they were members because it was a 
right (to an interlinked social and career network) whose benefits they did not wish 
to forego. Only a small minority of 4 said that they had joined the party because of 
‘good leadership and organisation’.
Within the sample of informal class respondents, the reasons for joining the 
party varied. Among the 37 informal sector party members, more than half (19 out 
of 37) took the view that it was a right that they had chosen to exercise (and which 
they would lose if they did not). Ten respondents felt that CCM membership would 
help to build useful connections and had joined because of the party’s leadership and 
good organisation. Eight said they had joined because they found its policies 
agreeable.
The responses regarding the preference for a multiparty versus single-party 
political system are outlined in Table 5.5.2.
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Note : Figures in brackets are sector totals and sub-totals for party and non-party respondents.
While half the 81 party members from both the formal and informal sectors 
appear to have been led by the nature of the question and their official position to 
reflect the ‘safe’ pro-party anti-multiparty ism line of argument, the other half quite 
openly acknowledged their support for the multi-party system. Further, while the 
relatively small proportion of party members in the informal sector was almost 
evenly divided on this issue, the formal sector with its high proportion of party 
members (nearly 94 percent) was clearly biased towards the multiparty system (70 
percent to 30 percent).
The reasons behind the preferences of respondents both for and against 
multipartyism are detailed in Table 5.5.3 below, along with the numbers that 
supported each side of the various arguments.
Table 5.5.3 : Responses to the Prospect of Multipartyism
Changes presumed to 











More democracy 17 (11.9%) 123 (86.0% ) 3 (2.1%)
Better government 69 (48.25%) 71 (49.66% ) 3 (2.09%,)
Better policies 60 (41.96%) 62 (43.36%o) 21 (14.68% )
Removal o f  lazy, inefficient or corrupt leaders 98 (68.54%) 41 (28.67% ) 4 (2.79%>)
Note : Total number o f respondents: 143.
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The explanations for the preferences of political system are interesting since 
they add an illuminating sub-text to the initial responses. In brief, they show that the 
preference for multipartyism does not stem from a belief in the virtues of 
democracy, but rather from a deep dissatisfaction with the existing government set 
up. In other words, it is largely a negative preference. And, interestingly enough, 
so is the preference for the single-party system.
For a Single-Party Political System : A majority of the party members within the 
sample who favoured a continuation of the single-party system said that they 
preferred it over the multiparty system because felt that the (single-party) CCM was 
essential to maintain peace, order and sustained development in Tanzania. 15 percent 
however explained their preference in terms of being used to the established 
institution of the one-party system.
But others revealed that a significant part of their preference for a single­
party system is by default. Firstly, it is on account of the ‘nebulous’, ‘opportunistic’ 
and non-viable opposition. This has been exacerbated by the fact that the state media 
(largely, the pro-government newspaper Daily News and the sole, government-owned 
radio station, Radio Tanzania Dar-es-Salaam) has not given it commensurate 
publicity.
Secondly, multipartyism holds out the threat of disunity and disruption 
through the emergence of religious, ethnic or tribal differences. Any breakdown of 
the existing link between the party and the army also raised, for the sample, the 
genuine fear of an army coup (as has happened in many African countries).24 
Indeed there is a history of several African countries which opted for multiparty 
political systems after Independence and ended up dominated by tribalism, or civil 
wars. Tanzania, in contrast, has had no such wars and it is widely believed that this 
has been due to the introduction of the single-party system after independence. Now 
the fear is that the multiparty system would encourage tribal, racial and religious
24 A fruit-stall owner in Jangwani expressed his fears that multipartyism would lead to the collapse 
o f Ujamaa and self-reliance and observed: "each party would formulate and impose its own policy - the 
army may form its own party and impose orders on the masses, thereby depriving the people o f their 
democratic rights; the army would never return power to civilians... the existing good relations between 
the army and the party would not be maintained in the presence o f many parties".
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differences - which Magomeni resident Ahmed Logomi believes are "factors which 
would lead to killing, misunderstanding and chaos in the country". There was also 
the fear that the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar might break up, were the 
multiparty system to be introduced.
Thirdly, scepticism for the multiparty system stemmed from the nature of the 
social and economic costs involved in the changeover. In the words of a housewife 
(and part-time informal sector worker), "having multiparty in Tanzania is like poor 
parents with many children whom they can’t afford to bring up properly".
A fourth reason put forward for preferring a single- rather than a multi-party 
system was, as a worker from the wire industry put it, that "those who were for a 
multiparty system were hungry educated young persons seeking power for their own 
interests".
Yet others felt that while the CCM leadership had been weak and corrupt and 
had led the nation to succumb to poverty and underdevelopment, there was no 
guarantee that multi-party system would clear the vices in the Tanzanian society. In 
fact, some respondents felt strongly a multiparty system might encourage even more 
corruption.
For a Multiparty Political System : The overwhelming support for the multiparty 
system among both the formal and the informal sector respondents was based on 
reasons distinct from the desire for a more democratic political system. Only about 
a tenth of the respondents believed that more parties meant more democracy. To the 
others, a preference for multi-party politics was more a preference against single­
party politics.
Interestingly enough, even those opposed to the multiparty system felt that 
the organization of the CCM left much to be desired. These felt that CCM had 
ruined the economy and that a further delay to pluralism will only harm the economy 
more. Some wanted the removal of NEC secretaries in order to eliminate the 
bureaucratic element within the party. But most others were of the opinion that it 
would be suicidal for the CCM government to expel most of its functionaries, as 
part of any such internal drive against corruption, because these may simply cross 
over and join the multiparty proponents - as had already happened with several
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former party politicians (stripped of their portfolios in the single-party system and 
now campaigners for a multiparty system).
Yet, others preferred multipartyism on the grounds that "everyone would now 
belong to a political party of their own choice" - implying that the CCM was 
obviously not everyone’s choice - and predicted that the CCM would still be at the 
helm under pluralism because of a "weak opposition".
But the most important reason that emerged was a deep dissatisfaction with 
the corruption and inefficiency within the CCM government, and this was a 
dissatisfaction shared by respondents in favour of either political system.
Against CCM politics : The majority of respondents, nevertheless, felt that the 
‘debate’ on multipartyism has helped to keep the CCM on its toes. Thus, although 
they expressed considerable doubt on the question of the viability of an opposition 
government, the urban lower classes felt that the competitive element was making 
the CCM pull up its socks which has already led to internal (intra-party) reform and 
greater accountability from both the government and the party. While they felt that 
the CCM still enjoyed wide popularity, the general attitude was that it needed a 
challenge to "keep it on its toes" and that deliberate efforts should be made to 
overhaul the entire CCM. Some even suggested that all the CCM leaders should 
resign if the country was to become a clean house. Other single-party supporters 
urged it to be more aggressive in its struggle against corruption, racketeering, 
embezzlement of public funds and so on.
Others felt that the CCM must change the system of electing district and 
regional chairmen to involve more members in the exercise if it was to maintain its 
political credibility. They observed that the present system whereby a handful of 
party members elected the chairmen provided loopholes for the leaders to bribe their 
way into office. Some, like Omari a parastatal worker in the Agricultural Industrial 
Supplies Company (AISCO), felt that although they preferred a single-party system, 
"it would be good if these leaders were elected by all party members in a given 
district or region to determine their popularity and capability". They also felt that 
multi-partyism should not be introduced on an experimental basis, in case they 
should have the concomitant dislocation and disturbance they had experienced in the
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case of ideological drives for villagisation {ujamaa vijijini), local governments and 
cooperative unions.
Interestingly, there appeared to be little correlation between the percentage 
of respondents who thought their own household economic situation had improved 
in the last five years and those who were for the CCM leadership to continue. Most 
felt that the CCM had done well over the years though the response was not 
universally positive about the last five or six years. Here, the workers and the urban 
income groups particularly referred to the leadership qualities of Mwalimu Nyerere 
although there was a similarly positive feeling towards the current President Mwinyi, 
the main architect of the current reform, for attempting to ‘move with the times’.25
There are three important features of the responses that emerged. Firstly, it 
must be noted that it would be misleading to generalise from opinion for or against 
the CCM to opinions for or against multipartyism, since sentiments against the CCM 
could be entirely consistent with a preference for a single-party political system.
Secondly, there is a thin line between a positive preference for one political 
system and a negative preference for the alternative. That is, fears of the possible 
consequences of multipartyism sometimes kept the respondents from expressing a 
positive preference for that system although they may have been dissatisfied with the 
existing single-party system. Conversely, dissatisfaction with the single-party system 
- rather than a positive preference for a multi-party system - seem to underlie 
preferences expressed for a multi-party system.
Thirdly, and relatedly, the reasons quoted in support of their preference for 
a multiparty political system have much less to do with ideas of democracy and 
much more to do with eliciting better government policies and with eliminating 
corruption and inefficient leadership structures. Indeed, it could perhaps be deduced 
that the true implication of these observations is that the call is for a ‘cleaner’ 
government - not necessarily a more democratic one.
25 Only a minority o f respondents, like Ali Mussa, a vegetable vendor along Maktaba street, were 
indifferent to the CCM party and the whole issue o f multipartyism. As long as he was able to continue 
to peacefully sell his shirts, bedsheets, sunglasses and other assorted miscellany, Mussa said, "achia wazee 
wafanya vitu viyo" ("let the leaders do their thing")
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Adding the considerable doubts expressed regarding the viability of an 
opposition government and the belief that the competitive element has already led 
to internal (intra-party) reform and greater accountability from both the government 
and the party, it appears that the real demand is not for a multiparty system for 
reasons of greater democracy, but for better government. The dilemma facing the 
person on the street is whether this will come from a continuation of the CCM, a 
continuation of the single-party system or a change to a multiparty system.
5.6. Conclusions : Political Implications for Further Reform
The general conclusions possible at the end of this review of the responses 
of the urban lower classes may be divided into those concerning the future 
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme and those pertaining to the 
form of the political system in the country.
The first feature is the strong disapproval for the rise in prices of essential 
commodities following the removal of government subsidies - which have implied 
continuing deterioration in the standard of living with cuts in welfare spending on 
education, health and other social services adding to the depreciation of purchasing 
power of the lower classes in urban Tanzania. Particularly worrying is the reaction 
to the introduction of user fees for education amongst the informal sector. This is 
significant in that it indicates a disregard for the role of education in future 
prosperity of this respondents from this sector, which is especially disheartening in 
a country which had the highest education levels in Black Africa in the mid-1970s.
But the second feature of the responses is the flip side of the reform, the 
expanding possibilities of entrepreneurial activity and the increasing availability of 
necessities and luxuries from both domestic and foreign sources. There was strong 
approval for the easy availability of imported commodities as well as for second­
hand clothes. But this was also seen as a mixed blessing. The import of luxury 
goods was not acclaimed by entrepreneurs in the informal sector who felt that 
liberalisation had generated too much competition for local enterprise to withstand. 
But the easy access and high relative profitability of informal sector activity, 
especially in comparison with formal sector activity and the minimum urban wage
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has caused a rapid increase in the magnitude and scope of informal sector activity, 
which now supplements the income of almost every urban household in Tanzania. 
Mention must also be made in this connection of the increased role of women in 
economic activity, especially in the urban household economy, which is likely to 
increase significantly in the future.
A third noteworthy feature of the responses is the recognition of the strong 
growth potential of the informal sector, especially with the recent government 
approval for such entrepreneurial activity. Also, diminishing official government 
control over pricing, marketing and distribution with liberalisation has meant a wider 
space for the ‘unofficial’ informal economy. With its productive use of domestic 
material, artisanal/entrepreneurial skills, tools and equipment and low overheads - 
the informal sector is comparatively self-sufficient and so much less vulnerable to 
external ‘shocks’ like shortages of foreign exchange, imported inputs and spares.
This combination of impacts from the reform process perhaps accounts for 
the fourth feature of these responses, a tolerance for the current economic hardships, 
both in anticipation of better things to come and in acknowledgment of the increasing 
benefits from the reform process. This is particularly so in the case of the informal 
sector respondents, who might have faced a steeply falling standard of living in the 
absence of informal sector activity. Even within the formal sector, while a part of 
the tolerance for the deteriorating economic situation and the austerity measures of 
the reform (government control of salaries and the imposition of user fees for social 
services) is partly because of their exposure to party and government justifications 
and as a result of their wider perception of a lack of viable short-run policy 
alternatives, a large part of it, however, is also due to the incentives offered by the 
government for entrepreneurial activity (like a five-day week, a modification of 
official working hours to suit extra-income informal activity and subsidised bank 
loans for entrepreneurial ventures). In both sectors, thus, the ujamaa ethic of kazi 
(work) has been conveniently modified to suit the liberalisation circumstances.
Regarding the implications for further political reform, the multiparty system 
does not imply more democracy for a majority of the sample of respondents. This 
is a significant finding in the context of Tanzania because of the well-developed 
political culture that has served to set it apart not only in the context of African
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countries, but also within developing countries in general.26 Indeed, successive 
political reforms in Tanzania (including locally constituted development planning 
committees) have been regularly presented and justified as institutionalisation of 
democracy.
Further, the sample wanted better government rather than any particular form 
of political system. Preferences for political system, however, tended to be negative 
rather than positive, focusing on the inadequacies of the other alternatives rather than 
on the advantages of the system of their choice. In general, thus, a good government 
based on a single-party political system was preferred to a multiparty system which 
a large part of the sample believed to be disruptive and capable of creating ethnic 
and tribal division and hence national disunity.
But as these economic and political implications depend on the manner in 
which Structural Adjustment policies are implemented, the political responses of 
those responsible for future implementation and those capable of influencing political 
opinion in the country are a significant factor. The responses of bureaucrats, party 
and political functionaries and the intelligentsia to the implications of Structural 
Adjustment are thus an integral part of the political responses of the country as a 
whole, and are taken up in detail in the following chapters.
26 Samoff (1992) points out that "the level o f effective citizen participation, not only in voting but also 
informed and critical intervention in national political debates, is higher in Tanzania than in much o f  




The Administrative and Party Bureaucracy
6.1. Introduction
The focus of this chapter is the political response of the administrative and 
party bureaucracy in Tanzania to the IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) and the move towards a multiparty political system. The term 
‘administrative bureaucracy’ is used here to refer to officials in the government 
hierarchy, basically civil servants, who are responsible for the administrative 
functioning of the government. The term ‘party bureaucracy’, on the other hand, is 
used here to refer to Members of Parliament (who have to be party members) as 
well as officials at various levels within the party hierarchy.1
Apart from an overlap of functions and roles due to the co-existence of two 
hierarchies of officials, the party-state interphase in the single-party state of Tanzania 
has led to a rather distinctive institutional framework for both the administrative and 
party bureaucracy. These are discussed in the following section. This section also 
discusses the charges of inefficiency and corruption that have been made, especially 
in the 1980s, against the bureaucracy in Tanzania.
The third section then details the salient features of the sample of 
administrative and party bureaucrats, including their age-groups, educational 
achievements and the proportion of women.
The fourth section analyses the responses of this sample to the changes in 
both their personal economic situation and the wider economic situation brought 
about by first the crisis and then the IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) implemented post-1986.
1 This is o f course an artificial distinction made for analytical clarity. Elsewhere, especially in 
quotations from other work, the term ‘bureaucracy’ is used in the conventional sense to refer simply to 
the officials in the government hierarchy.
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The fifth section looks at the evaluation by bureaucrats of policy-making and 
implementation before and after 1986. It goes on to discuss their perception of the 
performance of the CCM government in the implementation of SAP policies as well 
as their perspective on the prospect of multiparty politics. A concluding section 
presents the major findings of the chapter.
6.2. The Bureaucracy of the Single-Party State : Essential Features
The United Republic of Tanzania has an Executive President, a single­
chamber Legislature (called the National Assembly) and a Constitution which vests 
formal and final authority within the single-party state with the single party, the 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (or CCM).2 The power of the Executive President3 and the 
supremacy of the party over the Parliament in all matters, including the important 
area of policy-making, as well as the semi-competitive nature of the party-state have 
made for a unique institutional framework for the operation of the bureaucracy. 
These special features, it is here argued, have created a unique context within which 
even the often-made charges of inefficiency and corruption within the Tanzanian 
bureaucracy must be viewed. But first, the basic features of the single-party state.
6.2.1. The Party-State Interphase
The single party in Tanzania is strongly hierarchical, with elected and 
nominated members staffing local, regional and national-level party organisations 
based on a Conference-Executive-Committee model (Cranenberg, 1990, chapter 4). 
At the top are the National Conference - which is the supreme de jure organ of the
2
For a detailed account o f the development o f the Constitutional provisions for an Executive 
President, for a single-party state and for party supremacy over the Executive, see Cranenberg (1990) 
chapter 3, Sam off (1987) or Okumu (1979), pp. 52-56. See also Chapter 3 above, especially, sections 3.2  
and 3.3 , for a brief account o f  the development o f the single-party state in Tanzania and the birth o f the 
CCM in 1977.
The Constitutional Amendment o f 1984, however, "substantially weakened the president in favour 
o f the Party" (Okema, 1990, p. 38). These changes, including the limiting o f  the Presidency to two terms 
o f office and the institution o f a minimum age o f 40, were apparently aimed at eliminating the possibility 
o f having a dictator President (Mutahaba and Okema, 1990).
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party, the National Executive Committee (NEC) - which is the supreme de facto 
party organ, and the Central Committee (CC) - which oversees the day-to-day party 
affairs as well as the implementation of policies generated by the NEC (ibid.).4 The 
NEC, which meets far more frequently than the National Conference (every three 
months compared to every five years), is the chief executive organ of the party 
which formulates guidelines on party policy and has the power to "initiate, discuss, 
make decisions and issue guidelines on Party policy in various fields" (ibid., p. 115; 
see also Okumu, 1979, p. 48). The Central Committee also enjoys "considerable 
powers of patronage" since it is the "appointing authority for all party offices not to 
be filled by the President" (ibid., p. 116). Interestingly enough, the Parliament - 
consisting of the Executive President, the Cabinet and the Members of Parliament - 
is part of the National Conference, although not all MPs belong to the more 
powerful National Executive Committee (Barkan, 1979a; Cranenberg, 1990). The 
administrative machinery of the government, including the civil service, is also 
subordinated to the party.
Lower down the party hierarchy, a similar Conference-Executive-Committee 
setup exists at regional and district levels of the party hierarchy with the lower 
branch and cell levels having a slightly different organisational layout (including 
more frequent meetings and no Working Committee), representing a concentration 
of effort on activating the grass roots of the party (ibid., p. 113).5 Mass 
organisations, like the trade unions, women’s and youth organisations, are also part 
of this party hierarchy with elected members in the National Executive and the 
Regional and District level Committees (Cranenberg, 1990, chapter 3).
4 Cranenberg (1990) notes that while the Constitution proclaimed the National Conference the 
‘ultimate authority’ responsible for "formulating the general policy of the party and die supervision o f its 
implementation" with an "impressive" list o f other functions (including the nomination o f a candidate for 
the Presidency o f the United Republic), "the effect o f its supremacy widiin die party was considerably 
reduced by die low frequency o f its meetings", which was normally once in five years (pp. 114-115). In 
practice, dierefore, "the meetings served to endorse party documents formulated elsewhere or candidates 
nominated elsewhere" (p. 115).
5 At the very bottom o f the hierarchy are Cells, with ten families comprising a cell in rural areas and 
fifty in urban areas including places o f work, which have elected Leaders and meet at least once a month 
to discuss, "explain and defend party and government policies in the area" (Cranenberg, 1990, p. 113).
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As the formal codification of the ideology of ujamaa in both the 1967 Arusha 
Declaration and the 1971 Mwongozo indicate,6 the single Party has aspired through 
the state to create a hierarchically-ordered and centrally-controlled economy and 
society in which orders flowed downwards and obedience upwards. Structurally it 
is a tightly-coupled organisation with pre-determined relations between party and the 
state, between state and civil society, and between party and non-party members. 
Low-level organisations and functionaries are supposed to depend on the hierarchy 
just as districts and regions depend on headquarters. Action is supposed to be pegged 
to precise instructions and behaviour and conduct, likewise, is pre-determined and 
pre-programmed, supposedly on the basis of ujamaa (Cranenberg, 1990).
However, this is not necessarily a homogenous ‘state’ class with unanimity 
of purpose and direction. Samoff (1987) sees four ‘poles’ of power in the single­
party state although power alternates between them. While three poles are, 
respectively, the single party - especially the National Executive Committee (NEC), 
the government - both the legislature (National Assembly) and the administrative 
bureaucracy, and the President, the fourth pole consists of "local political coalitions" 
which have formed from time to time, "resistant to central direction from party, 
government and presidency and effectively able to channel or block the 
implementation of national policies" (p. 160). Describing the "fluid" relations 
between these poles of power Samoff writes:
"Redefining those relationships is itself a focus for political conflict. 
Although the supremacy of the party is regularly reiterated, in 
practice the party (that is, its national leadership) has not always 
prevailed. In many circumstances, the party neither governs nor rules, 
but rather operates as one channel for political participation alongside 
others. In other circumstances, the party dominates the policy-making 
process but is only partially successful, and sometimes not successful 
at all, at securing the implementation of its policies. The party often 
also functions to legitimize policies and programs of which it is not 
the creator" (pp. 151-152).
Although this pictures the single-party state as being riven with power 
factions in constant flux, the fact that the NEC and the country’s President-cum-
6 See Chapter 3, sections 3 .3 .1 . and 3 .3 .2 ., for more details.
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Party Chairman work in close harmony and that there is a close overlap between 
NEC decisions and national policy ought to considerably diminish any ambiguity 
there may be about the locus of political power in the single-party state. Party 
functionaries, civil servants and legislators are largely concerned with carrying out 
pre-determined policies.
6.2.2. The Party Bureaucracy : Patronage and Accountability
An important feature of this party-state interphase is the semi-competitive 
nature of the party with an ‘electoral regime’ (Bienen, 1974) enforcing periodic 
accountability in most major party posts, including those for Party Chairman and the 
President of the Union.7 This has helped hold in check any major tendency towards 
exploiting either the heavily statist nature of the state or the subordination of the 
administrative bureaucracy to the political machinery by party functionaries, 
including Members of Parliament. Most aspiring Members of Parliament have to 
face parliamentary elections as do local government council officials (although 
district level elections were suspended from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s), 
cooperative officials (also suspended for about a decade), cell leaders - the lowest 
level party officials, as well as those wanting party positions in branch, district, 
regional and national party committees (Samoff, 1987).8
This unique feature of the Tanzanian state gives it flexibility and the ability 
to absorb new trends and ideas, including radical policies with adverse implications 
for powerful vested interests (Cliffe, 1967; Saul 1974). This also means that there
It was the 1965 Constitution which provided for contested elections within the single-party 
framework. For extensive discussions o f party elections, see inter alia  Samoff (1987), Cranenberg (1990), 
Barkan (1979) and Bienen (1967).
In most o f these elections, Samoff (1987) writes, "the process involves both screening by the party 
at the relevant level and then voting for contested seats" (ibid, p. 151). There are three significant features 
o f such elections: first, there are normally only two contestants for each office, thus enabling the single 
party to "eliminate some aspiring officeholders and by using that power, to discourage others"; second, 
political campaigns are "controlled and managed by party delegates"; and third, candidates must usually 
"share formal appearances with their opponents and are limited on time, topic and campaign expenditures" 
(id.).
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is intense competition within it for elections to Parliamentary and Party posts.9 Such 
an electoral system functions as an important feedback mechanism between 
Tanzanian citizens and party officials, which the masses have been able to play 
skilfully to limit elite power and occasionally outplay them. For it is not so much 
the national-level committee work that determines the contribution of sitting MPs 
and other party functionaries in such public elections as the regular constituency 
work of the state and the servicing of the clientele network to which they are linked 
(Schlosser and Siegler, 1990; Van Donge and Liviga, 1990; Barkan, 1979b). The 
fact that between 70 and 80 percent of the population have registered as voters each 
time since 1960 and that voters have been making increasing use of the possibility 
of casting invalid votes serves to warn the political elite against taking party and 
parliamentary positions for granted.10 Voters can and do punish politicians who 
they feel have not serviced local community needs, as is apparent from the rate of 
turnover of political functionaries (Samoff, 1987, pp. 158-159).11 Nevertheless, 
while elections are compulsory for almost all major posts at the all levels of the 
party hierarchy, there are still a substantial number of posts that are filled by 
Presidential or party nominees.12 And this implies considerable powers of patronage 
for certain officials within the party hierarchy.
But those political functionaries for whom the threat is effective have to 
constantly balance patronage relations and electoral-community servicing with
9 Van Donge and Liviga’s (1990) election study reveals that 119 constituencies attracted 1145 
candidates, i.e ., nearly 10 candidates per seat.
10 See Bavu and Okema (1990) for an analysis o f invalid votes in the 1985 elections.
11 The following table gives an idea of the rate o f turnover and hence the danger o f assuming ‘safe’
seats:
Years Turnout Turnover % of losing incumbents
(% o f registered voters) (% o f 1st term MPs)
1965 73 80 45
1970 72 70 33
1975 82 64 42*
[* previously elected incumbents only.]
12 Sam off (1987) notes that while 81 out o f the 188 (or 43 percent o f  the) seats in the National 
Assembly were nominated, this proportion is still around 40 percent in 1985.
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national committee responsibilities. However, the squeeze on economic power during 
the economic crisis, over and above that imposed by the austerity of party ideology, 
has led to charges of corruption being voiced with increasing frequency in the 
1980s.13 But this is a charge equally applicable to the administrative bureaucracy 
and consequently it is taken up separately in a later sub-section.
6.2.3. The Administrative Bureaucracy : Roles and Responses
The post-colonial imperatives of Africanisation and nationalisation coupled 
with the state-dominated development strategy adopted by Tanzania resulted in the 
rapid replacement of foreign with indigenous personnel in public organizations and 
an expansion of the bureaucracy. But unlike its smaller, more experienced and 
skilled colonial predecessor, this set of bureaucrats appears in hindsight to have been 
ill-equipped to develop the nation’s economy, being widely lacking in knowledge, 
skill, experience and risk-taking ability. This was largely because the paucity of 
experienced African civil servants to replace the expatriates meant that "a pool of 
qualified African personnel had to be created almost from scratch by building and 
staffing a new university, institutes and schools" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986, pp. 
210). This almost naturally resulted in "an expanding bureaucracy composed of 
untested university and school graduates" who "were placed in command when the 
Tanzanian state took direct control of the national economy in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s" (ibid., 1986, pp. 210-211). Worse still, these nationalisations removed 
the possibility of a countervailing private sector against which to measure the 
performance of the public sector (including large state-owned parastatals) that the 
bureaucrats had been called upon to manage and run (ibid).
The civil service was coopted into the party hierarchy through a series of 
moves beginning with the appointment in the early 1960s of civil servants as 
Regional Heads of Government, or Regional Commissioners. They were 
simultaneously made Regional Party Secretaries, which made them ex officio
13 While the charge o f inefficiency would also be plausible given that these party bureaucrats are 
largely untrained in the professional requirements o f policy-making and planning and often subject to party 
directives ‘from above’, it is surprising that this is not an issue to be found in the literature.
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members of the Party National Conference and the National Executive Committee - 
and hence members of the party hierarchy in addition to the government hierarchy 
(Cranenberg, 1990, p. 68).14 Both Cranenberg (1990) and Samoff (1987) note that 
there was considerable opposition to the co-option of the administrative bureaucracy 
within the political ambit of the single-party state but that the latter finally 
"eliminated the barriers to civil servants’ political activity" (Samoff, 1987, p. 
156).15 Samoff (1987) observes that this meant that "[rjegions and districts thus had 
as their senior administrative officials individuals appointed directly by the president 
and responsible to him through both civil service and party channels" (p. 156). 
Although in 1985 the roles of party secretary and commissioner roles were divorced, 
for over two decades this arrangement - while beneficial in the sense that local 
citizens had frequently to deal only with one individual with a position in each 
hierarchy - had often resulted in situations where "even the commissioners 
themselves could not specify clearly, or found it useful not to distinguish, when they 
were speaking as commissioner and when they were speaking as party secretary" 
(id.).
The subordination of the administrative bureaucracy to the party meant that 
in Tanzania the bureaucracy was rarely called upon to perform its conventional role 
of policy analysis, policy formulation, and policy evaluation (Hyden, 1979; Barkan, 
1979b; Cranenberg, 1990). Instead, the bureaucracy was forced to share power with 
party functionaries regarding policy implementation and to be subservient to the 
dictates of the Party machinery regarding policy-formulation. As Pratt (1976, p. 
226) puts it, "the party far from meekly ratifying the policy proposals of a 
conservative civil service, has tended instead to be resistant and unsympathetic to
14 This was later extended to the district levels as well, with the appointment o f Area Commissioners 
who also doubled as Area Party Secretaries.
15 Samoff (1987) writes that the colonial model o f government in Tanzania, where civil servants were 
protected from political pressure "by excluding them from directly partisan activities and by sheltering 
them from directly partisan attacks", had forced Nyerere himself "to choose between his job and his active 
participation in the nationalist movement" (p. 156). Cranenberg (1990) writes, quoting Pratt (1972) that 
”[f]riction developed between the new African political leadership and the highest echelons o f the civil 
service, frequently European and better educated" and that "politicians began to object [to the 
"constitutional provision that freed the civil service from direct political control"] and argued for political 
control" (p. 62). Their argument was that the conditions for economic under-development called for a 
different style o f politics where "civil servants needed to be mobilised for political goals" (id).
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those who speak the language of priorities, moderation, bottlenecks and shortages". 
And herein lies the contradiction of a bureaucracy that should have in fact been a 
powerful institution given the strength of the single-party state.16 Yet it appears to 
have been reduced to an economically and politically innocuous body of 
administrative functionaries (at least at the national policy-making level) and also 
charged with administrative mismanagement. These were not the only charges.
Discrimination had come early, in the form of suspicion regarding their 
ideological commitment. They were regarded as having "been to" (Europe and/or 
America) and having consequently acquired foreign tastes and values which were, 
in the days of ujamaa, invariably regarded as snti-ujamaa and pro-capitalist. Such 
suspicion brought on an ideological onslaught. First, the government sought their 
ideological commitment by making membership of the party compulsory for the 
bureaucrats. Next, a party ideological college was opened and attendance by all 
administrators was made compulsory.17
But others have suggested that the civil servants were actually caught out by 
the institutional feature of the single-party state that gave the party leadership virtual 
control over policy-making, leaving the legislature and thus the civil service only to 
oversee the implementation of pre-determined policies. Hyden (1979), for instance, 
feels that civil servants "have been overwhelmed by new policies and programs in 
which the conflicts between ends and means have not been resolved in advance" (p. 
100). It is entirely possible, thus, that with their views disregarded at the policy­
making stage, any non-implementation of state policy could then be thrown back at 
the civil servants as ‘inefficiency’ (ibid., p. 101). This is not to say that the 
administrative bureaucracy is entirely efficient, but merely to suggest that there may
16 Analysts from the Fred Riggs school of thought, like Heady, Eisenstadt, Pye, Abernathy and 
Selassie, would argue, for instance, that in the absence o f a private sector and due to its monopoly of 
administrative and technical skills, the bureaucracy would be difficult to control because it would simply 
be too strong for other institutions to challenge (Hyden, 1979, p. 94).
i  n
While this had the desired effect o f indoctrinating the bureaucracy with the party’s ideological 
position, it also had the favourable effect o f reliving somewhat the tension between the civil service and 
the politicians - who were also required to attend ideological training. In particular, it gave the civil 
servant a political forum hitherto denied to him and reduced the remoteness o f the civil servant from the 
society whose needs he sought to serve. Since the Zanzibar Declaration o f  1991, however, diis 
requirement has been dropped {Daily News, February, 1991).
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be more to the charge of inefficiency than is apparent at first. The civil service 
appears to be a group of individuals whose initiative has been taken away by the 
policy actions of the party acting through the legislature. Hyden (1979) lucidly 
captures these features of the civil service in Tanzania as follows:
"In some cases, like the decision to introduce universal primary 
education (UPE) by 1977, the civil servants have really responded 
positively and constructively. They have worked out feasible ways of 
implementation which do not hamper the execution of other already 
existing programs in the government. In other cases, however, the 
civil servants have really been thrown out of gear. A good example 
is the 1975 Operation Maduka. The then prime minister, Rashidi 
Kawawa, directed that all private retail shops should as soon as 
possible be replaced by cooperative ventures. The political heads in 
Tanzania’s 20 regions responded very differently. Some decided to 
order the closure of private shops as a matter of urgency. Others 
suggested a phasing-out plan. Still others waited to see what was 
going to happen. In this, like so many other cases, bureaucrats have 
not been able to act in a concerted manner - characteristic of a group 
of people concerned with defending their class interest. Sudden and 
bold policy initiatives that have been so typical of Tanzania since 
independence have forced the civil servants into a defensive posture.
Because the politicians, and notably the president himself, have seized 
the initiatives, the discretion of the bureaucrats as a social class has 
been very limited" (p. 100)
While excluded from the top formal decision-making bodies which were the 
preserve of the politicians, bureaucrats learned to stall, circumvent, subvert and 
emasculate party decisions to suit their interests. As Mukandala (1991) writes, 
"[pjolicies which proved completely unacceptable (e.g. directives on the use of 
official vehicles) were simply ignored". Coupled with the Party imperative of forced 
austerity and the realisation that their council was unwanted or unappreciated, the 
constraints of their work atmosphere inevitably resulted in frustration and a search 
for alternate orientations and interests.
A major avenue was the development of local-level ‘distributional coalitions’ 
(Olson, 1982) and later informal sector activity. It would thus seem that while, like 
many countries in Africa, charges of corruption and inefficiency in the context of 
the administrative bureaucracy are not entirely baseless, this phenomenon ought 
perhaps to be placed in the light of the special circumstances of the Tanzanian
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single-party system, namely, the ‘constrained’ work-atmosphere of the administrative 
bureaucracy and the increasing economic hardship they faced with a steeply 
decreasing standard of living, especially from the late 1970s.18 The charge of 
corruption is explored in greater detail in a later sub-section.
6.2.4. The Institutional Context of Bureaucratic Functioning
This institutional setup has three main implications for bureaucratic 
functioning which are useful in developing a background to the subsequent analysis. 
The first is with regard to policy-making. As Cranenberg (1990) observes, with the 
1977 Constitution "[p]olicy decisions were now the exclusive domain of the party 
acting through the NEC" (p. 81). This effectively reduced Parliament, or rather the 
National Assembly, to "a committee of the party charged with supervision of the 
Government in the implementation of party policies" (Cranenberg, 1990, p. 81, 
emphasis added) and legislators in Tanzania are said to have been "increasingly 
relegated to a role of ratifying government-proposed legislation in the National 
Assembly", with any bargaining that did occur over policy "[taking] place behind 
closed doors in the meetings of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the 
party" (Barkan, 1979b, pp. 75 and 81).19
Legislators’ perception of their role has consequently changed. Barkan 
(1979b) writes "[f]or them, the essence of the legislative process is found not in 
legislating as a member of the National Assembly, but in lobbying on their 
constituents’ behalf vis-a-vis government ministers, senior bureaucrats in charge of 
ministries that run programs in the rural areas (that is, public works, health, 
education, agriculture), and the senior members of the provincial and regional 
administrations responsible for the area in which their constituencies are located" (p.
18 See Chapter 5, section 5 .2 .1 ., for details.
19 Barkan (1979) writes that while "MPs may, and do deliberate legislation proposed by the 
government [read NEC] ... once a decision is made - invariably in support o f the decision - they are 
expected to publicly support the decision whatever their personal conviction" (p. 75).
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67).20
The second implication is similar. The aim of the single-party state to 
subordinate "all other institutions - especially the administrative agencies of the 
Tanzanian government - to the authority of the party" (Barkan, 1979a, p. 10) has 
resulted in the attitude that "showing commitment to the policies as pronounced by 
their political leaders is more important than offering a rational critique of these 
policies" (Hyden, 1979, p. 102)
Thirdly, the overlapping of party and administrative hierarchies has created 
a complex web of responsibility such that "[t]he formal separation of responsibilities 
specified in the constitution suggests a sharper distinction between party and 
government than has been maintained in practice" (Samoff, 1987, p. 156).21 The 
leadership of regions and districts is shared between three different individuals with 
different sources of authority: "a chairman elected by the local party organization 
(and thus a local resident), a party secretary appointed by the president (rarely a 
local resident), and a party executive secretary appointed by party headquarters (also 
rarely a local resident)" (Samoff, 1987, p. 156).22 Members of Parliament are ex 
officio members of the National Conference and some MPs also belong to the 
National Executive Committee. Civil Servants, who as Regional Commissioners are 
the administrative heads of regions, are similarly ex officio members of the National 
Conference and ex officio Members of Parliament as well (Cranenberg, 1990, p. 73). 
Like administrative bureaucrats, MPs were also in charge of parastatal organisations 
until 1985 (Van Donge and Liviga, 1990, p. 16). Further, there is an overlap of
20 This is backed up by the Findings o f an empirical study of the 1985 elections, which concluded 
that "the electorate simply did not reward critical MPs", i.e ., those MPs who had "made a name in 
challenging the government [and its policies]" (Van Donge and Liviga, 1990, p. 4).
21 Samoff (1987) further suggests that these overlapping roles "reflected the limited pool o f skilled 
personnel, the party’s effort to create a hybrid o f the diffuse role responsibilities o f earlier African history 
and the functional specificity o f modern party systems and the party’s concern that its authority not be 
challenged by government and administration" (p. 156).
22 * *Samoff goes on to assess the pros and cons o f an institutional arrangement where "two
organisational networks had overlapping responsibilities", noting among the former the availability of 
"alternative paths to the policy-making process" - wherein local citizens with a grievance could appeal to 
their local MP and  their Party chair and  their Regional Commissioner, and among the latter, die problem 
in situations where one and the same person held two positions, one administrative and the other political, 
diat "citizens dissatisfied with the one could hardly turn to the odier" (p. 157).
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roles at national, regional and district levels where Chairpersons and Secretaries hold 
portfolios similar to those in the government hierarchy.23 This makes it difficult to 
apportion blame for inadequate performance, although the tendency has been for the 
party bureaucracy to blame the civil servants (Okumu, 1979; Hyden, 1979).
These three implications of the special institutional features of the Tanzanian 
bureaucracy, administrative and party, ought to be borne in mind while examining 
their responses to the economic crisis and the subsequent liberalisation that took 
place after the late 1970s. And it is also useful when examining the charges of 
corruption that have been made so often. This is the focus of the next section.
6.2.5. Corruption Within the Bureaucracy
Bureaucratic corruption in Tanzania appears to be closely linked with the 
economic circumstances of the political and administrative bureaucracy, which in 
turn have been determined largely by two factors: first, the strict party guidelines 
on private accumulation, and second, the deterioration in the standard of living 
following the economic crisis of the late 1970s.24
As far as the first factor is concerned, the leadership code since 1967 had 
forbidden all party and administrative functionaries to draw income from private 
sources, including from private enterprise or from renting own property. By means 
of this self-restraint the state hoped to preserve the integrity of their members in 
their official capacity from being affected by private economic interests, which 
would have endangered the legitimacy of its power in the long run (Shivji, 1975). 
And on the positive side, it is tine that the discrepancy between the highest and the
23 There are Party Secretaries under the (national) Central Committee for various departments 
including Education, Propaganda, Economic Affairs and Planning, Organisation, Defence and Security, 
Foreign Relations and Discipline and Control" (Cranenberg, 1990, pp. 119-120). Similarly, at regional 
and district levels, there are officials holding similar portfolios (ibid).
24 It must nonetheless be said unlike other African countries, the party’s leadership code (which 
applied equally to the civil servants), prevented the more glaring forms o f  corruption and nepotism, as 
were conflicts o f interest with private economic activities. In this connection one must also note that the 
African context o f what is termed ‘nepotism’ is perhaps more the tradition o f  gift-giving, hospitality and 
protection o f  kin - which might appear in a modern setting to be corruption.
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lowest net income, which at the end of colonial era was 50: l ,25 reduced to a mere 
6:1 (through inter alia a strongly progressive taxation scheme).26 But even 
privileges linked with public posts, such as an official apartment, car and office, 
compensated only partially for this austerity and the accumulative instinct and 
economic necessity led even top functionaries to evade these restrictions.
Concerning the second factor, World Bank data shows that while the 
purchasing power of urban workers on minimum wages suffered a loss of only 
around 20 percent from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the real income of the 
middle and higher level state employees sank by more than half and was reduced to 
little more than the real income of the rural population (Leonard, 1979).27 Squeezed 
between modestly increasing income (the result of belated attempts to restore 
purchasing power) and a spiralling inflation, all salaried employees, civil servants 
and party bureaucrats have had to rely on additional income. This additional income 
has come either from legal informal sector activity or from illegal Second Economy 
activity, including the diversion of state resources for private gain.28 Since the 
former has been dealt with in the previous chapter, only the illegal aspects of the 
Second Economy activity carried out by the bureaucracy are examined here.
Official corruption in Tanzania can perhaps be roughly divided into two 
phases, divided across the late 1970s when the economic crisis set in.29 Although 
qualitatively there is little difference between the two periods, one major distinction 
between the two periods is the increasing opportunities for the ‘privatisation’ of 
public funds that liberalisation provided. These new avenues of private profit
25 Till 1963-64 the ratio was 90:1, according to Abernathy (1984).
26 Leonard (1979), p. 155.
27 See also chapter 5, especially Table 5.2 .3  in section 5 .2 .1 .
See chapter 5, section 5 .2 .3 .
29 While corruption, nepotism and embezzlement had been common in the state sector as a whole 
from the late 1960s, the diversion o f public funds had been on a relatively low level in individual cases. 
Yet, it was only after 1977 when Sokoine began to deal more rigorously with corrupt politicians and civil 
servants that even the upper ranks o f the administration and die political elite began to feel menaced for 
die first time. Sokoine’s death in a road accident proved to be dieir salvation as his successors were less 
energetic in continuing his campaigns against what was dien called ‘economic sabotage’ (Maliyamkono 
and Bagachwa, 1990).
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brought harsh criticism during the investigations prior to the detailing of the IMF- 
sponsored SAP. But the charge that the bureaucracy was lining its own pockets is 
thus not new but merely set in a new context.30
A useful distinction in this context is between the activities of the high and 
low arches within the state bureaucracy. Low level functionaries have learnt to 
privatise from their superiors but their privatising projects are constrained by their 
limited leeway in the organization, the limited amount of resources that go through 
their positions, the greater likelihood of discovery and punishment by their 
superiors,31 as well as the possibility of their facing prosecution and conviction 
given their lack of "contacts" and resources to buy their way out of trouble. 
Corruption in the low arches has mainly been dependent on the ‘serial’ character of 
bureaucratic procedures. Almost all bureaucratic action has to be taken in a 
sequential way, with current action by lower level functionaries determining whether 
or not a simple administrative procedure - such as routing a file through a 
government office - is allowed to continue on its sequence. According to Effange 
and Balogun (1989) for example, " ...‘lost’ and otherwise ‘untraceable’ files have 
been known to surface after the client has taken ‘appropriate’ steps" (p. 67).
Government corruption after the onset of the crisis included some more 
specific activities (Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells, 1986). In the building 
industry, for instance, the scarcity of building materials and unrealistic prices pushed 
up rents and enabled landlords (the so-called Vigogo or Wazito) - who are often 
influential government officials - to ask for rent in advance and often in foreign
30 Outright old fashioned corruption, defined as "the use o f public resources for private gain ... .which 
takes place in a public organization when an official or civil servant in defiance o f prescribed norms, 
breaks the rules to advance his personal interest" (Gould, 1983), has a long history in even independent 
Tanzania. This has included pay offs, bribery, extortion, false declarations in documents, the stealing, 
leaking, selling and hiding o f information and official records, patronage, embezzlement, impersonation, 
use o f official cars and offices in smuggling (gold), poaching, the purchase o f faulty or non-existent 
goods, the fraudulent use o f official stationary, payment for office visits and for letters of 
recommendations, the misuse o f official housing and the issue o f phoney travel documents. Such 
‘privatization’ o f  public funds has also included the padding of salary lists and the wholesale conversion 
o f public resources through legalistic measures supposedly aimed at fostering efficiency - such as selling 
o f public cars to bureaucrats, and excessive conferencing so as to travel abroad and acquire foreign goods 
(Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990).
31 As is obvious, the higher up one is in the organisation, the fewer the number of superiors is likely
to be.
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currency, confident in the knowledge that their political influence would keep them 
beyond the reach of the (then) strict foreign currency laws in the country. Other 
abuses of official power on the rise during this period included the siphoning off of 
government stocks of material and grain on to the black market against pay-offs, 
usually in foreign currency. Another area was real estate transactions with a rising 
level of unauthorised and speculative buying, selling of (government) real estate and 
the ‘double allocation’ of surveyed building plots in urban areas.
The criticism regarding the efficiency and integrity of the civil service made 
by international organisations like the IMF and the World Bank is also echoed by 
several administrative bureaucrats themselves who feel that a large, underemployed 
and corrupt bureaucracy does stand in the way of economic progress and who 
therefore support the rationalisation implicit in the SAP. At the same time, however, 
there are bureaucrats who stand to lose, and perhaps substantially, by the full 
implementation of the policies of the SAP - either by their retrenchment, or simply 
by the curtailment of prerogatives, privileges and opportunities for private gain that 
were present earlier - and it is the response of this group that could be politically 
significant.
6.2.6. Crisis and Liberalisation : The Impact on the Bureaucracy
During the worsening economic situation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
administrative bureaucrats in the public service and parastatal organisations 
increasingly challenged the party bureaucracy about its credentials and capacity to 
run the economy. Their criticism that several government policies, especially with 
regard to the manner in which parastatal organisations were being run, were 
responsible for at least part of the economic crisis was echoed by the press and the 
intelligentsia.32 There was also pressure for action against corruption and 
inefficiency from within the party leadership, notably from Nyerere himself.33
These are discussed in detail m a subsequent chapter.
33 This was Nyerere s preferred method o f dealing with increasing problems o f  inefficiency and 
corruption within his party ranks. See, for instance, Nyerere (1977).
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Besides, several international observers were pressing for economic reform as a pre­
condition for financial assistance during the dismal socio-economic situation of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.34
The single-party state reacted in three ways to this pressure. Firstly, it looked 
increasingly towards its professional civil servants for policy advice. Secondly, it 
introduced wide ranging institutional reform within its hierarchical decision-making 
structure to strengthen party organisation and tighten the monitoring of its cadres. 
And thirdly, it toned down its socialist rhetoric, especially in party pronouncements. 
All three were implemented gradually during the 1980s.
The first of these resulted in the civil servants becoming progressively more 
closely involved in the policy-making that resulted in the formulation of the National 
Economic Survival Programme of 1981 (NESP) and the indigenous Structural 
Adjustment Programme (sap) of 1982, in collaboration with the international 
Tanzanian Advisory Group (TAG). Even the IMF-sponsored SAP (whose official 
programmes include the Economic Recovery Programmes of 1986 and 1989 and the 
most recent Priority Social Action Programme (PSAP)), whose range of policy 
pronouncements extended from agricultural pricing and import policy to foreign 
exchange policy and monetary policy, has been the product of a three-player 
collaboration between the IMF-World Bank consultants, the political functionaries 
of the state and the administrative bureaucrats. This mode of policy-making, 
consisting of policy-consultancy reports, enquiry commissions, study groups, 
investigative teams and negotiations, have entailed a more prominent bureaucratic 
role and the party has consequently had to rely increasingly on the technocratic 
professional input of administrative bureaucrats in the Civil Service.35
The re-structuring of the party organisation and the toning down its socialist 
rhetoric are related, and are the responses of the party towards the economic crisis. 
It was only with the realisation that some form of economic liberalisation was
34 See chapter 3, section 3 .4 .3 .
35 For example the decision to re-establish cooperative unions and local authorities was made in the 
early 1980s following the findings o f a Commission set up to study the issue. Bureaucrats were well- 
represented on the Commission, and the findings were heeded. Salaries and wage policy in the late 1980s 
have been guided by tire findings o f a Commission which was heavily bureaucratic in composition (URT,
1987).
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necessary that efforts began to be channelled towards the dismantling of the 
command economy with its administered prices, subsidies and quotas. The toning 
down of the socialist rhetoric appears to have its roots in these moves towards 
economic liberalisation. As seen earlier (chapter 2), the move away from centralised 
decision-making for the economy and society was slow and heavily contested in 
certain areas and largely divorced from official party pronouncements - which still 
espoused the old party line of African socialism. By the late 1980s, with Nyerere 
stepping down as President and also with the adoption of the IMF-sponsored SAP, 
even the veneer was wearing thin. While the 1985 Election Manifesto used the 
phrase ‘socialism and self-reliance’ thirteen times, the CCM’s 1990 Manifesto 
mentioned it only once. Terms like ujamaa, anti-capitalism, leadership code, 
exploitation and equality were rarely mentioned in the Manifesto or in actual 
campaigns. The Manifesto concentrated on ‘things that annoy citizens’ i.e., 
straightforward issues such as corruption, unfair treatment of citizens by state, 
shortages, etc. Also, in the 1990 elections, the CCM emphasised renewal regarding 
party ideology and practice alongside soft peddling on ujamaa socialism as 
symbolised in the Arusha Declaration of 1967.36 And it is significant in this 
context that the President of Tanzania and Chairman of the CCM Mwinyi stated that 
if it were possible the word ‘nationalism’ should be erased from Tanzanian political 
vocabulary.
The breakup of socialist Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union in 1990 
provided the catalyst for major changes in party ideology as evidenced, for instance, 
in the Zanzibar Declaration of 1991. This party document overturned the earlier 
Arusha Declaration of 1967, which had been the benchmark statement of party 
ideology. But by that time, to many, the official statement was only endorsing the 
reality on the ground.
With the breakup of the command economy, the relaxation of the party’s 
austerity measures and the removal of the pre-requisite of ideological training for 
party membership, it would appear that economic liberalisation has been
36 Accordingly, renowned ujamaa ideologues were passed over for nominations to top positions 
within the party and the government. There was, in addition, an almost total absence o f the use o f the 
term ujamaa.
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accompanied by an erosion of socialist ideology. But what the bureaucracy itself 
feels is the appropriate direction for the future is what the rest of this chapter 
attempts to detail.
6.3. Sample Description
The sample of 87 bureaucrats surveyed between April 1991 to August 1991 
is discussed in terms of their area of operation, their position within their respective 
hierarchies, educational levels, sex and age.
Table 6 .3 .1  : Regional Distribution o f Sample
Position Dar-es-
Salaam






8 44.44  
(100.00)





10 100.00  
(83.33)
- - 10 100.00
Area
Sub-total
12 42.85  
(100.00)
8 28.57  
(100.00)
8 2 8 .5 7  
(100.00)




8 40.00  
(27.58)
6 30.00  
(37.50)





20 52.63  
(68.96)
10 26.32  
(62.50)





1 100.00  
(3.45)
- - 1 100.00
Area 
Sub total
29 49.15  
(100.00)
16 27.12  
(100.00)
14 23.73  
(100.00)











Notes 1. ‘Admn’ refers to administrative bureaucracy while ‘Party’ refers to party bureaucracy.
2. Figures in italics refer to percentages to row totals; figures in parenthesis refer to percentages 
to the area sub-totals; while figures in italics and parenthesis refer to percentages to the total 
sample.
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As Table 6.3.1 shows, there are three main features of the sample. Firstly, 
party bureaucrats outnumber the administrative bureaucrats in the total sample as 
well as in the regional samples. Thus, 59 out of the 87 (or nearly two-thirds of the) 
respondents are party bureaucrats while only 28 are from the government 
administration.37 In Dar-es-Salaam, only 12 out of the 41 bureaucrats sampled (or 
roughly 30 percent) were administrative bureaucrats, while the remaining 70 percent 
belonged to the party bureaucracy, while in Dodoma and Arusha this ratio was 
around 1:3 in favour of the party bureaucracy. This is not necessarily indicative of 
the larger presence of party bureaucrats in these urban areas. It is more because the 
party bureaucracy was more accessible and willing to discuss issues and also because 
party offices tended to be located in the same complex while government offices 
(and Ministries) were often dispersed and rather difficult to locate.
Secondly, as the percentages of area totals to the sample total indicate, there 
are more bureaucrats in the sample from Dar-es-Salaam (41 out of 87 or 47.13 
percent) than from either Dodoma (27 percent) or Arusha (25 percent). This is also 
true of the sub-totals of administrative and party bureaucrats sampled; while around 
40 percent of civil servants sampled were from Dar-es-Salaam, the remaining 60 
percent or so were divided equally between Arusha and Dodoma. The only contrary 
trend to this is in the case of regional-level civil servants, who were much larger in 
proportion (44 percent) in Arusha and Dodoma than in Dar-es-Salaam (11 percent). 
All the ten national level civil servants and the only national level party bureaucrat 
in the sample were from Dar-es-Salaam. Even at the branch level, more party 
officials were sampled from Dar-es-Salaam than from either Dodoma or Arusha. 
This trend is largely due to the predominance of Ministries as well as administrative 
and party offices in the de facto capital of the country.38
Thirdly, more bureaucrats from the regional level in the hierarchy are 
represented in the sample than from other levels, in general. The only exception to
37 • •Following the rather extensive discussion in the previous section o f the party and administrative
hierarchies in the Tanzanian single-party state, the terms ‘government administration’, ‘civil service’ and 
‘civil administration’ are also used to denote the administrative bureaucracy. A lso, as before, Members 
o f Parliament are subsumed under the head o f the party bureaucracy.
38 ____  Although Dodoma is the official capital o f the country, many government and party offices have
not yet moved from die colonial capital o f Dar-es-Salaam.
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this general trend is in the case of the administrative bureaucracy sampled in Dar-es- 
Salaam, where more than 80 percent of the bureaucrats were from the national level. 
Apart from the party bureaucracy in Arusha and Dodoma, where the division was 
closer to 40:60 in favour of the regional level, the regional level officials outnumber 
the rest. This is largely due to two reasons, first, the better accessibility to this level 
than higher levels, and secondly, the greater visibility of this level of organisation 
in urban areas. Ministry-level officials of the civil service and the upper echelons 
of the party bureaucracy were much more difficult to meet and interview. Also, 
government or party offices are better known than branch-level organisations, which 
tended to be institution-specific in urban areas. Thus, workers and managers in an 
industrial plant or a parastatal organisation would constitute a branch of the party 
while workers alone might be part of a union which, in turn, would be an affiliate 
of the local branch office. In fact, the branch-level party bureaucracy in the sample 
are actually trade-union leaders.
This trend of regional concentration within the sample is brought out more 
clearly in Table 6.3.2 below.
Table 6.3.2 : Hierarchical Distribution of Sample
Category National level Regional Level Branch Level Row Totals
Administrative
bureaucracy
10 35.71%  
(90.09)
18 64.29%  
(32.14)
- 28 100.00  
(32.18)
Party bureaucracy 1 1.69%  
(8.91)
38 64.41%  
((67.86)
20 33.89%  
(100.00)
59 100.00  
(61.82)
Column Totals 11 12.64%  
(100.00)
56 64.37%  
(100.00)
20 22.98%  
(100.00)
87 100.00  
(100.00)
Notes 1. Figures in parenthesis refer to percentages to column totals. 
2. Figures in italics refer to percentages to row totals.
As a whole, 56 out of the 87 bureaucrats (or nearly 65 percent) are from 
regional offices, while 11 (or 12.64 percent) are from the national-level organisation 
and 20 (or 22.98 percent) are from branch level offices. Of the 11 national level
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bureaucrats in the sample, ten are from the civil service and the other, a Member 
of Parliament, is a party bureaucrat. Of the 56 regional-level bureaucrats, 38 (or 
around two-thirds of the sample) are from the party bureaucracy and 18 (roughly 33 
percent) from the administrative bureaucracy. Local level officials are basically from 
the party bureaucracy and are, as mentioned earlier, trade union officials in party 
offices or state-run enterprises. Within the party bureaucrats sampled, apart from 
one (Member of Parliament) from the national level, nearly two-thirds were from 
the region and only one third from the lower level. While there were no 
administrative bureaucrats below the regional level in the sample, the nearly two- 
thirds of the rest of the sample are regional-level bureaucrats and only a third are 
national-level functionaries.
Given that within the Tanzanian bureaucracy educational levels are positively 
correlated to salary and also that a higher proportion of government and party 
bureaucrats are well-educated in the 1980s (Van Donge and Liviga, 1990, p. 8), the 
educational achievements of this sample, presented in Table 6.3,3 below, are worth 
examining in detail.










Admn - - 4 14.3  
(18.18)
17 60 .7  
(50.00)





2 5,1  
(25.00)
7 18.0  
(53.85)
11 28.2  
(50.00)
16 41.0  
(47.05)





6 30 .0  
(75.00)
6 30.0  
(46.15)
7 35.0  
(31.82)
1 5 .0  
(2.94)
- 20 100.0
Totals 8 9.2  
(100.00)
13 15.0  
(100.00)




10 11.5  
(100.00)
87 100.0  
(100.00)
Notes 1, ‘Admn’ refers to national and regional level administrative bureaucrats.
2 . ‘Party (high) refers to party bureaucrats at the national and regional levels.
3. ‘Party (low) refers to party bureaucrats at the branch level.
4. Figures in brackets represent percentages to the column totals.
5. Figures in italics represent percentages to the row totals.
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As the percentages of the column totals of the Table to the sample total 
indicate, those with primary and secondary education account for only around 25 
percent of the sample as a whole, while those with graduate and post-graduate level 
education account for more than 50 percent. The Table also shows that educated 
bureaucrats are concentrated basically in the upper levels of the party bureaucracy 
and in the administrative bureaucracy. Within the civil service, graduates and post­
graduates account for more than 80 percent of the sample while those with less than 
secondary school education are not represented at all. This trend of the well- 
educated being better represented in the administrative bureaucracy is also apparent 
while going across the sample. Most (70 percent) of the post-graduates and fifty 
percent of the graduates in the sample were from the civil service, while only one 
of the 34 graduates was in the branch level party organisation. Again, 75 percent of 
those educated only till the primary level were in the party’s branch-level 
bureaucracy as were more than 50 percent of the respondents educated only up to 
the secondary-level. Thus, there seems to be a sharp divide across secondary-level 
education, with those with higher qualifications going on to higher party posts. The 
sample thus appears to be representative of the bureaucracy as a whole.
Significantly, there were no women in the administrative bureaucracy and the 
only women in the sample were in the party bureaucracy (see Table 6.3,4 below).
Table 6.3.4 : Proportion of Women within the Party Bureaucracy
Position Dar-es-Salaam Dodoma Arusha Total
Regional
level
6 2 1 9










8 2 2 12
Totals (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (20.33% )
Notes : 1. Figures in parenthesis are percentages to the column totals.
2. Figures in italics are percentages to the relevant sub-sample totals given in Table 6 .3 .1 .
3. Figures in italics and parenthesis under the row totals refer to the proportion o f women in the 
relevant category, i.e ., regional party bureaucracy, the branch party bureaucracy and the total 
sample o f party bureaucracy.
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There are only 9 women within the party bureaucracy at the regional level, 
which gives women a representation of only 23 percent within that stratum of the 
sample. Similarly, the 3 women sampled at the branch-level (i.e., trade union 
officials), represent only 15 percent of the total sample of branch-level party 
bureaucrats. Together, the 12 women in the sample represent only 13.87 percent of 
the total of respondents among the bureaucracy.
The distribution of these respondents between the three urban centres shows 
the same pattern as in the case of the whole sample, i.e., a distinct predominance 
of Dar-es-Salaam over the urban areas of Dodoma and Arusha; a total of 6 out of 
the 9 women interviewed at the regional level and 2 out of the 3 women interviewed 
at the branch level were from Dar-es-Salaam. Placing them in the context of the 
relevant sub-samples somewhat improves the general picture of under-representation. 
At the regional level, of the 29 party bureaucrats in the area sample of Dar-es- 
Salaam, women represented nearly 30 percent, while the proportion of women in the 
area samples of Dodoma and Arusha were 20 and 12.5 respectively. Among the 
branch level bureaucracy, women comprised nearly a quarter of the respondents 
from Dar-es-Salaam and an eighth of the sample from Arusha. There were no 
women respondents in this stratum from Dodoma. Within the areas themselves, 
more women were in regional- rather than in branch-level party organisations in 
Dar-es-Salaam and Dodoma, while in Arusha the proportion was the same.
The final set of sample characteristics is the distribution of the sample 
according to age-groups. In Table 6.3.5. below, three age-groups are used, 25 to 35, 
from 36 to 45 and 45 onwards.
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25 36 > 25 36 > 25 36 > 25 36 >
to to 45 to to 45 to to 45 to to 45
35 45 35 45 35 45 35 45
Admn - 7 5 1 6 1 - 8 - 1 21 6
(3.5) (75.0) (21.4)
Party 6 18 5 - 1 11 4 4 8 2 11 37 11
(18.6 (62.7) (18.6)
Sub- 6 25 10 2 17 5 4 16 2 12 58 7
Totals
14 .6 61 24.4 8.3 70.8 20.8 18.2 72.3 9.1 13.8 66 .7 19.5
Notes 1. Figures in italics below the first three sets of column totals represent percentages to the
total given within square parentheses at the head o f the column.
2. Figures in parentheses below the rows in the last column entitled 'Row Sub-totals’,
represent percentages to the total o f each row, while the figures in italics in the same 
column represent percentages o f column totals to the sample total o f 87.
It is useful to note that the first category corresponds to those born between 
1956 and 1966 - and hence to those who were between 1 and 11 years of age at the 
time of the Arusha Declaration, while the second category corresponds, similarly, 
to those who were teenagers at this time (i.e., between 12 and 21), while the last 
category refers to those born before 1945 - and hence who were in their teens at the 
time of Tanzania’s political independence in 1961 and in their early twenties at the 
time of the Arusha Declaration. This last category might, thus, contain those who 
were among the first to be sent to the Ideological College at Kivukoni as well as 
those who were taken into the fledgling civil administration run entirely by African 
personnel.39
39 Jackson and Rosberg (1986) note that following Nyerere’s demand in 1963 that the University 
produced ‘social engineers’ to fill the place o f die expatriates in the Tanzanian civil service, "professors 
and lecturers, many o f  whom very few had direct, practical experience in government or business ... 
responded to the demand for government personnel by graduating increasing numbers o f Africans who 
found their way into the government bureaucracy, at first at very senior levels" (p. 211). They go on to 
say, that "[t]hese same graduates, or later ones, were placed in command when the Tanzanian state took 
direct control o f the national economy in die late 1960s and early 1970s" (id.).
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Interestingly, the distribution of respondents according to their age is roughly 
‘normal5 in the sense that there are fewer respondents in the two extreme age- 
groups. For the sample as a whole, nearly two-thirds of the respondents are from 
the middle age-group of 36-45. This proportion is even higher for the administrative 
bureaucracy and slightly less for the party bureaucracy. Exactly the same proportion 
of respondents lie in the two outer age-groups in the case of the party bureaucracy 
while the proportion of older respondents is higher among the administrative 
bureaucrats. Consequently, for the sample as a whole, the proportion of respondents 
in the above-45 age group is larger than in the 25-35 age group. This pattern is 
discernable even within the three areas of Dar-es-Salaam, Arusha and Dodoma, the 
only distinguishing feature herein being that the proportion of the sample in the older 
age-group is smaller for Arusha but larger for the other two areas. The only 
implication this might have for the sample responses is a possible bias towards the 
party ideology and the official party line although there are other factors (such as 
position within the party hierarchy and membership of the civil service) that could 
affect any such bias. Indeed, even youthful zeal in proclaiming the party line is a 
factor that cannot be easily dismissed as discussed below.
6.4. Responses to Structural Adjustment
The sample responses can be ordered around three major issues: the direct 
impact of the various measures of SAP on the personal economic situation of the 
respondents; the perceived role of the bureaucracy in implementing liberalisation 
policies under the SAP; and, the attitudes towards the CCM government and the 
change to a multi-party political system. This section begins with a description of 
the personal economic situation of the respondents and discusses their responses to 
the first set of issues before detailing the informal sector activities undertaken by 
family members of the bureaucracy from the time of the economic crisis. The other 
two issues are taken up in the next section.
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6.4.1. Economic Background of the Sample
Since the responses to individual measures of the SAP are likely to be 
influenced by the economic circumstances of the respondents themselves, it is 
perhaps appropriate to begin with the latter. Two aspects of the economic 
circumstances of the respondents, their income levels and the number of dependents 
they have are outlined, the former being detailed in Table 6.4.1 below.
Table 6 .4 .1  : Profile of Respondents According to Incom e Levels
Category Monthly Income Brackets (Tsh)





































This Table brings out three main features of the distribution of income across 
the respondents in the sample. First, given that the minimum urban wage during this 
period was Tsh 3,000, the table shows that 49 respondents out of 87 (or more than 
50 percent) had an income below 3 times the urban minimum. Of the rest, 33 (or 
38 percent) had incomes between 3 and 4 times the minimum wage and only 5 (or 
5.7 percent) had an income ranging from 4 to 5 times the prevailing urban minimum 
wage.
It is interesting to compare this data with that on Basic Necessary Income 
discussed in Chapter 5 (Table 5.4.3). That Table presented the estimates of monthly 
income provided by the urban lower classes to cover the basic expenses for a family 
of five in Dar-es-Salaam. Essentially, while little more than a quarter (28 percent)
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of the respondents felt that they required between twice and three times the 
minimum urban wage, nearly twice that proportion (66 percent) felt that they 
required between 9,000 and 11,000 per month (i.e., roughly between three and four 
times the minimum urban wage). Another 28 percent felt that they required roughly 
between four and five times the urban minimum wage.40
Thus, it would appear that a monthly income of 7,000 to 11,000 would 
satisfy more than 90 percent of the respondents in that sample. Further, since 
roughly 80 percent of the sample had incomes ranging from 7,000 to 15,000, it 
would seem that this sample of respondents as a whole was bearing up rather well 
under the strain of the economic hardships.
But such a perspective might be misleading for at least three reasons. Firstly, 
the fact that the real standard of living has fallen for most for this stratum of urban 
Tanzanian society. As Table 4.2.3. in Chapter 4 shows, the real wages for the 
middle salary workers had decreased to just 16 percent of their 1969 value by 1984 
and those of top salary workers to just 9 percent of the 1969 wage by 1985.41 The 
table shows that the bureaucracy as a whole appears to have faced a long, steady and 
rather steep fall in its purchasing power and hence in its standard of living from the 
mid 1970s.
Secondly, the income requirements for top salaried posts might be different 
from the sample surveyed in Chapter 4, who were basically from the urban lower 
classes - and hence might have given different estimates of Basic Necessary Income 
had they been sampled. Given the fact that bureaucrats at least at the regional and 
national levels were better educated, performed tasks of greater responsibility and, 
perhaps more importantly, had been used to a better standard of living, it is quite 
likely that they perceived a severe fall in their economic welfare, especially in the 
1980s.42
40 As mentioned in Chapter 5, these proportions are quite close to those in a similar study (Lugalla,
1988) conducted in the late 1980s.
41 The data in the table are from Parastatals in Tanzania : Towards a Reform Programme, World 
Bank, Washington D. C ., 1988, p. 5.
42 In hindsight, it is clear that not collecting this data during interviews with the bureaucracy was a 
regrettable omission.
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Thirdly, as Table 6.4.2. below shows, it is significant that most respondents 
have between three and five dependent children who, given the age profile of the 
bureaucracy (see Table 6.3.5), must have been bom during the early and mid 1980s. 
This was a period following nearly a decade of steadily decreasing real wages and 
a more recent economic crisis that showed little signs of abating. Since a burgeoning 
population is not a policy problem in Tanzania and social norms are in favour of 
large families,43 any restriction on the number of children is most likely to be 
economic.
Table 6.4.2 : The Distribution of Dependent Children of Bureaucrats in the Sample
Category No
children
Less than 3 
children
Between 3 - 
5 children






- 8 18 2 28
Party Bureaucracy 
(National and Regional 
level)
- 7 26 6 39
Party Bureaucracy 
(Branch level)
3 6 11 - 20
Sub-totals 3 21 55 8 87
(percentage to total) (3.45%) (24.13%) (63.22%) (9.20%,) (100.00%,)
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the majority of respondents 
(around 78 percent) had between 3 and 5 siblings, while only a quarter came from 
smaller families, as Table 6.4.3 below shows.
43 Nevertheless, there appears little to suggest that like several agricultural households in developing 
countries the extra children were seen more as additional hands to work than additional mouths to feed, 
and it seems more likely that this was a cultural imperative.
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Table 6.4.3 : Distribution of Sample According to the Number of Siblings
Category Less than 3 
siblings




(National & Regional level)
7 21 28
Party Bureaucracy 





Sub total 19 68 87
(percentage to total) (21.84%) (78.16%) (100.00% )
Thus, either the social imperative outweighed the economic squeeze or there 
were additional sources of income available to supplement official income - in 
contravention to party guidelines. And the following sub-section records that such 
informal sector activity was indeed common. To conclude, therefore, it would 
appear that while the official wages were significantly higher than the minimum 
urban wage, falling purchasing power was a serious problem for this stratum of 
urban Tanzanian society. But the relatively large families they maintained44 
especially during a period of economic hardship, points to an economic situation not 
reflected in official income figures. Thus, their sources of additional income are an 
important factor and are examined in the next sub-section.
6.4.2. Economic Response to Hardship : From Crisis to SAP
The major informal sector activities undertaken by the family members of 
civil servants and party bureaucrats, the majority of which were begun during the 
1980s, are detailed in Table 6.4.4. below. It must be noted that dependent family 
members of the bureaucrat’s household might include brothers, sisters, brothers-in-
44 By and large, the wives and children were said to be in the villages. But, in this context, it must 
be said that five administrative bureaucrats, three party bureaucrats at the regional and national level and 
two at the branch level said that they had two wives, one in the city and the other in the village. Further, 
although they did not admit to it, it is quite likely at least in a few cases that there were other dependents, 
women and children, who lived off the bureaucrat’s income.
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law and sisters-in-law in addition to wives and children. Adult dependents are 
formally unemployed and hence would normally have lived off the income of the 
city-dwelling relative. The economic hardship forced them to be productive and 
contribute to the running of the household.
Table 6 .4 .4 . Inform al Sector Activity by Family M embers of Bureaucrats
Type of Inform al Sector 
Activity
Number o f Family M embers of 
Administrative Bureaucrats
Num ber o f Family M embers 
of Party Bureaucrats
Urban small-scale farming 8 32





Domestic labour 1 15
Transport and Vehicle Hire 4 5
Guides for Safari Companies 3 2
Interpreters 2 2
Snack bar vending - 9
Totals 32 101
Note Bureaucrats cited more than one informal sector activity carried out by their families.
Also, not all bureaucrats said that their family members were in the informal 
sector. And those who said that their families were involved stated that they were 
not limited to one activity alone. This variation in the sample is captured in Table
6.4.5. below.
Table 6.4 .5  : Variations in Inform al Sector Participation
Category o f Respondent Number o f Informal Sector Activities Undertaken
None One Two Three
Administrative Bureaucrats 3 18 7 -
Party Bureaucrats 9 11 27 12
Totals 12 29 34 12
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The Table shows almost a normal distribution of respondents arranged 
according to the number of informal sector activities undertaken. The majority had 
either one or two informal sector activities to supplement official incomes. The first 
interesting facet of these statistics is the low proportion (less than 15 percent) of 
bureaucrats who said that their family members did not participate in the informal 
sector. The second is the larger proportion of party bureaucrats who said that their 
families undertook two or more informal sector activities.
Again, it must be re-iterated that all the activities that the bureaucrats 
mentioned are in the legal side of the Second Economy. As mentioned earlier, there 
have been claims that government circles have been involved in large-scale Second 
Economy activity including the ‘privatisation of public’ funds. These activities are 
not represented in this analysis. Therefore, it might be safe to say that the extra 
income earned through informal sector activity is the minimum addition to official 
incomes. The true estimates could well be much higher.
6.4.3. The Impact of SAP Measures
The specific measures of the Structural Adjustment Programme analysed are: 
(1) price decontrol for essential commodities; (2) the increased and easy availability 
of imported essential commodities; (3) the easier and greater availability of imported 
luxury goods; (4) the greater availability of second-hand clothing; (5) the creation 
of private property rights, especially in land; (6) the imposition of user fees for 
education; (7) the formation of new cooperative societies; and (8) the government 
control of salaries. The responses of the sample of bureaucrats are outlined in Tables 
6.4.6., 6.4.7. and 6.4.8 and explained further below.
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Table 6.4.6 : Responses to SAP : Regional and National Administrative Bureaucracy




Price decontrol 15 (53.57%) 13 (46.43%) - -
More imported essentials 25 (89.28%) 2 (7.14%) 1 (3.57%o) -




More second-hand clothes 5 (17.86%) 16 (57.14%) 3 (10.71% ) -
Private property rights 2 (7.14%) 3 (10.71%) 23
(82.14% )
-
User fees for education 27 (96.43%) 1 (3.57%) - -
New cooperative societies 26 (92.86%) 2 (7.14%) - -
Govt control o f salaries 10 (35.71%) 16 (57.14%) 2 (7.14% ) -
Note Figures in parentheses are percentages to the total sub-sample o f 28 respondents.
Table 6 .4 .7  : Responses to SAP : Regional and National Party Bureaucracy






Price decontrol 2 (5.13%) 4 (10.25%) 19 (48.72% ) 14 (35.90%,)
More imported essentials 29 (74.36%) 8 (20.51%) 2 (5.13%,) -
More imported luxuries 2 (5.13%) 4 (10.26%) 22 (56.41%,) 11 (28.20%,)
More second-hand clothes 12 (30.77%) 27 (69.23%) - -
Private property rights 7 (17.95%) 14 (35.90%) 11 (28.20%,) 5 (12.82%,)
User fees for education 1 (2.56%) 3 (7.69%) 15 (38.46%,) 18 (46.15%,)
New cooperative societies 3 (7.69%) 7 (17.95%) 16 (41.02%,) 11 (28.20%,)
Govt control o f salaries 1 (2.56%) 1 (17.95%) 28 (71.80%,) 1 (2.56%,)
Note Figures in parentheses are percentages to the total sub-sample o f 39 respondents.
201







Price decontrol - - 14 (70.00% ) 6 (30.00%)
More imported essentials 17 (85.00%) 3 (15.00%) - -
More imported luxuries - - 15 (75.00% ) 5 (25.00%)
More second-hand clothes 17 (85.00% ) 3 (15.00%) - -
Private property rights - 1 (5.00%) 9 (45.00% ) 10 (50.00%)
User fees for education - - 2 (10.00%,) 18 (90.00%)
New cooperative societies 11 (55.00%) 8 (40.00%) 1 (5.00%,) -
Govt control o f salaries - 4 (20.00%) 12 (60.00% ) 6 (30.00%)
N ote Figures in parentheses are percentages to the total sub-sample o f  20 respondents.
Price Decontrol o f Essential Commodities : There is a sharp divide between the 
responses of the administrative bureaucracy - the majority of whom (53.57 percent) 
approved of the rationale for price decontrol and the rest of whom could bring 
themselves to tolerate - and the party bureaucracy. While only 5 percent of the latter 
strongly approved of this measure and around 10 percent found it tolerable, the 
majority of the regional and national level bureaucrats and all the branch level 
officials disapproved of this measure, with a third disapproving strongly. The 
rationale for the approval and tolerance appears to be a combination of higher 
education levels, permitting a better look at the options available to the government 
and the possibility of future improvements in general economic welfare, along with 
an economic status that was not unbearably threatened. In the case of the lower level 
party bureaucracy, the disapproval appears to be on account of the flip side of these 
reasons.
Increased Availability o f Imported Essential Commodities : Perhaps for the obvious 
reason of severe shortages during the years of the economic crisis, there was 
approval for this measure from the majority of the respondents at all three levels - 
nearly 90 percent of the civil servants, nearly 75 percent of the higher level party 
bureaucrats and 85 percent of the lower-level party officials. It needs to be borne in
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mind that the general shortage of foreign exchange in those years combined with the 
rationing system in place during the crisis years had led to a disappearance of even 
basic commodities like soap and toothpaste while a black market developed to cater 
for such a frustrated market. The open availability of items that were hitherto either 
too expensive or simply unavailable as a result of the economic liberalisation was 
thus welcomed. The mild disapproval expressed by a small minority was on two 
ideological counts. First, that this was ‘unsocialistic’ and had led to ‘capitalist 
tendencies’ among the citizenry: such a measure would only encourage the 
proliferation of the Second Economy. Second, because it went against the grain of 
the search for national self-reliance. But these, as mentioned, were a minority view - 
only one civil servant (out of 28) and two higher-level party officials (out of 39) 
viewed the measure from this perspective.
Increased Availability o f Imported Luxuries : While there was some support for this 
measure, the norm was widespread disapproval although the majority of the 
disapproval was mild. More than half the administrative bureaucrats and higher-level 
party officials as well as 75 percent of the branch level party officials disapproved 
mildly, while between 10 and 30 percent in each category disapproved strongly. This 
disapproval appeared to be influenced by the same two factors mentioned earlier in 
the context of imported essential commodities, i.e., it was anti-socialist activity and 
against national self-reliance objectives. It is clear that while imports of any kind 
goes against this objective, and that retailers of imported commodities tended to 
stock both essential and luxury items, the ideological puritanism appears to be 
strictly contextual. The convenience of good quality and easily-available imported 
essential commodities weighed in their favour and the basic inessentiality and 
possible charge of ostentation that invariably accompanies the purchase and use of 
imported luxury commodities went against these items of consumption. Yet there are 
those who approve of the easy availability of even luxury commodities following 
SAP - around 10 percent of the civil servants and 5 percent of the party bureaucracy 
at the regional and national levels. However, more administrative bureaucrats 
(around 20 percent) and party officials at higher levels (around 10 percent) found it 
safer to ‘tolerate’ this measure.
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Increased Availability o f Second-hand Clothes : As mentioned in Chapter 5, 
mitumbua or second-hand clothes enjoy considerable popularity in Tanzania. This 
is partly because of the lack of domestic supplies that are of adequate quality and 
partly because of the pre-existing curbs on imports. The easier access to such 
clothing hence met with general approval. While the new supplies had domestic 
sources (now that there was a price on such items), a more likely source for the bulk 
of such items was the free clothing supplied as international aid to countries across 
the border suffering from droughts and other natural calamities. As is probably to 
be expected, the party officials at the lower levels were overwhelmingly approving 
(85 percent ‘strongly approved’) while this proportion was lower in the case of party 
bureaucrats higher up in the hierarchy (around 30 percent) and still lower in the case 
of civil servants (around 18 percent only). One branch level party official put the 
issue in perspective when he said "Were it not for mitumbua, most of us would be 
naked".
Private Propeity Rights This measure overturned the previous party ruling 
abolishing private property control and abrogating all property to the state (see 
chapter 1), for the ideological reasons that private property would permit the 
accumulation of assets in the hands of the wealthy and hence go against the socialist 
principles of equality. The return of private property rights was thus as likely to be 
welcomed by liberals as it was likely to be disliked by the orthodox. There was 
widespread disapproval for this measure from lower-level party officials (around 95 
percent), half of them strongly disapproved. These proportions reduced when it came 
to party officials at the regional and national levels, with only 13 percent 
disapproving strongly and 28 percent disapproving mildly. Among the bureaucrats, 
a curiously high percentage (82 percent) disapproved. A small number (10 percent) 
of the civil servants and 36 percent of the higher-level party bureaucrats were 
prepared to tolerate it as was one branch level party official. There were 2 civil 
servants and 7 higher level party officials who were strongly in favour of the 
measure. The reasoning for the approval is probably that there is a positive 
correlation with the potential benefit that respondents could directly make from the 
measure. The higher the possible profit, the higher the support. And the former is
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surely dependent on available financial resources, with the civil service and senior 
party bureaucracy being the ones most likely to have such resources. But in addition 
to the lack of financial means to exploit this measure, the other probable reason for 
the high level of disapproval is that the proper official stance for party members, 
both the ideologically-committed and the highly-visible senior members, was indeed 
disapproval.
User Fees fo r  Education : This measure came in for sharp criticism, education 
having been one of Tanzania’s strong points during its period of socialist 
development.45 With the imposition of the user fees, there was an accentuation in 
the trend of school dropouts which had started with the economic crisis when hands 
were needed to work in the informal sector.46 This measure brought out a sharp 
contrast in the perspective of the civil servants and the party officials. While the 
former were almost unanimous (all but one) in their strong approval for this 
rationalisation measure, around 85 percent of the higher-level party bureaucracy and 
all the lower-level bureaucracy disapproved of the measure, with 90 percent of the 
latter and around 45 percent of the former expressing strong disapproval. The 
strength of the disapproval would appear to reflect two factors: first, the ideological 
resistance to what is clearly seen as the state succumbing to ‘capitalist’ pressure 
from outside, and second, the frustration of the economically less well-off in the face 
of escalating costs of living. Most of the political functionaries were quite vocal on 
their dissatisfaction on this issue, maintaining that user fees in the social services, 
especially in the health and education sectors, questioned the very ethos of ujamaa. 
The Member of Parliament interviewed said "the government’s decision to double 
school fees and make parents pay for their children’s fees would widen their gap of 
the ratio of rural and urban pupils enroled in secondary schools". The MP also felt
45 Under its programme for Universal Primary Education, literacy rates had increased impressively 
to take Tanzania to the top of Black Africa on this score by 1975 (Morrison, 1989). See section 7 .2 in 
Chapter 7 for more details on the Tanzania’s performance on the education front.
46 World Bank data shows that from a high of 100 percent in 1979, the enrolment rate in primary 
schools dropped to 72 percent in 1985 and 66 percent in 1988 (World Bank, 1989). Further, a recent 
government document notes that "Tanzania is nearly at the bottom o f the African league in secondary 
education enrolment rates [which was only 6 percent in 1987]" (URT, 1989, p. 6).
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that the ’’government was not effectively using foreign aid for the education 
sector".47
On the other hand, the extent of extreme responses from a relatively well- 
educated group of respondents seems to indicate that they perceived a premium on 
education. Their approval, would seem to reflect the more balanced and far-sighted 
view that this measure would improve the economic situation in the long run and 
result in more committed students besides providing better infrastructural facilities 
beginning with textbooks, desks and notebooks. There was also an underlying feeling 
that this was probably a measure that ought to have been implemented earlier, since 
that would have enabled students to place an appropriate value on their education 
and not just be uncaring beneficiaries of government funding.
New Cooperative Societies : The introduction of the Co-operative Societies Act in 
1991 (which was yet to be implemented by the time of the survey) finally did away 
with the rather draconian measures of hierarchical party control and compulsory 
membership that had been around since 1975.48 But there were fears that since the 
cooperatives were no longer to be under party control, they could be subject to 
private manipulation without a check from higher authorities (Yeo, 1992). The 
sample was accordingly divided on this issue. Almost the entire sub-sample of 
administrative bureaucrats approved of this measure, 93 percent strongly as did 95 
percent of the party officials at the branch level (55 percent strongly). But 5 percent 
of the latter sub-sample disapproved, a trend that was strongly reflected in the 
responses of the higher-level party bureaucracy where nearly 70 percent 
disapproved, nearly 30 percent strongly. Only a minority of 25 percent among the 
latter did not mind the measure while 8 percent strongly approved. This seems to 
reflect the division that Yeo (1992) mentioned, the fear of private manipulation 
working against the possible benefits of self-government.
47 The official stance o f the Tanzanian government has been staunchly behind the new measure, 
stating that these user fees are "meagre" and that the year’s advance notice would give parents "time to 
raise the money", Tanzania’s Education Minister, Charles Kabeho, is alleged to have said in Parliament 
that "the new Tsh. 8,000 fees for boarders starting in January [1992] can be paid in two instalments, each 
the value o f 8 hens" (Daily News, 17th July 1991).
48 See chapter 5, section 5.4.1 for more details on this Act and its implications.
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Government Control o f Salanes : The responses of the sample were interestingly 
distributed on this issue with the civil bureaucracy by and large on middle ground 
and leaning towards approval and the party bureaucracy at all levels being largely 
disapproving although a minority was on middle ground. Only one regional and 
national level party official joined in the strong approval that a third of the 
administrative bureaucrats had expressed. However, nearly 75 percent of the party 
bureaucrats at the higher levels and 90 percent of the lower level party officials 
disapproved, a minority of them strongly. A small minority of the civil servants (10 
percent) also expressed mild disapproval. There appear to be three reasons for this 
divide: firstly, an acknowledgement of the need to make short-term sacrifices for 
long-term gain; and secondly, a reflection of the fact that official incomes were, 
given the extent of informal sector activity, a smaller proportion of total income; and 
thirdly, an acceptance of the futility of expecting large increases in their official 
salaries.
Oveiview o f Responses : Overall, there is more approval for the rationalisation 
measures of the Structural Adjustment Programme among the administrative 
bureaucracy at the national and regional levels than among the party bureaucracy. 
Within the party bureaucracy, again, there seemed to be more support for these 
measures within the regional and national level officials than among those at the 
branch level. The latter appeared to be largely influenced by two major impulses: 
the implications of the measure for their personal economic situation and for the 
party ideological position. Thus, there is strong approval for greater availability of 
imported essential commodities and of second-hand clothes but disapproval for price 
decontrol, for the increased availability of imported luxuries, for the creation of 
private property rights, for the imposition of user fees in education and for the shift 
of control over salaries from party to the government.
The administrative bureaucracy, on the other hand, approved strongly of the 
imposition of user fees, of government rather than party control over salaries, and 
of price decontrol. This reflects their belief that only a shift to a market economy 
would improve the future economic situation - and hence the necessity for short-term 
sacrifice to realise that long-term reality. Interestingly, there was not so much
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approval for the increased availability of second-hand clothes, perhaps reflecting a 
more stable economic background for these officials, compared to the party officials 
at the lower levels of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, the disapproval of private 
property rights and of more imported luxuries appeared to be on account of 
ideological grounds as was the strong approval for cooperative societies. Thus there 
appears to be a certain selectivity in their ideological stance, with elements of 
rational economic decision-making modifying the party’s doctrine of ujamaa 
socialism (most of the bureaucrats had been to the Kivukoni Ideological College). 
While they were not entirely disillusioned with the idea of African socialism, these 
civil servants seemed to feel that it was time to tighten up the economic situation 
alongside social policies.
The higher-level officials of the party bureaucracy appeared to reflect a 
similar combination of the responses from the other two sub-samples, with the 
concern with personal economic well-being combining with both the party’s socialist 
ideology as well as the liberal atmosphere influencing economic decision-making. 
Thus, there is strong support from these higher-level officials (along with the lower- 
level party officials and the civil servants) for the import of essential commodities 
and for the greater availability of second-hand clothing and widespread disapproval 
for more imported luxury items. Yet, like the lower-level officials but unlike the 
civil servants, there is also a general disapproval of government control over 
salaries, of price decontrol and of the imposition of user fees in education. But there 
is a small minority that responded conversely - i.e., in the general line of the civil 
servants’ response and against the responses of the lower level officials - in the case 
of each of these issues. And clearly unlike the lower level party officials and the 
civil servants, they disapproved of new cooperative societies (28 percent strongly).
Thus, overall, there appears to be several distinct impulses motivating these 
responses. Two clear but related divides are visible within the sample as a whole. 
The first is between those who follow the party ideology by and large but see the 
need to take on board rationalisation measures that they feel will help improve future 
economic welfare all round, and others who do not see the necessity to look beyond 
the official party doctrine. There is certainly optimism in both groups, but on 
different grounds. The second divide is between those who are able to accept the
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adverse consequences of economic rationalisation for their short-term personal 
economic situation, and those who cannot afford these sacrifices. To be sure, the 
ability to bear the sacrifices depends in part on the perceived need to do so. Hence 
those who do not feel the need to move away from the party ideology of ujamaa and 
state control of the economy might not feel the need to make personal sacrifices to 
the cause of economic liberalisation. This apart, a major factor that influences the 
ability to make economic sacrifices in the short term is the extent of informal sector 
activity that, despite the party rulings on accumulation, these bureaucrats and their 
families are able to undertake. The greater the level of this activity, the more 
equanimity with which the short-term sacrifices can be viewed and undertaken if 
necessary. And as seen earlier, the possibilities here could be substantial.
The political responses of the bureaucrats, however, are as much conditioned 
by the impacts on their direct personal economic situation as they are on the wider 
impacts of SAP policies within the economy and society. This set of issues is 
analysed in the next section.
6.5. Political Responses of the Bureaucracy : CCM and Multiparty Politics
6.5.1. Perceptions of Policy Prescriptions
There are perhaps three major and related features of the responses of the 
administrative and party bureaucracy to the performance of the government in 
implementing SAP and its likely trend in the future: first, a general feeling 
concerning the issue of nationalism in the context of the externally-applied SAP; 
second, the commitment of the government and party to the SAP; and third, the 
capability of the government to implement the various measures of SAP. These are 
examined further below.
Anti-nationalist bias of SAP : Both the administrative and party bureaucracy 
perceived an anti-nationalist side to the IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment 
Programme against which there was a deep-seated resentment. But the reasoning 
behind this feeling varied. The administrative bureaucracy stressed the duress under
209
which the government had to accept the Structural Adjustment Programme49 and 
noted that virtual control over the government budget had passed to the hands of 
international organisations intermediating for the IMF. They also felt tied financially 
and operationally, especially in a time following their elevation in the policy-making 
process, by being made answerable to ‘expatriate experts’.50 In many cases, they 
felt that they had a better understanding of the local conditions and constraints and 
of the kind of policy action required. They were also unhappy about the fact that 
despite this they were being paid much less than these expatriate experts, whose 
salaries were paid in the preferred hard currency as well. But of all these perhaps 
the most significant feature was the general and growing resentment against the ‘re- 
expatriatisation’ of the Tanzanian government, which is rapidly becoming a sensitive 
government issue.
The dissatisfaction of the party bureaucracy on this score was due to more 
conventional ideological objections. The basic scepticism was due to their deep 
rooted statist, anti-market biases as to whether or not the profit motive could ever 
be socially constructive. And as one political functionary put it, "the efficacy of the 
state’s economic controls to pursue national goals would be completely eroded with 
the full implementation of SAP". They do not approve of what they often referred 
to as ‘government by donation’. Alongside was a feeling that the present economic 
crisis was more due to external forces and events rather than a result of past 
economic policies.51 Even if they recognise that government regulation and controls 
might not be effective (or even harmful) they perceive the withdrawal of the 
economic control of the government as a case of even the government abandoning 
the people at a time when economic forces seem most uncertain and unpredictable. 
This perspective on the general nature of SAP obviously influences their response 
to their commitment to SAP.
49 See Chapter 4 for details on this international pressure.
50 This is a term used frequently within the administrative and party bureaucracy to refer to foreign 
managers, consultants and advisors from international donor organisations who have been brought in to 
help the Government o f Tanzania to implement the IMF-sponsored SAP.
51 See chapter 4 for a discussion of internal and external causes for the economic crisis.
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Commitment to SAP : Even after the attempts by Nyerere’s government to liberalise 
the economy in the early 1980s, the party bureaucracy had doubts as to the economic 
benefits of stabilisation policies. Some felt for instance that some aspects of 
conventional stabilisation and adjustment policies like devaluation and the 
dismantling of government control over producer and consumer prices (e.g., for 
staple foods) and over interest rates for credit, would result (again) in scarcities and 
the growth of parallel black markets and thus aggravate the financial difficulties of 
the common man. Others were a bit more optimistic about the SAP and considered 
it as ‘bitter medicine’ - a remedial measure needed to get the economy back on its 
feet. But they feel it is problematic on ideological grounds - as SAP can enhance the 
power of specifically capitalist interests through the promotion of the market, they 
believe that it is not socially constructive. For either of these two reasons, the 
general attitude towards SAP was a reluctant acceptance of its measures.
In almost direct contrast, the administrative bureaucracy were comfortable 
and even enthusiastic about the efficacy and logic of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme, although they frequently began by saying that it was a circumstance- 
influenced measure taken because there was ‘no other option’. They however then 
moved to endorsing the SAP and its logic as well as its appropriateness to Tanzania. 
Most of the strong supporters were those who had worked with the Tanzanian 
Advisory Group in the early 1980s. Support was also on account of the events in 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, where they felt that the cumulative 
cost of statist intervention in those countries had resulted in the economic crisis 
which had necessitated a major shift in the theory and practice of socialism. In turn, 
they accepted that there was inefficiency in Tanzanian public corporations and a need 
for a realistic pricing policy. But they laid the blame on ‘the notion of party 
supremacy’ which had resulted in situations where "the elite/experts in various fields 
were implementing party directives" instead of formulating such policies. They also 
felt that party leadership was too ambitious and not realistic in setting targets for the 
administrative bureaucracy to implement, citing the examples of the government 
programmes for Universal Primary Education and Clean Water For All by 1977.52
52 See Hyden (1979) for a similar view.
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The party functionaries, however, blame the civil servants squarely for the 
inefficiencies, a Member of Parliament claiming that "the lack of accountability in 
the institution of the government allows systematic misuse of public resources to go 
on at an accelerating pace, Mremaism not withstanding".53 Such a charge is, 
however, not uncommon, (see, for instance, Hyden, 1979). These divergent lines 
of thinking underlying the commitment of the party and administrative bureaucracy 
to the liberalisation reforms in Tanzania influenced their perception of the third 
issue, the capability of the government to implement SAP.
Capability of Implementing SAP : The civil servants feel that their capacity to 
implement the measures of SAP is being seriously undermined by both the party and 
the international organisations overseeing the SAP on behalf of the IMF. The 
dissatisfaction with the role of the expatriates from international organisations who 
were supposed to guide the government on Structural Adjustment, is because they 
are perceived as impeding the flow of resources to areas where they were badly 
needed. Regarding the Priority Social Action Programme (PSAP) of 1989, one 
official in the Planning Commission said that 'Although this is supposed to deliver 
better, it seems contradictory since the government is the deliverer and with SAP 
there is a control on government expenditure’. He felt that increasing resources were 
going into agriculture, which is the focus of a lot of foreign aid, but less was going 
into education and health. Even in the rural areas, there was criticism, one official 
maintaining that infrastructure in rural areas was not being financed for 
development, "because it was not serving expatriate purposes". Another source of 
dissatisfaction is the planning of projects without adequate awareness of local 
conditions. Bureaucrats question the sustainability of certain projects taken up under 
SAP "which need to step up production and thus [help to] hold the inflation rate".
The party, they feel, is also impeding the quick and effective implementation 
of SAP policies by deliberately trying to soft peddle on various issues and is setting 
low targets and using delaying tactics, to impede the rate of policy implementation
53 The reference is to Augustine Mrema, the Minister for Home, who has been waging a relentless 
but somewhat unorthodox campaign against corruption and inefficiency in the country which has therefore 
been dubbed ‘Mremaism’. See Chapter 5, section 5 .5 .1 , for a reference in context.
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often by direct orders. The party also insists on sugarcoating many of the potentially 
unpalatable measures of the SAP - such as announcing subsidies for small scale 
investments, producer incentives along with the removal of subsidies on producer 
prices or government control over salaries alongside reduced working hours (7-3 and 
only 5 days a week). This the civil service ascribe to the party’s fear of an adverse 
political reaction. But these civil servants feel that although a firm SAP might well 
provoke protest, so will continued economic deterioration and, further, since the 
public will evaluate the government on result of the SAP, a good implementation of 
SAP is vital.
Yet, civil servants feel that there is a divide in the party with a growing 
group of pragmatic politicians led by Party Chairperson and Tanzanian President 
Mwinyi breaking ranks with the party ideologues. This new leadership they feel is 
pro-liberalisation, with a more pragmatic Secretary General and some new Party 
Secretaries who seem ready to depart from past policies and orientation and who are 
hence more approachable than were the officials of the older leadership.54 Also, 
they pointed out that most of the leadership changes that have taken place in the 
Mwinyi regime have been in favour of pragmatists rather than ideologues. Even top 
administrative bureaucrats, they say, have been hand-picked by Mwinyi for their 
capability and commitment to liberalisation.
The new atmosphere has allowed administrative bureaucracy to play 
increasingly independent role in policy-making since it is the bureaucrats and no 
longer the party officials who have to negotiate with the donor community for 
further technical and financial assistance. Consequently, many top officials have 
distanced from the party and have little time for ideological debate.
Yet, the administrative bureaucracy feels that the party is using them in 
projecting a dual public stance: while the CCM espouses socialism officially, it 
quietly implements radical and tough economic measures through the government
54 This pragmatic approach is manifest in the Zanzibar Declaration o f 1991, which was backed by 
the new Party Secretary-General Horace Kolimba and the Party Chairman Mwinyi and also in the 
endorsement by the NEC o f all legislations to free banks and cooperatives from party and government 
control. And yet senior party leaders like the Party’s Deputy Chairperson, Rashidi Kawawa and Prime 
Minister, John M alecela, continued to defend socialism in public. The 15-year programme unveiled by 
the party in 1987 as the official policy o f the CCM to ‘to guide the country into the next century’ still 
talks o f its struggle to build socialism and self-reliance.
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machinery. They feel that the party wants the responsibility to lie publicly within the 
government, which makes it convenient for the party to defend ujamaa and let the 
government appear to take the hard SAP decisions.55 But even here, its fear of 
public reprisal is leading it to slow down the government implementation. But for 
the CCM, the biggest stumbling block to economic reforms involving decontrol - 
which could hence affect patron client networks - is the CCM’s political support 
base - ideologically-committed groups loyal to the party. Yet, on the ground, 
politicians are attempting to present these to the public in a positive, balanced and 
persuasive manner.
An Overview o f the Responses : The overriding feeling is that if these early measures 
of SAP show positive results, it will be much easier to continue with its 
implementation. But there is also the feeling, well summarised by a comment made 
by one civil servant, that "the public is more ready to accept this bold new 
programme from Mwinyi [rather than from Nyerere]". The Tanzania public gave 
Mwinyi a symbolic iron broom to ‘sweep out inefficiency and corruption’ within the 
government (using force if necessary),56 which is also interpreted as a licence to 
adopt and follow new policies to improve the contemporary economic situation. This 
represents what Nelson (1988) has called the ‘new broom5 approach and what Toye 
(1992) calls the ‘honeymoon period’ - "an initial grace period of public 
acquiescence" (Nelson, 1988, p. 128)) when the public is willing to suspend 
judgement. Indeed, one administrative bureaucrat explicitly stated that the lack of 
public protest is partly because of party-cultivated homogeneity and partly because 
of an understanding electorate.
Nonetheless, the civil servants feel that, realistically speaking, sudden and 
sharp breaks in policy might be difficult to implement within the economy on 
account of the anticipated public response. Thus along with allowing for time for 
some results of SAP to manifest themselves, some attempts to dilute the measures
55 But these civil servants also stressed that there was no open divisiveness or disruption among the 
administrative bureaucracy and the party functionaries. Although some subtle rivalries existed, they felt 
it was unlikely to erupt into any major confrontation or split.
56 The idea behind it is captured by the proverb: A new broom sweeps cleanest.
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may be necessary, through a flexibility in timing and phasing of measures. This 
philosophy of gradualism is evident in the tone and ambit of the recent Budgets.57
The administrative bureaucracy also want the party to take open responsibility 
for SAP - and not use the government as a convenient scapegoat for any adverse 
short-term economic implications of SAP.
They also feel that a measure that would go a long way in helping them to 
work effectively with the party and the government would be periodic self- 
assessments of policy effectiveness, like neighbouring Kenya.58 The political 
functionaries, however, do not agree that there was much wrong with the old 
policies and feel instead that inefficiency in the administrative bureaucracy has just 
to be weeded out through party directives and party action.
6.5.2. Perspective on Political Parties
The attitudes of the party and administrative bureaucracy on the issue of 
multiparty ism are probably more divergent than their responses reveal. Party 
bureaucrats professed strong disapproval for the move and claimed that CCM rule 
was better for Tanzania. They feel that multipartyism will lead to the collapse of 
ujamaa and the ideal of self-reliance. Cohesive national direction would be lost as 
individual parties formulated and imposed policy packages designed to suit their own 
political ends. In contrast, they quote the performance of the CCM, without which 
the Union "would certainly have broken up with regional parties, tribal, religious, 
regional and racial parties". They also cite the good relationship between the army 
and the CCM and feel that this would be considerably threatened without a CCM 
government. Army coups are a very real threat in Africa, "which we in Tanzania
57 In this context, it is relevant to note that the 1991 budget has been termed a ‘Consolidation Budget’ 
by the D aily News issue o f June 13, 1991 which also terms it "an instance o f pragmatism" where the 
government wants economic reform "as long as it does not have to close down loss-making companies 
or declare the NBC [the National Bank o f Commerce] bankrupt". The Family M irror puts it more 
colourfully: "The government is committed to making free market omelettes without breaking the state 
monopoly golden eggs" (5th August 1991).
58 The Kenyan government published sessional papers in 1975 and 1980 besides the Ndegwa Report 
in the late 1980s in order to assess policy effectiveness and this, civil servants felt, was probably a useful 
thing to do in the Tanzanian case as well.
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did not fear till now".59Multipartyism thus is seen as a major threat to the unity that 
Tanzania had attained thanks to ujamaa and CCM. Although they admit the CCM 
has its faults their attitude is that mistakes are inevitable and that the party learns 
from past mistakes.
Concerning the multiparty debate itself, the party functionaries point out that 
it was Nyerere and the CCM who initiated the debate. But they dismiss the 
movement itself claiming that it is "a breakaway group" lacking cohesion and 
direction with regard to national issues and policies.
The administrative bureaucrats share the commendation of the CCM and the 
role it has played in unifying the country. One civil servant said, "we certainly do 
not think in terms of our tribe, or region or religious denomination in Tanzania". 
And like their counterparts in the party bureaucracy, they admit that the CCM 
government had made mistakes in the past. But, unlike the party officials, some civil 
servants include the Arusha Declaration among these policy mistakes. They go on 
to claim that "people are disillusioned with siasa na mdomeni [political rhetoric]". 
Many administrative bureaucrats are disenchanted with the kind of policies that 
ujamaa had occasioned and with ujamaa itself. One civil servant went as far as to 
state that "there is a problem with the concept of ujamaa itself" and that "socialism 
has not been well comprehended by the people".
Nonetheless, they are not as disapproving as the party officials about the 
prospect of multiparty ism, although they stopped short of expressing themselves 
fully on this score. Perhaps the constraints on their pronouncements, given that they 
were party members as well, is best put in a statement made by one civil servant 
who said that "it is difficult to defend multiparty system without somehow offending 
CCM and its leaders". But he would not be drawn into disclosing which way he 
meant the statement.
59 There is however a reference to a potential army coup in 1983 which did not come off. Jackson 
and Rosberg (1986) write; "In January 1983, Nyerere’s regime uncovered a plot to bring about a coup" 
(p. 215). But no further details are given.
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6.6. Conclusions : Bureaucratic Impressions for Future Reform
The main threads of the responses of the party and administrative 
bureaucracy examined in this chapter can be broadly divided into two, those 
affecting the further implementation of SAP policies and those affecting its political 
future. Under the first, the issues can again be sorted out under three main heads: 
the impact of SAP policies on the personal economic situation of the respondents; 
the commitment of these bureaucrats to the SAP and their capability in implementing 
its policies; and the possibilities for future action.
Regarding the first issue, the response seems to be divided, with those in the 
branch-level party bureaucracy showing a preference for policies that improved their 
personal economic situation and tied in with their ideological slant, while civil 
servants were prepared to take a more far-sighted look at rationalisation measures 
with adverse short-term consequences and while senior party officials seemed to be 
divided on most issues. Thus, while the lower-level party officials approved of the 
increased availability of imported essential commodities and disapproved of the price 
rise and the imposition of user fees for education, they drew the line at importing 
more luxury commodities, allowing private property rights and letting the 
government control their salaries. The administrative bureaucracy, on the other 
hand, did not mind the increasing prices, the government control of salaries or the 
imposition of user fees for education - maintaining that these were good for the long 
run health of the economy - but disapproved of imported luxuries and private 
property rights, mainly on ideological grounds. The higher-level officials of the 
party bureaucracy appeared in the main to take the same line as the lower level 
officials but there were a notable number among them who shared the longer-term 
vision of the civil servants.
Concerning the second issue, a major feature of the onset of economic 
liberalisation is that the party bureaucracy and administrative bureaucracy appear to 
have re-assumed their conventional roles, with the civil servants being once more 
involved more with policy-making and advice rather than with merely policy 
implementation. In addition to the positive effects of this re-integration, the support 
for SAP among these officials stems from the fact that the very logic of Structural
217
Adjustment also appeals to them strongly. This is in contrast to their more 
ideologically-committed colleagues in the party hierarchy who are uncertain about 
the potential of SAP to better the economic situation. Even to those party officials 
who are more convinced about need for the ‘bitter medicine’ of SAP, its social 
consequences are more unpalatable if not downright undesirable. And no doubt to 
some, the reduction in personal privileges and reduced opportunities for private gain 
through patron-client networks is a source of their deep disapproval for 
liberalisation. To this must, of course, be added the implications of the re-structuring 
of policy-making responsibility.
The party leadership, however, appears to be more pragmatic and pro­
liberalisation, as reflected by the endorsement of all new policies by the National 
Executive Committee of the party. But for fear of the staunch ideologues within the 
party and of mass political reprisals the government has been soft-peddling over the 
implementation of several SAP policies, especially those with possibly adverse short 
term implications for social welfare. So much so that the administrative bureaucracy 
feels it is being held back from rapidly and effectively enforcing SAP policies. The 
blame for the slow implementation of SAP, thus, ought not to lie with the civil 
servants - as is usually assumed - but with the party which is using its 
constitutionally-ratified supremacy over the government to circumvent the SAP 
policies for fear of political reprisals.
These implications naturally influence the commitment of these officials to 
SAP policies. It would also seem to account for the party’s attempts to publicly 
distance itself from the government which is responsible for the implementation of 
these policies - while the NEC quietly endorses these very same market-oriented 
policies. The public endorsements of ujamaa and self-reliance is also perhaps 
designed more to please the trenchantly idealist part of their political support base.
An almost unexpected outcome of the implementing structure of SAP policies 
is the extent of expatriate experts who appear to be directing decision-making in 
several key economic and managerial areas of the economy. Not only does the 
administrative bureaucracy feel that such expertise lacks an awareness of crucial 
local conditions and constraints, but they are also all too aware that these expatriates 
are being paid several times what they get themselves and that too, in hard currency.
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This appears to be a potential source of conflict and is already a sensitive issue with 
the government.
As far as their own commitment to SAP is concerned, a curious alliance of 
purpose appears to exist between the administrative bureaucrats and the party 
bureaucrats. While the latter are quite vocal about the harsh measures of the SAP, 
they are nonetheless governed by the party’s official rulings. And that, in this case, 
calls for a support of the SAP policies, however unpalatable they may be in the short 
run. On the other hand, the administrative bureaucracy is keen on the SAP because 
they believe in its restorative powers. And indeed their personal economic situation 
as also that of the country as a whole depend on the successful implementation of 
SAP policies. Irrespective of their disagreements with the expatriate advisors, it is 
unlikely that they are about to sabotage the liberalisation measures. Even those who 
profited from the laxity of the government administration, especially in state run 
enterprises, may have realised that a return to that state of affairs is unlikely and that 
their best bet was in the general prosperity of the country. But this sort of civil 
servant was not apparent in the sample.
Within the state and administrative bureaucracy, doubts about commitment 
to the policies of the SAP are possible, if at all, only within the die-hard ideologues 
within the party bureaucracy. But even they are more likely to question the 
government within the party organisation rather than in the implementation stage of 
what is now accepted party policies for the country. At any rate, this section of the 
party bureaucracy was not within the sample.
The third issue, however, is probably the most relevant and important from 
the point of view of this analysis. The clearest statement is an awareness that 
positive results from the SAP policies already implemented, in terms of actual 
economic or social gains, are an important condition for the successful 
implementation of SAP policies in the future. While the civil servants acknowledge 
that the public, at least in urban areas, is showing a great deal of patience, and that 
the party discipline is a major help in maintaining public calm in the face of 
considerable economic hardship, they are keenly aware that there is a limit.
On the question of multiparty ism, the party and administrative bureaucrats 
in the sample appear to hold similar views on the unifying role of the CCM. There
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is, however, a markedly different response to the impact of liberalisation on ujamaa. 
While party officials rue the fact that socialism and self-reliance have been left 
behind in the move, civil servants are not too perturbed by the prospect. Indeed, it 
appears they may have been more forthcoming in favour of multiparty politics had 





This chapter discusses political responses to economic and political 
liberalisation in Tanzania from members of the academic community in Tanzania, 
including University students, Lecturers and Professors, and from members of the 
Tanzanian mass media sector, basically journalists and radio broadcasters. These 
categories of respondents are collectively referred to as the ‘ intelligentsia’, although 
this is a larger grouping comprising of teachers, writers intellectuals and 
professionals.
Although Tanzania has won international renown for its progress in the 
provision of primary education and mass literacy, at least in the 1970s and early 
1980s, there are current fears of reversals in this trend following recent cuts in the 
budgetary allocation to the education sector and the re-introduction of primary school 
fees. These cuts are due to the re-evaluation of economic priorities as part of the 
economic liberalisation programmes followed in the 1980s. Education is an 
important sector for at least two reasons. First, education and politics are intimately 
related. As Morrison (1976) observes: "on the one hand, schooling influences the 
formation of political norms and values and provides one of several qualifications 
for political office-holding; on the other, a political process is involved in 
educational policy-making and in public controversies over certain policies" (p. 17). 
Indeed, in Tanzania this has been a major avenue for the legitimation of the political 
ideology of ujamaa (Roy-Campbell, 1992). Second, some of the most vocal criticism 
of government policies and action since Independence has come from the education
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sector.1 For these reasons at least, the political responses of the education sector is 
of considerable importance in the present context.
The press has had a relatively modest growth in independent Tanzania till the 
middle of the 1970s when the government began to take the question of mass media 
seriously and initiated several policy actions, including the detailing of a Press 
Charter and the setting up of an institute of journalism in the country. But the media 
sector - which is here taken to refer to both the newspapers and the radio stations - 
has been known more for its technically and politically mediocre voice and their 
extreme reluctance to criticise the single-party government (Lederbogen, 1992). Yet 
with the onset of the IMF-sponsored economic liberalisation in the late 1980s, there 
has been a proliferation of journalistic activity, including the foundation of new 
private newspapers and an increase in the critical content of journalistic writing even 
in government-owned newspapers. The impact of mass media in such a context can 
be quite considerable given political direction and determination.
The chapter begins with a brief outline of the major developments in the 
education sector, focusing in particular on the various demonstrations and protests 
made against government policies since Independence. The third section discusses 
the major features of the development of mass communication in the country. The 
fourth details the sample of respondents and data collection methods while the fifth 
section analyses the responses of the sample to various aspects of the IMF-sponsored 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The sixth section discusses the responses 
of the sample to the question of multiparty politics and a concluding section draws 
together the main threads of the analysis.
7.2. The Education System in Tanzania : Three Phases of Development
At the time of its political independence Tanzania was the second poorest 
country in the world, less than 10 percent of its adult population was literate (World 
Bank, 1983, social data; UNICEF, 1991, the Tanzania section) and merely 34
1 The period can be pushed back farther considering that Nyerere was also a product and participant 
in this system, having been a government teacher for some time before moving into full-time politics in 
the years before Independence. See inter alia Coulson (1982), especially, pp. 114-115.
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percent of children of the school-going age (and around 4.5. percent of the 
population) were enrolled in primary schools (World Bank 1989; Tanzania section; 
Morrison, 1976, p. 121). From these humble beginnings, Tanzania increased its 
literacy rate nearly three and a half times by 1975 to have the most literate 
population in the whole of Black Africa (Morrison et al., 1989). By 1979 Tanzania 
had achieved Universal Primary Education in the sense that the population within the 
school-going age was enrolled in primary schools (World Bank, 1989). And by 
1986, 91 percent of the adult population were literate (UNICEF, 1991; Tanzania 
section). This is certainly an impressive record for a country which even in 1987 
was among the twenty-five poorest countries in the world, and one that owes a lot 
to the policy of Education for Self Reliance adopted in the context of the Arusha 
Declaration in 1967 (Roy-Campbell, 1992).
Yet, a significant amount of criticism has been levelled against the 
contradictions inherent in the policies explicitly formulated for the development of 
education and their implementation. This has come from the members of the single 
party as well as from the staff and students of Tanzanian institutions besides 
international observers. But more consistent and expressive protests have come from 
the student body of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, which until the late 1980s was 
the sole University in the country. And the government has consistently resorted to 
drastic action to quell student movements suggesting that they are perceived as a 
threat.
Policy formation and implementation in the education sector within 
independent Tanzania can be divided roughly into three phases.2 The first (1961 to 
1967) being the period from Independence to the Arusha Declaration and the policy 
of Education for Self Reliance; the second (1967 to 1984) being the period till the 
major liberalisation budget of 1984, which saw the first deliberate government 
attempt at reducing the budgetary allocation to the education sector and the re­
imposition of school fees; and the third (1984 to 1991) being the period of 
intensification of liberalisation trends within the economy and a steady deterioration 
in the economic condition of the education sector, with decreases in the real income
2 * * *For a detailed examination o f the colonial policy on education in Tanzania, see inter alia  Morrison
(1976), chapters 2 and 3.
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of teachers and the real allowances of students and a deterioration in the physical 
infrastructure of educational institutions. Each of these phases has also been marked 
by various student protests. These issues raised in these protest movements as well 
as the reaction of the state are described in detail below.
7.2.1. The Early Years : 1961 - 1969
The immediate post-independence concern was to redress the unbalanced 
provision of educational facilities to the African population in colonial Tanzania by 
abolishing the racially-motivated three-tier system of education.3 Thereafter, the 
new government sought to provide greater access to Africans in order to answer the 
overwhelming national demand for greater access to formal education that had 
developed in the country4 and also to train more Africans bureaucrats to take over 
the running of the country’s civil service (Roy-Campbell, 1992; Samoff, 1987). 
Nevertheless, while the public was demanding more primary schools for their 
children, the government had been advised to concentrate more on post-primary 
education5 because it was believed that obvious economic benefits would accrue 
from such investment rather than from the expansion of primary school education 
(Morrison, 1976, p. 110). The Three Year Development Plan (1961 - 1964) and the 
First Five Year Plan (1964 - 1969) accordingly focused government investment in 
expanding post-primary education. To this end, an admissions quota was introduced 
to give preference to Africans in secondary schools and fees were abolished in 
secondary schools {inter alia, Roy-Campbell, 1992; Morrison, 1976, chapter 7; 
Msekwa and Maliyamkono, 1979, chapters 2 and 3).
3 The three tiers consisted o f  separate schools for Europeans, Asians and for Africans, with the first 
two categories o f schools being far superior to schools for Africans in terms o f teaching facilities, staff 
and student enrolment (Msekwa and Maliyamkono, 1979).
4 African enthusiasm for education in the period immediately following independence in Tanzania 
was a result o f the belief that education was the path away from the drudgery o f the land and towards the 
comforts o f a white collar job. See, inter alia, Roy-Campbell, 1991; Coulson, 1982; Morrison, 1976.
5 This was the recommendation o f the Tobias Report o f 1962, a Ford Foundation Report by George 
Tobias, seconded to conduct a "detailed study o f the country’s middle and high level manpower 
requirements and ways and means o f meeting them" and also o f the Report o f a UNESCO Mission in 
1963 (Morrison, 1976, pp. I l l -  112). Accordingly, manpower planning became the basis for subsequent 
investment in education (Msekwa and Maliyamkono, 1979, p. 24; Morrison, 1976, p. 112).
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Facilities for technical and vocational education as well as secondary school 
education were expanded during this period and government policy also sought to 
"supplement regular academic instruction with courses of a vocational and technical 
bent (Morrison, 1976, p. 114.). The problems of linguistic diversity was tackled by 
making Swahili and English the only media of instruction.
There was, nevertheless, a growing litany of complaints as government 
efforts of expanding educational facilities failed to "address inequalities based on 
regional origin, religion, sex and economic status" and consequently accentuated 
regional disparities (Roy-Campbell, 1992, p. 149). More seriously, there was a 
growing divide between the public’s aspiration for primary school education and the 
public provision of primary school facilities. This occasioned a spurt of private 
primary school expansion, reflecting the "unbridled mass enthusiasm for education 
and its anticipated rewards" (Morrison, 1976, p. 129), that the government was 
unable to control.6 This tremendous expansion in primary school expansion was not 
matched by the increase in secondary school places and the growing crisis erupted 
in 1966.
In December 1965, the 46,700 students who had written the General Entrance 
Examination for places in secondary schools were told that only 7,000 had been 
admitted to secondary schools. The discontent arising from the shattered dreams of 
students and parents about an escape from poverty focused on the TANU 
government. This added to the already considerable internal criticism that the 
government had already received for its inadequate investment in primary education 
(ibid., pp. 197-199). Parental frustration took either of two forms: protest to the 
officials,7 or a withdrawal of children from primary schools - because parents could
6 The government had declared that it was illegal to expand primary school facilities beyond the 
official allotment. See Morrison (1976) chapter 6 for details of the government efforts to curb such 
expansion and the manner in which they failed to check the surge.
7 Regarding tire first, Morrison (1976) notes that the situation was exacerbated by two facts: one, 
that the public had not been forewarned o f a failure rate o f such proportions; two, civil servants and 
politicians were simply not prepared to withstand the extent o f protest. Regarding the situation in Moshi, 
the scene o f the greatest protest, he writes: "Day after day during December [1965], January and February 
[1966], queues formed outside the Regional Education Office, sometimes a hundred or more people long. 
One by one, parents filed in to see the Regional Education Officer; dissatisfied with his inability to meet 
their requests, they would turn to the District Education Officer, Primary School Inspectors, and even 
clerks. In addition, the office o f the District Council’s Administrative Assistant for Education was
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not see the point of paying primary school fees when the chances of a satisfactory 
return on their investment were so small. In January 1966, the pressure came 
publicly on Nyerere, during a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam with all party cell leaders 
in the city area to discuss the school leaver’s problem. While he managed to defuse 
some of the tension by publicly admitting that there was a problem, a subsequent 
propaganda campaign to publicise the advances made by the Ministry of Education 
since Independence in 1961 was not entirely successful.8 But before the major shift 
in the educational policy in 1967 that followed the equally dramatic Arusha 
Declaration that served to re-orient public pressure, there University students had 
begun to be restive.
A University College had been set up in Dar-es-Salaam in October 1961, as 
part of the University of East Africa, with just one faculty - the Faculty of Law (the 
first in East Africa) - and fourteen students (Coulson, 1982, p. 224).9 Despite 
Nyerere’s fears of education being elitist (Nyerere, 1968, pp. 312-313), the 
University College established in 1961 was conspicuously elitist and fostered such 
a feeling among its students.10 The handful of University students who had
inundated despite the fact that he had no jurisdiction over secondary placement. Some petitioners merely 
sought information on schools in Uganda and Kenya, but many others were fully prepared to plead, 
threaten, cajole, or bribe to obtain places for their children; a few even threatened to injure or kill the 
Regional and District Education Officers. On one occasion several school leavers showed up at the Office, 
and although refraining from any activities other than shouting loud complaints, they thoroughly terrified 
Ministry employees. The police were called for assistance a few times, but, apart from controlling crowds, 
there was little they could do. Out in the villages in Mount Kilimanjaro, relations became so strained 
between teachers and parents that in a few cases teachers had to be transferred to schools some miles 
distant" (p. 200).
o
Letters to the editors o f the daily newspaper were hard-hitting complaints, and only the ones that 
were not libellous or too extreme were allowed to come out in print (Morrison, 1976, p. 202).
9 Pratt (1976) notes that although the two University Colleges setup before the one in Dar-es-Salaam 
- Makarere University College, Uganda and Royal College Nairobi - had a sizeable number of 
Tanganyikans (216 in Makarere and 26 at Nairobi) the total output o f Tanganyikan graduates remained 
small - 12 in 1958 and 17 in 1962.
10 Describing the University, Coulson (1982) writes quoting Saul (1968, p. 279): "The university 
had always been an elitist institution. Its accommodation was lavishly designed and largely built with 
grants from American, British and Scandinavian sources. The choice o f a site outside the city centre 
distanced the institution from the masses. The students lived on the site in individual study bedrooms in 
tower blocks - although, with increasing numbers some of the rooms were shared. Their food and 
allowances, and the books in the library and the equipment in the labs, were superior to those in other 
educational institutions. The elitism was intensified by the speeches o f politicians who stressed the urgent 
need for the trained manpower that only the university was supplying" (p. 225). Also, Peter and Mvingi
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absorbed that the nation’s urgent need for trained manpower could only be supplied 
by the University and were accordingly assured of a high-salaried job and a life of 
considerable comfort relative to the majority of other Tanzanians.11 Students 
therefore disliked the idea of any curtailment of their freedom, either on account of 
manpower planning and allocation (which tied them to government professions for 
the next five years) or by the adoption of a one party state (Coulson, 1982, p. 225; 
Morrison, 1976, pp. 237-238). This extended to the decision of the government to 
make National Service - a two-year period of nation-building activity in the country - 
compulsory for University students.12 But their first show of militant activity was 
during the UDI demonstration in 1965 organised by the National Union of Tanzanian 
Students (NAUTS) which was drew its membership from secondary schools and 
colleges besides the University.
According to various reports, students were denied police permission to stage 
the demonstration, but marched nonetheless through the streets of Dar-es-Salaam to 
the British High Commission, where they proceeded to burn the Union Jack and to 
damage vehicles parked on the premises (Morrison, 1976, p. 239 and endnote 11; 
Peter and Mvingi, 1985, p. 163; Kanywanyi, 1991, p. 14 and endnote 13). 
Morrison (1976) writes, "[ejventually riot police dispersed them with tear gas and 
the leaders were taken to State House to see the President" who "admonished them 
for their behaviour and sent them to the High Commission to apologise" (endnote 
11, p. 249).
Two aspects of this confrontation are of significance. First, as Morrison 
(1976) notes, "[ajlthough rebuked for their violence (but not their cause) many
(1985) note that the University College o f Dar es Salaam Students’ Union (USUD) formed in 1961 was 
mainly concerned with hosting dances and balls and participating in annual mayoral procession around 
Dar-es-Salaam (p. 162).
11 Mukandala et al, (1991) note that in the context o f the scarcity o f  trained manpower in the 
country, the Adu Commission o f 1961 had "guaranteed [Tanzanianprofessionals] high and even lucrative 
salaries" (p. 1).
Morrison (1976) writes that although initially the scheme was to be a voluntary one, designed to 
ameliorate the problem caused by the inadequate absorbtion of primary school leavers, it was subsequently 
altered, as the President himself announced in May 1965, to "attract educated youths" so as to give them 
"the opportunity o f  repaying the state’s investment in their education" and to encourage them to "mix 
more freely with less fortunate young people in tire common cause for o f service to society" (p. 238).
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students realised just how effective group action could be" (endnote 11, p. 249). 
Secondly, as Peter and Mvingi (1985) and Kanywanyi (1991) observe the state 
reaction was surprising. They argue that in view that (i) the government had taken 
a similar negative stand to the issue of UDI in Zimbabwe and (ii) the student action 
was not evidence of "roguery and criminal vandalism" but "political expressions of 
justified anger against imperialism", the use of riot police to disperse demonstrators 
with some violence was an unprecedented treatment of the ‘educated elite’. The 
common perception is that the action against students was supposed to be 
exemplary.13 But student protest continued and violence continued to be used, 
especially by the state in retaliation.
The next major student campaign came soon after in October 1966 organised 
by the NAUTS and centred on the terms and conditions of the proposed compulsory 
National Service for all University Students.14 Basically, students accepted the 
compulsory National Service but were protesting against the low pay and conditions 
of work. In addition, however, there were two important strands of protest. First, 
at least one student leader claimed that "university students forming the intelligentsia 
class of the nation can in a way be said to constitute a special category of reasoning 
and approaches to social problems" (Morrison, 1976, p. 240). Such sentiments 
served to popularise the government view that the students were being elitist and 
opposed to sharing in the labour and sacrifices of nation building.15
1T Kanywanyi (1991) feels that the state reaction was because "the students had gone too far out of 
step o f what the state would have desired" and hence "had to be ‘disciplined, never to do it again" (p. 14). 
Peter and Mvingi (1985) feel, like Kanywanyi, that the state saw the element o f violence used "not only 
as impolitic diplomatically but as a bad precedent" (p. 164), but feel in addition that it was on account of 
the realisation by the ruling elite, in the wake o f the army mutiny of 1964, o f how vulnerable it was to 
disruptions o f law and order in the land. They write that "[ojrders to have students rounded up and 
punished even by caning seem to have been a calculated political act aimed at putting an end, once and 
for all, to the use o f violence in political struggles in Tanzania" (p. 164).
14 See Morrison (1976), chapter 10 for details.
15 Indeed, this is the perspective adopted by both Morrison (1976) and Coulson (1982). Morrison 
(1976) holds that with Barkan’s (1971) analysis that students tended to be "more concerned with the 
trappings o f elite status rather than being elite in the functional and behavioral senses o f the term" and that 
"[r]ather than wanting to exercise power by making decisions which will affect the lives o f their 
countrymen", they are "content to carve out a secure niche for themselves and their families" holds in the 
case o f the National Service demonstration o f 1966 (quote from Barkan (1971), p. 177 in endnote 2, pp. 
248-249). But he does leave the issue slightly open by noting in his introductory passage that "at least the 
leaders o f  the protest movement demonstrated that they were more motivated by narrowly elitist
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While it is undoubtedly true that at least some of the students displayed elitist 
arrogance and that even the act of negotiating better conditions was an expression 
of student displeasure at accepting work that was "attractive" to "those who did not 
possess post primary educational qualifications" (Morrison, 1976, p. 238),16 at least 
a section of the student body, was protesting against "unequal treatment". This view 
was put forward by the TANU Club on the University campus in Dar-es-Salaam 
whose members pointed out in a statement that "students were being asked to make 
sacrifices while the "big men" in the party and the civil service continued to enjoy 
their "huge houses" and "magnificent cars"" (ibid., p. 243), a clear reference to the 
wabenzi-17 Peter and Mvingi (1985) endorse this theme and add that "[m]ost of the 
state functionaries at middle and top level and the political leadership in general 
were young people who should have volunteered into national service to show the 
example of commitment and patriotism" (p. 167).18 They then go on, however, to 
claim that the "new breed of qualified, articulate but poor elite posed a challenge to 
the "Wabenzi" who laboured to make up for their low level of education by
considerations than by the socialist sentiments so many o f  them espoused" (p. 237; emphasis added).
16 W hile Morrison states that "competition was intense for the 3,300 places available during the Five 
Year Plan period from 1964 to 1969" (p. 238), Peter and Mvingi (1985) quote the then Second Vice 
President Kawawa as informing Parliament that by October 1966 "[ojnly 25 have joined national service 
under voluntary scheme so far" (p. 166).
17 Broadly speaking, the wabenzi refers to the ‘haves’ o f independent Tanzania who indulged in 
conspicuous consumption with wealth earned as part o f the ‘fruits of independence’. They appear to have 
been intensely disliked by the impoverished public at large, for obvious reasons (Morrison, 1976; p. 239). 
Describing the wabenzi in action but not in name, Maliyamkono (1976) writes: "The few individuals in 
key positions followed the lead o f their colonial masters in attitudes and life style and mannerisms. They 
made efforts to acquire all symbols o f wealth ... There was little or no concern for the welfare o f the little 
man. Such was the scene in the key-days o f our country’s youth. The masses remained behind in the race 
against poverty, illiteracy and diseases which lingered upon the masses without mercy" (quoted in Msekwa 
and Maliyamkono, 1979, p, 36). More graphically (but slightly erroneously) and with explicit references 
to the ruling elite, Peter and Mvingi (1985) quote an description of the wabenzi tlius: "The ministers and 
top civil servants had stepped into the shoes of the colonial officers. They had joined the Dar es Salaam 
club, an exclusive club o f top officials o f the colonial state. They competed with each other in divorcing 
their old wives and marrying younger more modern ones and were identified with riding ‘Humber’, 
‘Roho’ and ‘Mercedes Benz’ saloon cars. They were nicknamed ‘Wakenzi'{sic) which means those who 
drive in Mercedes Benz cars" (quoting an anonymous ex-student o f the University College o f Dar es 
Salaam during the early 1960s; p. 161).
1 S Such a feeling among the students was also noted by Professor Terence Ranger, then a Professor 
o f History at the University College o f  Dar-es-Salaam, who noted in a letter to Joan Wicken, the private 
secretary to the President, that some at least o f the students felt that "it was unfair for them to be used, 
as they saw it, as a scapegoat for an establishment which was itself growing fat" (endnote 27, p. 194).
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showing-off, of (sic) power and conspicuous spending on new cars, mansions and 
girl friends'1 (p. 167).19
The point of interest is that in the eyes of the public - including the general 
mass party workers - students themselves were seen to constitute the wabenzi. 
Morrison (1976) notes that the antipathy of the Tanzanian masses towards the 
wabenzi was extended to the educated, the professionals and the students in higher 
education. He writes that "the mood of anti-intellectualism in TANU, always strong 
among low and middle level activists who had little formal education, had been 
strengthened by student opposition to the one-party state proposals; and finally, there 
was growing public resentment not just of the educated but also of all behaviour that 
smacked of a "wabenzi" mentality" (p. 239).
When the students therefore marched to the State House to present their 
memorandum to the President, Nyerere’s reaction in a dramatic speech culminating 
in exempting them from National Service and rusticating all the nearly 400 student 
demonstrators, found a popular echo in the public reaction to the students’ 
protest.20 Importantly, however, Nyerere responded to the question raised in the 
students’ memorandum about "the propriety of the fat salaries politicians, civil 
servants and those in the management of public enterprises were drawing, while the 
peasantry was barely surviving and the proletariat was living below poverty datum 
line" (Peter and Mvingi, 1985, p. 169) and its concluding statement that "the battle 
between the political elite and the educated elite will perpetually continue" 
(Morrison, 1976, p. 244) by (a) stating that both the political and the educated elite 
were part of the same class that was exploiting the poor and (b) by announcing an 
immediate 20 percent cut in his own salary. He followed this up a few days later 
with the announcement that the cut would extend to the salaries of Cabinet 
Ministers, civil servants and employees of public corporations (ibid, p. 246).
While this action served to acknowledge the presence of the wabenzi (and to 
set the stage for a larger attack on their economic positions in the form of the
19 They go on to argue somewhat unconvincingly that and that the National Programme was created 
by the "jealous ‘W abenzi’" to "humiliate" the students.
2.0 See Morrison (1976) for a detailed account o f the events surrounding the October 22 demonstration 
in 1966 and Edgett Smith (1973) for the content o f Nyerere’s speech.
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Arusha Declaration), the immediate fall out of the student demonstration was the 
banning of the student organisation NAUTS and the rustication of a large majority 
of the student body of the University. Although they were later pardoned and re­
accepted within a period of two years, the main message from the government on 
the issue of student protest was that students "had gone too far, had shown little 
respect for authority, disabused their democratic right by protesting ‘without 
permission’" and "had to be punished severely so that they would dare not to do it 
again" (Kanywanyi, 1991, p. 14).21
This is a pattern that was to repeat itself at least twice in the future: student 
protest over national issues - especially the behaviour of the wabenzi among the 
political elite - and over issues of direct relevance to their economic status through 
public demonstrations and the use of paternalistic and punitive force by the 
government to crush such movements, expelling students and/or banning their 
democratic organisations - virtually irrespective of the merits of the issues leading 
to the student protest.
To conclude the overview of major policy events and public reactions, there 
are probably three major issues of conflict that characterise this period. First, the 
conflict between popular aspirations for increased access to primary school facilities 
to enable rapid economic advance through their children’s educational development 
and the manpower-planning- constrained government policy of concentrating on post­
primary education. Second, the triangular conflict between the government’s (and 
Nyerere’s) perception of education as providing badly-needed trained manpower for 
the Africanisation of a new and growing economy, the students’ self-perception as 
an elite-in-waiting and the anti-intellectual stance of the TANU party’s rank and file. 
Third, the conflict perceived by the students between government’s public stance and 
the deportment of the wabenzi among the political elite.
The immediate effect of the general unrest in the education sector in 1966, 
however, was the announcement in 1967 of a major change in the education policy 
of the country, in the form of the policy of Education for Self Reliance, which was
21 On the issue o f police permission for the demonstration, Morrison (1976) states that police 
permission was obtained, while Peter and Mvingi (1985) maintain along with Kanywanyi that such 
permission was not granted.
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to be part and parcel of the earlier Declaration of Socialism and Self Reliance at 
Arusha in 1967.
7.2.2. Education for Self Reliance : 1969 - 1984
Three major policies concerning education in Tanzania characterise this 
period. First, the policy of Education for Self-Reliance in 1967, then the Mwongozo 
in 1971 and finally the Musoma Resolution in 1974. Each is briefly discussed 
below.22
Soon after the Arusha Declaration was made public in February 1967, 
Nyerere issued "another dramatic manifesto", Education for Self-Reliance (Morrison, 
1976, p. 255), wherein, he summarised his perception of the role of education in a 
society aiming towards socialism and self-reliance, the faults with the education 
system inherited from the colonial period and the measures he considered necessary 
to achieve African socialism and national self-reliance in Tanzania.23 After noting 
that the most ‘glaring’ defects had been tackled, he proceeded to outline four basic 
areas that were contradictory to the aim of socialist development: the elitist nature 
of current education; the alienation of education from society; the focus on ‘book’ 
knowledge to the detriment of traditional knowledge gained through experience; and 
the withdrawal of some of the most capable from the productive work force as a 
result of education.
To correct these ‘faults’ and to move the economy towards a socialist future, 
he proposed the following ‘first steps’: a re-introduction of agriculture in the primary 
school curriculum, curricular reform to "prepare young people for the realities and 
needs of Tanzania", making it a seven-year primary course that was complete in 
itself24 and aiming at universal primary education; making post-secondary school
The other major policy moves were the Decentralisation o f 1972 and the Villagisation programmes 
of 1973-1975.
23 The full text is published in Nyerere (1968a) and has been reprinted in several places including 
Nyerere (1968c).
24 This included raising the age o f primary school enrolment to seven plus so that school leavers 
would be fourteen plus.
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students aware of their educational advantages and hence social (service) 
responsibilities; and downgrading the status of examinations in government and 
public esteem and including other criteria such as "character" and "willingness to 
serve" in the promotion of candidates or the selection of candidates for jobs 
(Nyerere, 1968). Further, he envisaged schools and colleges developing as self- 
reliant and self-sufficient social units with every school being a farm and the school 
community consisting of "people who are both teachers and fanners, and pupils and 
farmers" (ibid).25
An immediate policy outcome was the adoption of an explicitly socialist 
programme of ‘political education3 in all educational institutions (with an especially 
heavy emphasis in Teacher Training Colleges), the establishment of TANU Youth 
League (TYL) branches in primary schools and their "re-vitalisation" in secondary 
schools and teacher's colleges (Morrison, 1976, p. 270). At that time, Nyerere felt 
that Universal Primary Education would take a long time and was hence planned 
only for 1989. In 1973 school fees was abolished for all primary school students to 
encourage primary school enrolment (Morrison, 1976). But along with expanding 
primary school education, another aspect of mass education, adult education, was 
also encouraged from 1970 onwards.26
The articulation of the Mwongozo or Party Guidelines in 1971, one of the few 
policy documents in this period not directly drafted by Nyerere, caused some 
consternation because of its overtly socialist overtones. While the policy of
25 Msekwa and Maliyamkono (1979) feel that at the school level, the policy o f Education for Self- 
Reliance has been interpreted, "and probably correctly" as dealing with three aspects: "the means to fight 
the growth o f public expenditure on education, relative to other social services"; "an important tool in 
fostering correct values, including cooperation, responsibility and self-dependence"; and to "prepare young 
people to fit better into their own communities" (pp. 45-46).
26 Msekwa and Maliyamkono (1979) note that Adult Education had already been on the agenda since 
the late 1940s and in the period from 1961 to 1969 adult literacy classes were conducted by the 
Community Development Division o f the government and by voluntary agencies. The Kivukoni College 
was opened for adult education in 1961 and an Institute for Adult Education set up by an Act of 
Parliament in 1963 (pp. 51-53), and expanded into a "high level ideological institute for the training of 
party and rural development cadres" in 1973 (Morrison, 1976, p. 279; see also Msekwa and 
Maliyamkono, 1979, pp. 53-56). In 1973, compulsory adult and political education classes were 
introduced in all places o f work and "all workplaces were required to offer workers’ education by 
conducting classes for their workers during normal work-hours for a period o f  not less than one hour 
daily" (Roy-Campbell, 1992, p. 153). But she also observes that this led to the diversion o f "financial, 
human and psychological resources" away from primary school expansion to adult education (ibid, p. 
152).
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Education for Self-Reliance saw students and pupils as "active participants in the 
school community, sharing responsibility with teachers for determining and meeting 
its needs" the Mwongozo in a more general setting defined a new and more 
prominent role for the party "in a number of areas previously the preserve of 
bureaucrats and technocrats, including the provision of guidance and leadership in 
the creation of socialist, participatory democracy in all places of work" (Morrison, 
1976, p. 285). In particular, it "condemned the arrogant, bureaucratic and 
undemocratic practices of the leadership" (Shivji, 1990, p. 54), in short, the wabenzi 
attitude of the ruling elite.
But the slow pace of reform irked Nyerere (Morrison, 1976, p. 274) and is 
a major factor for the even more revolutionary (at least in terms of goal definition) 
Musoma Resolution passed by TANU’s National Executive in 1974 which decreed 
that "within three years arrangements must be completed for making primary 
education accessible to all children of school age" (Roy-Campbell, 1992, p. 152).27 
Again, the economic and logistic demands of such a programme were secondary 
considerations (ibid). But the actual implementation of the policies and the problems 
found therein are not as significant in the present context as is the response of the 
public to specific aspects of government policies during this period.28
Public Protest against Government Education Policies : There are probably three 
distinct sets of protest movements against government action from within the 
academic community during this period: first there were the moves towards militant 
Marxist-Leninist student activism in the University College/University of Dar-es- 
Salaam that culminated in the 1971 Akivaga affair; secondly, there were a series of 
clashes between students and teachers in secondary schools and some other 
institutions of higher education in the period immediately following the Mwongozo; 
thirdly, the public demonstration in 1978 by University students against proposed 
increases in government salaries during a time of a severe national economic crisis.
27 * *This is a good example o f the one characteristic o f policy-making m Tanzania in this period, which
Hyden (1980) has called the "we must run while others walk" aspect.
9 0
“ For this, see inter alia  Buchert (1994), Galabawa (1991) and for earlier surveys, Mbilinyi (1979), 
Msekwa and Maliyamkono (1979), Mbilinyi (1979) and Morrison (1976).
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Also, the increasingly critical writing of members of staff at the University against 
government policies and actions saw government retaliation in the form of 
termination of contracts and forced retirements. Each of these is discussed in 
turn.29
The announcement of the Arusha Declaration and the policy of Education for 
Self Reliance, oriented the students towards the left of the political spectrum. A 
Socialist Club was formed which soon became the more militant University Students’ 
African Revolutionary Front (USARF).30 A TYL University College District 
Branch was set up which joined in the activities of the USARF as did a TANU 
Study Group in the city (Kanywanyi, 1991, p. 15). A radical student journal was 
started called Cheche or the ‘spark’ (following the Lenin’s Iskra and Nkramah’s 
Spark).
The University College became a fully-fledged University in 1970 with Pius 
Msekwa a party bureaucrat as its First Vice-Chancellor. This is widely seen as the 
beginning of a period of ‘bureaucratisation’ of the University, with the party- 
appointed bureaucratic administration assuming control over decision-making in the 
University (Mushi, 1991; Sheriff, 1991; Kanywanyi, 1991; Baregu, 1991). In the 
new university, the Dar-es-Salaam University Students’ Union (DUSO) succeeded 
the USUD as the students organisation.
In 1970 Cheche ran a special issue on class struggles and published a critique 
of the Arusha Declaration by Issa Shivji entitled ‘Silent Class Struggles in Tanzania’
29 An isolated incident reminiscent o f the 1966 protest occurred at the Nyagezi Training Institute of 
the Ministry o f Agriculture and Cooperatives in 1970 where forty-six students were expelled by their 
Principal because they refused to move into a dormitory which they claimed "lacked proper washing 
facilities and partitions" (Morrison, 1976, p. 290). But this was neither a big issue nor an organised 
student protest.
30 The USARF organised Sunday ideological classes devoted to studying "Marxist, Fanonist and 
Nkrumahist texts", solidarity work trips to nearby factories and ujamaa villages and public lectures by 
prominent figures such as C. L. R. James, Cheddi Jagan of Guyana, Gora Ebrahim o f the Pan Africanist 
Congress of South Africa, Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu (a veteran Zanzibari Marxist and then a cabinet 
minister) and Stokely Carmichael o f Black Power fame (Shivji, 1990, p. 52; see also, Kanywanyi, 1991, 
p. 15; Peter and M vingi, 1985, p. 174). Shivji (1991) adds that "[sjtudents grouped around USARF not 
only mounted ideological discussions but also challenged the traditional students’ organization, the 
University Students Union, Dar es Salaam (USUD)" (p. 52).It not only organized public lectures but also 
condemned the curricula and syllabi as irrelevant and imperialist inspired, while expatriate lecturers were 
branded as ‘bourgeois’" (p. 53).
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and, in retaliation, the Vice chancellor informed students in November 1970 that the 
State House had ordered that the USARF and Cheche be wound up. Then in July 
1971, Symonds Akivaga, a Kenyan and President of the DUSO wrote an open letter 
to the Vice Chancellor complaining of "inadequate student representation on 
committees, a breakdown in communications with the administration and the slow 
progress in adapting the University to the needs of socialist development" (Morrison, 
1976, p. 287). But he also "accused the University of bureaucracy, high-handedness 
and undemocratic behaviour" (Shivji. 1990, p. 55). But when the University 
authorities rusticated Akivaga on the grounds that he had used "inflammatory 
language" in his letter (Morrison, id.),31 in a show of unprecedented solidarity, 
students boycotted classes and staged sit-ins on the campus. In another 
unprecedented move, staff members of the University came out in support of the 
issue of non-democratic decision-making on the University.32 Nevertheless, the only 
positive result from the movement was that the University authorities substituted 
committees for individual decision-makers in most University affairs. There were 
no further student disturbances on the University campus until the demonstration of 
1978, but among the staff and elsewhere in the country considerable unrest was 
taking place.
Firstly, following the publication of the Mwongozo in 1971, there was a spate 
of wildcat strikes by workers against "authoritarian styles of management" (Mushi, 
1991, p. 7) which were put down with govermnent force (Mushi, 1991, p. 7).33 
Students in secondary schools and other institutions followed suit. Second, there 
were a series of confrontations between staff and students in secondary schools over
31 Shivji (1990) however states that "the F[ield] F[orce] U[nit] was dispatched post-haste to round-up 
Akivaga and deport him to Kenya, his home country" (p. 55). Somewhat more picturesquely, Peter and 
Mvingi (1985) write: "armed riot police (there was no riot on campus then) drove into the campus in full 
gear, armed to the teeth, to escort the unarmed Akivaga away" (p. 182).
32 Peter and Mvingi (1985) write: "In a joint staff-student meeting called to discuss Akivaga’s 
rustication, it transpired that the members o f  staff and not only the students had no say in the running of 
the University . Members o f staff could not even meet without the permission o f the administration 
because they had no organisation o f their own" (p. 182). The struggle o f the members o f staff to start their 
own staff association and for more representation on decision-making bodies in the University is 
documented later. But as Peter and Mvingi (1985), pp. 182-183, Morrison (1976), p 287 and endnote 129, 
p. 304, Akivaga was soon ousted in an internal coup and the affair died down.
In addition, see inter alia Peter and Mvingi, 1985, and Morrison, 1976.
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the period 1971 - 1974. Incidents were reported from schools in Mkwawa, Mzumbe, 
Musoma, Pugu, Bwiri and Tumaini (Morrison, ibid, endnote 124, p. 304; Peter and 
Mvingi, 1985, pp. 183-186)34 and in almost all these incidents, Morrison (1976) 
notes, "teachers and many members of the public have accused students of 
disrespecting authority and exploiting Mwongozo" while "students in turn have 
criticised teachers of being colonially-minded and negligent" and that "[a]s in any 
polarized situation, the truth lies buried somewhere in between" (p. 286). But they 
were serious enough for the government to "consider methods of curbing their 
radicalism so that it would not spill into colleges of higher learning and the 
University" (Peter and Mvingi, 1985, p. 185).35
Two major movements among the University staff are discernable for reform 
in the period 1967 to 1984. The first was the movement for curricular reform during 
1967 - 1972 and the second was for a independent and democratic staff association 
which was finally granted in 1980 in the form of the University of Dar es Salaam 
Staff Association (UDASA). While the first movement was toned down by actions 
internal to the University, the second was prolonged by the bureaucratic 
administration of the University. The only instances of state intervention in 
University staff affairs were: (a) the non-renewal of teaching contracts for expatriate 
members of staff in 1972 and 1977-79; and the ‘voluntary retirement’ of seven 
senior staff members of the University in 1977.
The movement for curricular reform started immediately after the Arusha 
Declaration with a group of nine expatriate lecturers seeking to establish a more 
relevant (socialist) inter-disciplinary approach to social science teaching involving
34 Morrison (1976) observes that these are only the prominent ones reported in the press and that 
there were more that went unreported. For full details o f the major secondary school protests, see 
Morrison (1976), p 286 and Peter and Mvingi (1985), pp. 184-5.
35 *These measures, formulated in the Musoma Resolution of 1974, included disciplinary measures 
(even dismissal) against teachers found to be behind student unrest, a compulsory year o f national service 
for students who had completed secondary school and two years of work experience before joining higher 
education institutions (ibid.). But, as later critical analysis showed, these were not entirely successful (e .g ., 
Mbilinyi, 1979).
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a dissolution of conventional University departments.36 But the new generation of 
American-trained Tanzanian professors and heads of department who were taking 
over in 1972 "did not welcome a proposal to remove them from their secure 
positions as heads of traditional department" (id.) and ensured that only a ‘watered- 
down* version of the re-organisation was accepted and put into practice.37 
Consequently, Coulson (1982) notes, the expatriate left felt "betrayed" and "its 
spokesmen either departed quietly or found that their contracts were not renewed"
(p. 228).
Although the University functioned almost uneventfully from 1972 to 1976, 
the struggle to establish a Staff Association that was not a trade union organisation 
(since the party’s worker organisation, JUWATA was the only trade union permitted 
in the country since the trade union struggles of 1963)38 but could operate 
independently of the bureaucratic University administration continued.39 Although 
started in 1972, it took certain critical events in 1977 and 1978 to push the issue 
through the University administration and in 1980, UDASA was formed.
The increasing subordination of the academic functioning of the University 
to its administrative side has been extensively commented upon recently.40 It is 
closely associated with the periods in office of the first two Vice Chancellors, Pius
36 Coulson (1982) writes that this group argued that "the traditional Western division of social science 
into economics, political science, sociology, geography, etc., was irrelevant in an underdeveloped country 
building socialism, where most o f the problems (e.g ., of rural development) were interdisciplinary in 
nature" (p. 227). They wanted an inter-disciplinary core course along with "a number o f career-oriented 
specialisations in rural planning, industrial planning, resource assessment, public administration, or 
whatever" (Coulson, 1982, p. 227). Perhaps the most revolutionary part was that this concept of teaching 
did not require traditional departments; instead, "power was to be held by those elected to co-ordinate the 
various career streams, who might come from any o f the disciplines involved" (id.).
37 A course called ‘Social and Economic Problems o f East Africa’ was offered in the Law Faculty 
which evolved quickly into a compulsory ‘Common Course’ for all students. Thereafter, Shivji (1990) 
notes, "through the East African Society and Environment offered in the Faculty o f Arts and Social 
Science, the initiative to offer interdisciplinary education culminated in setting up the Institute of 
Development Studies" (p. 53).
38 See Coulson (1982, pp. 137-140) or Pratt (1976, pp. 177-186) for accounts o f the trade union 
activity o f  the early 1960s, the subsequent banning o f trade union activity in the country and the 
subordination of all such activity under the party-controlled union, JUWATA.
39 See Sheriff (1991) for a comprehensive account o f this struggle.
40 See, for instance, Baregu (1991), Kanywanyi (1991) and Sheriff (1991).
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Msekwa (1970-1976) and Ibrahim Kaduma (1977-1979), who were both party 
bureaucrats prior to these appointments. Although Coulson (1982) finds that Msekwa 
had "mellowed after his confrontation with students in 1970/1 and took a fairly 
tolerant view of the debates on the campus", his successor was well-known for his 
authoritarian approach (p, 229).41 Kaduma disliked the "free-ranging debates about 
government and party policy which were a feature both of teaching and of public 
meetings on the campus" (id.).
In 1977, Kaduma’s first year as Vice-Chancellor, "five left-inclined senior 
Tanzanian academic staff were suddenly ‘retired in the public interest’ without 
warning and then offered employment elsewhere in the civil service" (id.).42 Sheriff 
(1991) notes that "the renewal of contracts of many progressive expatriates was 
blocked during the next two years in the name ‘of nationalism" (p. 5).43 Kaduma, 
however, also had a major role to play in the student unrest during 1977-1978.
Student unrest resurged in 1977 according to Coulson (1982) who writes that 
in response to the expulsion of two groups of students in October and November, 
students "held protest meetings (which Kaduma claimed were illegal) and boycotted 
classes for two days" (p. 229) 44 The actual demonstration, however, was sparked 
off by a report in the Daily News that, in an obvious contravention of the Arusha 
Declaration, "ministers, senior party officials, and members of parliament would get 
substantial salary rises - as much as 40 percent in many cases" (id .)45 Since the 
country was "in grave economic problems and cholera had spread almost over the 
entire country", students were "infuriated" (Peter and Mvingi, 1985, p. 188).
41 Sheriff (1991) is not so charitable about M sekwa’s attitude towards the functioning o f the 
University.
42 Coulson (1982) goes on to note that "[the historian Arnold] Temu had recently been re-elected  
Dean [of Arts and Social Science], with an overwhelming majority, and petitions in his support were soon 
circulating, along with letters to The Daily News, and the retirements were even raised by four MPs in 
the National Assembly" (p. 229).
43 Although there were widespread protests, Sheriff feels that these were not successful because of 
the lack o f an effective staff organisation that could challenge the government on such issues.
44 Curiously, he does not mention why they were expelled and this incident is not referred to by any 
o f the other writers on student unrest in Tanzania during this period.
45 Peter and Mvingi (1985) are more specific about these provision. See, especially, pp. 187-188.
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However, students organisations of three institutions, the Ardhi Institute, the Water 
Resources Institute (Maji) and the University of Dar-es-Salaam who had demanded 
an explanation from the government and were negotiating for an audience with 
Nyerere through the then Vice Chancellor Ibrahim Kaduma, were led to believe that 
the Chancellor had refused to see them.46 Students took to the streets, intent on 
marching to the city centre six miles away from the campus. Coulson (1982) writes 
"students had marched before but never before had they openly demonstrated against 
a decision that had just been made by the Party" (p. 229). Shivji (1990) adds that 
this was first time that a student demonstration had been organised on basically 
national issues (p. 58).47 Shivji (1990) writes, "[sjtudent demonstrators were beaten 
up and expelled from the University and their organization was banned by the state, 
never to be revived again" (p. 58).48 Coulson (1982) writes that "[ajfter some days 
and without any legal procedures, more than 400 [students]... were taken by the 
police to their home areas" (p. 230). However, all but forty were allowed to return 
after a few months.49 But in addition to the expulsions and the banning of the 
DUSO, the government "issued a fabricated account of the student struggle" through 
the state-controlled press justifying the expulsions by saying that students had 
"engaged in acts of hooliganism and had tried to cause chaos contrary to national
46 Although Nyerere said that he was ready to meet them, Kaduma failed to convey this to the 
students believing that since "students were highly inflamed" it would be better if  they met the Party 
Executive Secretary Pius Msekwa instead (Peter and Mvingi, 1985, p. 188).
47 Shivji writes that in addition to the increase in the privileges granted to MPs and Ministers during 
a period o f economic crisis and cholera, they were also demanding that "the Party should not interfere 
in the revolutionary activities o f the students; that the prices of peasants’ crops be raised and wages should 
also be revised upwards" (endnote 19, p. 68).
HO
The riot police, the Field Force Unit, intercepted the students at the working class suburb of 
Manzese and asked them to return back to their respective campuses. When students refused, "the police 
unleashed violence" during which "some students were injured" (Peter and M vingi, 1985, p. 188 and 
Coulson, 1982, p. 229 respectively). Students, however, "re-formed nearer town and headed for the office 
of the English-language newspaper The Daily News where they hoped to hand in a manifesto" (Coulson, 
1982, pp. 229-230). But while Coulson (1982) continues "[ijnstead, they were rounded up by armed police 
and taken away in buses", implying that they did not in fact reach the newspaper office and read their 
manifesto, Peter and Mvingi (1985) state that the students "re-grouped and continued their demonstration 
which ended up at the government newspaper D aily News" where "they read their memorandum" (p. 188). 
The memorandum, however, has been published in the Review o f  African Political Economy, 1978, No. 
10, pp. 101-5.
49 The forty comprised "21 who were alleged to have organised the demonstration and 19 who had 
given false information (usually names and addresses) to the police" (id.).
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ethic" (p. 190).50 Yet Coulson (1982) feels, unlike in 1966, where students had 
marched basically to protect their privileges, in 1978 they had "joined exploited 
workers and peasants to protest about a bureaucracy which was granting itself 
privileges contrary to the Arusha Declaration" (p. 230). He farther observes that the 
extreme reaction of the state "shows that they were perceived as a real threat" (id.).
But in a public question answer session with the students in July 1978, 
Nyerere not only pardoned the students but also admitted publicly that there had 
been an "error" caused by the Vice Chancellor not informing students of Nyerere’s 
willingness to hold talks. But he refused to lift the ban on DUSO, the student 
organisation, maintaining that the CCM Youth League would run student affairs in 
the University.51 This organisation was the MUWATA, conceived later that year 
as a "pan-territorial student organisation under the control and supervision of the 
Youth League" (Peter and Mvingi, 1985, p. 191). With this imposition of party rule 
over student organisation, Coulson (1982) notes that there was an "uneasy truce on 
the campus" (p. 230). This uneasy truce persisted till the end of the 1980s.
Both these events of 1977 and 1978 bolstered the staff struggle for an 
independent association and in 1980 UDASA was formed. Although it began to 
discuss and debate national issues with considerable vigour, its only points of direct 
conflict with government interests came in 1983 and 1984 when members of staff
50 Further this statement charged that "students were protesting against the government programme 
o f sending experts to the rural areas and the new terms and conditions o f service o f members of  
Parliament, Ministers and Party leaders at different levels o f leadership" (id.). It also alleged that students 
had been "informed that the Chairman o f the Party was willing to listen to their complaints but had chosen 
to stage an illegal demonstration" and hence that "their purpose was not to present their complaints to the 
Party Chairman or to get an explanation of the government decisions but to cause chaos" (id.). Coulson 
(1982) also notes that "students were treated to a good deal o f abuse in the press" and were accused o f  
"having opposed ujamaa village managers (diere was no evidence of this) and o f having marched instead 
o f accepting an evidence to talk things over with President Nyerere (the evidence suggests that this 
invitation was received when it was already too late to stop the march)" (p. 230). Importantly, iie also 
adds that "the march itself was peaceful, and the students received enthusiastic support from the crowds 
along their entire route; the disruption of it was violent, with several students seriously injured" (id.).
51 In this context, Coulson (1982) notes that although the President had made it clear that "he did 
not see the University as merely an ideological institute", the university would never be a socialist 
institution" (p. 230). He writes even more tellingly: "Its economic function was, and would continue to 
be, to train a privileged class o f technicians, managers and administrators. Those who argued for socialism  
would be tolerated only so long as they did not expose the weaknesses of the state" (id.).
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were arrested and detained in violation of existing legal procedures.52 The timing 
coincides with the height of the government campaign against economic saboteurs 
(see chapters 2 and 4). In both cases, the academicians subjected to police action 
"were not presented before a court within the legally stipulated 24 hours, were 
denied access to legal advice, were interrogated by the police in the absence of their 
legal counsels, and one of them was required to surrender his passport" (Sheriff, 
1991, pp. 8-9).53 Again, the head of the institution was not informed. Following 
UDASA protests, Nyerere deputed the then Prime Minister Salim Ahmed Salim to 
meet a UDASA delegation and he admitted that the arrests did not follow legal 
procedures, reassured them that such acts would not be repeated in future and 
especially without the permission of the Head of the Institution (Sheriff, 1991, p. 9). 
But these were violated in 1989 in the case of two student leaders from the 
University of Dar-es-Salaam as is discussed below.
7.2.3. Education and Liberalisation (1984 to 1991)
Through the tentative steps towards economic liberalisation till 1984 and the 
moves towards the 1986 agreement with the IMF on Structural Adjustment, the 
education budget was diminishing and at an accelerated pace thereafter (Roy-
52 See Shivji (1990; pp. 60-65) and (1991; pp. 20-21) for an account o f staff action on national 
issues, especially those o f the Legal Aid Committee and the Law Faculty o f the University. The first 
incident was in January 1983 when T. B. M. Bugingo was detained in connection with a treason case. 
UDASA raised the matter with the Vice Chancellor pointing out that the entry o f security forces into the 
campus and the detention o f a member of staff without even the head o f the institution being informed 
"created a sense o f insecurity and weakened the integrity o f the University" (Sheriff, 1991, p. 8). 
Although the then Vice Chancellor Nicholas Kuhanga "reaffirmed the University’s position as regards 
academic freedom and observed that the University had an obligation to defend the principle at all times 
so as to ensure that academics carry out their tasks without fear or sense o f  insecurity" (id.), a similar 
incident re-occurred about a year later. In November 1984, two members o f the academic staff Professor 
Sam Ntiro and Ndugu Mziray Kangero were detained and their houses searched at midnight without any 
search or arrest warrants being shown. In contravention o f the Bill o f Rights contained in the 1984 
Constitution (but which had been suspended in the mainland; see Shivji (1990), pp. 62-63).
53 The detention was apparently linked to the alleged possession o f a ‘seditious’ document calling for 
a multi-party system and addressed to the Chairman of the CCM. The UDASA put its case to the 
Chancellor, Nyerere, as well as to the Minister o f Justice and Attorney-General J. Warioba that since 
"documents are our tools o f trade ... if we are to go by the police definition o f  sedition as implied in this 
incident, we would have to close shop or have each document vetted by the forces of law and order" 
(Sheriff, 1991, p. 9 quoting from the letter from the then UDASA Chairman, Professor H. Othman, to 
the President o f Tanzania).
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Campbell, 1992; Mukundala et al., 1991). This re-prioritisation of investment to 
weather the economic crisis has been reflected in the declining infrastructure in 
educational institutions, the decreasing availability of education materials including 
chairs, tables, blackboards, notebooks and textbooks as well as declining real 
incomes of teachers and diminishing real value of student allowances (Roy- 
Campbell, 1992; Mukundala et al., 1991; Baregu, 1991).54 Although staff at the 
University of Dar-es-Salaam protested in 1986 about the "pathetic conditions" in the 
University and the "resultant flight of teachers to greener pastures", this had 
received a "cold shoulder in the usual bureaucratic process of delays and 
indifference" (Shivji, 1991, p. 21). School teachers also have been unhappy about 
the poor pay ever since the late 1970s and were increasingly resorting to taking 
private tuition classes on the side (Mbilinyi, 1979; Carr-Hill, 1994).
The deteriorating conditions for students led to two specific instances of 
student unrest, in 1988 and 1990, although there were more clashes between the 
academic community and the state.53
Baregu (1991) writes that in 1988 there was a "student crisis in which 
students were demanding a raise in student allowances, an independent student 
organization and a different way of administering various student allowances" (p. 
3).56 Shivji (1991), sees in this action, the emergence of a "more militant student
54 Shivji (1990) notes that by the end o f the 1980s, "a University professor’s salary amounted to no 
more than US $ 50 [per annum] while a student’s book allowance could not buy more than two standard 
text-books" (p. 21). Further he observes that the infrastructural facilities in the University had deteriorated 
to the point where "even chalks, dusters and mimeographed material became scarce" (id.). Baregu (1991) 
states that the physically run-down state o f the University was the subject o f comment at a Donor’s 
Conference in 1988 where "the verdict o f most donors was that the university badly needed a strategy of 
continuous preventive maintenance" (p. 3). He also mentions "a chronic water problem [on the campus] 
leading to despicable and totally unhygienic conditions on the whole campus" (id.).
55 Apart from a brief mention in Sheriff (1991, p. 10) about a 1986 student crisis regarding book 
allowances and medicines, there is hardly any news of other student or teacher protests. In 1994, 
however, a report quotes the Education Minister Philemon Sarungi as admitting "that student unrest is 
caused by a lack o f funds" and goes on to say that ”[o]ver 20 secondary schools were closed following 
student riots and extensive damage" (African Business, September 1994, p. 44).
56 He goes on to describe the issues as follows: "One of the key issues at that time was that the meal 
allowances given to students were inadequate to provide them with a wholesome diet on a daily basis. 
Students were also protesting against the state o f accommodation in their halls o f residence. Apart from 
the overcrowding in their rooms students complained about the generally unsanitary conditions in which 
they were forced to live" (p. 3). The last issue apparently received increased emphasis when M[t]he report 
investigating the circumstances o f Levina Mukasa’s death described living conditions as brutalising" (id.).
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leadership" which, among other things, "set to work on the formation of an 
autonomous [student] organisation" (p. 21). This was the DARUSO, launched in 
1988 coincident with the replacement of Vice Chancellor Nicholas Kuhanga, a party 
bureaucrat, by Professor Geoffrey Mmari, the first academic to hold this post since 
1970 (Kanywanyi, 1991, p. 15). But DARUSO was pending official sanction from 
the Chancellor,57
In early 1989, two student leaders were "illegally arrested, detained for three 
weeks and interrogated" apparently because "they had dared raise questions on the 
way funds were used by the ‘leaders’ on a trip to the youth festival in North Korea" 
(Shivji (1991), p. 21),58 Protests by UDASA to the Prime Minister Warioba, 
reminding him of his own and his predecessor’s 1984 commitment that "such ‘acts 
of illegal and improper search, arrest and detention won’t be repeated in future" and 
the report of a University Council probe committee "which also confirmed most of 
the charges against the state security service", led only to the Prime Minister 
admitting in private that "excesses had been committed" but maintaining that all 
concerned were to blame and all had therefore to "forget and forgive" (Sheriff, 
1991, p. 9 and Shivji, 1991, p.21).
In 1990, however, there was a more serious confrontation between the 
academic community on the ‘Hill’ and the state.59 Even before the interim 
government of DARUSO was properly in place students met in their General 
Assembly (Baraza) on April 7th 1990 to discuss "a long agenda including their own 
academic and living conditions" (Shivji, 1991, p. 21). Shivji (1991) writes: "The 
Baraza developed into an extended Baraza lasting over some ten days as student
57 Kanywanyi (1991) also writes that one o f the major reasons behind the setting up o f DARUSO 
over and above the state-enforced MUWATA was the discovery that "MUWATA had no legal status" 
since "it had never been given to operate as a University o f Dar es Salaam students organisation by the 
Chancellor as per the relevant law" (p. 15).
58 Sheriff (1991) describes the incident in detail: "Nd. Bazigiza and Mkenda had been part o f a 
Tanzanian delegation to the Youth Festival in Korea where they had protested against the conduct o f the 
delegation’s leadership and had written a report on their return. The former was detained in Korea, and 
both were abducted, blindfolded and taken to a pace o f incarceration. They were subjected to long periods 
o f interrogation and were kept for several weeks under degrading conditions o f nakedness" (p. 9).
59 The University o f Dar-es-Salaam is situated on a small hill called Chuuo ki koo  outside the city 
o f Dar-es-Salaam and the University is thus referred to, especially within the academic community, as the 
Hill.
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demands began to be pressed at various levels. Lecturers, while expressing 
reservations on the method (boycott of classes) adopted by students to press their 
demands and raise issues, found the issues themselves supportable. In an 
unprecedented move, lecturers joined the student Baraza through their organisation 
UDASA. Joint discussions and debates ensued" (p. 21). Among the issues, Sheriff 
(1991) counts "a series of university and national issues: declining allocation of 
resources to education; inadequate student book and other allowances; 
impoverishment of the lecturers and the ‘brain drain5; corruption, accountability and 
democracy in the country and at the ‘Hill5; and a number of other burning national 
issues such as low producer prices and minimum wages" (p. 10).60
But it was not only the unity between teachers and students, although 
"momentous in the history of the University" (Sheriff, ibid.), that characterised the 
1990 demonstration. In another unprecedented move, the students put into practice 
the government slogan of public accountability and summoned four University 
administrators to appear before its Baraza and to "explain alleged incompetence, 
negligence and corruption in their offices" (Shivji, 1991, p. 22).61 In another novel 
move, the students dispensed with representative negotiations with the state 
authorities being skeptical about its effectiveness and purpose.62 However, they 
reluctantly decided to send a delegation with a limited mandate to meet the
60 Shivji (1991) also mentions that in the various student statements as well as Baraza debates a 
number o f ‘national’ issues were raised including, "the gutting down of the Central Bank in a fire which 
remained unexplained; the purchase o f a second-hand pontoon which broke down within days of its arrival 
for which no one had been made accountable; the deteriorating conditions o f  workers and peasants and 
the increasing income differential between the top and the bottom; dumping o f  waste by the City Council 
in Tabata causing health and environmental hazard to the residents" (p. 22).
61 Shivji (1991) continues: "Having sought explanations, the Baraza went ahead and passed their 
decisions; the doctor acquitted himself well; the Baraza "fired" the Estates Manager and withdrew 
recognition from the Chief Administrative Officer". Noting that the Baraza did not actually have any legal 
powers, Shivji argues that "politically this was an important act" which asserted "the right o f the 
community to demand accountability and re-call, if necessary, those supposedly appointed to serve it, but 
in law and practice, lording over it" (p. 22).
62 The Baraza decided not to send delegations to the government but instead invited the Principal 
Secretary o f  the Ministry of Education to come and listen to the Baraza. Being dissatisfied with his 
explanations the Baraza then invited the Chancellor and President of Tanzania AH Hassan Mwinyi to come 
and listen to the Baraza. The Chancellor, however, sent word that he was ready to see a delegation. But 
the reluctant Baraza decision to send a delegation with "no mandate to ‘negotiate’ or arrive at decisions", 
Shivji (1991) notes, was "construed [later] by the media and state spokesmen as insolence and act of 
disrespect on the part o f students to the Head o f State" (p. 22).
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Chancellor, but since it did not have the power to negotiate any settlement, the issue 
was left unresolved.
The government reacted in two stages. Its immediate reaction had three 
facets. First, it issued an ultimatum to striking students to return to classes (and most 
students apparently did). Next, it unleashed an unprecedented and massive 
propaganda onslaught on the students through the two daily national newspapers and 
the national radio.63 But with the appearance within ten days of the Students Baraza 
of a poster campaign in the University maligning the Head of State (with posters 
ranging from regular political cartoons indefensibly vulgar drawings), the state 
authorities intensified the propaganda campaign and closed the University on the 
12th of May 1990.64 Students were asked to vacate their hostels at four hours 
notice. They were prohibited from working while at home and were expected to 
report regularly to the District Commissioner’s Office in their locality {Africa 
Events, February 1991, p. 9).
The officials reasons given for the closure of the university apparently span 
a wide range, from "protecting peace on the campus; forestalling possible physical 
clashes among students; imposing punishment for disrespect, indiscipline and 
insubordination" (id.). Yet, there was no violence involved. Shivji (1991) notes that 
"students remained peaceful" throughout "in spite of some efforts by ‘agent 
provocateurs’ to incite violence" (ibid., p. 23). But he also adds that there was no 
physical violence against the students.
Despite the Report of the Mrosso Commission (appointed to investigate the 
issue) which "completely exonerated both students and lecturers" {Africa Events, 
February 1991, p. 9), the government implemented its second stage reaction when 
the University re-opened nearly eight months later on the 1st of January 1991. There
63 Beginning on the 18th of April, students "were portrayed as ‘traitors’ who had committed the 
heinous crime o f treason against the nation; unpatriotic; national enemies; agents o f external enemies; 
disobedient; rude and nothing but hooligans" (ibid., p. 23). Yet Shivji (1991) notes that neither was any 
student taken to court nor was any evidence was produced in support of the charges. Editorials and ‘views 
o f citizens’ called upon the government to "punish the students severely; whip them; make them pay for 
their education, etc." (id.).
64 Again, Shivji (1991) is doubtful o f their origin and writes "at the time, the campus was infested 
with ‘strange faces’ from the state apparatuses, [and] the planting o f such ‘literature’ by ‘agent 
provocateurs’ cannot be ruled out” (ibid, p. 22).
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were two main actions. First, the government announced that 13 students were to 
be expelled and 8 others were to be severely reprimanded. Secondly, the government 
also announced several staff transfers, the most significant ones being (i) the transfer 
of Vice Chancellor Mmari to Sokoine University; (ii) the appointment of Professor 
Shivji as Chairman of the Land Question Committee (with a year’s mandate); and 
(iii) the appointment of Professor Baregu to a diplomatic post abroad.65
Shivji (1991) points out several factors towards an explanation of the state 
reaction. First, he notes that the government feared ‘domino effects’ within the 
nation since "what [students] were saying, and wanted to say, is and has been on the 
lips of the masses of people even if it has remained unsaid" (p. 23). Hence, if the 
students could say it, debate it and protest about it, "so could other, even more 
critical, sectors of the society" (id.). Secondly, he notes that the open debates and 
discussions in a mass assembly that characterised the student protest "looked like a 
harbinger of mass politics" and "could become infectious" (id.). Thirdly, the 
students’ call for public accountability was turning official policy on its head and 
was therefore "usurping the role of the Parliament", regardless of its effectiveness. 
Fourthly, the nearly successful call for an autonomous organisation could spread and 
join with other voices in officially-sponsored state organisations already calling for 
autonomy and independence. Fifthly, the ominous implications of the unity between 
students and members of staff on the University (pp. 23-24).66
In the context of these and other struggles by various sections of civil society, 
Shivji (1990) makes two important observations. First he observes that "[t]he unique 
characteristic of the Tanzanian state has been to allow a fairly free and even critical 
intellectual debate, at the same time, to firmly suppress any collective protest or 
organised alternative politics" (p. 65). Secondly, he notes that the debates and 
discussions among the intelligentsia have been (a) largely confined to the 
intelligentsia and (b) uncoordinated, incoherent, inconsistent and largely
65 Of these, the dismissal o f the Vice Chancellor has led to the greatest protest within and outside 
the University and there have been several calls on the President to revoke his decision.
66 He also ascribes "minor factors" including "the fact that this is an election year; internal 
contradictions within the ‘palace’; vying for favours by individuals with the Head o f State and therefore 
outdoing each other in the condemnation o f students; distracting attention from other national issues and 
concerns by focusing on the alleged misdeeds o f the students" (ibid., pp. 23-24).
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spontaneous, without either "organised form or links with the broad masses of the 
people" (id.). Nonetheless, the student demonstration of 1990 served to emphasise 
that students remain one of the most volatile groups within civil society and one 
which the state seeks to suppress because it recognises therein a potential threat.
There are a few notable features of student protest at government policy in 
this and the previous periods. First, the government has seen the academic 
community mainly as a supplier of trained manpower to serve the needs of the 
nation. Indeed it has likened the University to a parastatal organisation (Baregu, 
1991; Sheriff, 1991). Secondly, and relatedly, it has not taken kindly to organised 
student protests over local and national issues, however justified, although 
superficially it has sought to champion the cause of academic freedom and critical 
independent thought, especially in the Universities. Thirdly, any form of organised 
protest by the students, even on grounds that seemed common with the rhetoric of 
the government, has elicited prompt and extreme measures of suppression including 
armed force. However, as the repeated uprising of an essentially fluid student body 
has shown, government attempts to ‘teach students a lesson once and for all’ have 
not succeeded. Lastly, in contrast to students, teachers in schools, colleges and 
Universities have responded to the considerable deterioration in their economic 
conditions by either moving into the informal sector to supplement their incomes or 
by moving out of the country and thus the education sector.
7.3. The Media in Tanzania : An Outline
There are four issues of interest regarding the mass media in Tanzania. First, 
the various institutions that make up the mass media sector in the country. Secondly, 
the communications policy of the government. And within this, a feature sufficiently 
notable to warrant separate consideration as the third issue of interest, the lack of 
adequate information from the government especially on controversial matters of 
keen public interest that has led to a rumour culture in the country. Finally, the 
change in the attitude of the government towards the media following the economic 
liberalisation in the late 1980s that has permitted an independent press to emerge and 
more critical writing in the state-owned newspapers. Each is examined below.
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7.3.1. A Profile of the Media
At the apex of the contemporary Tanzanian media sector on the mainland is 
the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting which oversees the national press - 
comprising basically of the English papers The Daily News (and its weekend edition 
Sunday News),61 the national radio - Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD), the 
national news agency Shirika la Habari la Tanzania (SHIHATA) and the Tanzanian 
School of Journalism (TSJ). Zanzibar has its own Ministry for Information which 
supervises activities of Radio Zanzibar and TV Zanzibar. The various Party 
publications including the newspapers, XJhuru and Mzalendo (the Patriot/Nationalist) 
and the workers magazine published by JUWATA called Mfanyakazi are directly 
controlled by the single party.
The mainland Ministry of Information is divided into several directorates, one 
the most important of which is the Tanzanian Information Services which controls 
all media organisations in the country, except the national radio, and keeps the 
media informed about government activities - including "journeys, appearances of 
members of the government or official notices" (Lederbogen, 1991, p. 37). Foreign 
news is supplied by SHIHATA, established in 1976, which buys it from foreign 
news agencies like Reuters and the Agence France Presse but newspapers also use 
the mail services of other African and international news agencies (ibid, p. 43).
The Daily News is the largest national English daily with a circulation of
50,000 although the Party newspaper published nation-wide in Swahili, Uhuru 
(Freedom) has the larger circulation of 100,000 (Lederbogen, 1991). There are far 
more weekly, monthly and quarterly publications than dailies, but equally there are 
several publications that for various reasons cannot keep up a steady publication 
rate.68 Each national newspaper employs around sixty permanent staff, of whom
67 The Tanganyika Standard , begun in 1929, became The Standard in 1965 (Morrison, 1976, p. 339). 
Then, Lederbogen (1991) writes, "[a]fter stormy clashes between the Tanzanian government and the 
British media giant, Lornho, in 1970 the paper was finally nationalised, merged with the party paper, The 
Nationalist, and renamed Daily News and Sunday News. Morrison (1976) however puts the nationalisation 
date at 1972 (ibid.).
68 For a detailed listing o f the various publications, see the Press Directory o f Tanzania, URT (1986) 
and Lederbogen (1991), Press Directory, pp. 151-157.
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half are journalists and between 4 and 6 are photographers (ibid, p. 43). Yet the two 
papers are targeted at different readership; while the readers of the Daily News are 
the educated elite, the party paper Uhuru sees itself as a ‘medium for all’ (ibid., p. 
42). Also there is a ‘capital bias’ in the coverage of the two, not only because there 
are no regional editions of these newspapers but also because they tend to cover 
events in and about Dar-es-Salaam (ibid, p. 144).
Yet, given the uneven spread of education in general and English education 
in particular, neither set of Newspapers can be truly called a ‘mass medium’. The 
only medium that comes close to being accessible by all is the radio. Radio 
broadcasting began in 1951 as a colonial administration-operated service, and was 
constituted as a public corporation, the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC), 
modelled on the BBC, in 1956. But, as Lederbogen (1991) writes, its expansion into 
"a mass medium with adequate transmitting power and fast-growing recipient 
potential and programmes due to the spread of the transistor radio" came only with 
independence (p. 48). There are two radio stations operating currently, one in 
mainland Tanzania and the other in Zanzibar.
Coulson (1982) writes that "[tjelevision was not introduced [in Tanzania], 
except in Zanzibar, on the (very logical) grounds that it would not reach the majority 
of villages [on the mainland], and so would benefit a minority; instead resources 
were used to improve the radio service" (p. 206). However, television has been in 
Zanzibar for around 20 years, while mainland Tanzania has been promised a 
television station in the 1990s.
Since the nationalisation of the newspapers and prior to the liberalisation 
measures of the 1980s, there is comparatively less by way of anti-government 
protests or movements in the media sector. However, there has a distinct change in 
the nature of newspaper and radio reporting after the moves towards economic 
liberalisation. This is discussed below after briefly describing the main features of 
the media sector and of the communication policy of the state in the pre­
liberalisation period.
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7.3.2. Communication Policy in the Single-Party State
Although Tanzania has no comprehensive and consolidated body of legislation 
regarding its communication policy, there are several notable features of the attitude 
of the single-party towards the media since Independence that together can serve to 
summarise communication policy in the single-party state.
Firstly, the immediate post-Independence political activity did not pay as 
much attention to developing mass media as other newly-independent African 
countries had done. Lederbogen (1991) ascribes this "unusual reticence" to the 
structure of the unitary party whose tight-knit hierarchy facilitated the flow of 
politically-important information to the general public (p. 26). He writes: "Political 
legitimation, propaganda and communication as a rule used traditional media such 
as meetings and announcements, with radio and newspapers employed only 
complementarily" (p. 26). Another reason, doubtless, was the low level of literacy 
in the 1960s. Indeed Lederbogen (1991) notes subsequently that "the print media 
became more important with the mass literacy campaign under Julius Nyerere" (p. 
39). Indeed, the entire mass media in Tanzania, he later states, "primarily addresses 
townspeople, the rich, the educated, whereas the 85 percent rural people, the poor, 
the illiterates, remain largely excluded from access to informative and educative 
sources" (p. 143).
Secondly, since the written word has remained the most widely disseminated 
in newspapers, the single-party state has sought to use it for political legitimation 
and propaganda, and more so after the nationalisations. Thus Lederbogen (1991) 
writes that by far the most significant feature of the media in Tanzania, at least until 
recently, is the "close meshing" of political and communication structures (p. 26). 
Although no official policy document is unavailable, Lederbogen (1991) culls three 
basic objectives of government efforts from available various official documents and 
government statements: national integration, socio-economic modernisation and 
cultural self-identification. The overall aim seems to be, as Lederbogen puts it, "the 
lessening of inequalities, the wish for balanced participation, be it in the spreading 
of new technologies or the provision of schooling" (p. 22). However, in practice, 
all three are linked to the legitimation and stabilisation of single-party rule. This
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impression is reinforced by the fact that the media in Tanzania are part of the 
political system and that most Tanzanian journalists are state employees (ibid., p. 
27). Indeed, both in the 1967 Arusha Declaration and in the 1976 Newspaper Act 
(which was basically the Press Charter proposed by Nyerere), the degree of state 
control over the media’s actions was spelt out quite clearly.
A third characteristic feature is the tension between journalistic freedom in 
theory and state censorship in practice. In the Arusha Declaration, for instance, the 
mass media was to not only support the country’s policy of socialism and self- 
reliance, but also the policies of the party and the government, it was also "free to 
criticise any particular acts of individual party or government leaders, and to 
publicise any failures in the community by whoever they are committed in the 
implementation or following upon complaints or suggestions from the people" 
(Lederbogen, 1991, p. 27)69 Further, the media was to "report the truth to the best 
of their ability, and without distortion, whether that truth is pleasant or unpleasant" 
(id.). In the same vein, President Nyerere assured the media at the time of the 
nationalisation: "The new "Standard" will give general support to the policies of the 
Tanzanian Government, but ... will be free to criticise any particular acts of 
individual Tanu or Government leaders, and to publicise any failures in the 
community, by whomever they are committed. It will be free to criticise the 
implementation of agreed policies, either on its own initiative or following upon 
complaints or suggestions from its readers".70
But Part II of the Newspaper Act of 1976 is clear in its requirement that all 
publications for public consumption must be registered by the Ministry of 
Information and that the Minister can refuse to register a publication if it is 
"contrary to the public interest" (Lederbogen, 1991, p. 26). And further, it reserved 
the right to forbid the import and dissemination of foreign print products (id.).
Such official policy called for a difficult balancing act for journalists and was 
not always successful. Coulson (1982) observes, in the context of The Daily News
69 He quotes Mpenda (1990), p. 6f.
70 Nyerere, The Standard , 5 February, 1970, p. 1; quoted in Coulson, 1982, endnote 13, pp. 342-
343).
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that ”[o]n occasion it was willing to follow the liberal terms of reference given to 
its predecessor The Standard when it was nationalized in 1970, and to attack abuses 
of power or confusions of policy, although there were strict limits beyond which it 
would not venture" (206-7). He goes on to quote the instance of the ‘influential 
columnist’ Chenge wa Chenge who’s article encouraging the striking workers’ in 
1973 was followed within two weeks by a complete turnaround by the paper, which 
proceeded to justify the harsh government action taken to suppress the workers 
movement (Coulson, 1982, pp. 288-289).
Indeed, most journalists are now characterised as indulging in self-censorship, 
an act which is locally known as ‘writing with scissors in their heads’. But in 
another contradiction between rhetoric and reality, Nyerere is supposed to have 
"frequently accused the media angrily of censoring news themselves" (Lederbogen, 
1991, p. 146). Yet, journalists and especially those employed by the state have 
"learnt to interpret even the slightest pointers from the government and party as to 
what news is agreeable to the political leadership and what is not" so as to "not 
endanger their careers in state employment" (id.) Lederbogen (1991) is probably 
correct in observing that "very little professional autonomy is to be found in 
Tanzania’s state-controlled mass media and it is probably unassertable" (p. 144).
But there is an interesting fourth feature which is that the correspondence 
columns of Newspaper provided a safety valve for Tanzanians to vent some of their 
feelings about what has been going on in the country (Coulson, 1982, pp. 206-7). 
However, even here, there has been a certain amount of censorship and only those 
views that pass muster are allowed to appear.71 Still, this is the only exception to 
the rule of ‘bullet communication’ (one way, no return) that has been widely 
criticised (Lederbogen, 1991, p. 23 passim).
But perhaps the most important feature is a negative feature: the plethora of 
technical and financial problems which have not only meant that the Tanzanian mass 
media has been unable to be an institution of discussion and control, as it usually is
71 On this issue, see Morrison (1976), chapter 10, in the context o f the letters received by the editor 
during the school leavers’ problem in 1966 and the national service demonstration by university students 
also in 1966. See also Shivji (1991) who doubts the authenticity o f at least some o f the strongly-worded 
letters condemning the student action in 1990.
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in most other countries, but which have resulted in a failure in carrying out even 
government propaganda effectively. These financial problems have grown in severity 
with the onset of the economic crisis and the subsequent indigenous liberalisation 
(ibid, p. 23). Only three programmes on the national service of the radio survive to 
the 1990s, a general national service, an external service aimed at listeners abroad 
and a schools service. A fourth programme, the Commercial Service was closed 
down in 1989 because of "poor studio technology and outdated transmission 
equipment" (ibid, p. 49). And, ironically, despite the official attempt to protect the 
Tanzanian masses from the corruption of western media (especially television), 
Lederbogen reports that due to the poor technical quality of Radio Tanzania’s 
broadcasts, kiswahili broadcasts from foreign stations such as the BBC, the Deutche 
Welle and Voice of Kenya can often be heard with greater clarity.
This last feature is especially important since the limited and often dated 
news items that appear in the national mass media do not satisfy the general public, 
especially on issues of national importance, and this has led to a ‘rumour culture5 
in the country - an important means of mass communication in a society where there 
is a lack of accurate and complete information on events and government actions and 
a great public desire for such information. Indeed Nyerere is reported to have 
termed Dar-es-Salaam ‘Rumourville5,72 This is explored in further detail below.
7.3.3. Official Disinformation and the Rumour Culture
In a unique and important book published in 1990, a prominent journalist 
Ndimara Tegambwage writes of the paucity of information in Tanzania, where 
government officials are chary of giving a full and correct picture of political and 
other events within the country, where journalists either do not risk presenting full 
details or are prevented from doing so by their editors and publishers and where as 
a consequence rumours, wildly inaccurate and sensationalist, dominate the lives of 
ordinary citizens.
72 Professor I. G. Shivji in his Foreword to Tegambwage (1990, p. vii).
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Tegambwage (1990) provides two sets of examples to substantiate his case. 
Firstly, important instances where the government has deliberately sought to screen 
the information being made available to the public either by official silence, or the 
release of inaccurate and confusing press reports or by instructing mediapersons not 
to publish.73 And secondly, instances of rumours that have spread around the 
country in the face of such a lack of information, reflecting the public need for
74news/
His main points of argument, however, are that government and its officials 
"sit on information and are not moved by the docile state-owned and controlled 
media" (p. 14). He writes that silence by the government on issues of public concern 
"creates apathy, breeds doubts and suspicions, and erodes government credibility 
amongst the people". It also decreases the confidence of the people "in the state- 
owned national media as a reliable purveyor of news and information" (ibid, p. 14). 
Further, he notes that "scanty information, and unclear, unspecific statements 
sometimes released by the government and leaders, are not better than silence as 
they leave so many questions unanswered, thus confusing the audience on the issue 
un question" (ibid, p. 15). This form of ‘censorship’, he argues, leads to public 
speculation and rumour-mongering, both of which are rife in the country.
73 He refers to: (i) the Kilombero massacre in 1986 where members o f the paramilitary policy "fully 
armed, fired at workers and passersby at the Kilombero Sugar Company factory premises, leaving four 
dead and 16 others wounded" - which was investigated by a government team whose report was never 
made public in full; (ii) the mysterious fire in the Bank o f Tanzania building along Mirambo Street in Dar- 
es-Salaam - which was reported by the mass media without adequate follow up with coherent details of 
extent o f damage or responsibility; (iii) the death o f 30 people in an illegal gold mine in Mwanza region 
in 1985-86 - which was denied by the government whose probe teams’ reports were not published in full; 
and (iv) the negotiations leading up to the signing of the 1986 accord with the IMF and the details o f the 
conditionalities - which have not yet been made available in full to the public.
74 Herein, Tegambwage mentions the rumour (1) about a rift between party and government 
following the election in 1985 o f Mwinyi as President of the Union and the continuation o f Nyerere as 
Party Chairman; (2) about whether or not Nyerere would step down as Party Chairman in 1987; (3) about 
foul-play regarding the death of Premier Sokoine in 1984; (4) about Sokoine’s differences o f opinion with 
other members o f the Cabinet over his ‘crusade’ against corruption in the government; (5) about the 
moves for setting up alternative political parties in the country; (6) that Aboud Jumbe’s resignation as 
President o f Zanzibar in 1984 was a result o f party pressure; (7) that regarding the growth o f dissident 
activity in Zanzibar seeking to topple the government in Zanzibar; and (8) the anti-party anti-Union 
activity reported from Zanzibar’s sister island, Pemba. But these are only a few o f the 87 rumours that 
Tegambwage has collected over the years (ibid, p. 34).
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Rumour as a means of filling in for unavailable official information is 
particularly effective and almost invariably erroneous. Analysing 81 examples of 
public rumours concerning political and other events in the country, Tegambwage 
(1990) notes that "61 percent would never have entered the rumour category were 
the journalistic principles honoured even to the point of a commited (sic) journalist 
losing a job or going to jail" (p. 34). Another 38.9 percent, he notes, "would not 
have become rumour were the authority giving full, detailed explanation for certain 
actions; if authority was clear and specific, and if it had not erected "road blocks" 
in form of filters - those information managers who regard themselves more 
Tanzanian, more married to policy, and more capable of deciding, (most often 
arbitrarily and unprofessionally) what the rest of the people should read, hear or see 
on TV" (id.). Only, 0.1 percent of the 87 examples of rumours he has collected, he 
feels, represent stories where rumour could not be ruled out.
He further notes, pointedly, that in a society that talks of ‘power to the 
people’, it is indeed remarkably incongruous to have "a few people sitting on 
information, leaving the majority to feed on bits and hearsay" (ibid, p. 35). In such 
a situation, it is indeed natural that the public should try and listen to foreign radio 
in an obvious preference for any additional pieces of information.
His conclusion, however, is far-reaching for he feels that without accurate 
and complete information there is a lack of accountability, especially among the top 
echelons of the government and party. He writes:
"In Tanzania, deeds of officials are not knowable, or if they are, it 
is through the rumour industry. This means that if their deeds are not 
knowable, then officials are automatically not accountable. And, 
strictly speaking, without accountability there is no democracy. But 
as both the officials and the press have yet to acquire the impulse to 
disclose things, all [official] talk about kuwajibika (accountability) 
remains empty (p. 33).
Pursuing his theme that there is little real democracy in the functioning of the 
single-party state in Tanzania he writes:
"for democracy to function, people need to be fully informed. They 
must be informed so as to enable them be conscious of their rights;
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so that they are able to make sound decisions on all matters affecting 
them; so that they question the abuse of power, fight and protect their 
own rights and demand accountability by all those in power, in 
representative positions and at places of work" (ibid, p. 35).
Nevertheless, although he himself has taken a lead in this process through his 
independent magazine Radi, as Professor I. G. Shivji records in his foreword to the 
book, Ndimara Tegambwage is a rare journalist.
7.3.4. Liberalisation and Press Freedom
After 1986, there have been two major changes in the functioning of the 
media in Tanzania. First, there has been greater critical content in journalism and 
secondly, there has been an unprecedented growth in private publications for mass 
circulation. Yet, conditions in the official media sector have seen a steady 
deterioration over the 1980s.
The Deterioration of the 1980s : Lederbogen (1991) reports that SHIHATA was in 
dire economic straits in the late 1980s: Beginning in November 1988, Reuters 
stopped supplying foreign news for nine months because SHIHATA was no longer 
able to pay the annual subscription fee of £ 22,000 and in July 1991, SHIHATA had 
"long been" in debt to a French news agency which had also stopped its service (p. 
44). Further, not only are there complaints within the media sector about the delays 
in dissemination of news from SHIHATA, many of the subscribers now have their 
own offices or correspondents in the major provincial capitals "who phone important 
messages to their head offices in Dar-es-Salaam" (p. 46).
To the long-standing complaints of poor printing standards and an erratic and 
expensive newsprint supply can be added the inadequate infrastructure reflected in 
"overburdened telephone networks, defective telex machines, lack of paper and lack 
of transport" (ibid, p. 138). Consequently, journalists often see their stories ‘date 
and die5 before they reach the main office, what Tanzanian journalists term "writing 
for the waste paper basket" (ibid, pp. 47-48). In extensive interviews in the late 
1980s with journalists in Tanzania, Lederbogen finds that there is very little job
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satisfaction among Tanzanian journalists, who list "bad working conditions, 
inappropriately low pay and political control" as the main factors (p. 146). The low 
pay forces them not only to work on the side but also to try and go abroad, if not 
for work, for training (pp. 114-115). Lederbogen writes that many journalists have 
been at training centres in Europe, North America and the former Eastern Bloc 
countries (p. 147). But beyond a desire for training, there has been a great urge to 
work abroad. He finds that nearly 65 percent of the 83 media workers he 
interviewed "would prefer to work outside Tanzania" (p. 118).
The Possibilities of Liberalisation : Just over a year after events in Eastern Europe 
in 1989, a certain liberalisation was evident media policy and tangible reforms were 
put in place. Several independent newspapers were allowed to be launched some of 
which carry frankly critical articles. Lederbogen (1991) writes that they can now 
"compare the political system in Tanzania with that in South Africa or criticise the 
state party" without fear of being punished (p. 28). Perhaps the most visible 
evidence of this change in official policy was the hosting of a workshop on the 
freedom of the press in Tanzania by the government-owned Daily News in January 
1990, whose proceedings were reported in the same paper under the banner 
headline: "No Press Freedom in Tanzania" (id.). Lederbogen goes on to quote from 
the story:
"Many journalists, publishers and scholars rejected the assertion that 
Tanzania enjoyed press freedom. Twenty participants had the 
opportunity to contribute to the debate. The Secretary-General of the 
Publishers Association of Tanzania cited an example in which the 
Daily News failed to publish a review about a book about the recent 
treason trial. His petitions to the editor were not heeded. ‘When I 
complained about it to some journalists, they reminded me not to 
forget that the editor had a family’, he told the workshop, tie said the 
media ignored the interests of the people because its editorial policy 
was determined by the state" (pp. 28-29).
These are sentiments that would have been virtually impossible to express 
publicly and thereafter, expect to see in print. Although most comments were on the 
inability of the mass media to report accurately and factually because of political
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interference, there is a growing trend of self-criticism. Lederbogen notes that 
censorship is now being "publicly pilloried" (p. 146). This is underlined in an article 
in the Daily News soon after the report on the Workshop, which said:
"There is press freedom in Tanzania... The only problem is that the 
media in Tanzania don’t use their freedom to the degree they should; 
the freedom is there, but it is not always used. The image of our 
media more often than not turns out to be cowardly, as if unfree. But 
self-imposed restriction on the press on its freedom does not negate 
the existence of this freedom. It simply manifests cowardice on the 
part of the editors. A stronger will, with a little bit of courage would 
spur the press towards a more forceful and responsible utilisation of 
the freedom that it does, in fact, have" (p. 30).
Meanwhile, the independent press of Tanzania has continued to diversify. 
Although initially comprising almost exclusively of church publications - the most 
outstanding being the Catholic periodical Kiongosi (The Leader), by 1991 there was 
a business paper, a women’s magazine, sports papers, music and film magazines and 
Islamic papers (Lederbogen, 1991, p. 74). The business weekly called Business 
Times is published in English while a bi-monthly political journal Fahari is published 
in Swahili. However, Lederbogen feels that the private press has not been able to 
help redress the bias in the access of the general public to information largely 
because it is a metropolitan phenomenon (ibid, p. 143). However, to this criticism, 
Tegambwage (1990) adds the stronger criticism that there is little serious journalism 
in the private press. He maintains that while the private media has a mission to 
question the government’s withholding of news and information, query officials for 
issuing "unclear and unsourced" statements, and demand an end to "the spasmodic, 
bit-by-bit release of information", in actual fact, it indulges in escapism by 
remaining silent on many issues, and by publishing "sloppy material under the guise 
of ‘entertainment’" that serves to tell the public that serious issues of public concern 
"don’t matter". In doing so, he feels, they "only perpetuate backwardness and the 
system that breeds rumour" (ibid, p. 35).
Thus, although the grip of the government on the media appears to be 
loosening, the extent to which complete autonomy will be possible and the advantage 
that journalists and opponents of government policies will be able to make of it
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remain to be seen. But despite its financial and technical troubles, it is clear that the 
mass media remains, at least potentially, one of the more potent agents of political 
mobilisation within civil society. But before going on to discuss the political 
responses of the sample of mediapersons and members of the academic community, 
the sample itself has to be discussed in somewhat greater detail.
7.4. The Sample of Respondents
The sample of 77 respondents interviewed in this category of urban 
Tanzanians can be differentiated on the basis of two broad criteria: their 
occupational structure (including the proportion of women) and their economic status 
(including their informal sector activities). All the respondents work, study or teach 
in Dar-es-Salaam although some students were actually interviewed in Arusha and 
Dodoma.
Occupational Structure : The largest category of respondents are students as 
Table 7.4.1 below shows and, together, staff and students are a larger sub-category 
than mediapersons.
Table 7 .4 .1  : Occupational Structure of Respondents







Non-degree students 2 (1)
University 
teaching staff
Professors 7 15 (2) 










Note : Figures in brackets refer to the number o f women respondents.
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The majority of University students interviewed are undergraduates (31 out 
of 57) while 24 are postgraduates and two are non-degree students, but none were 
first-year students. The students are mainly from the Departments of Political 
Science and Law and from the Institute of Development Studies. Some are mature 
students who have been working prior to coming to the University and have wives 
and children. The sample of 15 members of the University teaching staff have 
almost equal numbers of Professors and lecturers. The Professors are from the 
Departments of Political Science and Law and also from the Economic Research 
Bureau and the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Dar-es-Salaam. 
Of the five members of the media sector, one works for the government-owned 
national newspaper The Daily News, another for the government-controlled national 
radio, Radio Tanzania Dar-es-Salaam, and the remaining three work for two 
newspapers in the newly set-up private independent press, The Family Mirror and 
Business Times.
A singular feature of this sample is the low number of women respondents. 
All the 13 women in the sample are drawn from the university and are mainly 
students. Only two working women are in the sample, both lecturers, one from the 
Department of Education and the other from the Department of Political Science.
Economic Status of the Respondents : The economic status of the respondents 
may be evaluated by looking at the formal earnings of the working sub-sample, the 
number of dependents they have to support (including children and immediate 
families), their estimates of Basic Necessary Income and the informal sector 
activities that they engage in to supplement their formal income or student grants. 
While students get approximately 1,800 Tsh per month as their student allowance 
from the government, the monthly salaries of the University teaching staff and the 
mediapersons are given in Table 7.4.2 below.
Table 7.4.2 : Income Distribution among the Salaried Respondents
Category o f Respondent
Monthly Salary Brackets
Tsh 4,500 - 7,000 Tsh 7,000 - 10,000 Tsh 10,000 - 14,000
Teaching Staff 3 5 7
Mediapersons 1 3 1
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Among the teaching staff, the respondents reporting incomes in the last two 
salary brackets are Professors. Given that the urban minimum age was Tsh 3,000 
during this period, these salary brackets would correspond, roughly, to between IV2 
and 2Vi times the urban minimum wage, between 2Vi and V/i and between VA and 
nearly 5 times, respectively. It is interesting to compare this Table with Table 6.4.1 
in the previous chapter. There, none of the civil servants earn less than Tsh 7,000 
and the salary of the civil servants ranged between Tsh 7,000 and Tsh 15,000, which 
is roughly the same as the salary range for Professors. Further, the bureaucrats at 
the branch levels had salaries ranging from between Tsh 4,000 to Tsh 12,000 - 
roughly the same as that of the lecturers in the present sample. But as Peter and 
Mvingi (1985) write, it is not the basic salary as much as the perks and other 
advantages of office that matter. And in this respect, clearly the administrative and 
party bureaucrats (at the national and regional levels) have a definite advantage over 
the University teaching staff.
The respondents themselves feel that these magnitudes of income are 
inadequate as their monthly estimates of the basic income necessary to support a 
family of five in Dar es Salaam, given in Table 7.4.3 below, indicate.
Table 7 .4 .3  : Basic Necessary Incom e per M onth According to Respondents
M onthly BNI 
Estimates (Tsh)
Num ber of Respondents quoting the Estim ate
Students Teaching staff M ediapersons Sub-totals
6,000 - 8,000 12 - - 12
8,000 - 10,000 15 2 - 17
10,000 - 12,000 3 4 - 7
12,000 - 14,000 24 2 - 26
14,000 - 19,000 2 3 4 9
over 19,000 1 4 1 6
57 15 5 77
A significant feature of this distribution is the preference for increasingly 
larger monthly incomes as one moves up from students to teaching staff to the
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journalists. Most students prefer between 12,000 and 14,000 Tsh per month - 
although more than half are content with between 6,000 and 12,000 Tsh - while 
most of the teaching staff would be satisfied with an income between Tsh. 8,000 and 
19,000. Journalists, however, prefer the higher end of the scale quoting upwards of
14,000 Tsh which probably indicates, among other factors, the fact that members 
of the academic community have government subsidies that others sections of society 
do not. But it might also reflect an awareness of the earning potential of private 
enterprise and therefore a rising standard of living.
Mukundala et al. (1991) also gives actual and preferred incomes for teaching 
staff members in the University of Dar-es-Salaam, but these are not comparable 
because their estimates are in US dollars and they do not mention the rate of 
exchange used to convert the figures. These "minimum (living) wages for the 
academic staff" are, however, reproduced in Table 7.4.4. below to give an idea of 
the range of estimates proposed (Mukundala et al., 1991, p. 5).
Table 7 .4 .4  : Actual and Preferred University Teaching S taff M onthly Salaries
Position Number Actual Salary (US$) Preferred Salary (US$)
Professor 40 101 - 125 1000
Assistant Professor 69 90 - 98 800 - 900
Senior Lecturer 139 71 - 90 650 - 800
Lecturer 166 58 - 69 550 - 650
Assistant Lecturer 164 45 - 57 450 - 550
Tutorial Assistant 37 31 - 42 400 - 450
While the differences between actual and preferred incomes could have been 
on account of a variety of factors, two important factors are the number of 
dependents of the respondents and the possibilities of additional sources of income, 
which are discussed below.
Dependents : Of the 45 respondents who have children, only 37 are married 
with 3 acknowledging common law wives. Two of the 5 with no long-term 
relationships are women. While roughly equal numbers of the sample have either no
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children (32 out of 77) or between 1 and 3 (33 out of 77) far fewer have between 
3 and 5 children (only 12 out of 77).
Table 7 .4 .5  : Number of Dependents Reported by the Sam ple
Num ber o f Dependents Students Staff M ediapersons
Children
none 27 3 2
less than 3 24 7 2
between 3 and 5 6 5 1
Immediate
family
in the village 27 1 1




Although most students tend to have fewer children, as a proportion, they 
tend to have more dependents outside Dar-es-Salaam. On the contrary, most of the 
teaching staff members and journalists tend to have children and also to have their 
immediate family in Dar-es-Salaam. In this connection, it must be noted that the 
family members of respondents, while unemployed formally and hence technically 
dependent on the respondent’s income, often supplement the family income by 
informal sector activity. This aspect is discussed in detail later.
Informal Sector Activity : All occupational categories seem to have reasons 
to indulge in informal sector activity because neither salaries nor student stipends 
were deemed sufficient to cater to even basic economic needs. The informal sector 
activities reported by the respondents themselves, presented in Table 7.4.6, shows 
that there is a marked difference in the nature of informal sector activities 
undertaken by the staff, students and the journalists. The main informal sector 
activity reported by the students in the sample is to act as interpreters for research 
workers and for aid agencies. The second most important is to work as urban 
household help or as errand boys for families of aid workers. Most staff members 
on the other hand work as part-time journalists. Another popular secondary activity 
is small-scale urban farming, usually in their back gardens on the University
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premises. Interpreting for research and aid workers from abroad as well as hiring 
out (their) vehicles are the other main activities. Journalists either farm in their own 
backgardens and sell the produce on the markets or act as guides for companies who 
take foreign tourists on safaris in the national parks and game reserves.
Table 7 .4 .6  : Inform al Sector Activity Reported by the R espondents
Informal Sector 
Activity
Number of Respondents 
Undertaking Activity
Number of Respondents whose 












3 - - 6 2 2
Small scale 
urban farming
2 6 2 5 3 1
Poultry-keeping 1 3 - 2 3 -
Dairying 1 - - 1 2 -
Journalism 6 9 - 3 - -
Domestic labour 11 - - 19 5 1
Transport and 
vehicle hiring
1 2 - 2 3 -
Guides for safari 
companies
7 - 3 - - -
Interpreting 19 3 - 2 1 -
Hair braiding 1 - - 6 2 1




- - - 19 2 l
Totals 57 23 5 60 24 7
N ote : Respondents listed more than one informal sector 
activity carried out by their family members.
Usually, however, the income earned by such activities by the respondents 
is supplemented by income earned by others members of their immediate family, 
also presented in Table 7.4.6. Again, there is a difference in the profile of informal
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sector activity undertaken by die family members of the three broad categories of 
respondents. Families of students are mainly employed in agricultural labour (19 out 
of 60), followed by domestic labour (9 out of 60), small-scale trading, hair-braiding 
and kiosk vending (all 6 out of 60). Families of staff members, however, are mostly 
engaged in domestic labour (5 out of 24), small-scale urban farming, poultry- 
keeping, transport and vehicle hiring and hair-braiding (all 3 out of 24). Families of 
these mediapersons, on the other hand, are mostly engaged in small-scale trading (2 
out of 7), small scale urban farming, domestic labour, hair-braiding, kiosk-vending 
and agricultural labour (1 out of 7 in each).
7.5. Responses to Economic Liberalisation
The responses of the sample to various SAP measures are presented in three 
Tables below, the first detailing the responses of the students, the second those of 
the teaching staff and the third those of the mediapersons. In the case of the 
mediapersons these responses are substantiated by articles published in newspapers.
Table 7 .5 ,1  : Responses of University Students to SAP M easures
SAP M easures Strong Approval Tolerance M ild Disapproval Strong
Disapproval
Private property rights 29 (50.87%) 1 (1.75%) 3 (5.26%,) 24 (42.10%)
Price decontrol - - 15 (26.31% ) 42 (73.68%)
New cooperative societies 57 (100.00%) - - -
More imported essentials 20 (35.08%) 9 (15.80%) 11 (19.30% ) 17 (29.82%)
More imported luxuries - 18 (31.58%) 18 (31.58% ) 21 (36.84%,)
More second-hand clothes 18 (31.58%) 3 (5.26%) 7 (12.28% ) 29 (50.88%)
User fees for education - 5 (8.77%) 1 (1.75% ) 51 (89.47%)
User fees for health care - - 3 (5.27) 54 (94.73%,)
Govt control o f salaries 7 (12.28%>) 9 (15.80%o) 13 (22.81%,) 28 (49.12%)
Note Percentages are to the total sub-sample of 57 respondents
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Table 7.5.2 : Responses of University Teaching Staff to SAP Measures
SAP M easures Strong
Approval
Tolerance M ild Disapproval Strong
Disapproval
Private property rights 2 (13.33%) 4 (26.67%) 5 (33.33 Jo) 4 (26.67Jo)
Price decontrol 2 (13.33%) 6 (40.00%) 6 (40.00 Jo) 1 (6.67 Jo)
New cooperative societies 12 (80.00%) 3 (20.00%) - -
More imported essentials - - 6 (40.00 Jo) 9 (60.00%)
More imported luxuries - - 6 (40.00 Jo) 9 (40.00 Jo)
More second-hand clothes 6 (40.00%) 5 (33.33%) 4 (26 .67Jo) -
User fees for education - 1 (6.67 Jo) 2 (13.33 Jo) 12 (80.00 Jo)
User fees for health care - - 1 (6 .67  Jo) 14 (93.33 Jo)
Govt control o f salaries - 2 (13.33 Jo) 5 (33.33 Jo) 8 (53.33 Jo)
Note Percentages are to the total sub-sample o f 15 respondents
Table 7 .5 .3  : Responses of M ediapersons to SAP M easures
SAP M easures Strong
Approval
Tolerance M ild Disapproval Strong
Disapproval
Private property rights 3 1 1 -
Price decontrol 1 1 1 2
New cooperative societies 3 2 - -
More imported essentials 3 2 - -
More imported luxuries 1 2 2 -
More second-hand clothes 4 1 - -
User fees for education - 2 1 2
User fees for health care - - 2 3
Govt control o f  salaries - 3 2 -
The re-introduction o f piivate property rights : As mentioned earlier, private 
property rights for a wide variety of economic resources were abrogated by the state 
during the wave of nationalisations in the late 1960s following the Amsha 
Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance. The issue of the re-introduction of
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private property rights in land had sizeable proportions in support of and against 
among both the students and the staff members. As Table 7.5.1 shows, while 50 
percent of them approved strongly, just over 40 percent of them disapproved 
strongly. Similarly, among the staff, 40 percent approved of the measure, 16.67 
percent strongly, 60 percent disapproved and 26.67 percent strongly. The 
mediapersons, on the other hand, were almost unanimously in favour of the 
measure, with only the journalist from the government-owned Daily News expressing 
mild disapproval. Overall, 52 percent approved and 47 percent disapproved.
Among the students, the rationalisation for the support was on two counts: 
first the possible future benefits from succession (especially among those whose 
families operated land in their villages); and secondly, a feeling that it is better to 
try and legalise the vast informal economy that operates by assuming private 
property rights over what is really public resources rather than to try and control it 
through government ‘crackdowns’ and ‘Mremaism’.75 The disapproval for the 
measure came largely from students who were ideologically committed to the values 
espoused by the Arusha Declaration. Incidentally, they were also highly critical and 
skeptical about the motivations behind the Zanzibar Declaration of 1990, which 
overturned several of the tenets adopted in Arusha. The teaching staff who approved 
of the measure appeared to be motivated more by the pragmatic considerations of 
their deteriorating economic situation and the need to undertake informal sector 
activity to supplement household incomes. As mentioned earlier, these activities 
included poultry-keeping, dairying, fanning and operating vehicles for hire - all of 
which require private property rights to justify the operators’ claim to the income 
from these activities. The disapproval of this measure was, again, on ideological 
grounds but the specific reasons differed from those quoted by students. In the place 
of almost unreasoned espousal of socialist principles, the staff felt that the 
implications of private ownership would have worse consequences for income 
distribution and inequality generation which might outweigh any immediate and 
transient advantages that the measure might bring. The mediapersons, however, gave 
greater weight to the positive aspects of the measure although one journalist felt that
75 See chapter 4 for details on the methods o f the current Home Minister Augustine Mrema, who 
has been conducting a vigorous anti-corruption campaign for the government.
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the CCM had been forced into this defensive posture by the international donor 
community.
Increase in prices o f essential commodities : The students were unanimous in their 
disapproval for this measure, with nearly 75 percent voicing strong disapproval. The 
teaching staff and the mediapersons however, were almost evenly divided, but with 
marginal advantage going in different directions in the two cases.
Students were quite passionate about the measure and almost refused to see 
any logic in the measure. A lot of the passion appeared to be prompted by the sharp 
declines in their subsidies and allowances in the 1980s. The few who appreciate why 
the government felt it needed to decontrol prices felt that it could have been avoided 
or done without affecting the access of the poor to basic needs. This, they claim 
cynically, is a manifestation of the indifference with which the government has 
swallowed what it itself said was the ‘bitter pill’. Instead of protecting the poor, the 
wabenzi in the government has only safeguarded its own position while 
simultaneously selling out completely to the IMF.
The staff members who accepted the measure did so only on the ground that 
it was a step necessitated by the fact that there were no other options open to the 
government. Those who approved felt that if even essential commodities became 
unavailable it would push the liberalisation process by forcing people to explore new 
entrepreneurial avenues.
Among the mediapersons, the strongest disapproval came interestingly from 
members of the independent press who felt, like the students, that this showed the 
extent of the government’s disregard for the common man and also of the 
government’s ‘passive acceptance’ of IMF conditionality. But along with the 
emphasis on the effect of the measure on the poor, there was realism about the 
government’s hands being tied. The strong approval for the measure was on the 
grounds that it was part of a process to ‘get the economy on its feet’.
Formation o f new cooperative societies : There was unanimously strong approval 
for this measure from the students and members of the teaching staff and strong 
approval from the mediapersons as well. The strong approval of the academic
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community was because they saw it as part and parcel of a process of independence 
from the CCM of other University staff and student organisations. As seen in section 
7.3 above, a major preoccupation since the banning of the several student 
organisations in the University has been the revival of democratic student politics. 
They also felt that this measure could be the forerunner to multiparty politics in the 
country.
The staff, who were deeply aware of their decade-long struggle for a 
democratic and independent staff association of their own in the University, 
perceived this measure as providing the grounds for freedom and independence from 
the CCM. However, the 20 percent who only approved mildly, or tolerated the 
measure, did so because they were skeptical about possible manipulation by certain 
economically powerful vested interests. But even they felt that the possibility of 
having a collective voice separate from the CCM was a better state of affairs.
The strong approval among the mediapersons came from the independent 
press, who perceived a link between this measure and the beginning of multiparty 
politics in the country. However, there was caution from other quarters of the press 
about the possibility of the emergence of disruptive and discriminatory groupings on 
the basis of tribal, religious and other divisive factors.
Increased availability o f imported essentials : There was a strongly divergent 
response from the three sections of the sample on this issue. While there was 
unanimous disapproval for this measure among the teaching staff, there was an 
almost equal division of the student respondents on this issue and almost universal 
approval from the mediapersons.
The disapproval from the members of the academic community was based on 
the argument that such imports will dampen possibilities for indigenous 
entrepreneurial initiatives. Thus they acknowledged that such imports would have 
an immediate positive impact of alleviating the acute shortage of affordable essential 
commodities, it would not help the nation in the long-run. Some others noted that 
"due to poor administration, control and corruption, some importers evade proper 
duty and sales tax payments, which causes an unfair competition to local producers 
who pay sales tax". Regarding tax evasion, they claimed that it was continuing
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unabated and "correct taxation was only exercised on salaries and wages". Further, 
they stated that "private companies could not be appropriately taxed due to 
underreporting of sales and profits".
There was, nevertheless, also the feeling that the country’s self-reliance was 
being compromised. One section of the teaching staff surmise that the success of 
SAP (if at all) is minuscule and unsustainable since "dependence on foreign aid is 
more than ever before" and anyway "such grants cannot last indefinitely". They also 
note that government finances were still in a precarious position with the budget still 
recording deficits and implying that foreign funding to the government budget has 
not been sustainable in the medium and long terms. And further, they feel that this 
assistance be withdrawn at anytime, as indeed had happened in the past.
The approval from the mediapersons was largely because of this positive 
impact on the immediate economic situation, while the students espoused both views 
in almost equal proportion.
Increased availability o f imported luxuries : The staff members were unanimously 
against this measure, with 60 percent disapproving strongly, while more than 60 
percent of students disapproved, a third of them strongly. On the other hand, none 
of the mediapersons disapproved strongly of the measure, and although some 
expressed reservations, the rest approved. The reasons are, however, more clear cut 
in this instance. The disapproval was on three grounds: first, the ideological 
disapproval of conspicuous consumption; secondly, the disapproval of relying on 
foreign commodities; and thirdly, the reduction of positive need-based incentives for 
domestic production. Alongside, the influx of non-basic consumer goods like 
cosmetics into the market is seen as ‘maladministration’. In this connection, they see 
Home Minister Mrema’s policy of cracking down on corruption and saboteurs as 
possibly adequate as a short term measure but they are cynical about its 
sustainability. The approval for the measure is basically because of the chance it 
provides to improve one’s standard of living given the extreme shortage of 
consumption commodities of comparable quality.
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Increased availability o f second-hand clothing : Students and staff members were 
divided on this issue. While nearly two-thirds of students disapproved of this 
measure, nearly 50 percent strongly, about 75 percent of the staff members 
approved, many strongly. Mediapersons, on the other hand, were unanimously 
approving, a majority strongly.
The main reason for the disapproval from the students appeared to be 
grounded in an ideological rejection of ‘hand-outs’ from richer foreign countries. 
The others, like the staff and the mediapersons, were approving because of the relief 
these commodities provided in an economic situation which made new clothes either 
unaffordable or simply unavailable.
The re-introduction o f user fees fo r  education : There was all round disapproval 
for this measure although some were prepared to be tolerant. The staff noted that the 
earlier government policy objective of Universal Primary Education was being 
sacrificed as was evident from the neglect of the education sector in general. The 
imposition of fees would further alienate the poor, whose children were already 
suffering from deteriorating quality of teaching in schools. This ‘cost sharing’, they 
argued, only meant a greater burden on parents already bogged down by the effect 
of other SAP measures on their economic welfare. Both staff and students pointed 
out that the cost-sharing was not linked to any increases in the budget for education 
or any positive investment in the education sector, which was seeing a continued 
deterioration.
Introduction o f user fees for health : The University teaching staff, students and the 
media disapproved unanimously, and quite strongly, of the imposition of user fees 
for health care. The mediapersons noted that Public Health experts meeting in 
Harare in July 1991 had said that structural adjustment programmes had "limited 
[the poor’s] access to health services essential nutrition and had led to increased 
malnutrition and childhood mortality" (.Family Mirror, No. 59, July 1991). The 
teaching staff quoted experts who emphasised that malaria, AIDS, cholera and 
tuberculosis had were major diseases threatening the area, and the poor would be the 
worst hit. They also noted that with the economic hardship, pharmacists were selling
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drugs without prescriptions, often in the wrong doses and without any qualms about 
quality control, this last because the WHO Essential Drug List ratified by the 
Tanzanian government could not be operationalised. They also pointed out that often 
government dispensaries ran out of essential drugs because these were being illegally 
sold on the black market because of the scarcity in the open market. This 
compounded the problem of access to adequate health care of the poor. One of the 
Professors felt that the government’s acknowledgment of this state of affairs is 
obvious since the mid 1980s when the Ministry of Health in Tanzania allowed 
government employed medical officers to utilise after-office hours to do private 
practice in private hospitals and towns - an admission by the government that the 
salaries that they paid were meagre.
Students disapproved of the measure stating that several family members had died 
of malaria, cholera and other undetected ailments because they had been 
misdiagnosed and also because they could not afford the drugs even if they were 
available. They further observed that with liberalisation, a number of pharmacies had 
opened up but often fake and out-of-date medicines were being sold as there was no 
quality check and, in addition, drugs were readily available across the counter even 
without a doctor’s prescription. In such a situation, the imposition of user fees in a 
climate of considerable economic hardship has only decreased the access of the poor 
to adequate and safe health care services.
The Daily News respondent pointed out that acute shortages in the health and 
education sectors was acknowledged by the Minister of Finance himself in his 1988- 
89 Budget speech where he said despite "a lot of effort", these sectors "could not 
be salvaged". Further he claimed that "the provision of services, particularly in 
water, education and health were ... adversely affected by the lack of equipment and 
tools and wrongdoings of all kinds emanating from the persistent shortages of 
foreign exchange" (quotes from Daily News, 1st June, 1989).
Government control o f salaries : Over 60 percent of the students disapproved of this 
measure although a minority among them even approved strongly, while among the 
staff, more than 80 percent disapproved, a majority strongly. Among mediapersons,
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however, this issue was not very important for the obvious reason that journalists 
and broadcasters in the government media sector were being paid anyway directly 
by the central government while journalists in the private independent press were not 
paid by the government at all.
Among the students, the disapproval was because their allowances had been 
steadily diminished in real value through the 1980s and was, by 1991, quite 
inadequate (see section 7.3.3). The teaching staff, similarly, had seen a steady 
deterioration in the purchasing power of their salaries. Consequently, they were 
strongly against any move by the government to freeze or otherwise control the rise 
in their salaries. Further, they stated that any increases granted in nominal terms was 
almost invariably a decrease in real terms by the time of implementation. In addition 
to the adverse effects of inflation, income tax took away a substantial part of their 
nominal salaries. But not only is their income level lower in absolute real terms, 
they are lower in comparison with the earnings of those who have gained from 
economic liberalisation. They point out that income disparities have increased and 
wealth was getting concentrated in the upper income groups. And that trend, they 
felt, could create social and political problems of its own.
An Overview o f the Responses : The responses of sample to the certain measures 
of the Structural Adjustment Programme can possibly be delineated in three ways. 
Firstly, there is a clear section of respondents who appear to be committed to the 
party ideology. However, they are critical and cynical of party support to several 
SAP measures which appear to run counter to ideological principles. As the 
following section details, there does not seem to be a direct correlation between 
party membership and support for government policies. Thus, the only basic 
difference between the responses of party and non-party members, who are guided 
by a variety of personal and larger arguments, to specific measures of the 
government’s Structural Adjustment Programmes is that party members seem to be 
guided by the ideological principles that the party itself appears to have abandoned.
Secondly, those who approved or disapproved of any measure did so for 
different reasons, ranging from the effects on personal well-being to larger 
considerations of the future effects on the country’s welfare and for the welfare of
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other groups in society. There is, thus, a split between those who approved of the 
measures with immediate positive implications for their own economic welfare and 
those of the others - and similarly disapproved of those measures with negative 
implications - and those respondents who were willing to consider a larger 
perspective on the various measures. This division has important implications for the 
course of future action, in particular, corrective action as well as the structure of any 
protest movement against existing government measures.
Finally, although there seems to be considerable unanimity in the political 
responses of the three different sections of the urban Tanzanian intelligentsia 
considered here, there is also a fairly clear divide between the academic community 
and the members of the country’s mass media sector. It would appear that more of 
the former consider the implications of SAP measures for individual welfare within 
the larger context of social welfare. That is to say, most journalists appear to be 
openly critical of only those SAP measures with obvious disadvantages to immediate 
public and personal well-being. On the other hand, the academic community appears 
to be willing to be openly critical of even measures that might provide immediate 
though temporary relief.
Overall, however, this section of urban Tanzanian society appeared to be 
more willing to discuss, debate and act on issues of national significance than the 
other sections considered so far. And, interestingly, such vehement responses are 
despite the series of repressive actions towards the academic community. But, unlike 
the academic community, it is the mass media sector that has been able to actually 
break free from government restrictions and establish an independent press. Going 
by the intensity of feeling among the academic community, however, it would 
appear that similar developments could well result for this section of the 
intelligentsia as well. But the differences in outlook, reasoning and motivation could, 
in the final analysis, impede the development of a unified protest movement from 
within the intelligentsia.
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7.6. Perspectives on Political Liberalisation
Since membership of the single party would appear to be a fairly important 
factor in determining or at least indicating the nature of political responses of the 
sample, the proportion of party members is presented in Table 7.6.1 below.
Table 7 .6 .1  : Proportion o f CCM M embers in the Sam ple
Category o f Respondents Total Number of 
Respondents
Number o f CCM 
Members (%)
University students 57 21 (36.84% )
University teaching staff 15 3 (20.00% )
Mediapersons 5 2 (40.00% )
Total 77 26 (33.76%)
It must, however, be clarified that this is probably an overestimate of those 
within the sample who believe in the party ideology. Several respondents, especially 
the teaching staff, did not immediately reveal that whether or not they were party 
members, only admitting it under direct questioning or mentioning it inadvertently. 
Many of these respondents also clarified that they were distancing themselves from 
direct association with the party, such as purely party-affiliated organisations and 
further, that they do not wish to renew existing party membership.
The 36 students who stated that they are not CCM members also 
acknowledge that they have been members in the past. The decision not to renew 
their membership is because they no longer wish to be associated with it. In fact, 
they also state that they joined the party not out of a belief in the party organisation 
and ideology but almost as the natural course of events. Of the 21 students who state 
that they are CCM members, nearly 60 percent openly admit that it is more for 
‘pragmatic’ reasons than for any other reason. Interestingly, however, student 
members of CCM are more critical and cynical about the way in which the single 
party operates than non-members and claim that they have ‘seen it from within’.
Thus, contrary to initial expectations, party membership does not appear to 
play a major role in the political opinions voiced by the sample, and no correlation
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is apparent between party membership and support for party policies and actions.
On the question of multiparty politics, more than 85 percent of students 
express a desire for a pluralist set up in preference to the current single-party 
political setup which, they feel, had become increasingly ‘complacent’ over the years 
with little accountability and feel for the important public issues.76 They thus feel 
that a multiparty system would perhaps be more democratic, would lead to a better 
government with better policies and policy implementation because of the political 
pressure that opposition parties would be able to bring to bear on the government. 
They also feel that such a pluralistic political system would provide greater public 
accountability which would help to curb the "lazy, inefficient and corrupt 
leadership". They are however ‘concerned’ about the possibility of regional, ethnic 
and class groupings that could emerge in the form of different political parties.
Although the teaching staff in the University of Dar-es-Salaam are positive 
about multiparty ism in Tanzania, they are wary about the possible political and 
economic effects. They feel that multiparty debates in Tanzania are beginning to 
reveal that most of the people championing them are the urban elite and the business 
classes. The latter, they feel, is more likely to align themselves with the ‘outside 
forces’ in search of what these business classes see as ‘democracy through 
multiparty ism’. Around 70 percent of the teaching staff see the impetus for the 
multiparty system as merely the desire of groups to form parties which can 
ultimately take over the control of government and thus reap the political and 
economic benefits of government rule. Several of the opposition leaders, they feel, 
are merely disgruntled former CCM members who, failing to secure political power 
within the single party, were now trying to gain political power from ‘outside’. They 
also feel that multiparty ism appeared to be a ‘fashion’ being imposed by the West, 
after the changes in Eastern Europe, on other countries without multiparty 
democracy. They thus feel that it is unfortunate that multiparty ism should be taken
76 For instance, in the context o f education, they reported although they were fully aware o f the 
financial constraints operating on the government, the government was not interested in listening to any 
alternative proposals from tire students. Regarding the issue o f cost-sharing - wherein the government was 
reducing student allowances and expecting students to make up the shortfall - they stated that their 
memorandum to President Mwinyi o f an alternative loan-scheme, repayable in instalments by their future 
employers, had no tangible response even several months afterwards.
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as a blueprint for political liberalisation and democratic processes and claim that "it 
would be naive to believe that multipartyism would necessarily result in democracy". 
However, they agree that the present state of affairs is unsatisfactory and change is 
certainly preferable to continuity.
The members of the independent press within the mass media sector are 
unremitting in their criticism of the CCM government and its policies. In the context 
of the general public opinion on multipartyism - including the recently concluded 
nation-wide Nyalali (Presidential) Commission on Multipartyism, they feel "it is a 
myth that the CCM is encouraging the citizens to air their opinions openly on the 
pros and cons of the multiparty system." The second issue of the Family Mirror in 
July 1991, traces the victimisation and ‘transfers’ of Professors Baregu and Kweka 
and Dr. Chachage of the University of Dar-es-Salaam because of their criticism of 
"those in power". The Business Times (12th July 1991) feels that the issues raised 
in the 1990 crisis, debated in public in UDASA’s Workshop on Academic Freedom 
and Social Responsibility, are widespread and the events on the University could be 
seen as a microcosm of activity within the country as a whole (see, in particular, 
section 7.3.3 above). Overall, they feel strongly that political change is not only 
desirable but a viable option as well.
To conclude, it would be fair to say that both positive and negative factors 
are responsible for the widespread support within the sample from the country’s 
intelligentsia for the idea of multiparty politics. Among the positive factors are the 
potential benefits of possibly better government, more people-responsive and people- 
oriented policies with better implementation as well as greater public accountability 
of government officials. These, however, were more ideals they hoped for than 
realistic expectations, although the extent of realism appeared to vary among the 
respondents. Some students and mediapersons believed that the change in political 
system would bring improvements almost automatically while the University teaching 
staff were much more guarded about the prospects. Among the negative factors, 
however, there is closer agreement within the sample with near unanimous 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the current government. But with the 
prospect of multiparty politics growing stronger, there is greater questioning of the
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nature of pluralist politics and its possible dangers. And those who have examined 
these seriously find considerably less to be enthusiastic about.
7.7. Conclusions : The Political Responses of the Intelligentsia
The three sections of the urban intelligentsia considered here, comprising the 
University students and teaching staff and the mediapersons from the government 
and the private mass media sector are quite vocal about their responses to the two 
issues of economic liberalisation and multiparty politics.
On the former issue, the three main features of the responses of the sample 
are: the disapproval of the ideologically-committed, marked differences in the 
reasons for approval and disapproval, and the disapproval of some of the academic 
community for measures that might provide immediate though temporary relief and 
may have adverse consequences for future national and societal welfare.
On the latter issue, there was unanimous dissatisfaction with the policies of 
the single-party state and its methods of operation, including policy implementation 
it undertook and the other issues it failed to act on, but the academic community’s 
support for the alternative multiparty system was qualified. This was largely because 
of factors underlying the emergence of various opposition politicians and their 
support bases as well as the direction of potential policy change. An important and 
clear opinion was that the merits of multipartyism was not so much in terms of the 
obvious ‘democratic’ principles that the West felt were lacking in the present set-up 
but the potential for greater accountability, better policies and better implementation 
that the mere presence of an opposition party might generate. It is in this connection, 
that several members of the academic community expressed reservations given the 
nature of the debate on the multiparty system, the types of political actors it had 
thrown up and the motivations behind such activity. Democracy was necessary, but 
it might not provide all that they wanted. Indeed, it would appear that if they had 
all they wished from the single-party state, support for multiparty politics might be 
substantially weaker.
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The questions that these responses raise of course are the nature of the 
contemporary Tanzanian state, the pressures for reform and change that are being 
shaped by government action and inaction on the economic and political fronts, and 




Political Responses in Perspective : Structural Adjustment, 
Civil Society and State in Contemporary Tanzania
8.1. Introduction
The trends in the political responses of urban Tanzanians discussed in the 
three previous chapters have to be placed not only in conjunction with each other but 
also in the perspective of the larger dynamics of state-civil society relations in 
Tanzania. This chapter attempts to provide this synthesis and also to draw some 
tentative conclusions regarding the implications of these political responses for the 
future implementation of SAP policies and for the nature of the state in the Tanzania 
to come.
The chapter begins (in section 2) with a brief discussion of the major 
characteristics of the post-colonial state in Tanzania before discussing the validity of 
various factors mentioned in the literature as affecting government commitment to 
reform, in the specific context of Tanzania. It also briefly describes the macro- 
economic performance of Tanzania since the IMF-sponsored reform started in 1986.
The third section evaluates the political responses to the two issues of 
economic liberalisation and political pluralism, drawing from the three previous 
chapters, and the latest developments in political pluralism, before going on to state 
the possible political action in response to the reform process in Tanzania.
A final section (section 4) discusses future scenarios for economic and 
political processes of reform in contemporary Tanzania. It suggests that a 
continuation of the processes of ‘disengagement’ from the state and informalisation 
of economic activity could, by withdrawing scarce resources of human capital, 
threaten the economic growth that Structural Adjustment aims to foster within 
Tanzania, almost irrespective of the nature of the political process.
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8.2. The Tanzanian State and its Commitment to Economic Reform
8.2.1. The Post-Colonial Tanzanian State and Structural Adjustment
Three phases of development of the post-colonial Tanzanian state can be 
delineated. In the first phase, till the Arusha Declaration, like most newly- 
independent African governments, Tanzania provided a variety of resources, jobs, 
low or subsidised prices for basic foods and preferential access to government 
projects to favoured constituencies.
But after this first phase, and following the nationalisations of the late 1960s, 
if the ‘overdeveloped’ post-colonial Tanzanian state grew ‘soft’ and progressively 
‘weaker’, it grew more and more authoritarian and coercive as well. The increasing 
control imposed by the one-party state has been termed the ‘statisation’ of the 
economy and of civil society by Kiondo (1992).
The third phase following the onset of the economic crisis of late 1970s 
ushered in a period of withdrawal of the state from its hegemony over economic 
power within the country and the rise of civil society.1 This led, in the early 1990s, 
to the political liberalisation of civil society from state hegemony with the 
establishment of independent civil organisations and multiparty politics in the 
country. But before discussing this development, the role of structural adjustment 
itself on state-civil society relations has to be briefly discussed.
Not surprisingly, the major impacts of SAP on the post-colonial state in 
Tanzania have been to reverse its ‘softness’2 and its ‘overdeveloped’ and ‘statist’ 
nature, by eliminating public subsidies, selling off loss-making parastatals and 
streamlining its bureaucracy. This led naturally to the reduction of state resources 
available to maintain patronage relations between the state and civil society which, 
along with the economic hardship imposed by the ‘austerity’ measures of SAP, could 
directly threaten the political legitimacy of the ruling classes. There has, however,
1 See Chabal (1992) for a discussion o f the pursuit o f economic and political hegemony by the state
and the resistance offered by civil society to this process.
The Tanzanian state was held to be soft in section 3.3.3 in that it carried managerial inefficiency
and chronic loss-making units in its public sector.
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been little evidence of volatile political response from the Tanzanian citizenry in the 
urban areas.3 Although why this has been so is an interesting question in its own 
right, a more relevant question from the present perspective is whether or not this 
state of affairs can be expected to continue. If it does, the impact on civil society of 
the structural adjustment policies that have already been implemented may not 
threaten the implementation of the remaining policies of structural adjustment in the 
future. But if civil society reacts adversely to SAP and its policies, it could threaten 
the future implementation of SAP and the political legitimacy of the current 
leadership.
Since SAPs aim to eliminate or at least to significantly curtail government’s 
ability to offer patronage advantages to their constituencies, from the political 
leaders’ perspective, SAPs with their conditionalities create a volatile political 
climate. With little or no short term benefits, the political leaders who are significant 
now would be among the last beneficiaries of the programme.4
Although, initially the World Bank approach was to financially support 
authoritarian reform-oriented governments to enable them to overcome the short­
term domestic pressures expected from the aggrieved urban coalitions (Toye, 1992; 
and Beckman, 1992), with the rise in political resistance, a plethora of food riots and 
such public protests, the efficacy of (even) authoritarian regimes in implementing 
SAPs is being questioned (Haggard and Kaufman, 1989).5 But before discussing the 
potential for political response to structural adjustment from urban Tanzania, it is 
interesting to look at two issues that have been actively discussed in the recent years: 
firstly, why governments with much to lose by way of patronage power opted for 
structural adjustment in the first place; and secondly, why some reform programmes
3 See chapter 4 for a discussion o f the urban bias in the formulation o f SAP. Bratton and van de 
Walle (1992) find that Tanzania is one among seven countries (along with Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Madagascar, Cape Verde, Somalia and Sao Tome and Princepe) in which political elites dispensed 
economic reform in die absence o f significant domestic protest.
4 Although there are certainly those who gain from SAP in addition to those who lose, Herbst 
(1990) rejects the possibility o f gainers acting to protect their interests against the state and its traditional 
allies, and feels instead that leaders will have to repress former clients in order to implement adjustment 
programmes.
5 For a contrary view, see Jeffries (1993).
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grind to a halt while others are sustained. Although it is the second question that is 
of more current relevance, the first is, as discussed below, organically connected to 
the second.
The Motivations for Reform and its Sustainability
Perhaps the most thorough and comprehensive analysis of the first question 
has been the collaborative research effort of Nelson (1989), Nelson (1990) and 
Haggard and Kaufman (1992). They advance three possible sources of the motivation 
for governments to reform. First is a ‘general interest in system maintenance’ 
especially in the face of economic crisis - which threatens the ability of elites to 
extract revenue, to acquire foreign exchange and to spend in pursuit of economic and 
political goals. However, this is rejected because empirical evidence shows that the 
mere onset of crisis cannot reliably predict the actions of governments, with crises 
varying in terms of intensity, timing and character and government responses 
varying accordingly.
The second factor they consider is ‘compatibility with the country’s 
organisational capacity’, i.e., governments adopt SAP because they are able to 
implement it. However, they consider this also unsatisfactory since data shows that 
even governments with a low level of bureaucratic competence have opted for 
reform.
The third explanatory factor is the acceptance of the logic and philosophy of 
structural adjustment by the ruling elites. Although Haggard and Kaufman 
acknowledge that it is difficult to pinpoint this process precisely, they conclude that 
the growing perception of the limits of state intervention has been a major factor in 
the adoption of reforms by the ruling elites in many developing countries.
However, Jenkins (1995) disagrees with both the ‘economistic’ tone of their 
analysis and the ‘narrow view of politics’ that it entails, suggesting that the effect 
of social changes on political action is an important player in this process and one 
that the analytical framework advanced by the authors above do not even consider. 
Jenkins argues, using the case study of Indian liberalisation, that a distinct and 
plausible argument could be made that economic reform has been adopted by
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governing elites as one part of a political strategy to win back political support. 
Stating that the economic crisis may be a ‘limited’ basis for initiating reform, he 
asks whether the crisis may not have been "the result of a mounting disjuncture 
within the political system that was not simply a reflection of poor economic 
performance". And further, whether or not "relatively autonomous executive elites 
might consider economic adjustment an instrument with which to confront political 
problems of more than a short-term nature?" (ibid, p. 10).
In support of his hypothesis, Jenkins (1995) argues that there may have been 
a stage, pre-reform, when the ruling elites felt that the ability of the government to 
win elections was declining despite ever-increasing patronage expenditure. Given 
this, a potential motivation for reform might be the desire to "[re-engineer] the 
[political] system for stability and flexibility" (ibid, p. 12) through the concrete 
benefits that such reform might bring - and inspite of the loss of "several prominent 
tools of building a political base" (ibid, p. 13).
This perspective informs the second question, that of the sustainability of 
reform. Nelson, Kaufman and Haggard define ‘successful’ implementation of reform 
as the continuation and consolidation of the various policies of structural adjustment. 
To Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1992) (see Chapter 2), neither the intensity of prior 
crisis nor the degree of authoritarianism of the implementing government are 
significant factors in the implementation of reform but the newness of the 
government, the political dominance of pro-reform groups in the government and the 
quality of the administrative bureaucracy are significant factors. Jeffries (1993) 
argues that successful implementation requires reform of existing political institutions 
in African governments to create a "relatively autonomous, coherent, capable, 
technocratic and developmentally committed state bureaucracy" (ibid, p. 25).
Jenkins (1995) however argues that the actual implementation of reform 
depends more crucially on the relationship between political action by the 
government and the social changes that it engenders. Pursuing his argument in 
answer to the first question and argues that if political goals are the ultimate 
objectives of the ruling elites for going in for reform, then, "they are likely to have 
their own ways of deciding when these objectives have been met" (ibid, p. 19) - 
irrespective of the economic goals of the structural adjustment programmes.
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Before going on to discuss whether or not these hypotheses hold in the 
Tanzanian context, it is useful to briefly review the actual macro-economic 
performance of the Tanzanian economy after the onset of economic reform.
The Fruits o f Economic Reform
There have been two evaluations of structural adjustment in sub-Saharan 
Africa by the World Bank, one in 1990 and the other in 1994.
The Report of 1990 (World Bank 1990) mentions that industrial capacity 
utilisation has increased from around 25 percent to 38 percent between 1987 and 
1989, while there have been substantial increases in official purchases of the main 
food crops (quoted in Gibbon, 1992, p. 148). However, there are offsetting negative 
results, including a fall in recorded production of all major manufactured 
commodities (except cement and soap), a stagnation or fall in the production of 
crops other than cotton, imports rising faster than exports resulting in an increase 
in the current account deficit from US $ 397 million in 1986 to US $ 841 in 1989 
and an increase in domestic inflation at an annual rate of about 30 percent during the 
programme period (id.).
According to the 1994 World Bank Report (World Bank, 1994), six countries 
- Ghana, Tanzania, Gambia, Burkino Faso, Nigeria and Zimbabwe - have made 
‘large improvements’ in the period following Structural Adjustment (i.e., 1986-1991) 
as compared to the preceding period (1981-1986). The criteria used to judge their 
economic performance are "reductions in the fiscal deficit, money supply, inflation 
rate, real effective exchange rate and parallel market premium on foreign exchange, 
and increases in public revenue" (Rimmer, 1995, p. 109). Average per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for these six countries increased at an average rate of 1.8 
percent (although Burkino Faso and Gambia showed decreases in the annual rate of 
growth) while that of Tanzania alone grew at 2.7 percent.
But despite this performance the 1994 Report still classifies Tanzania as 
‘poor’ at the end of 1991. The positive growth rate till then also conceals adverse 
performances on other fronts: of these countries, Tanzania had the sharpest fall in 
savings between these periods. Also, despite ‘resolute action’ in implementing
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reforms since 1986, Tanzania is acknowledged to have "retained even more loss- 
making parastatals, depended heavily on foreign aid for its budgetary expenditure, 
still had an overvalued official exchange rate, had failed to liberalize trade in its 
traditional exports, and experienced little return on investment" (Rimmer, 1995, pp. 
11- 12).
The 1994 Report stresses two propositions: first that adjustment in Africa is 
still not robust - "while macro and trade policies have improved, little progress has 
been made in privatising state enterprises, reforming the financial system and 
improving management of the public sector" (Rimmer, 1995, p. 13); and second that 
adjustment alone cannot provide sustained economic growth.
The two main reasons for this performance according to this latest Report are 
politics - resistance of vested interests, administrative decay, pervasive clientele 
politics, and the parastatals - and the poor design of the adjustment programmes, 
particularly the sequence of the policies implemented. Further, external aid has had 
negative side-effects, serving to cushion implementing governments from the hard 
decisions that liberalisation inevitably entail. But the overall conclusion reached by 
Husain and Faruqee (1994) of the World Bank is that there has not yet been the 
global winds of change that were predicted to sweep over the reforming countries.
The perception of the socio-economic and political impact of SAP on the life 
of the people it is aimed at is crucial to the question of whether or not the 
implementation of reform will continue into the future - and thus whether or not the 
hypotheses regarding the sustainability of SAP hold. In the case of Tanzania, as in 
other countries, this is a question that requires the examination of both continuing 
government commitment to the economic goals of SAP and the political responses 
that the implementation of SAP will engender. The questions of government 
commitment and political responses are discussed separately in greater detail below.
8.2.2. Government Commitment to SAP in Tanzania
Given the detailed description of the events leading up to the formal adoption 
of the IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme in Tanzania in 1986, it is 
clear that there were no larger political machinations behind the move for economic
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reform and that it was basically the intensity of the preceding economic crisis that 
drove the Tanzanian government to the negotiating table. Nevertheless, it is also 
apparent that the vacillation on the part of the government was not really on account 
of an inherent disinclination for market-oriented economic activity but merely on 
account of the pace of such reform and the nature of the conditions attached to the 
IFI aid package.
It is also clear that there was mounting support for reform from within the 
administrative bureaucracy despite the public scepticism of the political leadership. 
Whether or not this support can be called a pro-reform group is however moot. 
Overall it would seem that the motivations behind the adoption of reform in the 
Tanzanian case are better described by the analytical framework of Nelson (1988, 
1989, 1990) and Haggard and Kaufman (1992) than by the alternative suggested by 
Jenkins (1995).
The sources of the Tanzanian government's commitment to reform, 
accordingly, are not located in larger political calculations of the sort analysed by 
Jenkins (1995) in the Indian context, but in the deepening economic crisis that had 
prompted the move towards reform in the first place.
While authoritarianism is not quite descriptive of the single-party political 
system in Tanzania, it is true that at the time of the adoption of SAP in 1986, there 
was no democracy, as is conventionally defined, in the Tanzanian state. It is also 
true that the regime entrusted with implementing reform was new in the sense that 
it was no longer the CCM government headed by Nyerere - a trenchant critic of the 
IMF-sponsored SAP in Tanzania - but the newly-elected government of Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi. From the various newspaper articles and public responses surveyed it is 
also apparent that this new regime had been entmsted with a ‘new iron broom’ (as 
mentioned in Chapters 4 and 6), with which not only to sweep away the corruption 
and inefficiency of the old order but also to take away the economic hardship that 
had oppressed the country since the late 1970s.
The important question of course is the capability or quality of the 
bureaucracy entrusted with administering the reform measures. In contrast to the 
party bureaucracy, the administrative bureaucracy clearly supported the moves for 
structural adjustment and also displayed a better understanding of the logic and
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philosophy of reform, although the economic crisis continued to adversely affect the 
personal economic situation of most civil servants. There was also a feeling of 
greater freedom from the diktats of party bureaucrats in the government though it 
was balanced by the antipathy towards the ‘re-colonisation’ of the technostructure 
of the government by foreign experts, who had little feel for the nuances of the local 
socio-economic situation and administrative capability. Basically, however, it is the 
extensive secondary jobbing in the informal sector that appeared to be affecting the 
administrative capacity of the bureaucracy rather than any threat of the ‘disengaging’ 
state on their future job security.
By the World Bank’s own assessment, the years since 1986 have seen 
‘resolute action’ by the Tanzanian government in the implementation of SAP (World 
Bank, 1994). But in the absence of any evaluation of the extent of ‘leakages’ from 
the system or of improving efficiency, it is not quite clear whether or not the 
bureaucracy has proved adequate at tackling the tasks given to it. Yet it is by no 
means the case that the civil servants in Tanzania have become the ‘relatively 
autonomous, coherent, capable, technocratic and developmentally committed state 
bureaucracy’ that Jeffries (1993) feels any bureaucracy ought to be in order to 
successfully implement growth-enhancing structural adjustment programmes.
A significant factor in Tanzania that might be mentioned here is the 
phenomenon that Toye (1992) refers to as ‘countervailing action’ by the government, 
whereby the government, although officially complying with SAP conditionalities, 
takes other actions which effectively neutralise the effects of SAP policies.
Nevertheless it may well be, as the World Bank Report points out, that the 
reforms themselves have not been properly sequenced and it may be this poor 
planning of the liberalisation process that has led to Tanzania remaining poor at the 
end of nearly nine years of Structural Adjustment.
While the question of whether or not the reforms are properly planned and 
financed is another issue entirely, the concern here is whether or not the economic 
reforms continue to be implemented. Or, more specifically, whether or not the 
consequent political responses from the citizens are adverse enough to threaten the 
commitment of the government to continue to reform the economy. And this is an 
issue taken up in the next section.
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8.3. A Perspective on Political Responses to SAP
This section is divided into four sub-sections. While the first two synthesise 
the public responses to the two issues of economic liberalisation and political 
pluralism respectively, the third details recent developments towards multiparty 
politics in Tanzania. The last section draws these observations together and discusses 
potential political responses to SAP.
8.3.1. Reactions to Economic Liberalisation
The political responses evaluated in the previous three chapters indicate that 
there are basically four interacting factors determining the perception of the effects 
of SAP policies: the impact on personal economic situations; the impact on other 
groups within the economy; the impact on the sovereignty and integrity of the 
country as a whole; and the impact on the ideological foundations of ujamaa 
socialism that the single-party continues to endorse officially.
A general feeling, however, is that SAP has been against the interests of the 
poorer sections of (urban) Tanzanian society in that it has led to the withdrawal of 
adequate access to health facilities and other social services. Price decontrol has 
come under wide-spread attack although there were those in the administrative 
bureaucracy who approved and those among the University staff who were prepared 
to tolerate it for the sake of future benefits for the country as a whole. Students, 
however, were vehemently opposed to the measure.
There was, nevertheless, a curious reflection on the impact of user fees for 
education. While University students were passionately opposed to it, and the 
University staff and the media were against the measure, the administrative 
bureaucracy was in support of the measure. The reasoning was the general trend of 
economic rationalisation that they felt was essential for the future growth of the 
country. Curiously, there was support for the measure from the formal lower 
classes, who felt that education being the only way up in the socio-economic ladder, 
it was worth almost any current cost. But a pertinent objection of the University staff 
was that these fees were not being channelled back into education.
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There was broad approval for the increased availability of second-hand 
clothes and for imported essentials - largely because of the implications for their 
personal economic situation, but there were some reservations regarding the 
measure. The reservations were basically on account of three reasons: ideological 
disapproval for the sacrifice of self-reliance objectives and for the encouragement 
of informal sector (smuggling) activity; and objections from the University staff for 
the disincentive this poses for indigenous entrepreneurship.
Private property rights and the formation of cooperative societies split the 
respondents into two along lines determined by ideological commitment, past 
experience and potential profit. While the re-establishment of private property rights 
was supported by those who saw opportunities for potential profit, the move to form 
cooperative societies found favour with not just those who saw potential for private 
profit but also with those who had experienced the inefficiency and inadequacy of 
the previous attempts at cooperative society formation.
The overall feeling, especially among the informal classes, was that the 
economic structuring had brought the opportunities for future economic prosperity 
based on own-effort and hard work. The widening inequality was only rued by the 
ideologically-committed and the University staff, the others maintaining that since 
it was the outcome of merit and enterprise.
Also, there seemed to be an acknowledgment that the government was faced 
with little option but to impose economic hardship through the austerity measures 
of the SAP. There was hence a willingness to give the government some more time 
to get SAP working. The reasoning was that the current situation at least had the 
hope of future gain while the pre-SAP economic crisis period did not. The only 
signs of active discontent appeared to be within the University student community, 
but it is, as it has been in Tanzania, fragmented, contextual and without ‘spread 
effects’ among other groups within civil society.
A large part of the willingness to ‘suffer manage’ (Chazan, 1982), however, 
is probably because the ‘suffering’ is mitigated by supplementary income from 
informal sector activity - legal or illegal.
It is this process of ‘informalisation’ that makes it extremely difficult to 
generalise about groups of ‘losers’ from SAP and extrapolating possible political
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responses from them.6 But it is still undoubtedly true that the withdrawal of health 
facilities and other social services have hit certain vulnerable groups hard. The 
UNICEF has documented such effects on two groups, women and children, 
appealing for special consideration in their case. This has also led other writers to 
focus on compensatory mechanisms and state-support for groups disadvantaged by 
SAP (e.g. Callaghy, 1989; Nelson, 1989).
‘Informalisation’, however, is now actively encouraged by the state (after 
being outlawed in the early 1980s) with several incentives for such entrepreneurial 
activity.7 But while it is not clear whether the government requires the units to then 
be registered and pay taxes, it is clear that the proportion of undeclared informal 
sector activity is a much larger proportion of total informal sector activity.8
An interesting facet of this phenomenon is the link with the formal sector. 
Informalisation involves spreading risks and balancing alternative sources of income 
and resources in an integrated structure (Roitman, 1990). Other studies show that 
although public servants are involved in side-line activities in the informal sector, 
they perceive government employment as secure and expect salaries to rise in the 
future. Government pay is seen as an assured minimum and the ability to operate 
effectively in the informal sector may also depend on the influence, authority and 
connections derived from formal jobs. Thus the livelihood of informal sector groups 
is inextricably linked with the activity of formal enterprises (Ng’ethe, 1989 and 
Chew, 1990).
Although the benefits of SAP may take a while to become apparent and 
tangible, reforms will become more palatable as the economic benefits begin
6 Most writers link specific groups as gainers so as to prove that adjustment programmes actually 
benefit the majority o f the population and that the gains are derived from productive activities that add 
real value to the national product.
7 The support is clearly to legal informal sector activity, and not to the other activities that also 
characterise the Second Economy.
Q
There have been extensive processes of economic informalisation in sub-Saharan Africa. The ILO 
(1988) estimates that between 1980 and 1985, employment in the informal sector increased at an annual 
rate o f 6 .7  percent. The formal enterprise only absorbed 6 percent o f the new additions to the labour force 
in this period, whereas the informal sector absorbed 75 percent. In 1991, the ILO estimated about 60 
percent o f the African labour force was engaged in the informal sector. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 
estimate the size o f the Second Economy in Tanzania in the late 1980s to be up to one third of the GNP.
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accruing to individuals in civil society. But these can only be additional to the 
benefits accruing as a result of the current ‘state-sponsored disengagement’ (Bratton, 
1989).9
8.3.2. Responses to Multipartyism
At the outset it must be mentioned that the focus on the issue of 
multipartyism is limited in the sense that moves away from the denial by the state 
of alternative organisation space for civil society include the formation of civil 
associations. Political pluralism might be a better conceptual focus and more on this 
set of nascent developments in Tanzanian civil society is outlined in the next sub­
section.
The political responses of urban Tanzanians to the question of political 
liberalisation of this sort is closely tied up with their responses to the performance 
of the one-party state. In this context, there were two clear responses: almost
unanimous criticism of the corruption and inefficiency of the CCM government, and 
widespread approval for the moves to encourage private enterprise. Disapproval 
came from party ideologues but there was support for SAP since it was now official 
party policy. There was also some confusion regarding whether SAP was the path
9 Further, in the context o f African economies, in general, there are a lot o f  grey areas in which 
rigid distinctions between state and non-state do not exist: here, the public and the private are sometimes 
not even separate. It is in this context that the general competition between various groups to maximise 
the returns expected from these changes in the economic policy that the discredited privileged groups often 
turn out to be winners. Mamdani’s (1976) work on Uganda studies the "state-created and state-protected 
stratum o f big proprietors", popularly known as mafuta mingi (who came into existence with the Asian 
communities’ expulsion in 1972 and assumed prominence in Obote’s government), have been the main 
beneficiaries, according to Mamdani, o f  the liberalisation policies (the open general import licence 
schemes in trade and the shifts in the bank lending policies). Mamdani’s conclusion is that this has led to 
investment in the commercial and the speculative areas rather than the productive ones. Rosemary Galli 
(1990), in a study o f rent-seeking groups benefiting from these shifts in policy in Guinea-Bissau, feels that 
the liberalisation programme o f 1987 has simply shifted the economic power block from an exclusive 
‘state-class’ to one which now includes merchants and concessionaires but with direct links with the ‘state 
class’. Williams (1990), in a study o f Sierra Leonne, traces the rise o f  ekutay (an ethnically- based 
political pressure group) overseeing significant government decisions and key individuals within ekutay 
having flourishing businesses which are basically sustained because o f their links with the state. The study 
o f Kenya and Malawi (M osely, Harrigan and Toye, 1991) traces agricultural interests of the local ruling 
class being threatened by the decision to dismantle marketing boards, from which rents and taxes were 
derived. But a more general occurrence is that the repression o f the ‘rent-seekers’ becomes directed 
against groups which have hardly any representation in the power structure, i .e ., the workers, the 
increasingly-marginalised middle classes and the urban poor.
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to maendeleo that was promised to the followers of ujamaa.
Concerning multiparty politics, there was clear support for such a system, but 
it was equally clear that this was a negative preference. As Bratton and van de Walle 
(1992) note, the notion of political pluralism has sparked popular support only in so 
far as it is the antithesis of the discredited system that has led to the present mess.10 
The call for multiparty democracy seems to signal little more than a general 
discontent with the political status quo and an urge to try something - anything 
different.
It is in the ideological and programmatic vacuum that followed from the 
ethical duality that characterised the moves to economic liberalisation, that 
opposition leaders raised multiparty democracy as a convenient banner under which 
to gather inchoate demands for political change.
This last factor has been responsible for a certain amount of wariness 
expressed especially by the University staff and the party bureaucracy. While there 
is near unanimous acknowledgment of the unifying role of the CCM, the potential 
for national disunity that multiparty politics has is currently only a concern for the 
cautious. However, there is acknowledgment that it is power-hungry political 
opportunists and disgruntled former CCM members who spearhead the movement 
for full-blown multiparty politics.
The question really is whether the CCM is able to make the transition from 
single-party to majority-party smoothly. And the recent developments in Tanzanian 
political structuring provide some indications in this direction.
10 They quote a news analyst in Africa Confidential (July 27, 1990) : "Many Africans are now so 
poor that they are prepared to back virtually any demand as long as it implies change. More political 
parties? Fine, as long as something changes. This may not be sophisticated, but it is natural that the poor 
should reason thus and that opposition politicians hungry for poor should exploit it". It is in this context 
that Bratton and van de Walle (1992) among others note that events outside sub-Saharan Africa aided in 
releasing "this pressure during 1990 ... While external events were not the main factor, they did shape 
the politicisation and timing o f protests in sub-Saharan Africa" (p. 42). They follow this up by saying that 
Nyerere’s speech to the South-South Seminar in Arusha (February, 1990) declaring that "the single-party 
state was no longer sacrosanct", a perspective obviously influenced by the fail o f the East European bloc 
(and hence communism in Europe) - and the breaking o f relations between CCM and the Communist 
Party o f East Germany.
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8.3,3. Political Pluralism : Structural Adjustment of Politics?
The Presidential Commission in Tanzania (headed by Chief Justice Nyalali) 
set up by President Mwinyi in February 1991, submitted its Report on vyama vya 
siasa (political parties) and vyama vya wananche (people’s organisations), to the 
President of the Union Republic of Tanzania, after collecting people’s views on the 
political system: whether to remain one-party or go multiparty. After interviewing 
36,000 people 80 percent of who preferred a continuation of the one party system, 
the Commission recommended a move to a multiparty system, stating that it was not 
conducting a referendum and hence even if on the part of a minority, the demand 
for multiparty politics was a legitimate demand from within society - which might 
brew into a ferment that the state might one day have to use force to quell. The 
party and the government accepted this recommendation.
The Registration of Political Parties Act, enacted in April 1992 and which 
came into effect in July 1992, laid down special criteria for registration as being 
national in scope, not to be ethnically, tribally, regionally or religiously based (i.e., 
they should have at least 200 members from each of the 10 regions, i.e., from the 
8 mainland regions and the (island) regions of Pemba and Zanzibar). It alongside 
provided for an amendment of the Electoral Act and hence a new electoral 
commission. Though CCM is to remain until the next general election (1995), the 
Act tries to prevent parties from falling into ethnic, religious or tribal orientations 
in practice, even if in theory they appear national. Of the new parties registered, 
none is more left of centre than the CCM - according to the Tanzanian High 
Commissioner in London.11
The Nyalali Commission identifies 4 facets of a true democracy as: (1) an 
environment of respect for the rule of law; (2) an environment of respect for human 
rights; (3) a leadership periodically elected in free and fair elections; and (4) a free 
flow of information. But the Nyalali Report further notes that although "it is clear 
that political competition consequent upon permitting multiparties will enhance 
democracy and accountability of government and elected leaders in the country",
11 Speech by Ali Mchumo, October 15, 1992, quoted in the Bulletin o f  Tanzanian Affairs, 44, 
January 1993, p. 5, at a general meeting o f the Britain-Tanzania Society.
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"it is important to realise that having multiparties is not sufficient safeguard against 
the culture of authoritarianism, irresponsibility and malfeasance which have thrived 
over many years of monopoly of politics under the one-party rule" (volume I, p. 51, 
para 182, cited in Shivji, 1992). It also goes on to state: "[hjistory has shown that 
a country can have many parties and still be authoritarian! The question of 
democracy is really how the people are participating in the running of the country" 
(p, 104, para 147; ibid).
Shivji (1992) interprets these two as arguing firstly that "multipartism is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy", and secondly, that 
"democracy goes beyond organisations and political power to the very question of 
people’s capacity to decide upon and determine their own destinies". But Shivji also 
feels that the Government Bill on Political Parties took the Nyalali recommendation 
to its "logical though politically unwise conclusion", by instituting controls which 
curtail the scope of the freedom of associations. In particular, the Registrar of 
Political Parties, the official in charge of registration and deregistration of political 
parties not only has considerable power but is also an appointee of the President and 
carries out his duties in consultation with the Cabinet.
This institutional feature coupled with the Opposition’s lack of cohesion 
suggests that the overwhelming victory of the CCM in the local elections in 1994 
might well be repeated in the Parliamentary and Presidential elections of October 
1995.12 But in addition, there may be some indication that the CCM government 
has unfair advantage over the fledgling political parties. In the recent election, it is 
arguable that victory can perhaps be attributed to "a lack of information in remote 
areas about the essence of multiparty politics and the opposition’s lack of funds ... 
Radio Tanzania, the main source of news, has done little to let people know about 
opposition activities" (Shivji, 1994b, p. 10). Besides this, the disunity amongst and 
between the leaders of opposition parties and within the party itself has not
12 "Of the 2418 council wards, the CCM took 1191 unopposed and more than 80 percent of the 
others where Opposition candidates stood ... However, the Election Commissioner had had serious 
difficulties in registering electors and only about 10 percent o f eligible voters were eventually registered 
to vote" (cited from D aily News in Tanzanian Affairs, p. 9, January 1995. This manifests, according to 
the article, "widespread apathy among voters, specially in the cities" (id.).
296
helped.13
According to Gibbon (1992), there are three new trends in ‘political 
liberalisation’ in Tanzania since the beginning of 1991: (i) "successful effort of some 
pro-multiparty forces to establish platforms for discussion outside of official 
channels"; (ii) presidential and other official committees to make recommendations 
on the future of Tanzania’s political system (having collected public responses 
between April 1991 and 1992); and (3) ‘some broader political "adjustments", 
including "dropping important parts of the leadership code, creating conditions for 
the partial separation of party from other mass organisations and stimulation of an 
official "anti-corruption" crusade led by the Minister of Home Affairs, Augustine 
Mrema" (pp. 150-1).
8.3.4. Political Responses to SAP : The Impact on Government Commitment
The potential for political action in response to the policies of Structural 
Adjustment implemented by the government of Tanzania till August 1991 (when the 
fieldwork was concluded) is summarised below for each of the three categories of 
respondents surveyed: the urban lower classes, the bureaucracy and the 
intelligentsia.
The Urban Lower Classes
As Chapter 5 noted, the urban lower classes have borne the brunt of the 
hardship of the Tanzanian economic crisis and the subsequent attempts at policy 
reform. Burgeoning prices, falling real incomes and the diminished access to health 
care and education are the primary problems that have driven these classes to the 
informal sector to supplement their incomes. While the government initially
13 The most powerful political party in Zanzibar, the CUF, has a major leadership problem with 
the mainland chairman estranged from the isle’s vice-chairman, with the latter Seif Shariff Hamed acting 
over as the acting Chairman of tire party. The UMD of Chief Fundikira and Christopher Kassanga Tumbo 
is also rife with infighting. Indeed "so confident is CCM of winning next year’s elections that President 
Mwinyi has announced that the next CCM government will give Opposition parties able to garner at least 
5 percent o f tire votes, 20 percent o f the seats in Parliament" {Daily News in Tanzanian Affairs, p. 9, 
January 1995, p. 11).
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disapproved of these sideline economic activities - which it rightly perceived as 
draining national resources away from the official economy - the turnaround in 
policy following the budget of 1984 (and the realisation that the informal sector 
might constitute a potential asset to national development) has substantially 
encouraged the proliferation of entrepreneurial activity in the informal sector.
The response to SAP, thus, is conditioned by the potential for self- 
improvement afforded by the encouragement of secondary economic activity. The 
majority of respondents surveyed were resorting to legal informal sector activity 
although the matapeli (or illegal informal activity) is also reportedly flourishing.
The attitude towards the government is divided between approval for the 
economic and administrative re-structuring initiated in the 1980s and confusion 
regarding the ethical duality implicit in the government’s market-oriented capitalist 
legislation on the one hand and the continued defence of socialism in public by 
political leaders. At least to some, the development promised in ujamaa socialism 
appears to be manifest in the prosperity that the entrepreneurial activity of the 
informal sector affords.
Political support for the continuation of the single-party political system 
however appears to be less than that for a multiparty system - although support in 
each instance appears to be on account of a ‘negative’ rather than ‘positive’ 
preference. The threat of disunity accounts for the support for the status quo while 
the promise of a better government is the major factor behind the support for a 
change. Nevertheless, there is little belief that more parties mean more democracy. 
Indeed a ‘cleaner’ and more effective government appears to be the preferred option, 
not necessarily a government elected through a multiparty political system.
But it is by no means clear that the continuing hardship despite the onset of 
reform will result in mass protest and riots as have happened elsewhere in Africa. 
This is however not only on account of the monopoly that the single-party state has 
over organisational space, nor on account of a lack of precedent. A more probable 
reason is that a non-confrontationist stance allows greater effort to be concentrated 
on self-improvement through informal sector activity.
The dominant response from the urban lower classes, thus, is not a move 
towards political mobilisation for protest but towards steady ‘disengagement’ from
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the state and the greater informalisation of the economy.
The Bureaucracy
The party and administrative bureaucracy in Tanzania, as seen in Chapter 6, 
is the backbone of the single-party state, being almost indistinguishably inter-meshed 
and quite tightly-knit. The electoral regime affords a little flexibility within the 
system with electoral voices being effective in changing even long-serving 
incumbents of public office. Patronage and corruption, however, are strong 
characteristics of the bureaucracy although its levels may be lower than those found 
in neighbouring countries like Kenya. A major change in the relationship between 
the administrative bureaucrats - the civil servants - and the party bureaucrats has 
been the relative freedom currently enjoyed by the former from the long period of 
subordination to the party bureaucrats. While one legacy of this curtailment is the 
accumulated ability of civil servants to stall, circumvent, subvert and emasculate 
party directives to suit their own interests, another is the patronage networks built 
up over the years to further the economic and political interests.
The re-instatement of civil servants to their policy formulation and 
implementation role, without much interference from the party bureaucracy, 
however, does not appear to be complete since there is now a new factor to reckon 
with, the expatriate experts, who civil servants feel represent a new impediment to 
the speedy and effective implementation of reform measures.
The economic hardship and the frustrating work atmosphere has led several 
bureaucrats (nearly all those sampled) to secondary jobs in the infoimal sector. Yet, 
there is greater awareness among civil servants of the national interest and the logic 
and role of reforms in the future economic progress of the country as a whole than 
among the party bureaucracy.
The potential political response from the civil servants thus may not, once 
again, be towards public protests at the hardship of their own personal economic 
situation but rather towards a gradual slowdown of input into the reform process 
itself and a greater concentration on the prospects afforded by informal sector 
activity. Like the informal classes, then, the civil servants may opt for a non-
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confrontationist ‘disengagement’ and instead, for a greater degree of informal sector 
activity. Such a tendency, however, may be tempered by the long-term perspective 
that many bureaucrats expressed, the realisation that government was moving in the 
only direction possible under the circumstances. This is perhaps the single most 
important factor to offset the growing disengagement and informalisation.
The potential political response from the party bureaucrats, given the 
confusion created by the ethical duality of the government’s actions and the onset of 
multiparty politics, is rather more complicated. On the one hand, there is likely to 
be some move towards multiparty politics and a consequent escape from the 
governing dictates of party doctrine. This may well lead to greater economic and 
political activity with the express puipose of personal enhancement. The support to 
structural adjustment may then depend very much on the possible consequences of 
SAP policies on their personal economic and political situations alone. Thus while 
a general feeling of nationalism is a feature of the response of party bureaucrats, 
there is also support for those measures of SAP that improve personal well-being 
and disapproval for those that do not.
On the other hand, given that party policies are now openly in support of 
both economic liberalisation and multiparty politics, resolute adherence to party 
doctrine would imply staunch support for reform, almost irrespective of the 
consequences for their personal economic situations. Protest may instead be directed 
against specific members within the party seen to be stalling or diverting party 
resources away from stated party objectives. Such protest however would be directed 
within the party and through the party apparatus for political accountability. Clearly, 
however, overt protest against SAP policies, in the case of the party bureaucrats, is 
more likely in the case of those members who choose to leave the party.
The Intelligentsia
The responses of University students and staff and the mediapersons surveyed 
in Chapter 7 point towards possible sources of organised protest against SAP policies 
that adversely affect the economic well-being of not only these groups but also that 
of less-privileged groups in society.
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While students proved the more vocal and militant of the three groups, their 
failure to form a political cohesive and coherent interest group capable of sustained 
and strategic protest against government measures has proved their undoing in the 
past. There is no indication yet that this situation has changed. Thus although public 
protest may well be forthcoming from University student groups who feel that they 
have been unfairly targeted by reform (through the imposition of fees and the 
removal of subsidies and allowances), the effectiveness of their protest is 
questionable.
University staff members, on the other hand, are more ‘troublesome’ from 
the point of view of the government in the sense that not only are some of them 
international figures in their own disciplines but their protests are likely to be more 
reasoned, lasting and far-reaching. And the nascent press freedom with the attendant 
mushrooming of private newspapers and magazines as also the arrival of television 
in Tanzania are likely to increase the avenues of communication with the general 
public available to these literate and potentially persuasive group. Nevertheless, there 
are signs that this freedom of expression may not be fully granted for some time to 
come (see Shivji, 1994a, 1994b and 1994c).
In the past, however, the government has chosen (in the absence of a free 
press) to either publicly denounce protesting University staff members or to transfer 
them to less sensitive and visible appointments. The government has also taken the 
extreme step of closing the University to ensure that the protest movements did not 
have the environment to develop further into more threatening social formations.
Thus, while the staff are clearly unhappy about the impact of SAP measures 
on their personal economic situations, on those of the less-privileged groups in 
society and on the education sector of the economy, the government are clearly 
prepared to act quickly, decisively and ruthlessly to stop protests from reaching 
unmanageable proportions. The political response of this group hence is likely to be 
tempered by governmental action although some amount of caution may now have 
to be exercised with the coming of multiparty politics and alternative sources of 
political support.
The media is yet another group that is capable of public persuasion and 
expanding its sphere of influence under its newfound freedom from party control.
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From their responses, however, it would appear that the motivations of 
mediapersons are governed more by a concern for personal well-being than by issues 
of purely national interest. Against the option of trying to balance precariously 
between a concern for truth and public interest on the one hand and government 
censure on the other, there is always the other more comfortable option of going 
abroad to work.
The potential for political action from this group, while considerable 
superficially at least, is thus likely to be moderated by the apparent desire for better 
professional and personal prospects abroad.
In terms of the potential impact on government commitment to the 
implementation of reform policies, thus, it would appear that there are two broad 
responses: firstly, direct political action by groups such as University students, staff 
members and the media to impede the implementation of government policies by 
raising public consciousness of the ongoing economic hardship, and indirect political 
action - especially by those leaving the party organisation - to try and further 
personal economic and political prospects; and secondly, and perhaps more 
significantly, a disengagement from state activity to channel greater efforts into 
infoimal sector activity.
The consequences for the future implementation of SAP in Tanzania, 
however, is likely to be a complex interplay between these political responses, the 
outcome of the multiparty political process (the first multiparty elections are due in 
late 1995), the degree of commitment of the government and especially the 
bureaucracy to reform and their capability to implement the policies of the Structural 
Adjustment Process.
If, as recent poll results indicate, the COM returns to political power in the 
coming elections, the prospects for reform at least as far as government commitment 
is concerned may be intact. But the commitment and capability of the bureaucrats 
to implement these reforms may be less effective the longer the economic hardship 
continues and the greater the efforts they have to put into supplementary income- 
generating activity. Although a growth in such activity by all groups concerned may 
decrease the potential for effective political protest it may also decrease the quality 
and quantity of human resources channelled into the implementation process.
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8.4. Conclusions : Structural Adjustment, Civil Society and State in
Contemporary Tanzania
The post-colonial state in Tanzania, with all its attendant characteristics, and 
in the context of economic crisis, has had to implement the tough policies of 
structural adjustment at the behest of the IMF and the World Bank. Without such 
external financial assistance, the state would lose its social base and hence political 
legitimacy because the impoverishment of the state coffers, due to the economic 
crisis, sharply reduces the ability of the state to service the patron-client networks 
on which it depends for its survival. Alongside, given that the policies of SAP are 
focusing on a group of gainers, it simultaneously creates groups of ‘losers’ within 
society, which also affects the social base of the state and hence its survival. The 
state, thus, has no option but to selectively cut its patron-client ties, ‘disengaging’ 
especially those groups within society targeted by the IMF and the World Bank 
through their policies of structural adjustment. However, these may not be the 
groups that pose the least political threat to the state. This might include workers, 
peasants and the underprivileged classes in general (who are generally voiceless 
within society) but might also include University staff and students and 
administrative bureaucrats, who are by no means politically innocuous groups within 
society.
The state thus is caught in a bind. One the one hand, it has to satisfy the 
requirements of structural adjustment - since its economic and hence political 
survival depends on the generation of economic growth within the country - and on 
the other, it has to guard itself against the ‘revenge of civil society’, which could 
again threaten survival. One of the major threats posed by civil society’s actions is 
the ‘disengagement’ from state activity, not only by the active diversion of economic 
resources to the unregistered and therefore untaxed parallel economy, but also 
through the dissipation of bureaucratic expertise and administrative efficiency by the 
exigencies of secondary employment within the informal sector. Thus, not only are 
the quantitative resources of the nation being diverted but also its qualitative 
resources of human capital. It appears increasingly as if civil society in Tanzania has 
eschewed its option of confronting the government with its economic woes and
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instead has sought to substitute for the services that the state ought to but has failed 
to provide.
If structural adjustment works, and economic growth is engendered, the 
political gamble of the ‘state class’ would have paid off and its survival chances 
would increase. It might then try to re-capture some of the economic gains of civil 
society by re-forging or strengthening patron-client networks based on burgeoning 
state resources.
On the other hand, if adequate economic growth eludes Tanzania in the 
future, the economic and political fortunes of the ‘state class’ would look bleak 
indeed. Not only will the state resources for patronage shrink further - thus further 
curtailing the possibility of servicing patron-client networks essential for political 
survival - but there could well be popular uprisings based on the resultant economic 
hardship - with the possibilities of SAP-led growth now exhausted - that may signal 
the end of the political legitimacy of the state. And indeed, the organisational space 
and possibilities of effective communication offered by the arrival of multiparty 
politics in Tanzania may well facilitate the aggregation of sections of civil society 
to collectively protest or at any rate act against the state and the state class.
To pose the issue the other way around, the long-term sustainability of SAP 
requires, more than anything, (a) the state to become more decentralised, especially 
in its decision-making; (b) to develop better ties with the civil society and (c) to 
gather and process more information within civil society.14 And this is perhaps best 
served in a context of true plural politics, characterised by:
(a) Significant legal reforms to create an atmosphere congenial to potential 
investors, promoting business confidence, ensuring individual economic 
rights, a credible means of resolving conflict; and a government bound by 
institutional checks above authoritarian or personal rule, without control over 
the Constitution.
(b) A genuinely free press to promote accountability by creating public 
awareness of government action (and inaction) with critical and doubtful 
voices being given their due - and which does not just disseminate
14 This has been discussed in Chapter 3 in the context of the ‘closed’ nature o f the negotiation 
process and a lack o f information to the public regarding SAP.
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government press releases and sycophantic endorsements of government 
proclamations, reporting little else but government success; and
(c) Political mobilisation through the promotion of autonomous political 
associations within civil society which would allow organisations to represent 
economic actors who may not otherwise be heard.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the current and future implementation 
of SAP policies, the machinations of civil society, the success of SAP policies and 
the future political legitimacy of the state may not be so simple.
One plausible interlink is between the actions of civil society and the success 
of SAP. If larger and larger national resources are diverted into the informal sector 
and parallel economy, it may well be that there are insufficient resources left within 
the formal economy to engender the economic growth that the structural adjustment 
is trying to foster. If so, certain (large) groups within civil society may well prosper 
at the expense of the state. Contrary to the earlier trend, thus, the locus of economic 
(and political?) power may shift from the state to civil society. The main losers in 
such an event would be the ‘state class’.15 If these efforts at increasing the 
participation in the official economy (through registration and taxation) work, then 
the outflow from the formal to the informal sector of the economy may decline 
though it is doubtful if it would cease altogether.
But any inferences at this level, and indeed further theorising on these 
possibilities, require further micro-level empirical political analysis aimed at 
understanding the motivations behind the dynamic, fluid and blurred relationship 
between members of the state and society.
This may be one perception informing the current attempts by the state to ‘re-capture’ the 
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